

Innocent Gentillet

A  
DISCOVRSE  
VPON THE MEANES  
OF WEL GOVERNING AND  
MAINTAINING IN GOOD  
PEACE; A KINGDOME, OR  
OTHER PRINCIPALITIE.

Divided into three parts, namely, The Counsell, the Religion, and the Policie, vvhich a Prince ought to  
*bold and follow.*

Against NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL the Florentine,

*Translated into English by Simon Patericke,*



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TO THE MOST FAMOVS YONG  
GENTLEMEN, AS WELL FOR RELIGION,  
MODESTIE, AND OTHER VERTVES, AS AL-  
so for kinred, FRANCIS HASTINGS, and EDVARD  
BACON, most heartie salutations.

**A**fter *Solon* (right Worshipfull young men) had seene  
*Thespis* his first edition and action of a Tragedie, and  
meeting with him before the playe, demaunded, If  
hee were not ashamed to publish such feigned fa-  
bles under so noble, yet a counterfeit personage:  
*Thespis* aunswered, That it was no disgrace upon a  
Stage (merily and in sport) to say and do any thing: Then *Solon* (stri-  
king hard upon the earth with his staffe) replied thus: Yea but short-  
ly, wee that now like and embrace this play, shal find it practised in our  
contracts and common affaires. This man of deepe understanding,  
saw that publicke discipline and reformation of manners affected and  
attempted once in sport and jeast, would soone quayle: and corrupti-  
on, at the beginning passing in play, would fall and end in earnest.  
Therefore *Tacitus* worthily dooth extoll the manners of the Germanes  
of his time, amongst whom vices were not laughed at. For laughers  
begun of some publicke shame and dishonesty, will assuredly procure  
him some miserable calamitie. Hereof Fraunce is unto all ages and na-  
tions a wofull view, yet a profitable instruction at this day. For when  
the cleare light of the Gospell began first to spring and appeare, Sathan  
(to occupie and busie mens minds with toyish playes and trifles, that  
they might give no attendance unto true wisdom) devised this poli-  
cie, to raise up jeasters and fooles in Courts, which creeping in, by quip-  
ping and pretie conceits, first in words, and after by bookes, uttering  
their pleasant jeasts in the Courts and banquets of kings and princes,  
laboured to root up all the true principles of Religion and Policie.  
And some there were whom the resemblance of nature, or vantage of  
wit had so deceived, that they derided the everlasting veritie of the

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true God, as if it were but a fable. *Rabelayss* amongst the French, and *Agrippa* amongst the Germanes, were the stander-bearers of that train: which with their scoffing taunts, inveighed not onely against the Gospell, but all good arts whatsoever. Those mockers did not as yet openly undermine the ground worke of humane societie, but only they derided it: But such Cyclopien laughters, in the end proved to be only signes and tokens of future evils For by little and little, that which was taken in the beginning for jests, turned to earnest, & words into deeds. In the neck of these came new Poets, verie eloquent for their owne profit, which incensed unto lust & lightnesse, such minds as were already inclined to wantonnesse, by quickening their appetites with the delectable taste of unchaste hearing; and pricking them forward with the sharp spurres of pleasure. Who could then bridle vices and iniquities, which are fed, with much wealth, and no lesse libertie? seeing them not only in play, mirth, and laughter entertained; but also earnestly accepted and commended, as being very excellent. Yet some trod the steps of honestie, which now lay a dying, and practised the old maners and fashions, which were almost forgotten. For although the secret faults of the Court were evill spoken of, yet shame stood in open view; hainous and infamous crimes kept secret corners; princes were of some credit and faith; laws were in reasonable good use; magistrats had their due authoritie and reverence; all things only for ostentation and outward shew, but none would then have feared an utter destruction: For then Sathan being a disguised person amongst the French, in the likenesse of a merrie jester, acted a Comædie, but shortly ensued a wofull Tragædie. When our countrey mens minds were sick, and corrupted with these pestilent diseases, and that discipline waxed stale; then came forth the books of *Machiavel*, a most pernicious writer, which beganne not in secret and stealing manner (as did those former vices) but by open meanes, and as it were a continuall assault, utterly destroyed, not this or that vertue, but even all vertues at once: Inasmuch as it tooke Faith from the princes; authoritie and maiestie from lawes; libertie from the people; and peace and concord from all persons, which are the onely remedies for present malladies. For what shall I speake of Religion, whereof the Machiavellians had none, as already plainly appeareth, yet they greatly laboured also, to deprive us of the same. And although they have wrongfully banished us our native countrey, yet fight wee still for the Churches defence. Moreover Sathan useth strangers of France, as his fittest instruments, to infect us still with this



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this deadly poyson sent out of Italie, who have so highly promoted their Machiavellian bookes, that he is of no reputation in the Court of France, which hath not *Machiavel's* writings at the fingers ends, and that both in the Italian and French tongues, and can apply his precepts to all purposes, as the Oracles of *Apollo*. Truly, it is a wonderfull thing to consider how fast that evill weede hath growne within these few yeares, seeing there is almost none that striveth to excell in vertue or knowledge: as though the onely way to obtaine honour and riches were by this deceivers direction. But now to turne mine eyes from beholding so many miseries of poore afflicted France, as often as I see or remember our neighbour countries (which thing I doe daily) so often doe I bewaile our miseries: Yet am I right ioyfull for your felicitie; chiefly because God of his great bounty, hath given you a most renowned Queene, as well in deede, as title, even in the midst of so many troubles: For she coming to the crowne, even when England was tossed with tempestuous stormes, so dispersed those cloudes, with the brightnesse of her counsell and countenance, that no civile dissention, nor external invasion, hath disturbed your peace & tranquillitie, these many yeeres, especially so many warres sounding on every side: For shee by maintaining wholesome unitie amongst all degrees, hath hitherto preserved the State of her realme, not onely safe but flourishing: not by Machiavellian artes, as Guile, Perfidie, and other Villanies practising, but by true vertues, as Clemencie, Iustice, Faith. Therefore goeth she her progresse through her realme of England, entertained in all places with happy applause, reioysing and prosperitie of all her subjects, she being a princeesse, of both Nobles and commons, by due desert most entirely beloved: Whereas we against our wils, behold our countrie swimming in blood, and disfigured by subversion, which is a ioyfull object to the eyes of strangers, yea and those labour most to work her destruction, who should bee most carefull to rescue & deliver poore France, out of her long calamities: but the Lord will at length behould our miseries. But O how happy are yee, both because you have so gracious a Queene, & also for that the infectious Machiavelian doctrine, hath not breathed nor penetrated the intrailles of most happy England. But that it might not so doe, I have done my endeavour, to provide an Antidote and present remedie, to expell the force of so deadly poyson, if at any time it chance to infect you. For vhen I thought it meete and right (especially in such a confused disorder of matters and times) to impart as well to our French men, as to other nations

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nations these discourses, first written by a man of most singular Learning and wisdom, I willingly undertooke this labour, which I have performed to the uttermost of my power, and now I wholly refer my selfe and my travaile, to serve for the benefit of publicke utilitie: Yet I properly dedicated and inscribed it in your names, both because although I never saw England, yet it might serve as a pledge, to testifie my thankfull minde towards your countrymen, whose singular courtesie and kindnesse shewed to my bretheren, when they were banished for the profession of the Gospell, hath generally bound me to all Englishmen, but privately to you as also that by way of exhortation, I might enflame you (being most vertuous Gentlemen) to study and follow the contents of this booke, but especially the arts and vertues therein published, & almost in every word therof so highly commended, which indeede is no other thing, than you doe already. For the beholding of your ancestors monuments of their vertues (which are both many and famous) doth move you thereunto, more than the directions drawne from all ages and examples here delivered. Therefore my deare friend *Francis*, amongst so many notable examples of your realme, treade the steps of your uncle, the right honourable earle of Huntington, a man most admirable and illustrious, as well for godlynesse and other noble vertues, as for noble parentage & honour, that you may shew your selfe worthe of your place and kinred. And you good *Edward*, imitate the wisdom, sanctimonie, and integritie of your Father, the right Honourable Lord *Nicholas Bacon*, keeper of the broad Seale of England, a man right renowned, that you may lively expresse the image of your Fathers vertues, in the excellent towardnesse, which you naturally have from your most vertuous Father: If you both, do daily ruminare and remember the familiar & best known examples of your ancestors, you cannot have more forcible persuasions to moove you to that which is good and honest: But I will continually pray God to prosper that good hope, which your parents and kinsfolkes have of you, your good studies also, and that he will plentifully blesse and beautifie you, with all the gifts of his spirit, that you may become profitable members of the Church, your country, and commonweale, and may live long and happie daies. *Kalendar Augusti.*

Anno 1577.



3 Greeke, Latine, and French Authors,  
out of which are extracted the Hyſtories and other  
things alleaged in theſe Diſcourſes againſt *Machiavell*.

*Ammianus Marcellinus.*

*Annales of France.*

*Aristotle.*

*The Bible.*

*Capitolinus.*

*Cicero.*

*Comines.*

*Dion.*

*Dionifius Halicarnaſſeus.*

*Du Bellay.*

*Æſchylus.*

*Euripides.*

*Florus.*

*Froiſart.*

*Herodianus.*

*Homerus.*

*Horatius.*

*Joſephus.*

*Juvenall.*

*Ius Civile & Cannoni-  
cum.*

*Lampridius.*

*Molinæus.*

*Monſtrelet.*

*Munſterus.*

*Papon.*

*Paulus Æmilius.*

*Plinius Junior.*

*Platina.*

*Plutarchus.*

*Pomponius Lætus.*

*Sabellicus.*

*Saluſtius.*

*Sleidanus.*

*Sophocles.*

*Spartianus.*

*Suetonius.*

*Tacitus.*

*Titus Livius.*

*Thucydides.*

*Trebellius Pollio.*

*Virgil.*

*Uopiſcus.*

*Xenophon.*





## A Preface to the first Part , entreating , what Counsell a Prince should use .



Aristotle and other Philosophers teach us , and experience confirmeth it unto us , that there are two wayes to come unto the knowledge of things . The one , when from the causes and Maximes , men come to knowledge of the effects and consequences . The other , when contrarie , by the effects and consequences wee come to know the causes and Maximes . As for example , when wee see the earth waxe greene , and trees gather leaves , we know by that effect , that the sunne ( which is the cause thereof ) approacheth nigh us : and wee come to receive this Maxime , That the sunne gives rigour and force unto the earth to bring forth fruits : And by the contrarie also , when we have knowledge of this cause and Maxime , we come to know the effect , and to conclude the consequence ; which is , That that sunne coming nigh us , the earth bringeth forth her fruits , and withdrawing from us , the earth leaveth to bring forth . The first of these two waies is proper and peculiar unto the Mathematicians , which teach the truth of their Theoremes and Problemes by their demonstrations drawne from Maximes , which are common sentences allowed of themselves for true , by the common sence and iudgement of all men . The second way belongs to other sciences , as to Naturall Philosophie , Morall Philosophie , Physicke , Law , Policie , and other Sciences , whereof the knowledge proceeds more commonly , by a resolute order of effects to their causes , and from particulars to generall Maximes , than by the first way : although it is certaine , that sometimes they also help themselves , both with the one and the other way .

In the Politicke Art then ( whereof Plato , Aristotle , and other Philosophers have written bookes ) men may well use both these waies . For from the effects and particulars of a civill government , men may come to the knowledge of Maximes and rules : and by the contrarie , by the rules and Maxims , men may have the knowledge of effects . So that when wee see the effects of a politicke government , which is of no value , and which is pernicious and evill , men are hereby brought to the knowledge of the Maximes and rules which are of the same sort : and by the good and profitable effects , men are also led to the notice of good rules and Maxims . And on the other side , good or evill rules and Maxims do lead to the knowledge of like effects . Yet although the Maxims and generall rules of the Politicke Art , may something serve to know well to guide and governe a publicke estate ( whether it bee principallitie or free cittie : ) yet can they not bee so certaine as the Maxims of the Mathematicians , but are rules rather very dangerous , yea , pernicious , if men cannot make them serve , and apply them unto affaires , as they happon to come ; and not to apply the affaires unto these Maxims and rules . For the circumstances , dependances , consequences , and the antecedents of every affaire and particular businesse , are all for the

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the most parts drivers and contrarie: insomuch, that although two affaires be like, yet must not men therefore conduct and determine them by one same Rule or Maxime, because of the diversitie and difference of accidents and circumstances: For experience teacheth us, that in one same act, that which is good in one time, is not in another, but rather hurtfull: and that which is convenient for some Nations, is not good for others: and so of other circumstances. They then which deale in the affaires of publike estate, had need to know not onely the Maximes and Rules of the Politicke Art; but also they must have a wise, quick, and sharpe wit and iudgement, rightly and discreetly to ponder and weigh the circumstances and accidents of every affaire, prudently to apply them to the Rules and Maximes, yea, sometimes to force and bend them to serve to the present affaire. But this science and habit of knowing well to weigh and examine the accidents and circumstances of affaires, and then to be able handsomely to apply unto them their rules and principles, is a science singular and excellent, but rare and not given to many persons: For of necessity he that will come to this science (as the least in any perfection to be able to manage and handle weightie affaires) had need first, to be endowed with a good and perfect naturall iudgement: and secondly, he must be wise, temperate, and quiet, without any passion or affection, but all to publike good and utilitie: and thirdly, he must be conversed and experienced in many and sundry affaires: These he cannot have and obtaine, unlesse he himselfe have handled or seene them handled, or else by great and attentive reading of choise histories, he have brought his iudgement to be very stayed, and well exercised in such affaires.

We must not then thinke, that all sorts of people are fit to deale with affaires of publike estate; nor that every one which speaketh and writeth thereof, can say that which belongeth thereunto. But it may be, some will enquire, if I dare presume so much of my selfe, as to take upon me effectually to handle this matter. Hereunto I answer, that nothing lesse, and that it is not properly my purpose wherunto I tend, or for which cause I enterprise this Worke: But my intent and purpose is onely to shew, That Nicholas Machiavell, not long agoe a Secretarie of the Florentine Commonweale (which is now a Duchie) understood nothing or little in this Politicke science whereof we speake: and that he hath taken Maximes and Rules altogether wicked, and hath builded upon them not a Politicke, but a Tyrannicall science. Behold here then the end and scope which I have proposed unto my selfe, that is, to confute the doctrine of Machiavell, and not exactly to handle the Politicke science: although I hope to touch some good points thereof in some good places, when occasion shall offer it selfe. Unto my foresaid purpose I hope to come (by the helpe of God) with so prosperous a good wind and full sailes, as all they which read my writings, shall give their iudgement, and knowledge, that Machiavell was altogether ignorant in that science, and that his scope and intent in his writings, is nothing else, but to frame a very true and perfect tyrannie. Machiavell also never had parts requisite to know that science. For, as for experience in managing of affaires, he could have none; since during his time he saw nothing but the brabbings and contentions of certaine Potentates of Italie, and certaine practises and policies of some Citizens of Florence. Neither had he any or very little knowledge in histories, as shal be more particularly shewed in many places of our discourse; where (God ayding) we will marke the plaine, and (as it were) palpable faults and ignorances which he hath committed in those few histories which is pleaseth him sometimes by the way to touch; which also most commonly he alleageth to evil purpose, and many times falsely. As for a firme and sound iudgement, Machiavell also wanted, as is plainly seene by his absurd and foolish reasons, wherewith for the most part he confirms his propo-

The scope  
of the Au-  
thor.

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ons and Maximes which he sets downe: onely he hath a certaine subtiltie (such as it is) to give colour unto his most wicked and damnable doctrines. But when a man comes something nigh to examine his subtilties, then in truth it is discovered to be but a heafty vanitie and madnesse, yea, full of extreame wickednesse. I doubt not, but many Courtiers, which deale in matters of Estate, and others of their humor, will find it very strange, that I should speake in this sort of their great Doctor Machiavell, whose booke rightly may be called, The French Courtiers Alcoran, they have them in a great estimation, imitating and observing his Principles and Maximes, no more nor lesse than the Turkes doe the Alcoran of their great Prophet Mahomet. But yet I beseech them not to be offended, that I speake in this manner of a man, whom I will plainly shew to be full of all wickednesse, impietie, and ignorance, and to suspend their judgement, whether I say true or no, untill they have wholly read these my discourses. For as soone as they have read them, I doe assure my selfe, that every man of perfect indgement will say and determine, that I speake but too modestly of the vices and brutishnesse, found in this their great Doctor.

Of Machiavell and his writings.

But to open and make easie the intelligence of that should here be handled, wee must first search out, what that Machiavell was, and his writings. Machiavell then was in his time the Secretarie or common Notarie of the Common-weale of Florence, during the kingdome of Charles the eighth, and Lewis the twelfth, kings of France; Alexander the sixth, and Iulius the eleventh, Popes of Rome; and of Henry the seventh, and Henry the eighth, kings of England: in which time he writ his booke in the Italian language, and published them about the first beginning of Francis the first, king of France, as may be gathered by his owne writings. Of his life and death I can say nothing, neither did I, or vouchsafed I once to enquire thereof: because his memorie deserved better, so he buried in perpetuall oblivion, than to be renewed amongst men. Yet I may well say, that if his life were like his doctrine (as it is to be presumed) there was never man in the world more contaminated and defiled with vices and wickednesse, than he was. By the Preface he made unto his Booke entituled De Principe, Of the Prince, it seemeth he was banished and chased from Florence: For he there complaineth unto his Magnificall Lawrence de Medicis (unto whom he dedicated his Worke) of that he endured iniuriously and uniuersally, as he said. And in certaine other places he recureth, That one while he remained in France, another time at Rome, and another while (not sent Embassadour for he would never have forgotten to have said that, but as it is to be presumed) as a fugitive and banished man. But howsoever it be, he dedicates the said Booke unto the said Lawrence de Medicis, to teach him the reasons and meanes to invade and obaine a principallitie: which Booke for the most part containeth nothing but tyrannicall precepts, as shall appeare in the prosecution and progresse of this Worke. But I know not if they de Medicis have made their profit and taken use of Machiavels precepts, containing in his said booke: yet this appeares plainly, that they (since that time) occupied the principallitie of Florence, and changed that Aristocrasie free estate of that Citie, into a Duschie, or rather into a manifest tyrannie, as will easily appeare unto them, which are advertised and have seene how Florence is at this day governed and ruled. Besides this booke of a Prince, or of a Principallitie, Machiavell hath also written three Bookes, of discoursing upon the first Decade of Titus Livius, which (illustrating the other booke of Principallitie) is in stead of a Commentarie thereunto. Through all which discourses he disperseth here and there a few words out of Titus Livius, neither rehearsing the whole deed, nor hystorie of the matter for which hee fisheth these words, and applyeth



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esh them preposterously, after his owne fantasie, for the most part forcing them to serve to confirme some absurde and strange thing. He also mixeth herewith examples of small and petic Potentates of Italie, happening in his time, or a little before, which are not worth the recitall, but are lesse worthie to be proposed for imitation: Yet herein is hee to be excused, in that hee knew no better, for if he had knowne better, I doubt not but he would have brought them to light, to have adorned his writings, and to have made them more authentike and receivable. But out of those two Bookes, namely of Principalitie, and out of Machiavels Discourses, I have extracted and gathered, that which is properly his owne, and have reduced and brought it to certaine Maximes, which I have distinguished into three parts, as may be seene hereafter. And I have been as it were constrained so to doe, that I might revocate and gather every matter to his certaine head and place, to the end, the better to examine them: For Machiavell hath not handled every matter in one same place, but a little here, and a little there, enterlacing and mixing some good things amongst them, doing therein as poysoners doe, which never cast lumps of poyson upon an heap, least it be perceived, but doe most subtilly incorporate it as they can, with some other delicate and daintie morsels: For if I had followed the order that he holds in his bookes, I must needs have handled one same point many times, yea confusedly and not wholly: I have then awayne the greatest part of his doctrine and of his documents, into certaine propositions and Maximes, and withall added the reasons, whereby he maintained them: I have also set downe the places of his bookes, to leade them thereunto, which desire to trie what fidelitie I have used, either in not attributing unto him any thing that is not his owne, or in not forgetting any reason that may make for him: wherein so much there wanteth, that I feare that any man may impose upon mee, so have committed some faults therein: that contrarie, in some places I have better cleared and lightened his talke, reasons, and allegations, than they be in his writings. And if any man say that I doe wrong him, in setting downe the evill things contained in his bookes, without speaking of the good things which are dispersedly mixed therewith, and might bring honour and grace unto him: I answer and will maintaine, that in all his writings, there is nothing of any value, that is his owne. Yet I confesse, that there is some good places, drawne out of Titus Livius, or some other Authors, but besides that they are not his, they are not by him handled fully, nor as they should. For as I have abovesaid, hee only hath dispersed them amongst his workes, to serve, as with an honny sweet bait, to cover his poyson. And therefore seeing that that which is good in his writings, is taken from other better Authors, where wee may learne them, better for our purpose, and more whole and perfect than in Machiavell, wee have no cause to attribute honour unto him, nor to thanke him, for that which is not his: and which wee dolesse and retaine from a better shop than his. And as for his precepts concerning the Militarie art, wherewith he dealeth in his bookes, which seeme to be new, and of his owne invention, I will say nothing, but that men doe not now practise them, neither are they thought worthie of observation, by them which are well seene in that art, as wee may see in that which hee maintaineth, That a Prince ought not to have in his service any strange Souldiers, nor to have any Fortresses against enemies, but onely against his Subiects, when he is in feare of them. For the contrary hereof is ordinarily seene practised, and in truth it sheweth an exceeding great pride and rashnesse in Machiavell, that hee dare speak and write of the affaires of warre, and prescribe precepts and rules unto them which are of that profession, seeing hee had nothing but by heart, and was himselfe but a simple Secretarie or Towne-clerke, which is a trade as far different from the profession of warre, as an harquebus differs from a

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Cicero de O-  
rator.  
Plutarch in  
Anniball.

pen and inckhorne. Herein is fals out to Machiavell, as it did once to the philosopher Phormio, who one day reading in the Peripatetike schoole of Greece, and seeing arrive and enter thither Anniball of Carthage (who was brought thither by some of his friends, to heare the eloquence of the philosopher) he began to speake and dispute (with much babling) of the lawes of Warre, and the dutie of a good Capitaine, before this most famous capitaine, which had forgotten more, than ever that proud philosopher knew, or had learned. When hee had thus ended his Lecture and goodly disputation, as Anniball went from the auditorie, one of his friends which brought him thither, demanded what he thought of the philosophers eloquence and gallant speech? Hee said; Truly I have seene in my life many old dottards, but I never saw so great an one as this Phormio. So I doe not doubt but such as have knowledge in the Militarie art, will give the like iudgement of Machiavell, if they read his writings, and will say according to the common proverbe, That he speaketh not like a Clarke of armes. But I leave things touching this matter, unto them which have more knowledge therein than I: for it is not my purpose, any thing to touch that which Machiavell hath handled of the Militarie art, nor such precepts as concerne the leading of an Army.

At what  
time, and  
wherefore  
Machiavell  
was recei-  
ved into  
France,

By this which wee have before spoken, That Machiavell was, during the raigne of Charles the eighth, and Lewis the twelfth, kings of France, and attained the beginning of the raigne of Francis the first: It followeth that there hath not been past fiftie or threescore yeares since his writings came to light; whereupon some may mervaille, why hee was not spoken of at all in France, during the raigne of king Henry the second, and that after them the name of Machiavell did but begin to bee knowne on this side the Mountaynes, and his writings into some reputation. The answer hereunto, is not very obscure to such as know how the affaires of France have been governed, since the deace of king Henry the second of happie memorie: For during his raigne, and before, the kingdome was governed after the meere French manner, that is to say, following the traces and documents of our French auncestors; but since, it hath been governed by the Rules of Machiavell the Florentine, as shall be seene hereafter. In somuch, that since that time, untill this present, the name of Machiavell hath been revered and esteemed, as of the wisest person of the world, and most cunning in the affaires of Estate, and his Bookes held dearest and most precious, by our Italian and Italianized Courtiers, as if they were the bookes of Sibilla, wherunto the Paynims had their recourse when they would deliberate upon any great affaire concerning the Common wealth, or as the Turkes should deare and precious their Mahumets Alkaron, as wee have said above.

Cap. 3. De  
Princ.  
Discourse  
lib. 2. sp. 30.  
lib. 3. cap. 43.  
Machiavels  
flanders, 2.  
gainst the  
kings and  
the people  
of France.

And wee neede not bee ashamed if they of Machiavels Nation (which bould their principall estates in the government of France) have forsaken the ancient manner of our French auncestors government, to introduce and bring France in use with a new forme of managing and ruling their Countrie, taught by Machiavell. For on the one side every man esteemeth and praiseth alwaies the manners, fashions, customes, and other things of his owne countrie more than them of an others. On the other side, Machiavell being great doctor, describes so well France, and the government thereof in his time, blaming and reprehending the French mens conduction of affaires of Estate, that it might easily persuade his disciples to change the manner of French government into the Italian. For Machiavell vaunterh, that being once at Naples, and talking with the Cardinall of Amboise (which was a very wise man) in the time of king Lewis the twelfth, of publike and State affaires, hee plainly told him, that the French men had no knowledge in affaires of Estate. And in many places speaking of French causes, hee reprehendeth the government of our  
above-

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abovenamed king Charles the eighth, and Lewis the twelfth; yea, hee hath been so impudent, speaking of that good king Lewis, and rebuking him for giving succours unto Pope Alexander the sixth, that hee gives him the plaine lie, saying hee belyes himselfe, having passed Italie at the Venetians request, and yet succoured the Pope against his intension. And in other places hee calls our kings, Tributaries of the Swisses, and of the Englishmen. And often when hee speaketh of the Frenchmen, hee calleth them Barbarous, and saith, they are full of covetousnesse and disloyaltie. So also he taxeth the Almaines of the same vices. Now I beseech you is it not good reason, to make so great accounts of Machiavell in France, who doth so defame and reprove the honour of our good kings, and of all our whole Nation, calling them Ignorant of the affaires of Estate, Barbarous, Covetous, Disloyall? But all this might be borne withall, and passed away in silence, if there were not another evill. But when we see that Machiavell by his doctrine and documents, hath changed the good and antient government of France, into a kind of Florentine government, whereupon wee see with our eyes, the totall ruine of all France: Is infallibly followeth (if God by his grace doe not remedie it soone) that now it should be time, if ever, so lay hand to the work, to remit and bring France againe, unto the government of our ancestors.

Hereupon I humbly pray the Princes and great Lords of France, to consider what is their duties in this case. Seemeth it (most Illustrious Lords) seeing at this time poore France (which is your Countrey and Mother) so desolate and torne in sunder by strangers, that you ought to suffer it to be lost and ruinated? Ought you to permit them to sow Atheisme and Impietie in your Countrey, and to set up schooles thereof? Seeing your France hath alwaies been so zealous in the Christian Religion, as our ancient kings by their pietie and iustice, have obtained that so honourable a title and name of Most Christian, I thinke you, that God hath caused you, to be borne into this world, to help to ruinate your Countrey, or coldly to stand still and suffer your Mother to be contaminat and defiled, with the contempt of God, with perfidie, with sodomie, tyrannie, crueltie, thefts, strange usuries, and other detestable vices, which strangers sowe here? But rather contrarie, God hath given you life, power, and authoritie, to take away such infamies and corruptions, and if you do it not, you must make account for it, and you can looke for but a greivous and iust punishment. If it be true, as the Civilian Lawyers say, That he is a murderer, and culpable of death, which suffereth to die with hunger the person unto whom he oweth nourishment; then shall not you be culpable before God, of so many massacres, murders, and desolations of your poore France, if you giue it not succours, seeing you have the meanes, and that you are obliged thereunto by right of nature? Shall you not be condemned and arraigned of impietie, Atheisme, and tyrannie, if you drive not out of France Machiavell, and his government?

Here if any man will inquire, how it appeareth, that France is at this day governed by the doctrine of Machiavell, the resolution hereof is easie and cleere. For the effects which we see with our eyes, and the provisions and executions of the affaires which are put in practise, may easily bring us to the causes and Maximes, as we have abovesaid: which is one way to know things, by ascending from effects and consequences, to the knowledge of causes and Maximes. And whosoever also shall read the Maximes of Machiavell, which we shall handle hereafter, and disceend from thence into the particularities of the French government, hee shall see that the precepts and Maximes of Machiavell, are for the most part, at this day practised and put in effect and execution, from point to point: Inasmuch that by both the two wayes, from the Maximes to the effects, and from the effects to the Maximes, men may cleerely know, that France is at this day governed by the doctrine of



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Machiavell. For are they not Machiavelists, Italians or Italianized, which doe handle and deale with the seales of the kingdome of France? Is it not they also, which draw out and stampe Edicts? Which dispatch all things within and without the Realme? Which hould the goodliest governments and formes belonging unto the Crowne? Yea, if a man will at this day obtaine or get any thing in the Court, for to have a good and quicke dispatch thereof, hee must learne to speake the Messereske language, because these Messers will most willingly heare them in their owne tongue; and they understand not the French, no, nor the termes of iustice and Royall ordinances. Whereupon every man may coniecture and imagine how they can well observe, or cause to be observed the Lawes of France, the termes whereof they understand not. Moreover, plaine ynough it is, That within these fiftene yeares, Machiavels bookes were as familiar and ordinarie in the hands of the Courtiers, as the Breviaries are in the hands of Curases of parishes.

And as for the diversitie of auncient government (which was ruled in following the traces, fashions, and customes of our auncestours) from the moderne and present government, which is founded upon the doctrine of Machiavell, it is easily and apparently scene by the fruites and effects which doth proceed therefrom. For by the ancient French government, the kingdome was maintained and governed in peace and tranquillitie under the observation of auncient Lawes, without any domesticke or civile warre, flourishing, and enioying a free trafficke, and subiects were maintained in the possessing and enioying of their goods, estates, franchises, and liberties: But now by the Italian government of this time, the good and auncient Lawes of the Realme are abolished and suppressed; civile warres and dissensions are maintained in France; peace alwaies broken; the people destroyed and eaten, and trafficke decayed; subiects are deprived of their auncient liberties and franchises, yea, and brought into such confusion and disorder, that none knowes well what is his owne, and what is not; but one plougheth and soweth, and another moweth and reapeth the same. And although this be so true and manifest, that it shall not bee needfull to shew more amply, that the manner of our auncestours government was otherwise, and better than the moderne, which as this present is in use; yet for all that, I pretend hereafter upon every Maxime, clearely to demonstrate, and by good examples, that our auncient Frenchmen guided and governed themselves by good reason and wisdom, cleane contrarie from the way of Machiavels precepts.

Yet I meane not to authorize my sayings by the allegation of examples of small Potentates and tyrannizers borne in one night like toad-stooles (as Machiavell doth,) but by the allegations of gallant and notable examples of our kings of France, confirmed and fortified, yea by other examples of good and auncient Emperors, Princes, and Romane capitaines, and of the Senate of Rome. For I have chosen those two Monarchies, the Romane and the French, as the fairest and most excellent, from whence to draw true and good examples which are worthe for a Prince to imitate, borrowing but few from other precedent Monarchies as Medes, Assyrians, and Grecians, as lesse knowne unto us, concerning the management and government of their affaires, as too far from our time, and from our manners and customes. I have lastly chosen the best and most authenticke Historiographers, and especially, them which have written those things which were and fell out in their owne time, and of those affaires in the most part of which they were spectators and actors. Of this sort and order of mine owne Country Historiographers, were Froissart, Monstrelet, de Comines, du Bellay: and of

Romanes,

From whence  
these dis-  
courses are  
taken.

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Romanes, Salustius, Tacitus, Suetonius, Dion, Herodian, Lampadius, Capitolinus, Iosephus, and certain others, which shall be alleged hereafter in their places. I also have drawne out some part of my allegations out of our Annales of France, out of Paulus Æmylius, Thucydides, Xenophon, and many other Authours, all which are both authentick and approved, and that also by prescription of ancient time and long continuance have gained such praise and reputation, so bee good witnesses, and that without reproch or diffamation. And forasmuch as Machiavell dare say, That the Frenchmen have no understanding or knowledge in matters or causes of Estate, I hope it shall appeare quite contrary, not onely by the good government which I shall shew to have been kept and observed by our ancestors in publicke causes, but also by the many places and examples which I shall bring forth and allege out of M. Rabelais de Gomines, Knights and Chamberlaine of king Lewis the eleventh: who lived even in Machiavell's time, who also understood better how the affairs of a kingdom or Commonwealth should be ruled or governed, than ever Machiavell knew how to guide and rule a simple Towne. Yet I cannot but confesse, that for the governing and guiding of a tyrannous Estate, Machiavell hath more cunning than any other of whom I have read, hee so well know all the points and precepts which were meet and convenient for the establishing of it, as hereafter shall be seene in the handling of his *Maximes*.

Moreover, if in certaine places where the matter doth require it, I speake a little too hardly of Machiavell's Italian nation, I hope, that the good men of that Countrey cannot finde it evill; as well because Machiavell gives mee just occasion, having villainously and opprobriously slandered in many saies our French Nation; but also for that I intend not any thing to blame or reprove the good Italian people. And I will not denie, but that amongst the Italian and Florentine Nation, there are diverse vertuous people, which are nothing lesse than meer Machiavelists, and that detest and abhorre his wicked doctrine: For there is not so bad a ground, which amongst diverse and sundrie evill plants, bringeth not out some good. Yet will I give a particular praise and commendation unto such Italians as bee vertuous, which better appertaineth unto them, than unto the vertuous and goodly men of other Nations: namely, that as precious stones and some other drongs and spices are esteemed to be most singular, as they are most rare: so the good and vertuous Italians are so much the more to be praised and commended, because they are rare, and for that it is no triviale and common thing in Italie to be a vertuous and good man. There is also another point which excuseth mee, that is, That the force of the truth hath drawne and expressed this confession of Machiavell, even that hee sayth, That there is no Nation or people in Christendome, that is more vicious and corrupted than the Italian Nation; and that there is no Province nor kingdom, where there is lesse care of God and of all Religion, than in Italie. Although as to this last point of Religion, Machiavell (which in all his bookes sheweth himselfe a very Atheist, and a contemner of all pietie and godlinesse) meant not to taxe or blame them of his Nation, of impietie, nor of Atheisme, but onely hereof, that they are not like the Paynims, which so scrupulously observe their superstitions and ceremonies, as wee shall more at large set downe in the second Part of this Discourse.

But from whence comes this impudencie unto Machiavell, to taxe and blame the Frenchmen of disloyaltie and perfidie, seeing, that hee himselfe also teacheth, That a Prince ought not to keepe and hold his faith, but for his profit and commoditie; and that

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that the observation of faith is pernicious and hurtfull. I will not denie, but that at this present time, many Italianized Frenchmen are disloyall and faith-breakers; having so learned by Machiavels doctrine: but I denie, that in the time of Machiavell (during the reignes and government of Charles the eighth, Lewis the twelfth, and Francis the first; or before or long time after) the French nation was contaminated with that vice: as yet there are many good and naturall Frenchmen (thanks bee to God) which detest all perfidie and disloyaltie, and are in no way affected to those exploits, which the Italians and Italianized doe use in France; but rather doe sob and sigh in their hearts, for to see the French nation so be diffamed with that infamous and abominable vice, detested and hated amongst all Countreies and Nations. And I hope also, that the good and loyall Frenchmen will endeavour themselves to recover the good reputation and reputation of the French nation, which some degenerated and Italianized, have defiled and polluted. But wherefore doth Machiavell so diffame and disgrace the French nation for covetousnesse? I doe much mervell at it: For with this present time, the French have alwayes had this reputation, to bee Liberall, Courteous, and ready to doe any pleasure even unto strangers, and such as are unknowne unto them. And would to God, that the French nation had never been of that nature and condition, to doe well unto strangers, without first knowing and trying their behaviour and manner of life: we should not then see France to be governed and ruled by strangers, as it is: We should not feeble the calamities and troubles of civile warres and dissensions, which they doe enterprise there, to maintaine their greatness and magnitudo, and to fish in troubled waters: The treasures of France should not bee so exhausted and drawne out, by their rapines and most insatiable avarice, as they doe. What Countrey or Nation is there in the world, that feeleth, or can justly complaine of the covetousnesse of Frenchmen? Or rather, what Nation is there, which hath not felt of the Liberalitie of the kingdom of France. But contrarywise, you see with the eye and touch with the finger the covetousnesse and avarice of the Italians, which doe undermine and ruinate us; yea, which also doe sucke out all our substance and wealth, and leaves us nothing at all for our selves. Some of them are Publicanes or Farmers of the Kings revenues or Farmes: Some, Farmers of the customes and freights of marchandizes and carriages: Some, Farmers of yearly Tributes and Subsidies: and some, of the Princes private rents, yea, of all publicke and common profits belonging unto the French king, rating them even as what price they will: So that by that meanes, infinite Coine comes into their hands, but there is but little which returneth againe to the publicke or common good of the Prince and Countrey. Others obtaine great Estates, Offices, and Benefices, by the meanes whereof, all the treasure and money of the kingdom of France falls into the hands of strangers. And those Italians, which have no meanes or occasions thus to deale with the publicke affaires of the Commonwealth, doe hold and keepe bankes in good Townes, where they exercise most exorbitant and unmeasurable usuries, by the meanes whereof, they doe wholly eat and consume poore France, and bring it unto confusion. And although that in Machiavels time, France was not fallen into that extreme evill and great calamitie, as it is now at this present; yet since that time have wee sufficiently felt the covetousnesse of the Italians, in the warres which our kings of France have made in Italie and Piedmont. For the great store of treasure and money that must needs have been sent beyond the Alpes, for to satisfie the insatiable and greedy lusts of the Italians, was the cause oftentimes of encreasing and raising imposts and

rallages



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rallages upon the people, which by little and little did rise so high; that they exceeded and doe exceede many times more than halfe the revenue of the poore Plebeian, or common sort of people. But this Italian covetousnesse, which the Italians did exercise and use in the kingdome of France at that time, by their dealings for to draw out treasure and money into their owne Countrie, was but hanny, in respect of that which they have exercised, and doe still exercise more and more, since that they have passed on this side the Alpes, and that they came to dominate and pearch all over the Countrie of France, and to hould and possesse Offices, Benefices, Farmes, Customes, Revenewes, and Bankes, as is heretofore said. And therefore it is cleerely and evidently seene, that it is (as I may say) against the haire, that Machiavell and the other Italians doth taxe the French men of Covetousnesse and Avarice. Vnlesse a man will say, that the French men are much to bee blamed and reprehended for Passive Avarice, which is in them, that is to say, which they suffer and endure of the Italians, who by their Active Covetousnesse (which they doe practise and put in action amongst us) doe clip the wooll on the backe, and sucke out blood and substance, as men doe with sheepe. And in this sence to take it (as wee should) it is certaine and assured, that Machiavell blaming us of Passive Covetousnesse, which wee doe suffer, sheweth us breefely, that wee are beastes, which will suffer our selves so to bee bereaved and weakened of our wooll and blood (with patience) by strangers. For it may well one day come to passe, that they may bee made to disgorge their booties and rapines, and that their great heapes of money gotten by extorsions in France, may turne them unto damage: For as the Poet Sophocles sayth:

Men must not seeke, nor love, of all things to get gaine:  
For hee that draweth gaine out of that which is nought,  
Before hee profit gets, shall sooner losse sustaine:  
Forevill gotten goods are often dearly bought.

And whereas Machiavell taxeth and chargeth the Almaines with Covetousnesse and perfidie, herein may bee seene, what an impudent and most wicked slanderer he is: For all men may plainly see, that (neither in their owne Countrie, nor in the Townes of France, where they dwell for their commerce and trafficke) they practise no great and execrable Usuries, as the Italians doe, but content themselves with a meane and reasonable profite for their money; as of five or eight at the most, for the loane and use of a hundreth: Whereas the Italians doe often retorne their money with the gaine of fiftie, yea often of an hundreth, for an hundreth. And as for Marchandize and traffique, it is well knowne, that no other Nation is more plaine, faithfull, sincere, and loyall than they are, in their bargaines and trafficke: For they doe not refresh, pollish, and decke up their wares, nor doe change them and sell one for another; they set not a price of their marchandize more than it is worth, but as the first word they aske, what as the last they will have, or not sell it, without seeking any unmeasurable or extraordinarie profit, upon them which know not what the marchandize is worth. And as for perfidie, deceit, and treason, the Almaines have them in so great execration and detestation, that they thinke, there neither is nor can bee any greater vice or sinne than they are. Yea, after a man once hath forfeased and failed in his Faith, contract, and promise,

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although but in small things and of no great reckoning or value, they will never afterward esteeme or account him a good or honest man: So great (I say) is their detestation of all kinde of deceit and false dealing. But a man needs not marvel, that Machiavell dare so impudently lye upon the Almaines, for hee hath brought forth more strange things than this slander, as wee shall shew hereafter, both to the good of all others that shall read our writings, and to the manifest and plaine laying open of him in his true and perfect colours: For the effecting whereof, let us then now enter into the matter.



THE



# THE FIRST PART, ENTREATING what Counsell a Prince should use.

## 1. *Maxime.*

§2 A Princes good Counsell ought to proceed from his owne wisdom: otherwise, he cannot be well counselled.

**T** is a *Maxime* and generall rule (saith *Machiavell*) that good counsell ought to proceed from the wisdom of the Prince himselfe: and not contrarie, that the Princes wisdom should proceed from good Counsell. For as much as if hee bee counselled by one alone in the administration of his affaires, hardly shall he find a man of requisit honestie and sufficiencie well to counsell him: & although hee should find one of such qualitie, there were danger that hee would take away his estate: For, to dominier and reigne, there is no honestie or vertue that can keepe in the ambition of men. And if an unwise Prince take counsell of many, hee must euer make his account to haue discordant & contentious counsels & opinions, which hee can never accord nor reconcile; in the meane while, every one of his Counsellors will seeke his owne particular profit, neither can the Prince know, or remedie it.



The first shew this *Maxime* seemeth to haue some appearance of truth: but when it shall be well examined, a man shall find it not onely nothing true, but also that it is pernicious and of wicked consequence. I am well contented to presuppose, that it is very true and certaine, That there cannot come a better and more profitable thing to a people & Commonweale, than to haue a Prince wise of himselfe: therefore, said *Plato*, That men may call that an happie Commonweale, when either the Prince that raisheth it, can play the Philosopher, or els when a Philosopher commeth to raaign there:



Spartianus  
in Severo.

33

1. Kin. 4. 10.  
1. Chron. 9.

Froiss lib. 1.  
cap. 132.

there: that is to say, in one word, when the Prince is of himselfe wise and prudent. For in old time, that name (Philosopher) was taken for a person full of wisdom & science, not for a dreaming unfociable man, as he is commonly taken at this day. Of old, that name of Philosopher was attributed for a title of great honour unto the Emperour *Marcus Antonius*, who in truth was a good and a wise Prince. But to verifie that which I say, it is not needful to alleage many reasons: for it is evident enough, That the felicitie of a publike estate, lieth wholly in well commanding and well obeing, whereupon ariseth an harmonie and contordance so melodious and excellent, that as well he that commaundeth as he that obeieth, doe both receive contentment, pleasure and utilitie. But to obey well, dependeth wholly of well commanding, and it cannot be without it: so well commanding dependeth of the prudence & wisdom of him that commandeth. Therefore the Emperour *Severus* being in wars, and his sonne *Bassianus* with him, and being caried in a Litter (because he had the gout) as he saw his souldiers discontented & mutinous, & would needs have *Bassianus* his sonne their Chieftaine; he caused all the Armie, but especially his Colonels, Captains, and Corporals to be called, and to assemble in one place: and after having made unto them some remonstrance and Oration, he caused presently to be put to death all the heads of that mutinie. After he spoke thus to all the armie, Now know ye, that it is the head and not the feet which commandeth you. And in deed and truth, the good commanding proceeds from the prudence and wisdom of him that commandeth: which remaineth & hath his being not in the feet nor armes, but in a brave mind, well staid and governed, which is aided & helped with a good naturall towardnesse, a mature and ripe age, and experience. And the Prince which can well command, shall also undoubtedly be well obeyed. For a prudent commandement draweth after it withall, an obedience: because a wise Prince will alwaies advise to found his commandements on Reason & Iustice, and to the publike utilitie, not to his owne pleasure; by which means they that are to obey, shall as it were be constrained by the force of reason and equitie, and drawn also by the sweetnesse of the profit, to yeeld obedience. But if some by these means cannot be induced to obey (as there are always some amongst many) they will be brought thereunto either by the example of such as let themselves be overcome with reason and publicke utilitie, or els by punishment, which is in the princes hand. He that will shew this by pluralitie of examples, That prudent Princes haue alwayes ben well obeyed, and that their kingdoms and countries haue been happy, & full of all prosperitie; should never haue done: but I will content my selfe to alledge only two. *Salomon* was a King most wise, and a great Philosopher: for he asked wisdom of God, & he gaue it him in such abundance, that besides that he was ignorant of nothing which a Prince should know, well to govern his subjects; yet knew he the natures of Plants and living creatures, and was so cunning in all kind of Philosophie, that his knowledge was admired through the world. This his prudence and wisdom, made him so respected of all the great Kings, his neighbours, that they esteemed themselves happie that they could doe him pleasure, and might have his amitie: By this meanes hee maintained his kingdom in so high and happy a peace, that in his time, his subjects made no more account of silver than of stones, they had such store. And as for himselfe, he held so magnificall an estate, that we read not of any King or Emperour that did the like.

*Charles the wise*, king of France, comming to the Crowne, found the kingdom in

in great confusion and calamitie: For all Guienne, part of Normandie, & Picardie, were occupied by the Englishmen: he saw he had K. *Edward* of England (the third of that name) his adversary who was one of the most happie and most valiant Princes that ever was in England; and who certain yeares before had obtained to great victories in Fraunce, the one, at the journey of Crecy, against K. *Philip de Valoys*, where Fraunce, lost elcuen Princes, 120 hundred Gentlemen and knights, & thirtie thousand other people of warre; the other victorie was at the journey of Poitiers, which also the said K. *Edward* gained, by the conduction of the Prince of wales his sonne, and lieutenant Generall, against *John* King of Fraunce, who was there taken prisoner, with a son of his called *Philip*, after Duke of Bourgoigne, and many other Princes and great Lords, all which were conducted into England: thus were the people much discomfited, and by these two battails lost in France the one after the other, in a small time, the countrie was so debilitated of his forces and goods, as it could not stand: yet for a further heape of mischiefs, at Paris, and in many other places of the Realme, at the same time arose there many broiles and civile dissentions. But that good king, *Charles le Sage*, was so wise and prudent in the conduction and government of the affaires of the realme, as well in time that he was Dolphin and Regent of France (his Father being prisoner) as after when he was king, that by little and little hee laid to sleepe all civile stirres and discords, and after did so much, that he recovered upon the Englishmen almost all which they occupied: and although he was not so brave a warriour as his father king *John*, nor as his grandfather King *Philip*, yet was he wiser & better advised in his deliberations, nor hazarding his affaires as they did (feareing to be reputed cowards) nor did any thing rashly, without due consideration. Hee took not arms in hand, but he knew well how, and when to employ them to his good. In somuch, that K. *Edward* of England seeing that the wisdom of that king made his Armes rebound & become dul, and his victories and conquests to be lost and annihilated: Truly (said he) I neuer knew king that lesse useth Armes, yet troubleth me so much; he is all the day enditing letters, and hurteth me more with his missives, than ever did his Father or Granfather with their great forces and Armes. Behold the witnesse which king *Edward* gave of the wisdom of his enemy king *Charles*: which was yet of so great efficacie, that he brought his kingdom into a good peace, by meanes whereof his people became rich and wealthie, where before they were poore and miserable. And not only the people became rich, but the king also himselfe heaped vp great treasures, which he left to his soune after him: in somuch that he was not only surnamed the Wise, but the Rich also. I could to this purpose adde here many other examples, but in a thing so cleare, the example of these two kings, *Salomon* and *Charles*, shall suffice: which two for their great wisdom have acquired the name of Wise: they both were rich in great treasures, both of them maintained their subjects in peace, both left their kingdoms opulent and abundant, & placed the estates of their Commonwealths in great felicitie.

It is a thing then plaine & confessed, That it is an exceeding great good to a people, when they have a prince that is wise of himselfe: but thereupon to inferre and say (as *Machiavell* doth) That the government of a Prince ought to depend upon his owne proper wisdom, and that he cannot be well counselled but by himselfe, is evill concluded, and such a conclusion is false, and of pernicious consequence. For a Prince, how prudent soever he be, ought not so much to esteeme of his owne wisdom,

Prudence  
is more re-  
quisite in a  
Princes  
Counsell,  
than in  
himselfe.

dome, as to despise the counsell of other wise men. *Salomon* despised them not, and *Charles the wise* alwaies conferred of his affaires with the wise men of his Counsell. And so farre is it off, that the Prince ought to despise anothers Counsell, that even he ought to conform his opinion to that of the men of his Counsel, which are wise, and ought not stubbornly to resist their advise, but to follow it, and hold his owne for suspected: And therefore that wise and cunning Emperour *Marcus Antonius*, the Philosopher, being in his privie Counsell house (where was that great Lawyer *Scavola*, *Marianus*, *Volusianus*, & many other great persons, excellent in knowledge, and honest:) after having well debated with them the matters they handled, when sometimes he tooke in hand to sustaine opinions contrarie to theirs. Well (said he) masters, The thing then must be don according to your advise: For it is much more reasonable, that I alone follow the opinion of so great a number of my good and faithful friends, as you are, than that so many wise men should follow the opinion of me alone. Vnto this opinion of the Emperour *Antonius* agreeth also the common Proverbe, That many eyes see clearer than one eye alone. Experience also teacheth vs, That things determined and resolved by many braines, are always wiser, safer & better ordered, than the resolutions of one alone. And we see also, that the ancient Romanes, and all Commonweales well governed, as well in times past, as at this day, have alwaies followed & observed that which by pluralitie of wise mens voices was concluded & determined. And truly, so much the wiser a prince is, so much the more will he suspect his owne opinion: for the same wisdom which is in him, will perswade him not to beleve himselfe too much, & to have his own judgment for suspected in his own case (as all publicke affaires may be said to be proper to the Prince) and so to suffer himselfe to be governed by his Counsell. And contrarie, because there are no people more presumptuous, nor that thinke to know more, than they which know little; nor that imagines to bee more wise, than they that have no wisdom: if you learne a Prince that thinketh himselfe wise, this principle of *Machiavell*, That he ought to governe himselfe by his owne wisdom and Counsell, and that he cannot be better counselled than by himselfe; you shal straight find inconveniences: for then shal you see, that he wil beleve neither counsel nor advice, but what comes out of his own head; & he will say to them that wil give him any, That he vnderstands well his owne matters, and that he knoweth what he hath to doe: and so will bring his estate and affaires into confusion, and overthrow all upside downe. And from whence comes this evill government and disorder? Even from that goodly doctrine of *Machiavell*, which willet, that a Prince should govern himselfe by his own wisdom: and that maintaineth, That a Prince cannot be well counselled, but by his own wisdom. The consequence then of this *Maxime* is not small, seeing the publicke state of a countrey may stagger and be overthrowen thereby. Better then it is, that contrarie, the Prince hold this resolution, To govern himselfe by good counsell, & beleve it, and have in suspicion his owne wisdom. For if the Prince be wise, & his opinion grounded upon Reason, though of his Counsell will easily fall to his advise: seeing also, that oftentimes they applaud and like too wel the Princes opinions, scant reasonable. And when it happens that they take the hardinesse to contradict the princes opinion, he ought even thereby to perswade himselfe, that he straieth far from good reason, and in that case he ought to hold his judgement for suspected. And contrarie, if the prince be not wise at all (for it is not incompatible nor inconvenient; to bee a Prince and to bee unwise withall) yet having

Dionis. Hist.  
 lib. 2.



having this resolution to governe himselfe by Counsel, his affaires wil carry them selves better, than being governed by his owne head. But in all cases I presuppose that the Princes Counsell be compounded of good and capable men, which haue ever before their eyes the service and vtilitie of their Prince, which is no other thing but the Commonweal. For otherwise, if they be wicke, the Princes affaires cannot but goe evill, whet her the Prince be wise or vnwise. For that being wise, yet can hee not see nor know all, but onely considereth those things which passe by the relation of his Counsellors: and if they of his Counsell bee wicked, they may alwayes so handle matters, that he shall not be advertised but of such things as it please them, as soone false as true, to cause him to incline to their pleasure and will. If the Prince be vnwise, then much better they of his Counsell (if they be wicked) may handle him at their devotion, and in all sorts abuse him.

And therefore haue the Elders held this Maxime (cleane contrary to that of *Machiavel*) That it is more expedient to the Commonweale, that the Prince be wicked and his Counsell good, than that the Prince be good, and his Counsellors wicked. But for because the Hystoriographer *Lampridius* hath touched that point very clearly and breiefely, I will here recite and translate his owne words: he saith then, in the life of the Emperour *Alexander Severus*, adderssing his speech vnto the Emperour *Constantine* the Great, in this manner. Thou accustomed (*Constantine* the Great) to demand, What was the cause that *Alexander Severus*, borne in Syria, hath been so excellent a Prince, seeing that even from the very Romane nation, & from the other Provinces, there have proceeded & come men wicked, impure, cruell, contemptible, unjust, & given only to voluptuousnesse? I may first answer according to the comon opinion of good men, That Nature (which is every where a Mother) may in all places & in all nations engender good Prince: I may also say, That *Alexander* was a good prince by feare, for that *Elagabalus* his predecessor (which was a most wicked Prince) was massacred and slaine. And to touch the very truth, may it please thy pietie to remember that which thou hast read in the Hystoriographer *Marius Maximus*, That the estate of the Commonwealth is better and more assured, wherein the Prince is wicked, than that wherein the Princes Counsellors are wicked. For one wicked man may be well corrected by many good men; but many wicked men cannot be surmounted by one good man alone. *Alexander* had Counsellors, which were venerable & holy persons, not malicious, not theeves, not partiall, not cautelous, not consenting to evill, not enemies to good men, not voluptuous, not cruell, not deceivers of their Prince, not mockers nor abusers of him as a foole: but contrarie, persons honorable, continent, religious, loving their Prince, which would not mocke him, nor be mocked of him, which in their estate were no-sellers, lyers, dissemblers, and which defrauded not their Prince of his honor, but loved him. They entertained not Eunuchs & flatterers, which serving for newes-carriers, oftentimes report otherwise than is said unto them: and which hold their master shut up, providing above all things, that he shall know nothing of his owne affaires. I know (*Constantine* Emperour) that he brings himselfe into great danger, which talketh to a Prince, that is a servant and a slave, unto such people: but thou, which hast experience of the great mischeefs that such pestilent flatterers bring, & how they deceive Princes, thou knowest how to rebate & humble them, namely to force them only to deale with the affaires of the house, and not of the Commonweale. Above all, this is most memorable in *Alexander*, that hee would never receive any alone into

his chamber, but the great master of his household, and the great Lawyer *Vipian*: neither gave he any man libertie to sell smoke, nor to slander or speake evill of him: especially after he had put to death *Ennius*, who often had sold him as a sencelesse foole. There is more yet, that *Alexander* spared not his owne parents and friends when they deserved punishment, or at the least put them from him when they offended, saying, That he loved better the Commonwealth, than his parents and friends. And that thou maiest know what people he had of his privie Counsell, these were they, *Fabius Sabinus* the sonne of *Sabinus*, an excellent man, a second *Cato* in his time; *Domitius Vipianus*, a learned man and a Lawyer; *Elius Gordianus*, father of that *Gordianus*, which was after Emperour, a man very excellent; *Julius Paulus*, a great person in the law; *Claudius Venetus*, a great and worthy Oratour; *Pomponius*, a very cunning man in the civile law; *Alfenus*, *Africanus*, *Plorentinus*, *Martianus*, *Callistratus*, *Hermogenianus*, *Venuleius*, *Trifonius*, *Melianus*, *Celsus*, *Proculus*, *Modestinus*, all excellent Doctors of law, and disciples of that great Lawyer *Papinian*: all which were great familiers and very privat with *Alexander*. More also he had of his privie Counsell, *Casilius Severus*, his Parent, as learned as any; *Elius Severianus* a person above all others, of greatest sanctitie; *Quintilius Marcellus*, of whom there is not found in hystorie a better man. *Alexander* then having all those and many other like of his privie Counsell, all which agreed to doe well, how could he then either do or thinke evill? These Counsellors at the beginning were put from him out of credit, by evill Counsellors which abused *Alexander*, but afterward having wisely driven them from him which were worth nothing, he called again his other good Counsellors, and loved them all well. And these were they which made *Alexander* a good prince: as contrarie, wicked Counsellors have made many Roman Emperours as wicked as themselves. Behold then what *Lampridius* saith touching this question, Whether it is better to have a wicked Prince, which hath good Counsellors, or a good Prince which hath evill Counsellors: & he resolveth that the Elders have held, That it is much better to have a wicked Prince, which hath good counsellors. Which is contrarie vnto the new opinion of *Machiavell*, who makes no account of a Princes good Counsellors, if so be it the Prince himselfe be good and prudent: who also saith, That the affaires of a Prince cannot be well conducted, vnlesse he guide them himselfe by his owne wisdom. It is then very clearly scene, that his Maxime is false by the alledged reasons of *Lampridius*, namely, That many good Counsellors may well supplie the want of wisdom that is in a Prince, and moderate his vnbridled and vndiscreet appetites; but a good Prince cannot correct so many evill counsellors, which will feed him with lies, and hide from him such things as he ought to know for the Commonwealth.

This may be better shewed by the examples of many Princes, which have bene of small wisdom and vertue, and yet notwithstanding have well ruled the Commonwealth by good and wise Counsell of prudent and loyal Counsellors; where with they were served: as did the Emperour *Gordian* the yong, who was created Emperour at eleven years of age, insomuch, that many iudged the Empire to be faine into a childish kingdome, and so into a weakenesse and a bad conduction. But it proved otherwise: for this young Emperour *Gordian* espoused the daughter of a wise man, called *Misubus*, whom he made the high Steward of his household, and governed himselfe by his Counsell, in all his affaires, so that the Roman Empire was well ruled so long as *Misubus* lived.

Princes of  
little wisdom  
have bene well  
governed  
by good  
Counsell.  
*Capitol. in  
Gord. Iun.*

Like

Likewise *Iosab* king of Israel, came to the Crowne a young child, of the age only of seven yeares: but he was governed by *Ioiada* his vncle, a very wise man: Inso-much, that whilst that good Counsellor lived, the kingdome was well and rightly administred.

*Charles* the sixt, king of France, was but thirteene yeares old when he came to the Crown, & was of small vnderstanding: yet during his minoritie, the kingdome was well & wisely governed by his three uncles, the Dukes of Anjou, of Berry, and Bourgoigne. There was nothing in their government to be spoken against, but only that they were a little drawing unto themselves the kings treasure, all other affaires were administred well and prudently. Yet true it is, that after the kings majoritie, they yet entred into the government of the kingdome (because of a phrensie that tooke the king, which endured more than twentie yeares) but then their government was corrupted by ambition, covetousnesse, a desire of vengeance, & enuie: yet as I said, during the kings minoritie they did governe well.

The kings of France, *Clotilde* the fourth of that name, and *Chilperic* the second, were both Princes of small vnderstanding, and indeed had no wisdom to conduct the affaires of the realme: but they had for a Counsellor and Conductor of their affaires, that valiant Lord *Charles Martell*, that during their reigne the realme was well ruled, yea, with many great and excellent victories.

In our time we know that the Emperour *Charles* the fift was left very young by his father and grandfather, in such sort, as during his minoritie he could never have knowne how to governe his affaires, which were great, and in great trouble in many places: His said father then, foreseeing at his death, that his sonne had need of a good overseer, which were a good man, ordained for that purpose, to governe him & his affaires, king *Lewis* the twelfth, praying him to accept that charge, knowing well the sinceritie & loyaltie of that good king, which for nothing would wounde his conscience (as he did not) although he might, for thereby he had offered him great occasions of enlarging his limits. The king then loyally to aquit himselfe of that charge, gaue unto that young Prince for Governour, a good man, faithfull, & of good vnderstanding, called the Lord *de Chievres*: by the counsell of whome, and of certaine other good Counsellors, the affaires of that young Prince were much better managed (euen in that low age) than euer they were in his fathers or grandfatheres time. This good government in that young age, proceeding from good Counsell, gaue so great a fame and reputation unto the Prince, that he was chosen Emperour at the age of 20 yeares.

The Emperour *Domitian*, besides he was not wise, he was wicked and exceeding cruell: yet he during his raigne, had so good hap to encounter and light upon such Governors and Magistrates for the Provinces of his Empire, being good and wise men, that whilst he reigned, the Roman Empire was well governed, & there was none but certaine particular persons of Rome, which felt the evill of his vices and crueltie.

*Charles* the eight king of France, came to the Crowne at the age of thirteene yeares, and was a very good Prince, but of no great vnderstanding nor wisdom: yet the Estates that were assembled at Tours, gave him a good Counsell, which they did chuse of fit and capable persons, by which Counsell, the affaires of the kingdome were well governed during the kings minoritie, although there fell out some emotions and stirres of some revolvers.

1. Kin. 11.  
and 12. and  
3. Chr. 23.

Annales of  
France vp.  
on the year  
716, & the  
three fol-  
lowing.

De Bellay,  
lib. 1. de ses  
Memoires,

Suetonius in  
Domit. cap.  
34. 4. 8. 10.

Annales of  
France up to  
the year  
1484.



I will not here repeat the example of the Emperour *Alexander Severus*, who very young came to the Empire, & under whom the affaires of the Commonwealth were well governed, by the meanes of good Counsellors, as is abovesaid.

I may also here adde many other examples of our kings of Fraunce, which were not too spirituall, and yet governed well by their good Counsel. As also there were many Emperours of the Romane Empire, some ignorant & brutish, others voluptuous and effeminate, others cruell, and knowing nothing but to handle yron. As were *Philipus*, *Licinius*, *Dioclesianus*, *Maximianus*, *Carnus*, *Carinus*, *Gallus*, *Constantius*, *Aurelianus*, *Galienus*, *Leon*, *Macrinus*, *Zeno*, *Iustinianus*, and many others, which yet made very good Lawes, as well for distributive justice, as for the pollicie of the Empire, as is seene by the Code of *Iustinian*; which lawes wee must needs attribute to their wise and learned men, which were their Counsellors: for none of all them knew any thing, or little (except *Macrinus*) how to make good Lawes. Therefore I conclude this point against the Maxime of *Machiavell*; That a Prince may well governe wisely the Commonweale by the good counsel of good and faithfull Counsellors, although he be evill provided of wisdom.

Of the election of good Counsellors and Magistrates.

But here remaineth a difficultie, which is not small, How an unwise Prince may provide good and loyall Counsellors, seeing that Princes that are wise and well advised, are therein often deceived. And upon this point I confesse there is nothing harder nor of greater consequence to a Prince, than to guide himselfe well in the election of such persons, wherof he should compose his Counsell. For there are great hypocrisies and dissimulations, and one seemeth to be a good man, sincere, and continent, which shewes himselfe another man, when a meane comes in his hand to corrupt vertue for to make his particular profit thereof. And we see but too much by experience, that the old Proverbe is true, *Honoury change manners*. You may see how the most gracious and courteous in all the world, the most affable and officious to every one (that is possible) whilst they are in base degree; after they be mounted into some high degree of honor & dignity, they become rough & haughty, & so much, that to whom before they shewed themselves facile and serviceable; they even seeme now not to know them, yea, which before were their privat friends and familiars: Such people have no good soules, but deserve that their fiercenesse and pride should dispossesse them of that place unto which most commonly their dissembled humilitie and courtesie hath advanced them. This vice is reprehensible, not only in a Princes officers, but also in the Prince himself, who ought not so put pride and fiercenesse upon that head whereupon the Crowne and Diademe standeth. For hereof is the king *Agamemnon* taxed and reprehended by *Menelaus* his brother, in a Tragedie of *Euripides*, where he sayth thus:

Most humble wast thou in times past, and kissed each mans hand,

Most humane, gentle, affable, to none thy gates didst shut

Shut up, so highest Honour thou (by such means) soughtst to rise:

But now thou Honour hast supreme, why prov'st thou so unwise,

Another man straight to become, and change thy manners all?

Yea humane durst even to friends, by thee doth not befall.

To good men that esteeme good fame, this is not covenable;

Chameleon-like thy manners chang'd, thou so be'st unsable.

This mutabilitie then, of manners, which is scene in many natures of men, is the cause that it is so hard for a Prince to know how to elect good mē for his Counsel, and that in that point it is very uneasie to teach a Prince how to behave himselfe therein: yet I will a little discourse upon that point, how the Elders governed themselves in election of Princes Counsellors, and then we will returne to *Machiavell*.

Vpon this I first find, that our ancient Frenchmen have observed three rules, which I thinke good enough. The first, that the princes of the blood are alwayes of the kings Counsell: for although it may well come to passe, that some one of them is not the most resolute nor best garnished with parts requisit to know wel to counsell & governe the affairs of the Commonwealt; yet seeing they haue that honor to be princes of the blood, they may not be excluded, unlesse it be for some great fault and offence: For so there may arise (as many times hath been scene) great discontentments, troubles, and partialities, which often draweth after them civile wars & infinit evils. The other rule is, that the new king retaine alwayes in his service the old Counsellors of his predecessor, which governed wel, especially such as have before acquired the reputation, to be good, loyall, and sincere men. The third rule is, that the three estates provide good Counsellors for the king, during his minoritie or if by accident he leese the use of his senses or understanding: as was practised in both cases during the raigne of *Charles the sixth*, *Je bien aime*. Which aforesaid rules, as I hope none can denie but they are good, and introduced with good reason by our ancestors, so I must needs confesse that they are not sufficient in all cases to provide good Counsellors for a prince. For it may wel happen, that a prince of full age may have few or no princes of his blood experienced in affaires: and that the other Counsellors which his predecessor left, shall either not be good men, or not capable, or that they are dead, and therefore then he must needs come to an election of new Counsellors, some other way than by these aforesaid rules.

And upon that point it seemeth unto me, that the manner of proceeding, which *Alexander Severus* the Emperour used, to chuse as well his Counsellors as his Magistrats, is very good, & meriteth well to be imitated and drawn into consequence. For first, he never provided any persons for an office, in consideration of any favour of kinred or amitie, nor in recompence of any service, but only in consideration of the probitie and capacitie of the persons. But if any man were presented unto him, which was not of good reputation, as well in knowledge & experience, as in good life, although otherwise hee had done good services in some other charge, or that there had been good appearance that he might do well, being of the house & race of wise and prudent people, yet he would not receive him. And the better to be informed of the reputation of persons, whereof he had profers by his wise friends, he caused to be set up in common streets and great publicke places, where many ways meet, certaine posts to fix bills upon, whereupon was written certaine exhortations unto the people, That if any man had any thing to say against such and such a man (which he named) wherefore they might not be received & admitted to such and such an office, that he should denounce it. And so made those commaunds by plaecards, to the end he might better be advertised of the vertues and vices of such persons. For (said this paynim Emperour) seeing the Christians use (wel) this form to denounce publickly in their assemblies, the names of such as they will promote to the order of Priesthood, why should not we use it also in the electiō of our officers and Magistrats, into the hands of whom we commit the lives & goods of our subjects?

*Empri. in  
Alexandro.*

jects. Moreover, he never suffered Offices and estates of Magistrates, which had power & authoritie over the people, to be sold; not that any commerce whatsoever should be made of them: For (said he) necessarily, he that buyeth, selleth; and if I suffer that any man buy an Office, I cannot condemne him when he selleth; for it were a shame for me to punish him which selleth againe that which he buyeth. Besides all this, in the election of Counsellors and Magistrates, he did ever suspect such as sought for Offices, and held them for ambitious and dangerous people for the Commonweal. But they which he could know to be good men, & worthy of publicke charge, & never sought it, these were they which he esteemed most sufficient; and the more they excused themselves from accepting of Offices, so much the more were they constrained unto them. In somuch, that one day there was one (whereof there was good testimonie given unto him) unto whome he determined the Office of Lieutenant Generall of Iustice in the towne of Rome: But the other excused himselfe the best he could, saying, He perceived not himselfe sufficient nor capable to exercise so great an estate. The more he excused himselfe, the more the Emperour *Alexander* constrained him, and commanded him to accept and exercise it, and that he would have it so, being contented with his sufficiencie. The other, which in no case would accept that estate, found some light occasion to get from the Emperours presence for that time, and so fled. When the Emperour knew hee was fled, he caused him to be searched diligently, & found him, caused him to be brought unto him, then he constrained him whether he would or no, to accept that Office. He had also a good grace in the election of the Senators of the Senat: for he chose not any, without demanding the advice of them which were already in that estate, and enquired of the maners, knowledge, & sufficiencie of him or them which were to be Senators. And when it came to passe, that any man by his opinion did bring any into an Office, that was not in all points sufficient, (as it often cometh to passe that they that favor a man, make his maners good, and his knowledge greater than it is) he thus punished them, to bring them to the lowest roume of all their companie: which was a covenable and meet punishment: for he that by undue and unlawfull meanes will advance another, meriteth well to bee put from the place himselfe.

We find in our hystories of France, that our kings have sometimes imitated this manner of proceeding of the Emperour *Alexander*, in his manner of election of Counsellors and Magistrates: For by auncient ordinances which lately were first in the publicke Counsell of Estates of Orleance (but since evill observed,) Offices ought to be conferred upon such as were named to the king, by the other Officers and Magistrates, & by the Consuls & Presidents of Townes and Provinces, which were to make true report of the life, good maners, and sufficiencie of such as they named. As for the vent and selling of Offices, it seemeth that it hath been long time tollerated in Fraunce. For *M. Philip de Comines* in his Hystorie which hee writ of the life of king *Lewis* the eleventh, saith, That already in the time of that king (when he had warre against the Lords of the Commonweal) in the yere 1464, the Parisians made a great trafficke and commerce of Offices, whereof they are more desirous than any others of all the French nation: For (saith he) there are some which will give eight hundred skutes or crowns for an Office, that hath no wages nor depend belonging unto it: and some will give for an Office that hath a stipend belonging unto it, more than fifteene yeares the stipend comes to. But it seemes unto me, that



that *de Comines* toucheth not the white, when he speaks of the cause why the Parisians are so desirous of Offices. For the true cause seemeth to be, for that by the customs of Paris, a father cannot bestow upon one child more than upon another, be they daughters or sonnes, unlesse it be in Offices. And that therefore the Parisians, which desire to advantage any of his children above other (as commonly the father which hath many children, loves one more than another) are as it were constrained to buy Offices. And would to God that this custome were yet to invent, & that the Parisians had free dispensation of their goods, and that they had not brought in this villainous trafficke of Offices. But a strange thing it is, which *Comines* addeth, That even in the time of king *Lewis* the eleventh, the parliament of Paris maintained, that such commerce and trafficke was lawfull. But he speaks not of what Offices the Court of Parliament tollerates that kind of trafficke. It is not credible, that at that time, Offices of judgement were sold; nor that the Court of Parliament approved such a commerce; but rather that they were Offices of Fines, Vshers, Castlekeepers, Sergeants, Notaries, Offices of Waters, and Forrests; and such like, whereof the sale was tollerable: but not of Offices of Presidents, Counsellors, Bailiffes, Stewards, Lieutenants, and other Offices of judgement. For it is seen by our Annales, that king *Lewis* the twelfth (who was called the Father of the people) to spare his people, and to pay the debts of king *Charles* the eight, his predecessor, and to helpe other great affaires which he had on his Arme for the recoverment of the Duchie of Millan, he was the first king that began to sell Offices Royall, excepting alwaies the Offices of judgment, which he touched not. This was a very good king, and did this to a good end, to comfort and help his poore people from tallages and borrowings: Who considered, that it was as much and more reasonable that hee should take silver for such Offices (which were not of judgement) as privat persons did, upon who they were freely bestowed, unto whom it was lawfull (as is said) by a sufferance already inveterat of the said Parliament, to sell and trafficke them. But since, the fact of this good king hath been drawn into a consequence & an use; yea, the exception of Offices of judgment is cleane also taken away, in such sort, that now all Offices indifferently are penall, yea to him that offereth most to the last penny. And although we may say still, it is to the same end, namely to helpe the people, yet it is evident, that that end is not sought nor followed. For by the contrarie, the people is eaten up even to the bones, by these buyers of Offices, which will needs draw out of them the mony of that they bought. And it seemeth, according to the saying of the Emperour *Alexander*, that they have reason: for that which may be bought, may be sold. As for the manner of election of the said Emperour, whereby he preferred to estates such as demanded them not, before such as sought them, our kings have somtimes used that also: as king *Charles le Sage*, when he gave the Office of Constable to that generous & valiant Knight *Bertrand de Guesclin*. For *de Guesclin* excused himselfe the most that hee could in the world from accepting that estate, shewing that he was a simple knight, and that the Office of Constable is so great, that he that will acquite himselfe of that Office, ought rather to commaund great men, than the that were of low calling; & that he durst not enterprise so much, as to commaund the brethren, cousins, and nephewes of his Majestie. But the king replied unto him: *M. Bertrand*, by this meanes excuse not your selfe; for I have neither Brother, Cousin, Nephew, Countie, nor Barron, in my kingdome, which shall not obey you with a good heart: and if any one doe otherwise, I will cause him to know

Annals vp-  
on an. 1499

Froissart lib.  
1. Chap. 290.  
lib. 2. cap. 49.  
Annals vp-  
on an. 1403.

know that it displeaseth me: So that in the end *de Guesclyn* accepted the Office, as constrained. After the death of this valiant Constable, king *Charles* the sixt, sonne of the said *Charles le Sage*, minding to give that Office to the Lord *de Concy*, who was a brave & wise knight, and of a great house, and had performed great services unto the Crowne of France, he refused it, saying, that he was not capable for an Office of so great a burthen, & that *M. Oliver de Clisson* was more sufficient than he to exercise that Estate, for hee was valiant, bold, wise, and well beloved of the men of warre. *M. Oliver* made the like refuse, saying that the Lord *de Concy* was much more worthie & capable than he. But after great strife thereabouts, in the end, *Oliver* was constrained to accept that Office, wherein he acquitted himselfe well & like a wise and vertuous man. Likewise, after the death of this *M. Lewis de Sancerre*, Constable of France, the king would needs give that Office to *M. Charles de Albres*, Counte de *Dreux*, but he refused it many times, untill he was compelled to accept it. Where is now that modesty, to refuse estates, & to defer them unto his companion? Where is that time, that men esteemed not of honours, but such as were gotten by true vertue? Where is that happy world, when ambition was so banished from great men? Where are now those good, vertuous, and wise Princes, which gave no Estates and Offices, but to them which onely by vertue deserved them, and that could make so good choise of fit persons? Surely we are come into the time of the Emperour *Aurelian* (when the Empire began already to decay) wherein Offices were not for Men, but for Riches: & to the time of *Cesar* and *Pompey* (when the Commonweale was altogether ruinated & changed into another Estate) in which time also, Offices were not given, but for ambition, wealth, & unto such as toke part with such great men as sought to caray away the publick government. But I confesse, these examples which I have rehearsed, are but examples; but they may wel ynough be Rules and Laws, unlesse we scorn to imitat that which *Alexander Severus* did, who never gave Offices, as is said, to importunat ambitious men, which sought them, but to such as were modest, and desired them not; such as *de Guesclyn*, *de Concy*, *de Clisson*, and *de Albres*. For they which accept them most hardly, are they which wil acquite themselves of them most valiantly and wisely.

Good Counsell  
keeps  
a Prince in  
his estate.  
*Plutarke in  
Phocion.*

Now after I have touched the election of a good Councell and Magistrates, I would a little speake of the necessitie and utilitie that cometh to a Prince, to have good and wise Counsellors. And upon this point, it seemeth unto me, that *Plato* & the other Philosophers haue a very proper & fit comparison, when they compared the soveraigne authoritie of a Prince, to the course & motion of the Sunne, whereby he accomplisheth the naturall dayes; and the wisdom of Princes Counsellors, unto the motion and course of the Sunne, whereby he accomplisheth the year. For this diurnall motion, whereby the Sunne makes an end of a naturall day from one morning to another, is admirable, swift, fearefull, and violent: and so is a soveraigne authoritie of it selfe, under which men tremble, and are dismayed with fear & trouble. But as we see, that the annuall motion of the Sunne, whereby he maketh an end every year, opposeth it selfe against this violent and swift diurnall motion, yet not directly, but awrie, & as it were kissing and bending, drawing from the West to the East, by the oblique and crooked circle of the Zodiacke, & by this means tempereth the rapacitie, violence, and swift diurnall motion, & by his pleasantnesse distinguisheth the seasons of the Spring time, Summer, Autumne, and Winter, and nourisheth and maintaineth all living creatures, which otherwise cannot endure: even so

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the prudence and wisdom of Princes Counsellors, opposing themselves pleasantly and with a good grace by reason and equitie, against that soveraigne power, which of it selfe is fierce, redoubtable, and fearful, it entertaineth and maintaineth publicke causes and the Commonwealth in good estate, which otherwise could not continue. Examples are ordinarily seene in Princes that are destitute of good Counsell: For straight they abuse their soveraigne power and authoritie, and degenerate it into a Tyrannie, indiscreetly exercising violences, rapines, and injustice. And afterward men shall see it come to passe, that it cannot endure, but that they and their estate shall fall into ruine and confusion. For it is a true Maxime, That no violence can endure long.

Behold then a very great effect of good Counsell, that is, That it maintaineth the Prince in his Estate, and makes him to be obeid of his subjects: and again, as I may say reciprocally, it maintaineth his subjects in prosperitie under the obedience of the Prince. There is yet more, that is, That good Counsell obtaineth honour and good reputation to a Prince: For if a Prince be not wise of him selfe, nor of great capacitie, yet he shall be accounted wise, if he provide himselfe good Counsellors. For it is commonly seene, that men attribute alwaies the effects of all things unto Princes, whether they be victories in warre which are conducted by wise Captains, or be they good rules, ordinances, and provisions, which have been layed and builded by wise Politicians, his Counsellors: insomuch, that the qualities & conditions of Princes Counsellors are alwaies attributed vnto him, because of the effects which arise thereof, which alwaies seeme to the people to proceed from him, by whose power and authoritie things are done. And withall, it is impossible, that the Prince which is provided of good Counsellors, should not ever learne with them, and every day be more cunning and sufficient well instructed to understand and governe his affaires (unlesse he be exceeding dull and sencelesse: ) For how good Counsellors soever the Prince hath, yet must he not so much repose & trust vpon them, as he himselfe will understand nothing of his owne affaires. Well to be allowed is the opinion of *M. Philip de Comines*, who saith, That God hath not established the office of a Prince to be exercised upon brute beasts, & to mocke & scorne those which speake to them of any affaire; answering, I am no Clarke, I leaue all to my Counsellors, in whom I trust, and so go to their pastimes: For (saith he) if they have been well nourished in their youth, they will alledge other reasons, and desire that men should esteeme them wise and vertuous.

Moreouer, it is certaine, that the Prince which shall have the reputation and renowne, to governe himselfe by good Counsell, shall alwaies be the more feared and redoubted both of his enemies and strangers, and they shall not easily get any advantage upon him. Thereupon it was, that *Anniball*, a prudent and valiant Captain, feared more the wise Captaines that were sent against him by the Romans, than he did such as were hardie and hazardous, and that the Romane forces were more feared and doubted of him, under the conduction of that wise Captaine *Fabius Maximus*, than under the other hardie and valiant Captaines. For when the Romans sent against him the Captaines *Flaminius* and *Sempronius*, the one after the other, both of them generous and forward, and such as desired nothing more than the fight, *Anniball* rejoyced thereat, and as he was prudent and hardie withall, he suffered them to take upon him some small advantages; seeking still to draw them unto some place of aduantage, to fight with them, as indeed he did: They being

Good Counsell makes the Prince honoured.

*De Comines*  
*lib. 1. cap. 32.*  
and 34.

Good Counsell makes the Prince feared and redoubted.  
*Titus Livius*  
*lib. 3. Dec. 3.*



swelled, for that in some light skirmishes they had overthrowne some few of *Annibals* souldiours, and thereby thought it was not honorable to recoile, and that men would think their hearts failed them to flie before such as they had alreadie beaten, resolved to give battaile; and indeed they gave it, but they lost it to their great shame and confusion. Which the Romane Senate seeing, sent against *Anniball*, *Fabius Maximus*, who was not so forward (and it may bee not so hardie) in enterprizing as *Flaminius* or *Sempronius* were; but he was more wise and carefull, as he shewed himselfe. For at his first arriual, he did not as the others did, aboard and set upon *Anniball* (who desired nothing more) but began to coast him afarre off, seeking alwayes advantageous places, and when *Anniball* approched him, then would he shew him a countenance fully determined to fight, yet alwaies seeking places of advantage. But *Anniball*, which was not so rash as to joine with his enemy to his own disadvantage, made a shew to recoile and flie, to draw him after him: *Fabius* followed him, but it was upon coasts and hills, seeking alwayes not the shortest way, but that way which was most for his advantage: in so much, as *Anniball* saw him alwaies upon some hill or coast nigh him, as it were a cloud over his head: so that after *Anniball* had many times assaied to draw *Fabius* into a place fit for himselfe, and where he might give battaile for his owne good, and yet could not thereunto draw him, said: I see wel now, that the Romanes also have gotten an *Anniball*; and I feare that this cloud, which approching vs, still hovering upon those hills, will some of these mornings poure out some shoure on our heads. Briefely, the prudence and wisdom of *Fabius* brought more feare and gave more adoe unto *Anniball*, than all the Romane forces, which yet was not small.

I have above recited another example, witnessed of king *Edward* of England, who said, That he feared more the missives and letters of king *Charles le Sage*, than he feared the great and puissant armies of 40 and 100000 men of his Father and Grandfather: and that he wrought him more trouble, and broke more of his purposes & enterprises, in ending of letters, than they ever did with their great forces. Which is another witnesse making for prudence and good Counsell, like unto the example of *Anniball*: which witnesss are so much the more worthie of credite, as the one proceeded from a most valiant king, and the other from a most noble and hardie Captaine; both which well knew by long use and experience, how to helpe themselves with force & armes. And if we consider the Romane hystories, we shall truly find, that the ancient Romaines made themselves lords & maisters almost of all the world, more by wisdom and good Counsell, than by force, although they used both. Therefore, said *Varro*, (as by a common proverbe received in his time) That the Romanes vanquished, sitting: as if he would say, As they sit in their chairs in their Senate, they provide so for their affaires by good Counsell and wisdom, that they get and obtaine the upper hand in all their enterprises. Yea, & we see that at this day the Venetians mayntain very well their estate, yea, do augment and make it greater, although they understand not well how to handle armes: and indeed when they must needs goe to warre, they hire and wage people to doe it: but yet notwithstanding are they wise & prudent, keeping themselves as much as they can from the warre: and when they have warre, they do discreetly seeke meanes to quiet and appease it by some other way than by battailes, besiegings of Townes, or any other exploits of warre. And assuredly they know better how to finish and bring a warre to an end by their wisdom & good Counsell, without striking any stroke, than

than many puissant Princes by their forces and armes.

Hitherto we have spoken of a Princes Counsell, which in the time of the Roman Emperours men called, The Princes Consistorie; and our French, The kings Priuie Counsell. But now we must know, that as well the Romane Emperours as the kings of France of old, haue yet had another Counsell wherunto they had recourſe in all their waightie affaires which were of great conſequence: as, when they ſtood in need to make lawes, ordinances, and rules, concerning the univerſall eſtate: the Romanes called this Counsell, the Senat, and the French call it, the Parlement. But this name of Parlement, aunciently ſignifieth an aſſembly of the three eſtates, as *Philip de Comines* ſaith, and as is ſcene by all our French hystories. Our kings alſo conuocated ſometimes with their ordinarie and priuie Counsell, ſome good number of great Prelats and Barons of the Realme, and that aſſembly they called, The great Counsell. But afterward, men attributed the name of Parlement unto the aſſembly of Iudges and Senators, which judged cauſes and proceſſes, from whom there is no appeale. And ſome thinke that our Parlement is at this day like unto the Senat of Rome, but they are greatly deceived: for the Romane Senat tooke not any knowledge of the proceſſes & cauſes of particular perſons, but only dealt with affairs of the State, of the univerſall government, and policie, and of matters of conſequence unto all the Commonwealth: and therefore the aſſembly of the three eſtates in France, doe much better reſemble the Roman Senat than the Parlements doe at this day: which might better be compared unto the Romans Centumvirat, or to their Praetorian government, which dealt in the knowledge of appellations; and matters of juſtice diſtributive, from which judgement ther was no appeale. And as the name of Parlement is at this day otherwiſe applied than it was aunciently, ſo is it of the name of Great Counsell. But to come to our purpoſe. We read that the good Emperours never contemned or thought much, in waightie affairs to take the advice of the Romane Senat, and to governe themſelves thereby: for although that by the change of the eſtate which happened in the time of *Iulius Caſar*, when the Commonwealth was changed into a Monarchie, the authoritie of the Senat was much abated and weakned; yet there was never Emperour found that durſt enterpriſe altogether to abolith it: but contrarie, the good and wiſe Emperours rather helped to eſta bliſh their authoritie and power. And the reaſon why no Emperour good or wicked, durſt enterpriſe to abolith the Senate, was, becauſe by the Law Roiall (whereby the eſtate Monarchicall was eſta bliſhed at Rome) there was only transferred unto the king, the authoritie & power of the people, and not that which the Senat had. Which people, although they had ſoveraigne power over every particular perſon of the Senat, yet had they no power over the whole body of the Senat: for they might well puniſh with death one Senator, but they had no ſuperioritie over the body of the Senat. So the body of the Senat, and the body of the People, were as it were alike and equall. And as much authoritie had the lawes of the Senat, which they called *Senatus conſulta*, as the Lawes of the People, which they called *Placita*. And therefore the Emperours which by the Law Roiall ſucceeded in the place of the People only (for the Senat did never diſpoile themſelves of their authoritie to inveſt the Emperour therewith) had never power to decay the Senat, neither durſt they ever enterpriſe it, although ſome had a will therunto, as *Nero*, *Caligula*, and the like. But as for the good Emperours, beſides that they had no power to abolith the Senat, they never had any deſire thereto, but maintained and con-

A Senat, and the Eſtates, are things cor-  
reſpondent.

*De Comines,*  
*lib. 1. cap. 64.*

Lamp. in  
Alexand.

L. Humanum  
C. de Leg.

Dion in Au-  
gust.

served it, and governed themselves by it, and by it were they better obeyed than the bad. For we need not doubt but a people will more willingly obey a Law or Decree, which shall have been sifted and examined in a great, wise, & notable assembly, (such as was the Senat) & will like it better, and rather judge that Law to be founded upon reason and equitie, than when it onely passeth through the brain of one sole man, or of some small number. Therefore the Emperor *Alexander Severus* never made law nor Edict, but he had on his Counsell twentie great & excellent Lawyers, and fiftie other great & excellent persons, wise and well experienced. And unto the end that they might giue their opinions more assuredly, he first made them understand the matter upon which they must give their advise, and after gave them time to consider thereof, that their opinions might be better digested & resolved. Therefore also the Emperor *Theodosius* ordained, That no law should be available, unless it were first concluded and determined with good and assured resolution of all the Princes Consistorie, & afterward received & approved by the Senat of Rome. For (saith he) we know well, that the ordinance of good Lawes and Edicts concluded with good Counsell and deliberation, is the establishment of the assurednesse and glorie of our Empire. Therefore was it also, that the great and wise Emperour *Augustus Caesar*, did so communicate all the affaires of his Commonwealth with the Roman Senate, that as *Dion* saith, he made a sweet and pleasant mingled harmonie of the Monarchicall estate, with the estate of the Commonwealth. And he not onely contented himselfe to conferre with the Senate of all the affaires of importance, and to take their advise; but yet he would that the Senate should giue him every yeare twentie Counsellors to be nigh him, of his privie Counsell, in which Counsell he had alwaies many men very wise, courteous, and very modest, such as the Lawyer *Tribonianus*, and that good and prudent *Agrippa* his sonne in law, with that so learned and good a pillar of learned men *Mecenas*. Therefore also *Tiberius* the Emperour, the successor of *Augustus*, although he was a Prince more abundant in vices than in vertues, not daring wholly to stray out of his predecessors traces (that good *Augustus*,) made nor ordained any thing of weight without the Counsell and advise of the Senate. For this cause also (briefly all the good Emperors, as *Vespasian*, *Titus*, *Traian*, *Adrian*, the *Antonines*, and others like, communicated alwaies with the Senate upon all the great affaires of the Commonwealth; and they bore themselves not like maisters, but like Presidents of the Senate: also they did not attribute unto themselves any title of honour, nor enterprised to make any triumphs, but such as was decreed & ordained by the Senate. And to the contrarie, the Emperors which were of no account, such as *Caligula*, *Nero*, *Comodus*, *Balsianus*, *Maximilianus*, *Helio-gabalus*, and other like, hated extreamey the Senate; esteeming of it as their pedegoge and corrector; and haue caused many Senators to die, thinking the more easily to command as they would, hauing no controulers to withstand their wicked actions. But the end was alwaies this, that such as despised and would haue annihilated the Senate, haue ever had an unluckie end, and reigned not long time, but haue all been massacred and slaine young, and haue left unto their posteritie an infamie and most wicked memorie of them. Herein is shewed a continuall successe of the just judgements of God against them which despised wise Counsell: and contrarie, a felicitie and divine prosperitie in other Emperours, which governed themselves by the good Counsell of the Senate, and of the wise men of their privie Counsell. For they raigned and held the Empire happily replenished with all goods, honours, and glorie,



glorie, and their subjects under them enjoied good repose and tranquillitie. And we need not doubt, That such felicitie comming to good Princes, as also the evils hapning unto wicked Princes, doe not both proceed from God: for as the wise man saith, Good Counsell commeth from God, and he that despiseth the gift of God, certaine it is, that in the end he shall be well chastised.

Prov. 18.  
Eccle. 37.

In old time  
the general  
estates were  
held for  
three causes.

Annal. upon  
An. 1380  
and Froiss. li  
2. cap. 98. &  
60.

Annal. upon  
An. 1484.  
and Comin.  
lib. 3. ca. 109.

Froiss. lib. 1.  
cap. 134. &  
lib. 4. cap. 44.

Our kings of France of old, used the same course that these good Emperors did: For they often convoked the three Estates of the kingdome, to have their advice and Counsell in affaires of great consequence, which touched the interest of the Commonwealth. And it is seene by our Hystories, that the generall assembly of the Estates was commonly done for three causes: One, when there was a question to provide for the kingdome, a Governour or Regent, as when kings were young, or had not the use of their understandings by some accident, or were captives or prisoners. For in these cases the three Estates assembled to obtaine a Governour for the Realme. Againe, when there was cause to reforme the kingdome, to correct the abuses of Officers & Magistrates, and to bring things unto their ancient and first institution and integritie: our kings then caused the Estates to assemble; because that many being assembled from all parts of the kingdome, they might better be informed of all abuses and evill behaviours committed therein, and might also better worke the means to remedie them: because commonly, There is no better Physician, than he that knoweth well the disease, and the causes thereof. The third cause why there was made an assembly of the Estates, was, when there was a necessary cause to lay a Tribute or Impost upon the people: For then in a full assembly, some shewed to them which were there (which represented all the people) the necessitie of the kings and the kingdomes affaires, who graciously and courteously entreated the people to aid and helpe the king but with so much money as they themselves thought to be sufficient and necessarie. And for this cause, that which the Estates accorded to the king, was called by these gracious names, Subsidies, Subventions, Ayds, Grants: not with these tearmes, Tailles, Imposts, Tributes, Impositions; which were tearmes more hard and odious. Examples appeare of the first cause, when the generall Estates assembled at Paris, after the death of king *Charles le Sage*, to provide for the government as well of king *Charles* the sixt, being under age, as of the kingdome: which government they gave unto three of the kings Uncles: namely, unto the Duke of Anjou, to the Duke of Berry and Languedoc, and to the Duke of Bourgoigne, Picardie, and Normandie: the government of all the Realme, and of the young kings person was committed to the said Dukes, and so was there ordained during the said kings life, another ordinance. In like manner the generall Estates were held at Tours after the decease of king *Lewis* the eleventh, to purvey for the government of king *Charles* the eight (under age) & of the kingdome. And by the same Estates was established a Counsell of twelve persons, good men and of good calling, to dispatch the affaires of the kingdome; yet in the kings name, and under his authoritie. And the rule of the young kings person was committed unto *Madame de Beavien* his sister.

When king *Charles* the sixt *le bien aime*, was come to the age of one and twentie yeares, his uncles were discharged from the government of the kingdome, by the advise and deliberation of the kings great Counsell. But this good prince by an accident of sicknesse fel a certaine time after into a frenzie, which sometimes bereaved him of his senses; insomuch that the Estates assembled at Paris, gave the govern-

ment of the kingdome during the kings indisposition, to his two vnclcs, the Dukes of Berrie and Burgoigne.

The yeare 1356 that king *John* was taken prisoner nie Poictres at the journey of Maupertins with his sonne *Philip* (after Duke of Burgoigne) and that they were led into England, there remained in France three of the said king *Johns* children, namely, *Charles*, Dolphin and duke of Normandie, *Lewis* duke de *Anjou*, and *John* duke of Berrie: There was a question about the providing for the government of the kingdome, because of the kings captiuitie, but none of them would enterprise the managing thereof of himselfe: insomuch, that the generall Estates were assembled at Paris, whereby were elected thirtie six persons (some say fiftie) to governe the affairs of the kingdome with *Monsieur le Dauphin*, who at the beginning called himselfe the Lieutenant of the king his father, but afterward he named himselfe Regent.

The yeare 1409 during the raigne of *Charles* the sixt king of France, were held the generall Estates at Paris, for the reformation of abuses in the kingdome, and there it was ordained, That all accountants for the kings revenues & rents, should make their accounts: by the meanes of which reformation, great summes of money were recovered upon the same accountants, and there were also made some good lawes and ordinances. In other conventions of Estates, the money and coine hath been reformed from weake and light, unto thick and of good waight and goodnesse. Also of late at the generall Estates held at Orleans, were made manie goodly ordinances for the good and comfort of the poore people, reformation of justice, and for the cutting off of manie abuses which were committed in plaies at Cardes and Dife, in superfluitie of apparell, and in matter of benefices. But commonly commeth such euill hap, that all good things which are introduced and ordained vpon good reason and to a good end, incontinent vanisli away, and wicked examples are alwaies drawn into consequence.

As for the last cause for which we haue said the generall Estates in old time were called, namely for the graunt of Helps & Subsidies, there are many examples in our Histories. As in the time of king *John*, wherein the Estates accorded great subventions or subsidies to make warre against the Englishmen, which then held a great part of the kingdome. And after he was taken prisoner and led into England, the said Estates agreed to give vnto *Monsieur le Dauphin* his sonne, great summes of money to pay for the said kings raunsome, and for *Philip* his sonne, being also a prisoner. And well to be marked it is, that our histories doe witnesse, that all the people of France generally, were meruailously anguished & grieved with the prisonmēt & captiuitie which they saw their king suffer, but especially the people of the countrey of Languedoc: For the Estates of the said countrey ordained, that if the king were not delivered within a yeare, that every one, both men and women, should lay by all coloured garments, such also as were jagged and cut, and such as were enriched with gold, silver, or other strange and costly fashion: Likewise, to make cease all stage-plaies, morrisdauncings, piping, yea and plaies pastimes and daunces; in signe and token of their mourning and lamentation for their princes captiuitie. A thing whereby appeared the great and cordiall affection of this people towards their king. As truely the Frenchmen have alwaies been of great love and affection towards their kings, unlesse they were altogether tyrants. But to make an end of this point: Certaine it is, that before king *Charles* the seventh called *le Vi-*

*Etorien*,

Annal. up-  
on An. 1356  
and Froiss. li.  
1. cap. 170.  
171.

Monsirelet.  
lib. 1. ca. 59.

Froiss. lib. 1.  
cap. 155.  
Annal. up-  
on An 1354  
58. 59.

*Forieux*, no Subsidies were imposed, without assembling the generall Estates. And that our kings used thus to doe, was not because they had power by an absolute authoritie to impose tallages and subsidies, without calling the Estates: but it is to the end they may be better obeyed with a voluntarie & unconstrained obedience, and to shunne all uprores and rebellions which often happen upon that occasion. And truly, the French people have alwaies been so good and obedient unto their kings, that they never refused him any thing, if there were but any appearance of reason to demand it. Yea often the Estates have granted their king more than he would demand, or durst looke for: as is scene by that which our histories write of the Estates held for Subsidies.

But because Aydes and Subsidies were customably granted for the making of warres, *M. Philip de Comin.* saith, That kings should also communicat and consult with their Estates, whether the causes of such warres be just and reasonable; & that the Prince cannot nor ought not otherwise to enterprise a warre: For it is reason that they which defray the charges and expences, should know something. And yet he passeth further, and saith: There is no Prince in the world which hath power to lay one pennie upon his subjects without their grant and consent, unlesse he will use tyrannie and violence. But because at the first they which reade this place of *Commines*, may peradventure thinke that he seemes too much to limit and restraine a Princes power, I will here as it were by an interpretation of his saying, a little cleare this point.

You must then understand and presuppose, that in a soveraigne Prince, there are two powers: the one is called an Absolute power, & the other a Civile power. The Absolute power, is that which cannot not ought not to be any thing limited, but stretcheth it selfe to all things whatsoever they be, unlesse it be to the lawes of God & of nature, and of those lawes which are the foundation of the principallitie and estate: For a Prince hath not power over God, no more than the vassall hath over his liege Lord, but ought himselfe to obey his commandements and ordinances, so much there wants that he can any thing abolish or derogate from them.

The Prince also cannot abolish the fundamental lawes of his principallitie, whereupon his estate is founded, and without which his said estate cannot subsist nor endure: for so might he abolish and ruinate himselfe. As in France the king cannot abolish the Salike law, nor the three estates, nor the law of not alienating the countries and provinces united to the crowne. For the Realme and the Royaltie are founded upon those three points; which are as three pillars, that sustaine and hold up both the king and kingdome: neither can the Prince breake nor abolish any law naturall, approved by the common sence of all men. But in all other things, the absolute power of a Prince reacheth without limitation; for it is above all other lawes which he may make and unmake at his pleasure: he hath power also over the body and goods of his subject, without restriction, purely and simply. True it is, that he ought to temperat the use of that Absolute power, by the moderation of his second power, which is Civile; as we shall say hereafter. But suppose he will not moderate his absolute power by the Civile, we must notwithstanding obey, because God commandeth us. But before we speake of the Civile power, we must a little more amply cleare the points before touched.

The first point then, which is that the Absolute power of a Prince stretcheth not

*De Com. lib. 5  
cap. 18.*

A Prince  
hath a double  
power,  
an absolute  
and a civile.



above God, is a matter of all confessed : And there were never found any Princes (or very few) which would soare and mount so high, to enterprise upon that which belonged unto God, yea, even the Emperours *Caligula* and *Domitian* are blamed and detested by the Paynim histories, which had no true knowledge of God, for that they durst enterprise upon God, and upon that which appertained unto him. Also it is a Maxime in Theologie, That we must rather obey God than men : which Maxime hath at all times ben practised by all good people and holy persons (which are praised even with the mouth of God in the holy Scriptures) as by *Daniell* and his companions, the Apostles, the Christians of the primitive Church, and many of our time.

The Prince  
cannot abo-  
lish the fon-  
damentall  
lawes of his  
principality

As for the other point, which is, that the Prince cannot abolish the fundamentall lawes of his principality, it is as cleare of it selfe. For if a Prince overthroweth the foundations of his principality, he ruinateth and overthroweth himselfe, and his estate cannot endure : for the first sencelesse and unwise man that comes thereunto, will overthrow all upside downe. As if in Fraunce a king may overthrow the Salicke law, and so subject his Crowne unto the succession of women, it is certaine, that long ago the estate of France had ben overthrowne. For kings which have left none but daughters after them (as *Philip le long*, *Charles seibel*, and *Lewis* the twelfth) had been easily enclined upon naturall affection towards their daughters to have broken that Salicke law (if they so could) to cause the Crowne to have falne unto their said daughters ; by the meanes whereof, the kingdome after should have falne into strangers hands, and by consequence into ruine and dissipation. For the nature of the inhabitants of France is such, that they cannot long suffer a strange Prince (wherin they differ from many other nations) as they could not long beare the domination of the Romane Emperours : but against the reigne of the Emperour *Tiberius* they began to kicke, and be grieved with the rule of princes of another nation than their owne ; and finally they rid themselves of the Romane yoke, & Gaule was the first Province that cut it selfe from the Empire. Neither was there ever found king that durst enterprise to breake the Salike law. True it is, that king *Charles* the sixt, at the instigation of *Philip* duke of Bourgoign, gave the kingdom of France in dowrie with his daughter *Katherine*, which hee married to the king of England, and declared the Dolphin unable and incapable to succede in the kingdome of France, because at Montrean-faute-Yonne, *John*, father of the said *Philip* duke of Bourgoigne, was by him slaine. But this donation held not, as being made against the Salicke law : insomuch, that the said duke *Philip* himselfe (which had procured and caused to declare the said Dauphin unable to be king of France) after the death of *Charles* the sixt, acknowledged him for king and lawfull successor to the crowne of France. For as for incapacity, it was knowne there was none, because that Duke *John*, which the Dolphin had slaine, deserved it well, having before caused to be slaine the duke of Orleans, the kings only brother. Yet because the manner of the execution which the said Dauphin caused to be made upon the said duke *John*, was not by lawfull means, he acknowledged his fault in that case, and made a great satisfaction to the said duke *Philip*, as shall hereafter be more at large set forth. So then the Salique law hath alwaies remained firme, as one of the three pillars of the kingdom and roialtie of France, our ancestors never being willing to suffer women to raigne and rule over them.

As much is to be said of the Estates general, the authoritie of which hath alwaies remained

remained whole, vntill this present, even from the foundation of the kingdome, as being the second pillar wherupon the kingdome is founded. For if it happen that the crowne fall to a king under age, or to one that is not well in his wit and understanding, or that the king be a prisoner or captive, or that the kingdome haue urgent necessitie of a general reformation: how necessarie is it in all these cases, that the estates assemble to provide for all affaires, otherwise the estate of the kingdome and of the Royaltie would incontinent fall to the ground? & w<sup>th</sup> how doubt it could not long continue in his being, if the general estates were abolished and suppressed. For to say that in the aforesaid cases [other than the foresaid estates may well order the affairs of the realme, as the Princes of the blood, and the kings Counsell, lets say nothing: because it may so come to passe, that the Princes themselves be under age, or prisoners, or captives, or witlesse, or suspected, or dead, or otherwise incapable: as also it may come to passe that the kings Counsell shall be dead, or qualified, or suspected, or otherwise unable, so that the estate of the kingdome and the Royaltie shall be euill founded and assured vpon such foundations & leaning stocks. But the body of the estates General, is a body not subject to minority, captivity, perelusion of understanding, suspicion, nor other incapacie; neither is mortall, therefore is it a more certaine and firme foundation of the kingdomes & Royalties estate than any other. For the body of the Estates (which is a body composed of the wisest & fittest of the kingdome) can never faile, because it consisteth not in *Individuall* and certain particular persons, but it standeth in *Spacie*, being a body immortall (as all the French nation is immortall.) The Princes, & the kings Counsellors, are but faile & brittle leaning stocks and means, subject to incapacie: so is not the body of the Estates, and therefore the Estates being the true and perpetuall foundation to sustaine and conserue the kingdome, cannot be abolished, but ought to be conuocated whensoeuer there is to be a provision in the cases above mentioned. Withall also, Reason willet that the Estates (whom the affairs of the realme toucheth most) should haue a part in the conduction of publike things, but most especially in the cases aforesaid where the king cannot order them. Therefore is it a strange, damnable, and pernicious position which our strangers that gouerne France at this day, dare impudently hold, That it is treason to speake of holding the Estates. But contrary, a man may rather say, That it is treason to abolish the Estates: and that they which will hinder that they shall not be held in the cases aforesaid (but especially for the reformation more than necessary of so many abuses as these strangers haue brought into France) are themselves culpable of treason, being such as do overthrow & ruinate the Realme, the Royaltie, & the King, in taking away the principall pillar which sustaineth them. And truly such people doe merit, that processe and informations should be laid upon them as upon the enemies of the Commonwealth, which do subvert & overthrow the foundations, upon which our Ancestors haue with great wisdom founded and established the estate of this goodly and excellent kingdome.

The like may we say of the Law, whereby the lands and provinces united to the Crowne of France, are inalienable: For a king of France cannot abolish that Law, because it is the third pillar upon which the realme and his estate is founded. For prooffe hereof, I will alleage but two examples, the one was practised in the time of *Charles le Sage*, king of Fraunce, and the other in the time of king *Francis* the first, of happie and late memorie: By which two examples may appeare, not onely that this law (of Not alienating the lands of the Crowne) is a pillar of the kingdome, but

also

Froiss. lib. 1.  
ca. 201, 211,  
212, 214,  
246, 247,  
310.

also that the Estates are as the very and true base and foundation thereof.

King *Iohn* having been taken prisoner at the battaile of Poitiers, was conducted into England, where he made a treatie of peace with king *Edward* of England. But the estates of the kingdome which were assembled, would not agree unto that treatie, as too prejudiciall, and to the diminution of the Crowne of France. King *Edward* was so angry and despited thereof, that he made a great oath that he would end the ruinating of France. And indeed whilest king *Iohn* was his prisoner, he passed over the sea, and made great warre in France, and much wasted the flat Countrey, but he made no great conquest of the Townes. In the end the Duke of Lancaster counsell'd him to make peace with the French, shewing him that he did but leese time so to run over the fields, and spoile the champion countrey, and souldiers only had the profit, and he himselfe losse of people and expences. These reasons could not much move the king to make peace, he was so sore offended and animated. But God, who had pitie of this poore kingdome (which was in extreame desolation and confusion) wrought and brought to passe, as it were by miracle, a peace; sending from heaven a tempest, accompanied with lightening, so great, over the campe of the English, that they thought that heaven & earth would have met, and the world have finished; for so great stones fel with the tempest, that they oventhrew men and horses. Then the king of England seeing God fight against him, being in a great fear & distresse, made a vow unto God, That if by his grace he escaped from that perill, he would hearken unto peace, & would cease to saccage & destroy the poore people: as indeed he did after the tempest ceased. Which peace yet was accorded, to his so great advantage, that thereby besides the ransom of three millions of franks, Guienne remained unto him in soveraigntie; also the countrey of Armignac, de Albret, de Comines, de la Marche, de Santongeois, Rochellois, and a good part of Languedoc, which before neuer was in the peaceable obedience & domination of the English. Unto this peace (which was concluded in a village called Bretigni, nigh to Chartres) the French subjects of that countrey would not in any sort agree nor condiscend, but refused to obey & yeeld themselves English. For their reasons they alleged, That the king had no power to dismember and alienate them from the Crowne of France, and that thereupon they had priviledges from king *Charlemain*, whereby they could not, nor ought not to be cut off from the trunk and house of France. After that they had long debated & refused to obey, the king *Iohn* (who upon good hostages was returned into Fraunce) sent into these counteries *M. James de Bourbon* his cousin, and a Prince of his bloud, to make them obey the English: inso-much, that whether they would or no, those good French subjects should forsake the French obedience, and be under the English government. This could not be without great greefe of heart, sadnesse, & incredible displeasure. But above al others, most remarkable for great constancie, were they of Rochell, to remaine French: for they many times excused themselves unto the king, and stood stiffe more than a year, before they would let the Englishmen into the Towne. And thinking that their excuses and remonstrances might stand in some stead, they sent to the king their Orators: which arriving at Paris, and being brought before the king, fell at his feet with weepings, sobbings and lamentations, making this speech. Most deare sir, your poore and desolate subjects of your towne of Rochell, have sent us hither to beseech your Majestie in all humilitie, and with joined hands, that it would please you to have pitie and compassion upon them. They are your naturall subjects, and they

Rochellois  
good Fréch  
men.



they and their ancestors haue ever been under the obedience of your Majestie and your ancestors. Alas (Sir) what greater evill hap can there come unto us, than to be now cut off and alienated from the kingdome and from the Crowne of France? They are borne and have been nourished in the French Nation, They are of manners, condition, and language, naturall Frenchmen. What a strange and deplorable miserie should it now be to them, to bend themselves under the yoke & obedience of the English, a strange nation, altogether different from us in manners, conditions, and language? shall not this be unto them a cruell and slavish servitude, now to become subjects unto them, which of long time have not ceased to vex this poore kingdome with warre? For if upon some divine punishment, and for our sinnes, the poore towne of Rochell must needs be violently plucked & seperated from France, as the daughter from the Mothers dug, to submit it selfe unto the said servitude of a strangers, yet that evill should be farre more tollerable, to serve and yeeld to the yoke of any other Nation, than to that which so long time hath been a bloudie enemy of France, and harpished so much of our blood. Wherefore most humbly we beseech you Sir (said they with teares,) that you will not deliver us into the hands of the English, your enemies and ours. If in any thing we have offended your Majesty, for which you will now leave & abandon us, we crie you mercie with joyned hands, and pray you in the name of God, and of our Lord Iesus Christ, that it would please you to have mercie and compassion upon us, and to retaine us still under your obedience, as we and our auncitors haue alwaies been. We are not ignorant (Sir) that your Majesty having been prisoner in England, haue been constrained to accord with them to their great advantage, and that we are comprehended in the number of the Townes & Countries that must be delivered: but yet we have some hope, that we may be taken from that number, by silver; and for that purpose your poore town of Rochell offereth contribution to your Majesty all that it hath in her power; and besides, we offer to pay with a good heart hereafter for our Subsidies and tallies, halfe the revenue & gaines of all our goods. Have pitie then (Sir) upon your poore Towne, which comes to retire her selfe under your protection in most humble and affectionat obedience, as a poore, desolate, and lost creature, to his Father, his King, and his naturall Lord and Sovereigne. We obtest and beseech you (most deare Sir) in the name of God, and of all his Saints, that you will not abandon and forsake us: but that it would please your clemencie and kindnesse to retaine for your subjects, most humble, them which cannot live but in al vexation, languishment, and bitterness of heart, unlesse we be your Subjects. The king having heard the piteous Supplication of these poore Rochellois, mourned & pitied them greatly: but he made them answer, That there was no remedie, that which he had accorded, must needs be executed. This answer being reported at Rochell, it is impossible to speake what lamentations there were through all the Towne; this newes was so hard, that they which were borne & nourished French, should be no more French, but become English. Finally, they being pressed & constrained by the kings Commissaries to open the Towne-gates to the English: Well, (said the most notable Townsmen) seeing we are forced to bow under the yoke, and that it pleaseth the king our sovereign Lord, that we should obey the English, we will with our lips, but our hearts shall remaine alwaies French. After that the English had been peaceable possessors of Rochell, and all the other Countries above named, king Edward invested his eldest sonne the Prince of Wales, in that government, (a valiant and verie humble

humble Prince towards greater than himselfe, but haughtie and proud towards his inferiors) who came and held his traine and Court at Bourdeaux, where hauing dwelt certaine yeares, he would needs haue imposed upon the countrey a yearly tribute of money upon euery fire. But to withstand this new Impost and tribute, the Lords, Barons, and Counties of those countreys, but especiall the Countie *d' Armignac, de Perigourd, de Albres, de Commenges*, and many others, went to Paris to offer in their Appeales against the Prince of Wales: Arriving there, they dealt with king *Charles le Sage* (for king *John* was then dead) about their Appeale; who answered them, That by the peace of Britaine, which he himselfe had sworne, the dead king his father for him and his successors to the Crowne, had acquitted & renounced all the soveraigntie of the said Countreys, and that he could not with a good conscience break the peace with the English, and that it greeved him much, that with good reason he could not accord their Appeale. The said Countreys and Barons contrarily, shewed him by lively reasons, That it is not in the kings power to release & acquite the soveraigne power & authoritie of his subjects and countreys, without the consent of the Prelats, Barons, Cities, & good Townes of those Countreys; and that was never scene nor practised in France, & that if they had been called to the Treatie of Britaine, they would never haue consented unto that acquittance of soveraigntie. And therefore humbly praied his Majestie to receive their appellation, and to send an Huisher to adorne in case of appeale, the Prince of Wales to appeare at Paris at the Court of Fraunce, to the end to quash and revoke the said new ordinance for the said tribute. Finally, the king *Charles* was nothing offended to heare them so speak of a kings power (much unlike our *Machiavelists* at this day which call them culpable of Treason; which speake of Estates) neither replied unto them, That the power of a Soveraigne Prince ought not to be limited; neither, That they spoke euill to call into question that which his dead father had done: but contrary, rejoycing at that limitation, referred the cause to the debating & resolution of the wise men of his Counsell. And after he was resolved, that it was true which they said; he accorded unto these Countreys and Barons their demand, and sent to adorne in case of Appeale to the Court of Paris, the Prince of Wales: which done, the said Countreys and Barons easily revolted from the English obedience: so did Rochell get all Englishmen out of their towne and castle. This done, the Duke of Berry, the kings Brother, would haue entred there; but for that time with good words they refused him the entrie thereinto, saying, they would send unto the king certain Delegates, to obtaine some priviledges, and therefore desired of the Duke a safeconduct, which he willingly granted: and hauing the same, they sent twelue chosen for that purpose amongst their Burgeses, which finding the king at Paris, shewed him in all humilitie, how of themselves they were rid of the English obedience, & that again they would remit themselves into his Majesties obedience, as being their king & naturall soveraigne Prince, but that they besought him humbly to accord them certain Priviledges. The king demanded, what priviledges. First, said they, That it would please your Majestie to agree unto us, that the Town of Rochell may be inseperably united unto the Crowne of France, so that it may never be separated nor dismembred, by peace, marriage, nor by any compact, condition, or misadventure, that can come in France: Secondly, that the Castle may be throwne to the earth, without which, we will keep the towne of Rochell well for your Majestie. The king perceiving their demands, and finding them reasonable, and proceeding from

Priviledges  
of Rochell.

a true

a true French heart, accorded their requests : and so the Rochellois returned merily into the French obedience, from whence they had been separated to their great griefe. Here then you see how well to the purpose and to the great profit of the king and of the kingdome, that law of Not alienating the Lands, Townes, and Provinces of the Crowne, was made. But upon this that I have said of the Rochellois, some Messier will say : How happeneth it then, that the Rochellois are at this day so bad French subjects ? hereunto the answer is easie and evident, that is, that they are at this day as good Frenchmen as ever were their ancestours, but they are not good Italians, neither meane to be subject under the yoke of strangers, no more than their ancestours. Let us now come to the other example.

King *Francis* the first of that name, being prisoner at Madril in Spain, in power of the emperor *Charles* the first, there was made a traitie and an accord berwixt the two great princes ; whereby amongst other things, the king promised the emperor, to grant him all his right and possession of the Dutchie of Burgoigne, and that he would imploy himselfe to cause the Estates of the countrey to condiscend therunto. This accord being concluded, the Emperor caused the king to be conducted to Bayonne, and there by his embassadours summoned him to ratifie the accord which he had made at Madril when he was prisoner, to the end to make it more valuable & that it might the rather appear to be made without constraint : unto which embassadours the king answered, That he could doe nothing in that article concerning the Dutchie of Burgoigne without first knowing the intent and will of his subjects, because he could not aliene it without their consent, and that he would cause the Estates of the countrey to assemble to know their wils therein. Not long after the king caused the Estates of Bourgoigne to come together, which would by no meanes consent unto the said alienation : wherof he advertised the Emperour, who seeing that by reason they could not be alienated without their consents, was content with that answer, upon this condition, That the king would assure the said dutchie unto the first heire male which the said king should have by *Eleanor* the said emperours sister, unto whom hee was then espoused. So that, that law (That the king cannot alienate the Crowne-land) was then very profitable unto the king and the kingdome. And unto this agree the doctors of the Civile law, which hold, That the emperor cannot aliene any thing of the Empires, but he is bound to encrease it to his power. And from thence they draw (but foolishly) the etymologie of that name *Augustus*, saing, The Emperours are called *Augusti*, for that they ought to encrease and cannot diminish the Empire : as much say they of other kings and monarchs, for there is therein the like reason.

For conclusion, no man of perfitt judgement can denie, but these three lawes of the kingdome of Fraunce, namely, the law Salique, the law of the Estates general, and the law of Not alienating the lands and provinces of the Crowne, are the very true pillars, bases, and foundations of the kingdome and the roialtie, which none can or ought to abolish. I doubt not but there will be found many, which will be quarelling at those aforesaid examples and reasons, and wil say, That to sustaine and defend that the king cannot abolish the said Law, is to diminish his power, and to give limitation and restriction to his soveraigne authoritie. But for replie, I will only demandaund, If it be not puissance in a Prince to conserve him and his estate ? If they confesse Yea (as none can denie it, if he bee not altogether without judgement : ) I say, it followeth by argument taken from contraries, that it is then impuissance and



want of power in a Prince, to ruinate himselfe and his estate. And by consequent it followeth, that when we say that a Prince cannot abolish the fundamentall lawes of him and his estate; so much there wanteth that we diminish his power, that by the contrarie we establish it and make it more firme, greater, and as it were invincible. As also one the contrarie, they which say, that a Prince can abolish and change his lawes, upon which he and his Estate are founded; they establish & place in him an impuissance to conserve himselfe. For to take it rightly and in good sence, it is an act of impuissance, to ruinate, destroy, overthrow, and to participate his estate: And contrarie, it is an act of power to conserve himselfe, and maintaine his estate. No more nor no lesse, than when a building falleth upon the earth, or when a man letteth it fall, these be acts of feebleness, frailtie, and impuissance: but when the one and the other holdeth and standeth streight and firme, without cracking or falling, these be acts of force and power.

The law  
naturall can  
not be abo-  
lished by  
the king, or  
any other.

Sueto. in  
Claudio,  
cap 26.  
Tacitus Ann.  
lib. 12.

Spartian, in  
Catac.

As for the law Naturall, it cannot be abolished: For if a Prince will authorise, adulteries, incests, thefts, murders, and massacres, and other like crimes, which naturall reason and common sence causeth us to abhorre and detest: certaine and evident it is, that such authorising is of no value, and that the Prince cannot doe this. When the emperor *Claudius* would espouse *Agrippina*, his niece, his brothers daughter, he made a Law, whereby he authorised the mariage of the uncle with the niece, which was published all over: but sayth *Suetonius*, no man would imitate and follow the Emperours example (but a bad servant newly enfranchised, & a souldier,) every body so detested and abhorred such kind of marriages, as being contrarie to the naturall law and common sence. And indeed, this mariage fell not out well for him: For *Agrippina* his neece and wife, poysoned him to bring to the Empire *Nero* hir sonne (whom she had had by another husband) and had caused him to be adopted for his sonne; although he had by his first wife *Messalina* another naturall sonne, called *Britanicus*, whom *Nero* (when he came to the Empire) empoysoned to death: so that by the incestuous mariage, wherewith *Claudius* had contaminated and poysoned his house, he and his naturall sonne (who by reason should have been his successor) were killed with poyson. We read likewise, that the Emperour *Bassianus* *Caracalla* beholding one day *Julia* his mother in law with an eye of incestuous concupiscence; she said unto him, *Si iule venis, tu le peux*. If thou wilt, thou maiest: Knowest thou not that it belongs unto thee to give the law, not to receive it: which talke so enflamed him yet more with lust, that he tooke her to wife in mariage. Hereupon Historiographers note, that if *Bassianus* had knowen well, what it was to give a law, he would have detested & prohibited such incestuous and abominable copulations, and not to have authorised them. For breiefely, a Prince may well give lawes unto his subjects, but it must not be contrary to nature and naturall reason. This was the cause why *Papinian* the great Lawyer (who well understood both naturall & civile law) chose rather to die, than to obey the said Emperour *Bassianus*, who had commanded him to excuse before the Senate his parricide, committed in the person of *Geta* his brother. For *Papinian* knowing that such a crime was against naturall right, so much there wanted, that he would have obeyed the Emperour, if he had commanded him to have perpetrated and committed it, that he would not obey him so far therein, as to excuse it. Wherin the Paynim Lawyer may serve for a goodly example to condemne many Magistrate Lawyers of our time, which not only excuse, but also cause to be executed unnaturall murders and massacres against all law divine and

and humane. But now we have spoken of a Prince's absolute power, let us come to the other.

The other power, which we call Civile, is that which is governed, and as it were limited within the bounds of Reason, of right, and equitie, and which we must presume, that the Prince will use, and useth ordinarily in all his commaunds: unlesse expressly he shew and declare, that he willeth and ordaineth this or that of his absolute power, and of his certaine knowledge. This is that second power, which is guided by Prudence & good Counsell: and which giveth a sweet temperature and counterpoise to that absolute power, no more nor no lesse, than the second motion of the Sunne tempereth the course of the first, as we have abovesaid. This is that power which establisheth and conserveth in assurednesse, kingdomes and Empires, and without which they cannot stand, but incontinent shal be ruinated, annihilated, and laid on the ground. This is that power which all good Princes have so practised (letting their absolute power cease without using any, unlesse in a demonstration of Majestie, to make their Estate more venerable and better obeyed) that in all their actions, and in all their commaunds, they desire to subject and submit themselves to Lawes and to reason. And in this doing they neuer thought or esteemed to doe any thing unworthie of their Majestie, but contrary, have ever accounted, that there was no thing more becomming the majestie of a soveraigne Prince, than to live and carrie himselfe in all his actions according to right and equitie. And that the domination and power of a Prince, that so governeth himselfe, is greater, more secure, and more venerable, than his which governeth himselfe after the absolute power. And truly, all the good Romane Emperours have alwayes held this language, and have so practised their power, as we read in their hystories. Yea, the Emperour *Theodosius* made an expresse Law for it, which is so good to be marked, that I thought good to translate it word by word. It is, the majestie of him that governeth, to confesse himselfe to be bound unto lawes, so much doth our authoritie depend upon law. And assuredly, it is a farre greater thing than the Empire it selfe, to submit his Empire and power unto Lawes. And that which we will not to be lawfull unto us, we shew it unto others by the oracle of this our present Edict. Given at Ravenna the eleventh day of Iune, the yeare of the Consulship of *Florentius* and *Dionisius*.

To come then to our purpose, you must understand, that *de Comines* spoke of this second power in the place above alleaged, and not of the absolute power of a Prince: for by that power it is certaine, that the Prince hath good authoritie to enterprife wars, and to levie imposts upon his subjects without their consent. Because that by the roial law above mentioned, the Roman people gaue all the like power unto the Prince, as they had themselves, to use it towards the people, and against the people; and gave him absolute power without any astringtion or bond to lawes, to do what he would. We see also by the Law of God the same absolute power is given unto kings & soveraign Princes: For it is written, that they shall have full power over the goods & persons of their subjects. And although God have given them that absolute power, as to his ministers & Lieutenants on earth, yet would he not have them use it, but with a temperance & moderation of the second power, which is ruled by reason & equitie, which we call Civile. For, so much there wanteth, that God would that Princes should use the said absolute power upon their subjects, as he would not so far constrain them, as to sell their goods, as is declared unto us in the example of *Nabush*. For most unlikely is it, that God the great Dominator and Governor of all

**The Civile  
power tempereth the  
Absolute.**

L. digna  
Von C. d.  
Leye.

Dion de Aug.  
gust. L. 1. D.  
de Conflic.  
Princ.

*I. Sam. 8.*

1. King, 12.

Princes, would haue Princes to abuse their powers with cruelties, rapines, injustices, or any other unreasonable way of absolute power. But as God by justice punished the wicked, & by kindnesse & clemencie maintaineth the good, and rightly & most holily useth his diuine power; so would he, that Princes which are his lieutenants on earth, should do the like; not in perfection (for that they cannot) but in imitation.

To conclude then now our talke, concerning the place of *Comines*, certaine it is, that a Prince may well make warre, and impose tallies without the consent of his subjects, by an absolute power: but better it is for him to use his civile power, so should he be better obeyed. And as for Aydes and Subsidies, whereof *Comines* speaketh, some say they are not at this day leuied by an absolute power, but by the peoples consent. Because in the time of *Charles* the seventh (who had great & long wars against the English) the Estates generall of the kingdome agreed unto him to leuie Aydes and Subsidies euery yeare, without any more calling them together; for that the warres endured so long, and that their euery yeares assembly would have come to great expences: so that if the cause had alwaies continued, then necessarily should the imposition have continued. But certaine it is, that this consent, delivered by the said Estates, concerned only the English warres, which ending, the said consent finished: yet afterward, the said consent and accord of the Estates was drawne into a custome. In the time of king *Charles* the eight, the Estates generall at Tours, were convoked, as well to provide for the government of the king and of the kingdome (for his Majestie was under age) as also for Aydes and Subsidies, which were freely graunted by the said Estates, although the people of Fraunce were then verie poore and ruined. And the abovenamed *Comines* sheweth one thing that is verie true, That the holding of the said Estates is very good and profitable for a king of France, whereby he is both stronger and better obeyed: but he complaineth, That in his time there were men (as there are at this day) unworthie to possesse those offices which they held, who all they could hindered the holding of the Estates, least their euill behaviors and incapacities should be spied and knowne. Such men are of like humors, as the unworthie Emperours *Caligula*, *Maximinus*, *Commodus*, and others, whereof we have spoken above: which hated the Senate of Rome, because they would not have such correctors and controulers.

The counsell of many is better than the counsell of one alone.

Let us now come to *Machiavell*, to prooue his Maxime, which we haue above confuted by good reasons and examples. He alleageth two reasons: The one is, that if a Prince governe himselfe by one Counsellor alone, it would prooue dangerous, for feare that the Counsellor seeke to occupie the Estate. Whereunto I answered, that that were considerable, if principalities were at this day given by tumultuarie elections of souldiers, as in times past the Romane Empire was given: for he that could obtaine the fauour of the men of warre either by love or money, carried it away. But in our time, principalities are hereditarie, or are given by grave and deliberate election of more staied and discreet people, than were the Pratorian souldiers of Rome. Yet doe not I approve that a Prince should be governed by one alone, when he may have a greater number of good Counsellors: for they that haue so done in times past, haue found it euill, and haue repented it, as more fully shall be shewed in the next Maxime. The reason also is euidēt, because one alone cannot so well by his wisdom examine & search out a matter or cause, nor so well can prevent difficulties occurrents, & consequents that may happen, as many can do. Therefore also the wise *Salomon* approveth the Counsell which is compounded of many.

The



Discordant  
opinions  
comming  
to one end,  
is not to be  
feared.

The other second reason of *Machiavell* is, that he saith, That in a Counsell compounded of many, there are alwaies discordances and contrarieties of opinions that they cannot accord. Wherunto I answer, That if a Counsell be compounded of good and honest men, they will alwaies sufficiently agree in their opinions (as experience sheweth it in the Counsells of many Princes, and in the body of Commonwealths) although they disagree in motives, reasons, allegations, and in other circumstances. These discordances are often very profitable and necessarie, if so be they all look to one end, which is the good of the Commonwealth. As happened in the Counsell of the Senate, which was held at Rome about that horrible and strange conspiracie of *Casiline*, who with his companions went about to destroy his country with fire & sword: For in that Counsell, *Cesar* reasoned so gently, as it seemed he made small account of the matter, and in respect of his authoritie others after him reasoned in like manner, mildly and gently, as *Casiline* and his partakers were in a good way to have been absolved. But when it came to *Cato* his turne, he reasoned in another sort, even plainly to rebuke such as spoke before him. Great pities it is (sayth he) that we are in such a time, when men attribute the name of wicked things to such as are good. Now is it accounted liberallitie to give the goods of another man, it is magnanimitie to use violence and boldnesse, it is mercie and clemencie to plucke criminall and condemned persons out of a Iustices hands: And I pray you, is it so small a thing to have conspired our destruction, and the effusion of our blood? Another crime might be punished after it should be committed: but who should punish *Casiline* after the execution of his conspiracie, and that we shall be all dead? They which before have delivered their opinions, seeme to be very liberal of our bloods, and of the blood of so many good men within Rome, to spare that of a sort of wicked conspirators. If they be not afraid of this conspiracie, so much the more (my masters) have we cause to feare, to watch, and hold us upon our guards, without too much trusting them which are in such assurance. For our aunccestors have made themselves great, by diligence, justice, & by good counsell, free from all covetousnesse and viciousnesse. Vnto them which are vigilant, take paines and use good counsell, all things succeed well; but sluggards & cowards had need implore aid of the gods, for no doubt they are both contrarie and angry with them. And therefore my advise is, that they which have confessed the fault, should die the death of the deserved. *Cato* in this matter reasoning against the advise of others which had been before him, greedily to his commendation, drew the rest at the last to his opinion; yet not more to his honour, than to the dishonour of *Cesar*. So then it is not ever evill, that in a Counsell there should be sometimes *Catoes* and *Appius Claudius* and such like persons, which often hold strong against others: for affaires and businesses are so much the better cleared and bouldred out. It also holds others better in order, which otherwise by too great facilitie and fear to contradict, suffer themselves to be carried after the first opinion, without debate or due consideration. And truly, in all Counsells, there are but too many such as were *Valerius Publicola*, *Manlius Atypia*, *Servilius*, *Pompeius*, *Cesar*, and such like, which alwaies reasoned gently and mildly in all things; but too few *Catoes*, *Appius Claudius*, *Quintus Cincinnatus*, and such like, which in Senates hold rigorous opinions. For although for the most part such rigorous opinions ought not to be followed, yet they being mingled and dispersed amongst others, they serve well to bring to passe a good resolution, and so doe make a good and sweet harmonie in a Counsell or Senat, as *Titus Livius* shew-

eth in many places. And therefore contradictions of opinions, whereof *Machiavell* speaketh, are not so much to be feared in Princes Counsels: Against whose *Maxime* I conclude, That the Prince which governeth himselfe by the counsell of men that be wise, honest, and experienced, shall prosper in al good: & he that trusteth himselfe by his own head, shall ruinate himselfe; as saith very elegantly the Poet *Horace*:

Com. lib. 1.  
Ode 4.

*A. Supream power, devoid of Counsell good, is a shadowe, which T. cannot  
Fals of is selfe, as though it never stood.*  
*A Temperat power by God exalted is:*  
*The Intemperat his hatred doth not misse.*



## 2. Maxime.

Cap. 23. of  
the Prince.

*The Prince, so shun and nor, so be circumvented of Flatterers, ought so forbid  
his friends and Counsellors, that they speake not to him, nor so counsell him  
any thing, but only of those things whereof he freely begins to speake, or asketh  
their aduise.*



He meanes to shun and avoid Flatterers, which doe nothing els but make lies, and report falsehoods; pleasing Princes eares (saith *Machiavell*) is, that he make knowne that hee takes no pleasure in hearing of lies: but that it is more agreeable unto his nature, that men should freely speake the truth. But because the Prince should too much debase his Maiestie to yeeld an eare to euery one that will utter a truth unto him; it is then requisite, that he take a third way: Therefore (saith hee) it shall bee good that the Prince hold alwayes nigh him some certaine number of vertuous people, which may haue libertie freely to tell him truth upon all such things whereof he demaunds aduise, and not of any other things. Forbidding and inhibiting them to speake to him of any thing but of that whereof hee himselfe hath begun the talke. After hauing understood their opinions, he ought to deliberate with himselfe, and chuse the Counsell that hee shall find best.

By



Y this Maxime Machiavel making a countenance to counsell a Prince not to seive himselfe with flatterers, teacheth him the very meanes wholly to be governed by them. For there is none more truly a flatterer, nor more dangerous, than he that seeth before his eyes a thousand abuses, and knoweth that his Princes affaires goe evill, and yet either will not or dare not open his mouth to let him know them: because herein lieth the principall dutie of a good and faithful Counsellor to his Prince, to declare unto him the abuses committed by his subjects, be they Officers or privat persons, that with good Counsell he may provide therfore. And to attend whilst the Prince himselfe begin the matter first to his Counsell, that should be in vaine: for he cannot propose that which he knoweth not: and it is a notorious and plaine thing, that the Prince (who is alwaies that up in an house or within a troupe of his people) seeth not nor knoweth how things passe, but that which men make them see and know. This was the chiefe wherefore *Dioclesian* complained so much of the flatterers of his Court, which keeping close the truth of things, fed him with smooke, and so by that meanes made him commit many great faults in the administration of the empire. But because that historie is worthy the marking, I will recite it at length.

The Emperor *Dioclesian* was borne in a little village, of a base and obscure race at Salon in Esclavonia: yet in his youth, and naturally, he was so ambitious and covetous of honour, that from a young souldier, he aspir'd still more higher, that he became a Captaine, and from a Captaine to be a Colonell, and from a Colonell to be a Lieutenant generall and cheefe of the armie. Finally came to that great altitude to be the Romane Emperour. Whence he was come to the sovereign degree of all honours, yet was his unsatiable ambition & covetousnesse of glorie unsatisfied; for being Emperour, he would needs be worshipped as a God, and make his feet be kissed, on which he wore golden shoes covered with pearles and precious stones, after the manner of the kings of Persia. But who would have thought that he would have given over the imperiall dignitie, and so many honours as were done him, yet in truth he did forsake all this, and dispoiled himselfe of his Empire, which he resigned to *Constantius Chlorus* and *Galerius*, and retired unto his house at Salon in Esclavonia, where he lived yet more than ten yeares a privat man, taking his pastime in gardening and rurall works, and never repented him whilst he was a privat man that he had despoiled himselfe of the Empire. But if this be so strange a thing, that a man so ambitious, and that so well loved the honours of this world, to rid himselfe of so great a dignitie, did become (as I may say) a Gardiner and a Labourer of the earth, yet more admirable is the cause wherefore he did this: For it was for no other cause, but for the hatred and evill will that he conceived against the flatterers of his Court, which a thousand waies abused him, wherunto he could not well give remedie, he was so besieged betwixt their hands. This hath bin written by many Historiographers, yea, by *Flavius Vopiscus*, who placeth flatterers amongst the principall causes of Princes corruptions. And because this place likes me well, I will translate it. A man may aske (saith he) What is it that maketh Princes so wicked & corrupt? First, their great libertie and abundance of all things they have: Secondly, their wicked friends, their detestable attendants, their covetous Eunuchs, their foolish and uncivile courtiers, and too plaine ignorance of the affaires of their Common-wealth. I have heard my father tell this, that the Emperour *Dioclesian* returning unto

The Prince knows not what is done but by the mouth of his people.

Pompe. Iustus in Diocl. Vopiscus in Aureliano.



a private life, was wont to say, that there is nothing harder, than to know well how to play the Emperour: Foure or five (saith he) will assemble & make a plot together to deceive the Emperour, after they will say all with one voice, what they will have him to doe. The Emperour, who is enclosed in his house, cannot know the truth of things as they passe, but by necessitie is constrained to understand nothing but what pleaseth them to tell him, & make him understand: so doe they cause him to give offices to men by themselves in poss, which merit them not at all, and makes him cast out such as best deserve them for the good of the Commonwealt. What should be said more, to make short, saith *Dioclesian*, A good, wise, & vertuous Prince is bought & sold by such people. Behold the very words of *Vopiscus*, who evidently sheweth, that *Dioclesian* was discontented to be Emperour, because he was governed maugre his beard (as they say) by flattering courtiers, which caused him to abuse his estate. But I leave you to thinke, if this were not a straunge thing to see *Dioclesian* change his emperiall estate with a rusticke life, for the displeasure he took at his flattering Courtiers: for by the contrarie we commonly see, that Princes rather please themselves marvellously to see flatterers, and they cannot goe three paces, but they have them at their tails, and more willingly doe they give their eares unto them than to good people which will tell them the truth of affaires that import their Estate. And he that will tell them this hystorie of *Dioclesian*, a man need not doubt but they wil straight say he was a sot & a beast to forsake his dignitie of an Emperour for such a cause, and that he better deserved to be a gardiner than an Emperour. But if they consider what was the end of *Galba*, of *Cotrudius*, of *Bassianus*, and of many other Romanie Emperours, which by meanes of flatterers have had fearefull deaths, they will not esteeme *Dioclesian* such a foole to withdraw himselfe to a privat habitation, there to finish his dayes otherwise than by the hands of murderers. Yet I must confesse, that he might have done better, to have put away from him all those pestilent flatterers: and if to rid so many at once from the court, there had been great perill in so great a change; yet no doubt it was not impossible for him to have dispatched them by little and little one after another, and then to have placed good people about him, thereby to have strengthened himselfe.

It is a pernicious thing to hold the truth from the prince.

It is then scene by the saying of *Dioclesian*, that the Maxime of *Machiavell* is a true precept of flatterie; and that there are no greater flatterers, nor more pernicious, than they that keepe close from Princes the truth of things as they passe. And truly, if the Prince have good Counsellors and servants, by whom hee may be well advertised of all truths which may concerne his estate, and where he ought to provide and give rules, although some lies by flatterers be sowne amongst them, yet can they not corrupt the good government of the Prince: for truth hath alwaies of hir selfe so great force, as she causeth lies to vanish away, as mists before the Sun, so that alwaies they convert to smoke without effect, if so bee the truth bee not hid in the Prince. And withall, flatterers and liers dare not open their mouthes, fearing to bee discovered in their evill purposes, when they know that the Prince hath nigh him good and wise men, which will freely tell him the truth of all that concernes his estate, and which are beloved and credited of him.

*L. quisquis  
C. ad Leg. lu.  
Mas.*

By the Civile law, he that knoweth any enterprife which tendeth to the damage of his Prince, is bound to reveale it unto him, upon paine himselfe to be held culpable of treason. They then which are Counsellors and most especiall servants of a Prince, which are in a more particular obligation unto their maisters service than other

other Subjects are, ought not they to be reputed for traitors when they conceale the trueth from the Prince, of such things as pertaine to his charge and providence? If any answer, that all things for which the Prince should provide, import not his ruine, being omitted: I reply, that it may be not his present ruine, but yet at length. For one fault and omission draweth another after it; and that, another; and so by litle and little, the estate of the Commonwealth; and by consequent, the Prince falls into confusion. And yet although the omission of providing, in things where the Prince is bound to provide, doe not import his ruine and destruction, either present or at length; yet it must needs alwaies import damage to the Prince, or his subjects; and in everie case it is the profit and interest of the Prince, to give provision and rule therefore. For there cannot come but good, when subjects are well governed, and that there is a good pollicie in all things.

Here may be demanded, Seeing the good Counsellors of a Prince are so necessarie, and flatterers and evill Counsellors are so domigeable, from whence cometh it that yet Princes are well attended on and garnished with flatterers, and have few good Counsellors about them? It seemeth that Maister *Philip de Comines* hath well hit this mark: Saying that this comes to passe, because Princes alwaies seeke such as feeds their owne humors and please them best, and contemne such as are contrarie, although they may be more profitable unto them. For (saith he) such as have been nourished with a Prince, or which are of his age, or which can best order and dispose his pleasures, or such as apply themselves unto his will, are alwaies in good grace, and the first unto whom he imparteth and disperseth his authoritie and great Estates. And a Prince never knowes how to chuse a wise man and of good counsell, untill he find himselfe in some great necessitie, and oftentimes hath most need of them which before he had despised; as I have seene (saith he) of the Countie de *Charolois*, and king *Edward* of England.

But upon this point riseth yet an other doubt, Wherefore it is that flatterers doe rather please Princes, than wise men? *Plutarch* seemes unto me well to resolve this question: when he saith, That it proceedeth from this, that naturally men, but especially Princes, do too much love themselves: And love of ones selfe obfuscateth and blindeth judgement, so that we can neuer truly judge that which we love. From hence it followeth, that when a flatterer tels his Prince many goodly things to his praise, he beleeves it, and persuades himselfe that there are many praise able things in him, although indeed there be nothing. And there helpeth to this persuasion, that the flatterer alwaies takes for the subject of his praises, such vices as are in alliance and neighbourhood with their vertues. For if the Prince be cruell and violent, he will persuade him that he is Magnanimious and Generous, and such a one as will not put up an injurie or despite. If he be prodigall, he will make him beleeve that he is liberall, and magnificall, that he maintaines an estate truly Royall, and one that well recompenceth his servants. If the Prince be over-gone in lubricities and lusts, he will say, he is of a humane and manly nature, of a Ioviall and merrie complexion, and of no Saturnine complexion or condition. If the Prince be covetous and an eater of his Subjects, he will say, he is worthy to be a great Prince, as he is, because he knowes well how to make himselfe well obeyed. Briefly, the flatterer adorne his language in such sort, that he will alwaies praise his Princes vice by the resemblance of some vertue ne thereunto. For the most part of vices have alwaies some likenesse with some vertue. The flatterer also on his

Princes love  
flatterers, &  
wherefore.

*De Comines,*  
*lib. 1. cap. 21.*

*Plutar. de di-*  
*scip. adul. &*  
*amicis.*

*Dionis. Halic.*  
*lib. 9.*

*Salust. in*  
*Catol.*

his part, will not forget to cover his owne faults and vices with the visage and likeness of some vertue nie unto them. For he will cover his ambition with the zeale of the Commonweale, and will say, that for the Princes service, and that the affaires of the Commonwealth might be well governed, he accepted or pursued such an Estate, or tooke on him such a charge, which otherwise he would neuer have demanded or accepted. His covetousnesse he will cover with his Princes honour, and will say, that it should be no honour to his Maister (who is so great a Lord) to have a servant poore and contemptible. If he be vindicative, he will alwaies cover his vengeance with the Princes mantle, saying that the enmities he hath, is for the good services he hath done to his Prince, and that the Maister is despised and outraged in the person of his servant. And so of all other vices. Insomuch that the Prince who yeeldeth his eares to flatterers, shall alwaies so be dealt withall, that they shall beleue vices to be vertues. And he will easily beleue this, because (as is said) It is the nature of man too much to love himselfe, & by consequent to be blind in judging of himselfe, beleaving still his vices to be vertues. And contrarie, if the Prince heare a good man speake, which of an evill thing, tels him the evill, and of a good thing, the good; he shall never please him so well, as that flatterer. And from hence proceedeth the common proverbe, which is as true as can be: *Obsequium amicos, veritatem odium parere*: To follow a mans pleasure and desire, gets friends, but the truth, hatred. And this is scene, not only in Princes, but also in particular and privat men. For say to a covetous man, or to a wicked usurer who eateth up his Christian brother by excessive usuries, That he is a frugall, good, and wise husband, and that he well observes S. Pauls commandement, who wils every man to have care of his family, and if not care to gather together goods for his children, he is worse than an Infidell; certainly you should be accounted his great friend, and he would take great pleasure to be so tickled in his vice. But if you say unto him, There is no charitie in him so to destroy and eat up his brother Christian whom he ought to love as himselfe, and that true charitie is joined unto faith, pittie, and all other vertues (as S. Paul saith) and that he that is without love, is without faith, without vertue, and is a verie Infidell; then have you lost him for ever, and he will be no more your friend; you haue obtained his hatred for telling him the truth.

The dutie  
of a good  
freind and  
servant to-  
wards his  
Prince

Titus Livius  
lib. 3.

But good people ought not to desist for that cause, to say the trueth both to Princes and to privat persons. For truely, Truth is so goodly and expedient of her selfe (as Plato saith,) that not onely we ought to preferre her before the good grace favour and amitie of men, but also before all things of the world. A good man then which loveth Truth, will imitate the example of *Quintius Capitolinus*, who one day making an Oration to the Romane people, after hee had liuely shewed them their faults, in that they ceased not to tumultuate and disobey their Superiors, whereby some great disorder and confusion might fall to the commonweal, added in the end these words: Masters, I know well, that a man may utter more pleasant talke, and tell you of things more plausible; but as for me, my nature is not to flatter, and the present necessitie causeth, that I loue rather to tel you true things, than pleasant: I have a good mind to please and content you, but I love much better, to preserve and guard you from falling into destruction, how little thanke soever I haue of you. These remonstrances and words of this good man, were of such efficacy by the pure and native truth which he shewed unto the people without any flatterie, that he appeased the tumults and discontentments of the Citie. And as to Princes men ought not



not to spare to speake truth: so they may not take delight to be praised by flatterers. but must shew them, that whosoever praiseth any man (be he Prince or other) in his presence, is a flatterer: he must set before them, the example of that good and wise Emperor *Alexander Severus*, who tooke pleasure in hearing the praises of great Princes which had bene before him, but would never heare his owne. And greatly praised that saying of the valiant Romane captaine *Pescennius Niger*, who as one day a certaine Orator would needs haue pronounced an Oration called *Panigerica*, in his praise, Go thy way (saith he) and write the praises of *Marins* and *Anniball*, and of other old and valiant Captaines, that we may imitate them: for it is a pure mockerie to praise such as do yet live, and especially great Princes, of whom there is hope and feare, and which may bereave a man of both life goods and libertie: as for me, whilst I am alive, I will do good and approved things, and after my death, then let me be praised. The Emperour *Alexander* then alledged this notable sentence of captaine *Niger*, and would by no meanes be praised in his owne presence. So likewise when men used to salute him, he would not suffer them to use titles and salutations of flatterie: As, *God conserve thy Divinitie, thy sacred Maiesie, thy Clemencie*, (which since have bene in use) but they must say only, *God keepe thee Alexander*. And they which did otherwise, or which wold use too many ceremonies in their salutations, were streight mocked and hissed at, yea, forced out of the Emperours chamber. But indeed willingly he would be saluted of none but of good men, and of good reputation. Infomuch, as he caused an edict to be published, whereby hee inhibited and forbad upon great paines, that none should dare to present himselfe before his face, which knew himselfe to be, or indeed was of evill fame & reputation. Moreover, they must shew to Princes, That it is the goodliest thing in the world to know himselfe. For besides that the knowledge of our selves leads us to the knowledge of God, it makes that men (although they be great Princes) acknowledge themselves alwayes men, that is to say, subject to faile and to doe evill, to follow evil, to leave that which is good, to be ignorant of good things, and to know many evill, and to practise them. For these qualities are common in all men generally. So that he that knowes himselfe a man, will also know and acknowledge himselfe apt to fall and offend, and so will he abate his pride; whereas otherwise it would mount and arise by the foolish and hyperbolicall praises of flatterers.

Moreover, as it is very requisite and necessarie, that wise men which are nigh the Prince, should use free libertie to tell him the truth of all things which concerne him: so must they doe it with all modestie, accompanied with the honour and reverence that God hath commanded us to beare unto Princes, as to his lieutenants. For that Cynicke libertie of some Philosophers, which knew not how to reprehend and shew mens faults, but by taunts and bitter biting speeches, are not to be approved; as did that foole *Diogenes*, who ridiculously and triflingly talked with king *Alexander* the Great, as if he had spoken to some simple burgesse of Athens. And *Calisthenes*, whom *Alexander* led with him in his voyage into Asia, to instruct him in good documents of wisdom; who indeed was so austere, hard and biting in all his remonstrances and reasonings, as neither the king nor any others could take in good part any thing that he taught. It is then very much expedient (if a man mean to fructifie and do good by his speech) to use gentle and civile talke and persuasions, especially if he have to doe with a Prince or great man, which will not be gained by rigor (or as they say, by high wrastling) but by mild and humble persuasions. And

Lam pri. in  
Alex.  
Spart. in  
Niger.

Plutarke in  
Alex.

above

The difference of a friend and a flatterer.

Plutarke de discip. adu. et ami i.

above all, men ought well to engrave in Princes minds, that notable answer which captaine *Phocion* made unto the king *Antipater*, who had required some thing of him which was not reasonable: I would (Sir) doe for your service all that is possible for me, but you cannot have me both for a friend and a flatterer: as if he would say, That they be two things farre different, to be a friend and to be a flatterer, as in truth they are. For the true friend and servant of the Prince, orders and frames all his actions to the good of the Prince, and the flatterer tends and bends all his actions to his owne proper good: the true friend loveth with a true love his Prince, and the flatterer loveth himselfe: the true friend modestly blameth his vices in his presence, and praiseth his vertues in his absence; but the flatterer alwaies exalts the Prince in his presence, rather for his vices, than for his vertues, and behind his backe he blameth and defameth him, vaunting and saying, that he governes him at his pleasure, and that he possesseth him, and makes him doe what hee will: the true friend persevereth in the service of his Prince, as well in time of adversitie as prosperitie, and the flatterer turnes his backe in time of adversitie: the true friend serves for an healthfull medicine to his Prince, but the flatterer for a sweet poison: the true friend conserveth his Prince in his estate and greatnesse: but the flatterer precipitateth him into ruine and destruction, as we shall discourse the examples of al these things hereafter.

Moreover, when we say that flatterers are pernicious to a Prince, that is not ment of all them which dedicate and give themselves to please the Prince: for there may well be Gentlemen of his owne age about him, to accompany him in his honest pastimes, as to ride, hunt, hawke, to tourney, to play at tennis, to run, and other like pastimes, which doe not evil to give themselves to please him in such things: but contrary, it is right necessary and requisit, that the Prince have sometimes such company. For it should not be good nor comely (in defect, and for want of plaies and pastimes) hee should to himselfe procure an habit of a Stoicall humour; neither that he should get a complexion too severe and melancholicke. Hereof we read a very remarkable example above others in *Alexander* the great, king of Macedon: When he departed from his countrie to passe into Asia, to make war upon that great Dominator, king *Darius*, he had with him most cheefe in his love amongst others, *Craterus* and *Hephaestion*, two gentlemen, his especiallest friends and servants, yet farre different the one from the other: *Craterus* was of an hard and sharpe wit, severe, stoicall, and melancholicke, who altogether gave himself unto affaires of Counsell, and indeed was one of the kings cheefe Counsellors: but *Hephaestion* was a young gentleman, well complexioned and conditioned in his manners and behavior, of a good and quicke wit, yet free of all care but this, to content and please the king in his sports and pastimes; insomuch, as men called *Craterus* the kings friend, and *Hephaestion* the friend of *Alexander*, as one that gave himselfe to maintaine the person of his Prince in mirths and pastimes, which were good to the maintenance of his health. When *Alexander* had conquered Persia and Media, he begun to apparrell himselfe after the Persian & Median manner, the rather to gaine the hearts of those nations newly conquered: *Hephaestion* to please the king, did the like, leaving the Macedonike manner, to apparrell himselfe as the Persians & Medes did, for which the king liked him the better: but *Craterus* kept alwaies his old fashions of Macedonie, and much blamed that change of fashions in their apparrell, and said it was but even to barbarize, and begun to taunt and gibe at *Hephaestion* for it. This their con-

Plutarke in alex.

contrarietie of manners, was a cause that they entred far into enmitie and quarrels; inſomuch as one day they came unto the drawing of ſwords one againſt another, and ſtreight aſſembled their friends on both ſides; whereby had ſalne out a great mutinie, if the king himſelfe had not come in good time, hearing a great noiſe of people, and ſeperated them, preſently and openly rebuking *Hephæſtion*, calling him foole and madman; he tooke alſo privately aſide *Cræſus*, and told him; he greatly marvelled, that he being a wiſe man, would ſo hate *Hephæſtion* for ſo ſmall a thing. Afterward, he agreed them, and publickely declared unto them, that they were the two Gentlemen which moſt he loved in the world; but if any more they fell to quarell againe, he ſwore by *Iupiter Amon*, that with his owne hands he would ſlay him that begun. But after that they did nothing one againſt an other. Hereupon I ſay: That it is neceſſary for a Prince to have ſuch as *Cræſus*, for his counſell, as alſo ſuch as *Hephæſtion*, to keepe him companie in his honeſt paſſimes.

But to the end men may better diſcerne ſuch as are good friends and ſervants from flatterers, I will now (God willing) diſcover the examples of many ſorts of flatterers, which for the moſt part have had inſingular obſervation, that Maxime of *Machiavell*, namely: To hold cloſe from the Prince the truth of things. And the better to diſtinguiſh them, I will call them with ſuch names as our auncesſors have called them, which are very proper and covenable unto them. Firſt there are a ſort of flatterers, which our auncient Frenchmen called janglers, which ſignifieth as much as a ſkoſſer, a triſler, a man full of words, or (as we call them) long tongues, which by their jangling & bablings in rime or in proſe, do give themſelves to pleaſe great men, in praiſing and exalting them exceedingly, & rather for their vices than for their virtues. Theſe be they which by their ſmooth language, can make (as one ſaith) of a Devill an Angell: but in the meane while, they ſo enchant men and ſwell them up with pride, that in effect they make them become even Angelicall Devils. This ſort of flatterers were baniſhed and driven out of Fraunce in the time of *Philip Auguſtus*, as perſons ſerving for nothing but to vanities and corruption of manners; unto which, Princes and great Lords gave gifts, which might better have been employed upon the poore. And therefore that good king made a vow, that he would from thenceforth give to the poore, all that which before he and his anceſtors had given unto janglers. And to the end that other Lords of the court ſhould follow his example, and that they might have no more occaſion to give any thing to the ſaid janglers, he baniſhed them all as is ſaid, from the Court.

Such flatterers in truth are very pernicious, for ſeeking too much to exalt and liſt up Princes by praiſes, they are cauſes to mount them into pride and unmeaſurable ſtweeneſſe, which after brings their deſtruction. So came it to *Julius Caſar*: For *Lælius Cotta*, *Cornelius Balbus*, and ſuch like janglers, being nigh about him, ever perſuaded him; firſt to name the month (which then was called Quintilis) with & by his name, *Julius*, which he did, and ever ſince was it called July: after that, they would needs build him a Temple, to make him be worſhipped as a God, and they called him *Iupiter* in his preſence: they alſo perſuaded him to take the name and crowne of a king, which he was determined to doe if he had not been prevented by death. When the Senators came to ſpeake with him in his houſe, he would not ariſe to meet them, but thoſe flatterers hindered him; neither would they permit him to riſe out of his chair to ſalute them, ſaying he was *Caſar*, the ſoueraign Prince of the Common-wealth, and that all others ought to honor him, and not he them. Theſe

Janglers.

Annal. up-  
on the year  
1104.Dion & Plu-  
tar. in Caſar.  
& Sueton. in  
Caſar. 78.  
79.



Suet. in Calig.  
cap.21.  
51. Joseph.  
Antiq. lib.  
18. cap. 15.

things which *Caesar* did against his will by the persuasions & constraint of janglers, got unto him hatred and evill will of all the Senate, insomuch, that some Senators conspired against him, and slew him even in the Senat house.

*Caius Caligula* a certaine time was a good Prince, but the janglers he had about him, by their unmeasurable praises made him become (as saith *Suetonius*) a monster: they caused him to take titles of, Pitious, The Sonne of Campes or Hoasts, Most good, and Most great *Caesar*: and in the meane while they made him become the most cruel the most coward, and the most wicked tyrant in the world. He tooke a desire after all those goodly names and titles, yea to take the name of a King, and to weare a crowne: but his flatterers shewed him, that the name of an Emperour was much more than a King: therefore from thence for ward he attributed to himselfe a divine honour. So gave he commandement, that men in temples should set up images of him through all the world, which were subject to the Romane Empire: Insomuch, that the Governour of Iudea, called *Petrionius*, would have placed an image of *Caligula* in the great temple of Ierusalem, but the Iewes would not suffer him, which extreemely detested images, whereby there had like to have beene a great sedition: but in all other provinces of the Empire it was executed without contradiction, Yet not contented that his images should bee in all places adored, this detestable monster would many times goe and place himselfe in person betwixt the two images of *Caesar* and *Pollux*, in the Temple which was consecrated to them at Rome, and there made himselfe to be worshipped in the midst of the said two gods, which hee called his bretheren. Moreover, he caused a Temple to be builded and consecrated, where he made his image to be erected, which was of gold, and caused it every day to have on such like apparell as he wore himselfe, and founded in that Temple, priests for his service, to offer up unto him rare and precious Sacrifices, as Pheasants, Peacocks, and other like birds and beasts, faire fetched every day. Sometimes went hee into the Capitoll, *Jupiters* Temple, and there would come unto the image of *Jupiter*, and make a countenance to talke with him; and speake in his eare, and then would lay his owne eare to *Jupiters* mouth, as it were to heare his answer: sometimes would hee lift up his voice, and taunt and rebuke *Jupiter*: and after hee was departed from thence, then said he that he had spoken with *Jupiter*, and had obtained that hee asked. I pray you what will you here say? Is it possible in the world to dreame or imagine a more extreame folly, or a pride and arrogancie more abhominable and estranged. Behold to what point janglers brought him. But this was not all: for seeing himselfe thus adored, hee fell persuaded, that no man durst ever enterprise any thing against him, and so committed he a thousand cruelties, and strange and horrible wickednesses, such as easily a Sovereigne Prince might doe, which spends his time and power in all excesses, wantonnesse, and riotousnesse; wherein he never ceased to wallow and tumble himselfe, till he was suddenly massacred and slaine: which was a just and merited recompence vnto him, because he so lightly beleaved flatterers and prailers.

You must thinke, that whilst these janglers handled thus their maister, leading him to such follies, that they themselves were merry and joyfull, to see him so governed after their fancie: yet was there no laughter for them all, and to speake of them which did not laugh, is somuch the better to make others laugh. First; there was one *Macro*, who seeking to come in favour and good grace with *Caligula*, not onely he

Dion in Calig.  
Calig.

he employed himselfe to praise and exalt the Emperour, but also he set on his wife, called *Ennea*, to make her fit and handsome to gaine the good grace of that young Prince, commaunding her to refuse him nothing. For such people, to come to the end they purpose, care not therein to employ their honour and that of their wives, even so far as themselves to be very bauds. She then obeying *Macro* her husband, did so much that shee entred into *Caligula* his amitie, and her selfe discovered unto him, how well hir husband loved him, and what commaundement hee gave her. Inso-much, that *Macro*, as well by the meanes of his wife, as by his owne jangling, was a good time in credit. But one day he had done something that pleased not *Caligula* (as to breake a glasse, or some other like fault) and this foolish Emperour caused him to be called. When he came he said: Come hither Gallant, did not you commaund such a thing to your wife? doe you not know well, that it is a thing punishable by our lawes, to be a baud to his owne wife? You must die: and so constrained him to slea himselfe, without hearing any excuse or defence.

There are yet two others, which received no lesse, and I will tell you how. The Emperour *Caligula*, being one day sicke in his bed, these janglers came to visit him: The first was one *Afracanus Positus*, who being nie the Emperours bed, seemed to be verie sad and sorrowfull for the Emperours disease, and amongst other adulatorie talke, he said unto him: I would (Sir) it would please the gods that I might die for the recoverie of your health; for I make a vow to the gods, that I would die with as good an heart, as ever I did anie thing. The other called *Afracanus Secundus*, said likewise to the Emperor: O, would it pleased the gods, that I might to utterance go skirmish with the Sword plaiers, to de slaine of them for your majesties health: For I swear by the gods, that I would willingly employ my selfe for your recoverie. *Caligula* answered them nothing at that time; but when he was whole, he sent for them both, and being come, he said unto them: Maisters, my good friends, I am made to know, that you are vere devout to the gods: For since the other day that you came to visit me, and that you vowed your lives to the gods for my health, I have soone recovered it, as you vowed unto me: But fearing a relaps, and againe to fall into my disease, if you accomplish not your vow, I have sent for you to make you die, praying you not to take it in evill part. And withall, without attending their answer, he commanded the Captaine of his Guard, to dispatch them. This foolish Emperour, after those janglers had made him be come such a beast and mad man, did never good thing but this. But in regard of the execution of these three flatterers, they encountred the best of the world: for they which had made him become a foole, merited well to receive part of his folly.

But certaine it is, that this sort of flatterers which are so prodigall of praises, will not spare all honourable titles towards the Princes unto whom they addiect themselves, whilest they are in their persence; but behind their backs, they mocke them, and speake a thousand evils upon them. *Teridates*, brother of *Vologasus* king of the Parthians, in the time of the Emperour *Nero*, came to Rome with a great retinue. As soone as he was arrived, he fell on his knees before *Nero*, his hands together tending towards heaven, saying in this manner: Sir, I, which am the Nephew of the great king *Arfaces*, and brother of the king *Vologasus* and *Pacorus*, am thy humble servant and slave, and am come hither to worship thee as my god: for I can doe nothing but what it pleaseth thee. Thou hast done well (answered the Emperor *Nero*) to come unto me to enioy and have fruition of my sight, and of my presence: For

that which thy predeceffors did not leave thee; I give it thee and make thee at this present, king of Armenia; that thou maist know, that it is in me to give kingdomes, and to take them away. After this word, he put a crowne on his head, and invested him with the kingdome of Armenia. After (for a pastime and sport for this new king) plaies were appointed, wherein *Nero* would needs make it appeare, how well he could play upon the citharon, and indeed plaied amongst the common plaiers. Also he thrust himselfe amongst carters cloathed in greene as they were, to shew, that in Lifts he could also tell how to handle chariot horses. After this, *Teridates* the new king of Amenia, being retired into his longding, mocked *Nero*, and spoke infinit evils of him, calling him Carter, Citternier: and further said, he mervailed how they could suffer at Rome such a master and Lord. When he was before *Nero*, he held and respected him as a god; but when he was out of his presence, he detested him as a monster. I aske of you, if such a flatterer deserved at *Nero* his hand, such a present as a kingdome.

*Titus Livius*  
lib. 5. Dec. 5.  
*Florus* lib.  
50.

*Prusias* king of Bithynia, was a flatterer like *Teridates*. For one day comming to Rome, a little after that *Paulus Aemilius* had vanquished king *Perseus* of Macedon, he made certaine Senators understand, that he had a desire to enter into the Senat, to know his masters and superiors, whose enfranchised slave he said he was, and to congratulate with them their victorie. To enter the Senat was granted him. When hee approched the place where the Senat assembled, hee fell on his knees at the doore, and kissed the doore lintell; after, rose up and entred into the hall where the Senators did sit; being there, he made great reverences, calling the Sanators, his gods, and his saviours, and desired leave to go into the temples of the gods in Rome, to make offrings and sacrifices to their gods, for the victorie which the Romans had gotten of the king *Perseus*. This also was granted him. But hee was mocked and despised of all the companie, for this so great and exorbitant humilitie and flattering which hee made unto vertuous people, which tooke no pleasure in flatterie. This was a king of no worth, a coward, and a man full of vices (as commonly all such people are, which cover their adulations with so extreame humilitie) and in the end was slaine by *Nichomedes* his sonne, who made himselfe king.

*Suetonius* in *Vitellio*, cap. 2.

*Lucius Vitellius* (father of the monstrous Emperour *Vitellius*) was such a flatterer as *Prusias*: for knowing that the Emperour *Claudius*, suffered himselfe to be much governed by *Messaline* his wife; to come to his good grace and favour, he came unto this Madame his wife, and praised her for the honour of the gods that it would please her to graunt him a gift, whereby he should for ever feele himselfe bound to doe her most humble service, as her humble slave. The Empreffe demanded, what gift he desired: It is Madame (said he) that it would please you to put out your feet, that I may pull off your shoes. (It may bee supplied in the hystorie, that this was at some houre when *Messaline* meant to put off her shoes either to go lie downe in hir bed, or to wash her feet, as the Elders used much to do,) *Messaline* could not refuse him this so honorable and excellent a demaund, proceeding from so generous and heroicall an heart, and indeed suffered him to plucke off her shoes. But what did my man? After he had drawne off her shoes, he tooke one of them smiling, and kissed it three or four times in the presence of this Madame, & caried it away with him. He ordinarily bore the shoo or startup in his bosome, and wheresoever he came, he shewed it to the people, kissing it, saying, That the Empreffe had done him that honor and favour, to give it him in pure and free gift, and that he bare it in his bosome,





Poets, janglers.

their language, alleaging lawes and hystories, which every man understandeth not, that often they cause euill conclusions. But when they be good men, they may marueilously order and conduct matters which are handled in Counsell, & bring them to a good resolution: as may be proved by infinite examples out of *Titus Livius*, and other Hystoriographers: which I will not here accumulate, because it is from our determined purpose.

In the ranke of janglers, may well be placed the Poets of our time, which by their Poefies full of flatteries and lies, seeke to hooke in some abbotship or priorship; or some other such gift, in recompence of their adulations. I confesse, that a Poet may and should take more libertie to write the praises of some one man, than an Oratour or an Hystoriographer: but when praises are so hyperbolicall, as they rather fall out to be the dishonour than the honour of him of whom they are written, then are they not any thing tollerable. I will take for example but the Epitaphes which were imprinted at Paris a little after the death of king *Charles* the ninth: there, those goodly Poets say, That the king before he died, overthrew more monsters than ever did *Hercules*, in shedding so much bloud of his rebellious subjects: That he died like *Sampson*, who at his death pulled downe and overthrew the pillars which hee had in his armes, and the house, upon himselfe; so in Fraunce, justice, pietie, and religion died with him: That France had been his stepmother: That there was in him an exceeding great cunning in all artes and sciences, and that he was also very expert in divers handicrafts: That the king (*Henry* his brother) his successor, succeeded him as *Cassio* to *Pollux*, as one god to another god: That king *Charles* died a martyr of Iesus Christ, and that from then forth he ought to be invocated as a Saint. I pray you is there any man of sober judgement, which doth not plainly see, that such speeches become rather men void of wit and understanding, by some extreme affection of flatterie, than these gallant Poets, which are drawne on and led with a generous and right Poeticall spirit: for meaning unmeasurably to praise, there escapes from them, that they speak things redounding to their dispraise: and if the dead king were alive, he would not thank them for such praises. For a good Prince (as *Horace* saith of *Augustus*) ever rejecteth such foolish praises.

To purpose ill, shall never see my verse

To *Cassio* care: for as his deeds appeare,

So would he, I, his praises should reuerse

To much his praise deesteth he so beare.

And indeed it is common to all good and vertuous people; not onely to reject excessive praises, but also to hate, as flatterers and liars, all such as use them as *Epigides* witnesseth, saying:

A good man, praise too great cannot abide:

But hates that thing, which puffes him so with pride.

If those goodly Poets before they had made their Epitaphs, had well read *Virgil* and *Horace*, they should have found, that these two excellent Poets writ in many places the praises of *Augustus*. But wherefore do they praise him? For that he established a good peace in all the Romane Empire; he caused justice to flourish; he brought

*Horac. lib. 4.  
Carm. Ode.  
5. 15.*

brought the people into a good repose and assurance, and reduced againe the golden world. They praise him also, because he amplified and enlarged the Romane Empire. But they speake not one word of the civile waies: nor for that hee overthrew *Caesars* and *Brutus*, doe they either praise or dispraise him. And indeed (as *Plutarch* sayth,) They are pitious triumphs which are made upon civile blood. These Epitaphers then should learne to praise a Prince, as they ought to doe, and as the elders have done. But when they say that our dead king died like *Sampson*, and that with him died also pietie and justice, which he carried in the devise of his two pillars; do they not plainly blame the kingdome at this present of impietie and injustice as if justice were not now so good, nor religion in so good estate as in the time of the dead king; or as if they were or could bee made worse: yea contrarie, every one seeth with his eye, that justice and religion are still in as good estate in France, as before that king died, and that they are now so well governed, as they cannot waxe worse. And when they say that France was a stepmother unto the dead king, is not this injuriously to blame the French nation? Wherein hath France appeared unto him a stepmother? Because there were rebels against the king, say they. They which they call rebels, denie they are such: and in truth when edicts were maintained and observed, they were seene to be very obedient. But let it be so, that there were in France some rebellious subjects; must therefore all the Nation be blamed and be called their kings stepmother, seeing there is no nation in the world more obedient than the French to his Prince? And as for that great cunning in arts, and the meanest mechanickall sciences, which those Poets attribute to our dead king, are not they goodly praises thinke you? As if it were some goodly vertue in a Prince to make a doffer, or to paint gourdes (for which we read that the Emperor *Adrian* was mockt) or to make some such like things. But contrarie, the Poet *Virgill* describing what kinde of Princes the Romane Princes should be, he wils they should have no knowledge in the mechanickall arts: onely they should learne (sayth he) the Science well to command, to governe, to vanquish, to pardon, to make lawes and edicts, and to establish good manners and customes upon the nations under their governance. In like manner, the prophane comparison of *Castor* and *Pollux*, where one god succeeds another god, how unfit a speech it is for a Christian? If Princes at this day will beleve janglers, they make themselves to be adored upon the altar in the midst betwixt two Saints, as was *Caligula* betwixt *Castor* and *Pollux*. But ynough is spoken of janglers, and of their janglings, and of their too too impudent and strange praises.

*Plutarch,  
in Caesar.*

*Æneid, 6.*

*Marmosets*

Let us now come unto *Marmosets*. A *Marmoset* according to the language of our elders is as much to say, as a reporter, murmurer, whisperer of tales behind ones back in Princes and great mens eares, against one or other, which be false, or else ought not to be reiterated or reported. And it seemes unto me, that this name of *Marmoset* is verie proper and fit for such people, and that it meriteth well to bee againe tilled backe in use. And I beleue it is drawne from hence that such people, go marmoting, murmuring and whispering secretly in Princes eares flattering speeches, which they dare not speake clearly and on high before the face of him whom they detest and speake evill of. These people are worse, and farre more perilous than plaine rylets, scoffers, jesters, or janglers, whereof we have before spoken: for bying the countenance of good servants and friends, they make the Prince beleve that they serve him as spies, to make and seek out the designs, evill purpo-

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Comines, lib.  
1. cap. 2. 56.

ses and carriages of their secret enemies, to the end he may not unawares be surprised of them, and that no evill may come unto him. And because (saith *Comines*) Princes are almost all suspicious (for doubts and feares that are put into their heads by advertisements) they easily beleve Marmosets and reporters. Yea some Princes (saith he) promise them that they will say nothing nor discover any thing, which is one of the greatest faults that a Prince can commit. For besides that, in all men (be they Princes or privat persons) the auncient proverb hath place (which saith) *Thar the sinewes of Wisedome is, not to beleve lightly*: yet is it a thing as particularly required in a Pntice, to stop his eares to all reports, unlesse the reporter will be well knowne, and sustaine the punishment of a slander, in case his report be not found true. And thereupon the Prince ought to make diligent inquisition to have the truth well averred, when the thing is waightie and meriteth it. And he may not be satisfied with a light information thereof: but he ought to heare him which is charged or blamed before he beleve any thing. And if the thing be not of great consequence and import him much, as if they be but words spoken (as it often happeneth) lightly in some pleasant talke, or at the table, or in choler, the Prince ought to despise and make no account of such words, but as talke uttered in an immoderate bable, and without thinking or considering thereof. For there is no man so perfect that can so bridle his tongue, but there will often fall words without consideration, which after when he thinkes of them wisheth he had never spoken them. And this imperfection which is in all men ought to be supported of some towards others, and Princes ought rather to beare them than particular persons, for two reasons. The one, for that he is more subiect to receive reports, than privat men: so that if he easily deliver his eare unto them, he shall see a thousand griefes and displeasures, and shall be in continuall doubts and feares. The other reason is, because all Princes ought to consider, that men speake more of them than of anie privat person. For there is neither great nor little, but he will meddle to speake of Princes, yea to judge of their actions, and every man to utter his follies of his good or evill behaviours. What should Princes then doe? It is impossible to bridle their tongues; and if they should be forbidden to speake, they would speake the more. Seeing then both great and small doe ordinarily speake of Princes, yea, more than of other things, it is impossible that in such abundance of talke there should not be alwaies much evill, and he that would set foot therein, should bind himselfe to an infinite paine, from whence he should not know how to get out. For the tongues of men are so ready and quicke workers in their trade, that they will frame more businesse in a day, than a thousand commissaries by their enquirers know how to dispatch in a yeare. Therefore the Prince which concerneth words spoken without due deliberation, and such other things as are not of importance, and which forbiddeth that no man shall report unto him such matters, shall in such things doe that which is most covenable and agreeable unto his gravitie and majestie, and in so doing, he shall shew himselfe more magnanimous, and in hart more generous, neither fearing, distrusting, or doubting any thing. Such an one was that great *Augustus Caesar*: for one day as one pleaded a criminall cause before him against *Emilius Ailianus*, the accuser amongst other crimes maintained, that *Ailianus* accustomed to speake evill of *Augustus*, and to detract and slander his Majestie. *Augustus* then making a countenance to be angry, returned towards the accuser saying. Is it true that thou saiest, that *Ailianus* hath spoken evill of me, I would well thou couldest prove it, and would

Sueton. in  
Aug. cap. 5.

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would then cause him to know, that I have a tongue, as well as he, and would say as much and more evill of him than hee hath done of me. This poore accuser seeing *Augustus* make no more account of it, was much abashed, and wished after, that he had never advanched such an accusation. Such was also the Emperour *Antonius Pius*, with whom, the murmurations which Marmosets blew in his eares, could not take place, and he made no account of them. As one day, *Lucilla*, the mother of *Marcus Antonius* the philosopher (which *Pius* had adopted for his sonne) being in a chappell upon her knees before the image of *Appollo*; *Valerius Ocellus*, who was a Marmoset, addressing his speech to the Emperour *Pius*, Behold! (sayth he) *Lucilla* makes her prayers to *Appollo*, that thou mightst quickly finish thy dayes, that her sonne might raine: But the Emperour *Pius* reprooved him for such talke, and told him, that *Lucilla* and *Marcus Antonius* his sonne, were too good, to thinke such a thought. So generally we read, That all good emperours, such as the above said, and *Traian*, *Adrian*, *Nerva*, *Alexander Severus*, and others like, have not onely hated and detested, but also chased and banished farre from the court, reporters and relators of false tales.

But as I before said, It becomes not a Prince to make account, but rather to contemne words not spoken by good deliberation. And to that purpose will I rehearse a Iudgement which was given and recorded in full counsell of king *Charles* the sixth, whereat were his Vncle the Duke of Burgoigne, the Constable, the Mareschals of France, and many other great Lords of the Kings privie Counsell. Master *Peter de Courtenay* an English Knight, being one day at the Court of the King of France, offered a chalenge unto a French Knight, called *Guy de la Tremouille*, by deeds of armes to trie, who was the stronger knight and best in armes: *la Tremouille* had no desire to refuse him: so that by the consent of the King, and of his Vncle the Duke of Burgoigne, and in their presence, and before many other great Lords, they ranne a launce one against the other and no more, for the King would not suffer them to go any further: the English knight was evill content therat, but yet without making other countenance, desired leaue of the King to returne into England, which the King granted, and gave him for his conduction, and guide for his assurance unto Calais, the Lord *de Clary* a French gentleman, one renowned and of great valour. As they went by the way, the English gentleman desired to goe by Lucen, to salute the Countesse of S. Paul the king of Englands sister, who dwelt there, who gently received them, and made them good chere: talking and speaking of newes, as the custome is, this English told the Countesse, that he could not find in France a knight with whom to do deeds of Armes, and that he would never haue thought but to have found in the Court great store, covertly taxing thereby the French Nobility. *Clary* his conductor marked wel his words, but he spake not one word whilest he came to Calais: being there, *Clary* angerly said unto *Courtenay*, *Mesire de Courtenay* I have acquitted my selfe of the charge which the King my Lord gave me for your conduction to this Towne, now that I have no more charge of you, I thinke good to remembet you of certaine words you delivered at Lucen, to Madame the Countesse of S. Paul, where you said, you could not find in France a knight, with whom to do deeds of armes, thereby taxing the noble knight hood of France: therefore, to maintaine with you the contrary, I offer my selfe to do deeds of armes with you, in what maner you will chose, provided that you can obtaine of the governor of this town for the king your Master, a permission & place to do them. The said permissi-

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*Capitolinus*  
in *Marcus*.

A word  
spoken in  
hall ought  
not to be  
regarded.  
*Froiss. lib. 4.*  
*cap. 9.*

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on and place was granted, and they so fought that *Clary* wounded *M. Courtenay* in divers places. This came to the King and his Vncles notice: *Clary* was sent for, who for his defence said, that that which he had done, was to maintain the honor of France, & alledged many faire reasons: whereby it seemed, that not only he ought not to have been blamed for that he did in that case, but that rather he merited to be allowed and praised. The matter was handled in the kings Counsell, & by judgement and decree *Clary* was condemned to prison for a certain time, & in the meane while his goods were seized into the kings hand, and little there wanted he was not banished France: but a certaine time after, the king pardoned him, at the intercession of the Duke of Bourbon, and of the said Countesse of *S. Paule*. And at his deliverance, was made known unto him the motive of the kings Councell, which was this: That the kings Councell thought him worthy that punishment, because a light and rash speech delivered in familiar talke, he would revenge as a serious and weightie matter. If this decree were well observed (as it meriteth to be) we should not see so many quarrels, murders, and suits for our words rashly and undiscreefly spoken. And it should be a thing much better becomming Christians, not so easly to feele words preferred and spoken upon suddaine motion, than in so scrupulously seeking points of honour, to enter into contentions and quarrels; whereby we make demonstration, that we are nothing lesse, than that we would appeare to be. For we would, that by our quarrels and going to law upon an overthwart and rash speech, men should account us of great heart, that we have our honor in singular commendation and estimation: and in the meane while we discover our selves in effect to be of a pusillanime, base, and feeble heart, that wee cannot despise and contemne a word of no account, pronounced in hast. Was that great Emperour *Augustus Caesar*, and many other, ignorant, what were the points of honor? yet were they most magnanimous, and had their hearts so noble and generous, as they never tooke footing upon any words spoken, without good consideration, but despised and held them as nothing.

Prov. 18.

The sentence of the wise man is verie true: That slanderers or false reporters, are like secret wounds which go downe into the bowels. For as we see that wounds and impostumes which arise within mans body, are almost all mortall, and blowes with a sword and other outwards wounds are much more likely to be healed: so the words of detraction, of blame, and of slander that are told in the eare, bring often destruction, either to the reporter, or to him to whom they are reported, or to him of whom they are spoken, either els to all together, as I will shew by many approved examples. But when such words are openly spoken in the presence, or at the least to the certaine knowledge of him whom they touch, there is place to purge and justifie himselfe, and to have recompence by justice, or by reconciliation, obtained and mediated by friends; so that seldome comes any ruine of either one or other.

Sueton, in  
Claudio, cap.  
37. Dion in  
Claudio,

The Emperour *Claudio* was much ruled by *Messaline* his wife (which was one of the most intemperate women of her time) and by the high Steward of his household (whom he had enfranchised) called *Narcissus*, who had too good intelligence with *Messaline*. This good Lady was amorous upon a faire young Roman Gentleman, called *Appian Sillanus*; but he fearing the Emperour, would not any thing yeeld unto the petulancie and wantonnesse of the Empreffe. What did shee? seeing his refusall, she and *Narcissus* plotted together seprately, and one after another, to tell



tell the Emperour, that they had dreamed sleeping, That there entred a man into the Emperours chamber to slay him, which was verie like *Sillanus*. And they resolved to tell him this dreame in a morning when they came to salute him; also they tooke order that *Sillanus* at the same houre should enter, to the end the Emperour (who was fearfull) upon his feare he should have of the reherfall of the dreame, and of the present sight of *Sillanus*, might commaund to slay him. This enterprife being thus made, *Messaline* sent to *Sillanus* (as from the Emperour) that he should not faile to come unto him the next morning at his arising, for a certaine affaire whereof he had to speake with him. The next morning came *Narcissus* before day, and knocked at the Emperours chamber doore, and it was opened unto him; being entred and counterfaising a great astonishment approched the Emperours bed, and seeing him, said: The gods be praised, that that is not come to passe which I dreamed in my bed (Sir:) how diddest thou dreame, said the Emperour? Sir, said he; I dreamed that *Appius Sillanus* had slaine you about this houre, and awaking upon it, I straight come to tell you; for sometimes dreames are images of true things, and are not to be despised. The Emperour, who was naturally fearfull, began to be troubled: the foresaid Madame also, tooke her course to the Emperours bed-side, faining also a great amasement, who incontinent told her *Narcissus* his dreame; she withall making admirations at it: O ye gods, behold a strange thing! all this night I haue done nothing but dreame, that I saw a man verie like *Sillanus*, which would needs have entred hither for some wicked enterprife. The Emperour seeing the concordance of those dreames, his feare was redoubled, especially because *Messaline* told him, that that was the onely cause of her rising so timely; for that this vision was ever before her eyes, that she could not rest at her ease. Upon that talke, *Sillanus* came and knocked at the doore: the Vsher which kept the chamber dore, came to tell the Emperour, that *Sillanus* was there, and would speake with him. *Messaline* and *Narcissus* then made a shew of feare and great wonderment, and told the Emperour, that it were good to command straight to slay him, leaſt he were slaine himſelfe. The Emperour *Claudius*, which trembled for feare, and was exceedingly troubled in his mind, beleaved them, and commanded to slay that honest gentleman. Behold how by false reports, yea, by the report of a dreame maliciously deuised, this noble person lost his life. And it is to be marked in this hystorie, that these false reporters customably have this subtiltie, to trouble a Princes senses, if they can either with feare, or anger, or by some other meane bring that which they would to their purpose.

The Emperour *Seuerus* had two sonnes, *Basianus* and *Geta*, which he caused to be instructed the best he could possibly, and equally loved them both, and ordained them both to be Emperours together after him: for alreadie they had experience, that *Marcus Antonius* and *Lucius Varns* were together Emperours in good concord, and after them *Dioleſian* and *Maximian*, *Maximus* and *Balbinus*, *Theodosius* and *Maxentius*, *Constantinus* and *Galerius*, *Valentinianus* and *Valens*, and many others: which hath shewed, that a soveraigne principallitie is not incompatible of two in consow and fellowship, as is accounted. *Seuerus* then being in this purpose to leave the government of the Empire to his two sonnes together, flatterers about them disposed it otherwise: for they ceased not daily to make false reports of the one against the other, making one understand, that his brother had such and such talke of him, and that he aspired to be alone Emperour after his father, and that it were good to

Spere. in  
Anno. Carac.  
Herod. lib.  
3. 4.

to provide betimes, and that it were better to prevent, than to be prevented; and alike the flatterers of the other, said as much to the other, and more if they could; inſomuch, that thoſe two young Princes fell into ſo great and mortall enmitie one againſt the other, that not onely the one hated all the friends and ſervants of the other; but alſo even to death they hated all them which would have agreed them. As ſoone as *Severus* their father was dead, *Latus*, which was one of the Marmoleſts of *Baſſianus*, perſuaded him to ſlay his brother *Geta*, and to ſeine that he was aſſailed by him. This counſell was found good of *Baſſianus*, who was audacious ynough, and readie with his hand to give the blow: ſo that one morning he entred into *Julia* the Empreſſe her chamber, mother of *Geta*, whom he found there, and ſlew him betwixt his mothers armes, who was all bloudie with the bloud of her ſonne. Incontinently *Baſſianus* got him out, and went to find the ſouldiers of the guard, ſeeming to be much troubled and eſcaped. Maſters (ſaid he) I have eſcaped faire; my brother would have ſlaine me, but I am gotten out of his hands: I pray you let us to the campe, and keepe you me companie, for I am not well aſſured here. The ſouldiers, which knew nothing of the blow he had given, beleaved it was true, and followed him, much grieved that his brother *Geta* had ſo enterpriſed upon him. Being in the campe, he gave them all great ſummes of money, (for *Severus* had left great treasure) and made them ſwear they would be faithfull unto him. So that when after they knew the deed done, and found themſelves all gainted and corrupted with ſilver, they obeyed him without contradiction, as to one ſole Emperour. And what came of all this? *Baſſianus* not ignorant, that the Senate of Rome would find this murder very ſtrange that he had committed of his brother, deſired that greſſ Lawyer *Papinian*, who was his kinfman, and had been as the Chancellor or great miniſter under the Emperour *Severus*, that he would go to the Senate, and make himſelfe by an Oration well ſet out, That he had done well to ſlay his brother, and that he had reaſon and occaſion to doe it. *Papinian* (who was a good man) answered him, That it was not ſo eaſie to excuſe a parricide, as it was to commit it. *Baſſianus* grieved at this reſuſall, cauſed one of his amendants ſtraight to cut off his head. After this, willing to ſhew to the Senate and to the people, that he grieved becauſe he had ſlaine his brother, and that they might ſee it was done by evil counſell, he cauſed alſo his Marmoleſt *Latus* his head to be cut off, who had counſelled him to doe that murder: he cauſed alſo to die all them which helped him in that buſineſſe; in which were culpable thereof, ſaying, that they were cauſe thereof. This notwithstanding, to the end *Geta* his friends ſhould enterpriſe nothing againſt him, he made die as many as he could catch of them. So that under that title of being a friend, ſervant, or favourer of *Geta* his brother he made die many great and noble perſons: yea he ſlew all ſuch as caried themſelves betwixt them two as neuter and reconciliators. I pray you what was the cauſe of all this great and horrible butcherie? was it not the mortall enmitie which theſe Marmoleſts had ſowne betwixt the brethren.

In the time of the Emperour *Commodus* there happened a like thing: and becauſe the hystorie is memorable, I would rehearſe it a little at length. *Commodus* the Emperour was ſurnamed the Philoſopher, becauſe he was a Prince wiſe and ſtudioſus, and a lover of good letters. In his time there were great plenty of wiſe and learned men, becauſe commonly (ſaith *Herodian*) men do imitate their Prince, and give themſelves to ſuch things as the Prince loveth. There was alwaies about him a great number of good and learned people for his privie Counſell, which he called his

his faithfull friends, as the king of France also at this day dooth call his privie Counsellors in his pattents. This good emperor being in Hungarie, at the warre with *Commodus* his sonne, fell into a disease whereof he died. But before his death hee caused his Counsell to assemble, and recommending his sonne unto them, he made a little remonstrance, worthy of such a Prince, in this manner. I doubt not (my good friends) that you are not anguished and sorrowfull, to see me of this disposition. For humanitie causeth, that easily wee have compassion of mens adversities, but especially when we see them with our eyes. But yet in my regard, there is a more speciall reason: for I doubt not but you beare me a like good will, to that which I have ever borne you. But now is the time for me to thanke you, that you have alwaies been unto me good and faithfull friends and Counsellors. And I pray you also not to forget the honor and amitie which I have borne you. You see my son, which you your selves have nourished, who now entred into the flower of his youth: who as he that entred into an high sea, had need of good Patrones and Governours, lest by ignorance and evill conduction, he stray from the right way, and so come into perill. I pray you then, my friends, whereas he had no more fathers but one in me, be you many fathers unto him, that he may be alwaies made better by your good counsels. For truly, neither the force of siluer and treasures, nor the multitude of guarders can maintaine a prince, and make him be obeyed, unlesse the subiects which owe obedience, doe beare him good affection and benevolence. And assuredly they only raighe long and assuredly, which ingrave and instill in their subiects hearts, not a feare by crueltie, but a love by bountie. For they ought not to bee any thing suspected to a prince, in that they doe or suffer which are drawne to obedience by their own will, and not by constrained servitude. And subiects will never refuse obedience, unlesse they bee handled by violence and contumelie. Very true it is, That it cannot bee but hard for a soveraigne prince, who is at his full libertie, moderately to guide and bridle his affections. But if you alwaies admonish him to doe well, and to remember the words which hee heareth now of me, that am his father, I hope you shall find him a good prince towards you and all others. And in thus doing, you shall manifestly shew, That you alwayes have me in remembrance, by which onely meanes you may make mee immortall. Vpon this speech, his heart and his words failed with languishment, and then all his Counsellors which were there, begun to weepe & lament. yea some could not containe from crying, for great sadnesse and bitternesse of heart that they had, to see so good a prince faile. After his death *Commodus* his sonne and successor to the empire, governed himselfe some little time by the good people and auntient Counsellors of his father: but this continued not long, for there were straight, Marmosets, which found subtil meanes and entries to get into him, which when they saw their time, begun to say unto him: What meane you to tarry in this base and barraine country of Hungarie, better it were for you to be at Rome, to have all the pleasures in the world: you have no cause to beleeeve these tutors which your father left you; you are no child, to bee governed by tutors. *Commodus*, who was a faire young prince, and one that desired nothing but his pleasures, and who yet had no great resolution (although his father had taken great paines to instruct him wel) begun to let himselfe to be led with Marmosets, which never spoke any thing unto him but of merry and pleasant things. So made he a shamefull and dishonorable peace with the Barbarians, against whom his father had commenced warre,



and retired to Rome: being there, he begun to become cruell, especially against the good and auncient counsellors of his father, which hee caused almost all to die, at the instigation of his Marmosets; which reported unto him, that they bore him no good will, that they blamed his actions, and controuled his pleasures: He caused also many Senatours to die, which his reporters for the same reason disgraced. Amongst other Marmosets, he had one called *Perennis*, which perswaded him to care for nothing, to take his pleasures, and to let him alone with the charge of his affaires. *Commodus* was glad thereof, and to plunge him into all lubricitie and wantonnesse, *Perennis* provided for him three hundred concubines and harlots, and as many slaves. Hauing cast him into this gulf and destruction, hee tooke upon him the affaires of the empire, and begun to make stay, and confiscate the goods of all such as he bore no good will unto, and unto such as contradicted his doings, and sold justice for mony. So in a little time made he himselfe very rich; but this endured not long: For in a warre which the Romans had against the Englishmen, hee cashiered the Senatorian captaines to bring into their places simple knights, which all the Romane armie much disdained, insomuch, that they cut *Perennis* in peeces, as an enimie of the commonwealth. *Cleander* was another Marmoset who succeeded in his place, who at the beginning made some shew that he would doe better, but incontinent he did worse: for practising many cruelties, he sold the estates and governments of provinces to them which would offer most. There happened at Rome a great famine and a pestilence withall: The people (which alwaies lay the cause of publick calamitie upon the Governors) bruted abroad, that *Cleander* was the cause of this plague and famine, and that therefore there was cause hee should die. *Cleander* to stop this brute and fame, & to cause the people to hold their peace, caused all the emperours horsemen to be armed, and in both the suburbs & towne to rush through the people, slaying & wounding innumerable. But the people begun to take houses and fight from the windowes so well, that the said horsemen were constrained to retire. *Fadilla* (the Emperour *Commodus* his sister, seeing this civile warre commensed & raised by *Cleander* within the town) went to find her brother, whome shee found in the brothelhouse amongst his harlots, where he tooke his pastimes: and all bewept, she fell on her knees before him, saying: Sir, my brother, you are here taking your pleasures, and know not the things that passe, nor the danger wherein you are: for both yours and our blood is in perill, to bee altogether exterminated by the warre and civill stire which *Cleander* hath raised in the towne: He hath armed your forces, and hath made them rush against the people and hath brought them unto a slaughter more than barbarous, filling the streets with Roman blood. If you doe not soone put to death the author of this evill, the people will fall upon you and us, and rive us in peeces. Saying these wordes, shee tore her garments, and was very sad, yea as it were desperate. Many also which were present, encreased the feare of *Commodus* by their persuations, in somuch, that he fearing greatly some great danger to himselfe, sent in hast for *Cleander*, who knew nothing of this complaint. As soone as he was arrived, he caused his head to be cut off, which he caused to be caried on a pikes point through the towne, in such sort, that the sight of that head did appease the stire of the people. After this execution, *Commodus* (who had acquired infinite enemies by the meanes of his Marmosets) determined with himselfe at once to cause a goodly execution to be made, because hee would not often returne thereunto (which is one of *Machiavels* precepts, wherof wee shall speake in

in his place) & for that purpose made two rowles of the names of such as he would cause to die, one of which was entituled *La dague*, the dagger: and the other *L'espee*, the sword. These two rowles by hap fell into the hands of *Latus* who was one of his Marmosets, and of *Martia*, one of his courtizans, which found themselves first in the role. They then seeing the danger nigh & evident wherein they both were, conferred together, & resolved rather to slay than be slaine. *Martia* took the charge to poyson him, which she did but *Commodus*, who had eaten & drunke too much, was provoked to vomit, and therewithall cast up his poyson: which *Latus* and *Martia* seeing caused him to be strangled in his bed: Behold here the end wherunto *Perennis*, *Cleander*, and other Marmosets brought their masters, and the end they made themselves and the great evils and slaughters of good people, wherof they were the cause. Think you not that this is a goodly example to all kings & princes; to keepe them from suffering themselves to be governed by reporters and flatterers? The emperor *Commodus* was one of the most noble and illustrious rase in the world, a goodly and personable prince as was possible, who was neither subtil nor malicious of his nature, the sonne of the best prince that ever was, who brought him well up, and left him a great number of wise and prudent men, well to govern him, and towards him had gotten the favour & good will of all the world: yet these Marmosets and flatterers brought him to a miserable end, and hee reigned but a while, and died yong.

The emperor *Severus* had on his Counsell, one *Vetronius Turpinus*, whome he judged to be a good man, but he proved to be a very Marmoset: for before the emperor he dissembled well, and knew well how to carrie his countenance and behaviour, but behind his backe he vaunted, that he governed *Alexander Severus* at his pleasure; & that he caused in the Counsell chamber, such resolutions as he thought good of: The solicitors of the court which had busineses in the princes consistory, understanding that *Turpinus* said he had there so great credit, failed not to wait upon him, to recommend unto him their affairs. What dooth he then? he marchandiseth with all the parties contending, and every one promiseth a good summe, upon condition to make him obtain that which he seeketh for, as he promiseth to all, yet none knoweth any thing one of another. *Turpinus* notwithstanding never speaks for the one nor the other, but only giveth his voice in the Counsell, as others doe which be there: but alwaies it came to passe that the one or the other obtained the cause, so that he payd him the summe that he had promised him: and as for the other partie he let go, finding some excuse why he got not his demaund. After that *Turpinus* had a certaine time used this occupation, To sell the hopes and the decrees of the princes privie Counsell, his dealings were discovered. *Alexander* incontinently sent him to prison, causing his proesse or indictment to be made; which proved against him, he was condemned as a seller of smoke, to be tied to a pillar, & there to be stifled with the stench and smoke of dung and karion, heaped up & kindled nigh the said pillar. Behold the reward that this Marmoset *Turpinus* received, for the false reports hee made against the princes honour and his Counsels.

Enough is spoken of the Marmosets of the Romane emperors: let us now speake of our French Marmosets. In the time of king *Charls* the sixt, *le bien aime*, by Marmosets and Reporters, a great enmitie arose betwixt *Lewis* duke of Orleans the kings brother, & *John* duke of Burgoigne, Countie of Flanders, of Artois, & lord of many other lands and territories. Our histories name not these Marmosets, but simply

*Lamvri, in  
Alex.*

*Annal. up6  
Anno 1405.  
Monstre.lib.  
1. lap. 22.*

say, that their household servants incited them to band one against another : the duke of Orleans his servants and favourites said, and said truly, That he was the chiefe prince of the blood, the kings only brother, also more aged and of riper and more staied wit than the duke of Burgoigne ; and that therefore he should not set his foot before him in the handling of the kings affairs. For at this time, the king having not perfect sences, his affairs were handled by the princes of the blood and the privie Counsell: but contrarie, the duke of Burgoigne his Marmosets, said, That he was the chiefe peere of France, and as they call it *le Doy en des Pairs* ; that he was more mightie and more rich than the duke of Orleans ; and although he was so neere of the blood Roiall as he, yet was he more neer by alliance ; (for the Dauphin, who was yet very young, had espoused his daughter) and therefore he ought in nothing to give place unto the duke of Orleans, but that hee ought to maintaine and hold the same ranke that *Philip* duke of Burgoigne (his deceased father) did, who whilst his father lived, governed the king and the kingdome at his wil. Briefly, these ratlers and reporters caused this duke of Burgoigne so to mount into ambition and covetousnesse to raigne, that he enterprised to cause the duke of Orleans to be slaine, who hindered his designs and purposes, and indeed he caused him to be most villanously massacred and slaine at Paris, ne the gate Barbette, by a sort of murdering theeves which he had hired, as the duke of Orleans went to see the Queene (who had lately beene brought to rest of a child.) Great damage there was for that good prince, for he was valiant and wise as possible one might be. Of him descended king *Henry* the second, now reigning, both by father and mother. For king *Frances* his father was sonne of *Charles*, duke of Angoulesme, who was son also of *John* duke of Angoulesme, who was sonne of the duke of that Orleance, and Madame *Claude*, queene of Fraunce, mother of the said king *Henry*, & was daughter of king *Lewis* the twelfth, who was son of *Charles* duke of Orleance who was the sonne of this duke *Lewis*, whereof wee speake. I would to God princes his descendants would well mark the example of this massacre, most horrible, which was committed upon the person of that good duke, their great grandfather, and the great evill haps and calamities which came thereof, to shun the like miseries which ordinarily happen when such murders goe unpunished. For because the duke *John* of Burgoin was not punished for this fault, but found people which sustained and maintained it to have been well done (as we shall say more at the full in another place) and that followed his part, stirring up civile warres, which endured two generations, and caused the death of infinit persons in France, and that the English got a great part of the kingdome, and that the poore people of Fraunce fell into extreame miserie, povertie, and desolation ; there were many causes and meanes of so many evils : for injustice, ambition, covetousnesse, desire of vengeance, and other like things might goe in the ranke of causes of so many mischeefs. But the Marmosets of Duke *John* of Burgoigne, were they which strooke the yron against the flint, out of which came that sparke of fire (a device fatally taken by the duke of Burgoigne) which brought into combustion & into a burning fire all the kingdome for so long time, and at last ruinated the house of Burgoigne.

Monstre Juh.  
3. cap. 4. &  
33.

*Francis*, duke of Bretaine (a prince that was a good Frenchman, and affectionate to the King of France his overaigne) had a brother called *Giles*, who gave himselfe to the English, in the time that they made warre in France, and accepted of the king of England the order of the Garter, and the office of high Constable of England.

The



The duke his brother much greeved hereat, found meanes to take him prisoner, and put him in a strong castle, whereunto he would never goe, to heare, or see him, he so much disdained him. But yet he sent men unto him, which he trusted, which in deed proved very Marmosets and false reporters: for after *Giles* of Bretaine had remained within the castle a certaine time, and that he had considered well his doings, that he was borne the kings vassale of France, and that he ought never to have disunited himselfe from his brother; he then praied his brothers people, that came to see him, to tell him from him, that he greatly repented what hee had done, and that if it pleased him to pardon him, that from thence forward he would follow with a good heart the part of the king of France and his; and that if it pleased them, hee would streight lend to the king of England his Order, and Constables sword. What do his Marmosets then? They report to the duke, that *Giles* his brother was still obstinate, and so perfect English, that no reasons they could make, could turne him unto that side. The duke sent still many times the same men unto him, but alwaies they made the like or worse report of him: insomuch, that this good duke, fearing that his borther was invincible in his obstination, fearing also, that if he should let him loose, he would cause the English to come into Bretaine to avenge himselfe, commanded the same reporters to strangle him in prison: which they did. Afterward (as God when he seeth his time, brings the most hid things to light) these murdering reporters could not hold, but discover the truth of the matter, and that *Giles* of Bretaine would have done any thing that the duke his brother would have had him to doe: which comming to the dukes eares, he was nigh out of his wits for his brothers death, and caused the reporters to be hanged, and to die with great and rigorous paines and executions. Behold the end of *Giles* of Bretaign, and the reward which such Marmosets received, which were cause of his death. Hereof Princes may note a rule, Not to beleve too easily reports made of men, without hearing them, but especially when it toucheth life.

One day before the emperour *Adrian*, there was one *Alexander*, which accused of certaine crimes one *Aper*, and for prooffe of those crimes, he produced certaine informations in writing against *Aper*, which he had caused to be taken in Macedon, *Adrian* mocked at it, and said to *Alexander* the accuser, that these informations were but paper and inke, and it might be made at pleasure: but in criminall causes we must not beleve witnesses in writing, but witnesses themselves in hearing, interrogating, and confronting them with him that is accused. Therefore hee sent the cause and the parties to *Junius Rufus*, Governour of Macedonie, commaunding him to examine diligently the witnesses, and take good advifement, whether they were good men, & worthy of credit: and if *Alexander* the accuser could not prove well his accusation, that he should banish him to some place. This commandment of the emperour *Adrian* hath since been marked by the Lawyers, which since made a law thereof. Behold how men must proceed, when it lies on mens lives, and not to beleve Marmosets and reporters, neither beleve papers, without seeing or hearing witnesses, and the accused, & without searching whether the witnesses be good men, or no, as is done at this day: for at this day there is nothing whereof magistrates make a better market, than of mens lives. But let us passe on.

I would now rehearse an example truly tragicall, of king *Richard* of England, who was sonne of that valiant and victorious prince of Wales. This king came to the crowne very yong, and had three good uncles about him, the duke of Lancaster,

*I. 3. 2. idem  
Din. D. de  
Testi. 6.*

*Proffart, lib.  
2 cap. 173.  
lib. 3. cap.  
63, 68. and  
other fol-  
lowing, and  
lib. 4. cap. 93  
et c.*

Yorke, and Gloucester, by whose counsell for a certaine time hee governed well his kingdome. But the earle of Suffolke (whom the king made duke of Ireland) entred so farre into the kings favour, that he governed himselfe after his fancie. Then tooke he occasions to talke so of the kings uncles, as was very strange: for he told him, that his uncles desired nothing, but to deale in the affaires of the kingdome, to obtaine it to themselves: a thing which they never thought. And did so much by his reports, that the king put his uncles from his counsell, and from dealing with any of the affaires of the kingdome: whereof the people, and especially the Londoners were so evill contented, that they rose up and made warre against the king, or rather against the duke of Ireland, and they were at a point to give the battell one against the other. But the duke of Ireland, who was generall of the kings armie, lost his courage with great feare that he had to be slain or taken, and therefore fled & passed into Flanders where he finished his dayes, never after returning into England. As soone as he was fled, his army was dissipated, & the kings uncles seized upon the kings person, & established a new Counsell, & by justice executed some of them which were of the duke of Ireland his adherents. A long time after, another Marmoset, called the earle Marshall, gained the duke of Ireland his place, and was so farre in the kings good grace, that he governed all as he would. One day (this earle Marshall talking with the earle of Darbie, eldest sonne of the duke of Lancaster) the earle of Darbie chanced to say: Cousin, what will the king do: will he altogether subiect the English nobilitie? there will soone be none: it is plainly seene, that he desireth not the augmentation of his kingdome. But he held this talke, because the king had put to death & chased away a great number of gentlemen, and caused the duke of Gloucester to die (a prince of his blood) and yet continued in that tigour, to make himselfe be feared, and revenging still that which was done in the duke of Irelands time. The earle Marshall answered nothing to the speeches of the earle of Darbie, but only marked them in his heart. Certain daies after, he reported them to the king, and to make them seeme of more credit, hee profered, and said hee was readie to enter combat against the earle of Darbie, to averre the said words, as outrageous & injurious against his Majestie. The king not measuring the consequence of the deed, in place to make no account of these words, sent for the earle of Darbie, his cousin germane, and after hearing before him the earle Marshall speake, his will was, they should enter combat and fight it to utterance. But the kings Counsell conceiving it might come to be an evill example, such great lords to slay one another, and that the earle Marshall was not of equall qualitie unto the earle of Darbie, they counselled the king to take another course, namely, to banish from England for ever the earle Marshall, because he had rashly appealed and challenged unto single combat a Prince of the blood; & to banish also the Earle of Darbie for ten years only, for speaking the asorfaid words of the king his lord. The king following the advice of his counsel, & by sentence given by himself, banished the earle Marshall out of England for ever, & the earle of Darbie for six years only, moderating his Counsels advice foure years. When the earle of Darbie came to depart, there assembled in the streets before his gates at London, more than fortie thousand, which wept, cried, & lamented his departure, & extreemly blamed the king and his Councell: infomuch, that going away, he left in the peoples hearts an extreame anguish and greefe for his absence, and a very great love towards him: yet notwithstanding he left England, and came into France. Whilest he was in France, the duke of Lancaster, his father, died. The king to heape up his evill

evill luckes, caused to be taken and seized into his hands all his lands and goods, because they fell to the earle of Darbie. Hereby he got great hatred and evill will of the Nobilitie, and of all the people. Finally, the Londoniers made a complor, and tooke part against the king, and secretly sent word to the earle of Darbie, that he should come, and they would make him king. The earle arriving in England, found an armie of the Londoniers ready. So went he to besiege king *Richard* in his castle unprovided, whom he tooke and imprisoned, and caused him to resign unto him the Realme and Crowne of England. King *Richard* was put to death in prison, after he had reigned two and twenty yeares: a thing very strange, rigorous, and unheard of in England or in any kingdomes nigh unto it. And so the earle of Darbie, who had been banished from England, remained a peaceable king, and was called *Henry* the fourth of that name. This earle Marshall, who kept at Venice, knowing these newes, died ragingly. This was the end of this Marmoset, and the tragicall evill hap whereunto he brought his master, and that upon words reported, which were never spoken for any evill will unto the king, but onely for the greefe he had, that they of his Counsell governed so evill the kingdomes affaires. Which words should nor ought not to have been taken up nor reported to the king, and being reported unto him, he should have made no account of them, and to have alwaies presumed rather well than evill of his cousin Germane.

*Herode*, borne of a lowe and base race, was created king of Judea, Galalie, Samaria and Idumia, by the favour of *Marcus Antonine* a Romane captaine, and by decree of the Romane Senate he espoused a noble Ladie, who was of the kings race of that countrey called *Mariamme*, by whom he had two children, *Alexander* and *Aristobulus*: but *Herode* had a sister called *Salome*, who was a very *Tisiphone*, and served for nothing but to kindle and light fires in the kings Court, by false reports which she invented; and this infermall furie did so much, as she perswaded the king her brother that *Mariamme* sought to poison him by his cup-bearer, and brought out certaine false witnesses to prove it: so that the king beleevved it, and put to death his wife, one of the fairest princesses of the world, and for whose death there was after much greefe and repentance. But as one sinne draweth after it another, *Salome* fearing that those two aforesaid children would feelee afterward, the outrageous death of their mother, she machinated and resolved in hir spirit that they must also die. So began she straight to forge false reports, false tokens, and false accusations, insomuch as she perswaded *Herode* the father, that these two children *Alexander* and *Aristobulus* spake alreadie of revenging the death of their mother, and by the same meanes to usurpe the kingdome. *Herode* suffering himselfe to be perswaded by the calumniations and slaunders of his sister *Salome*, tooke his journey to Rome, having his two children with him, where he accused them to have sought his death, before *Augustus Caesar*, he began to decipher his accusatorie Oration, and to deduct and set out the meanes, whereby hee pretended that his two children should go about his death. When it came to their turne to speake for their defence, they began to weepe and lament. *Caesar* knew well thereby that the poore children were full of innocencie. So hee exhorted them from thence forward to carry themselves in such sort towards their father, that not onely they should not doe against him any thing unworthy or greivous, but also should doe so much as to bring themselves farre from all suspicion. He exhorted also *Herode* to use his sonnes well, and to keepe them in his favor. Then fell the children on their

*Ioseph. Ant.  
119. lib. 14.  
cap. 23. &  
lib. 19. cap. 9.  
& li. 16. cap.  
3. & 23. &  
lib. 17.*



knees before their father with great effusion of teares, crying him mercy, by which meanes they were reconciled unto their father. But after the returne of *Herode* and his children, this furie *Salome* (not contented with this reconciliation which *Cæsar* had made) began to lay new ambushes by false reports that she made to *Herode*, wherein she mixed some truth, to giue the better taste: *Herode* who was verie credulous in such matters, made *Augustus* understand, that his children had againe conspired his death. *Augustus* answered him, That if his children had done against him the thing which merited punishment, that he should chastice them as he thought good, and that he himselfe gave him power and permission so to do. The abovesaid *Herode* ioiful to have received this power, being led with an irreconcilable rage, by the meanes of *Salome*, caused the two poore children *Alexander* and *Aristobolus* to be strangled. *Salome* ayded her selfe in all this businesse, with one other sonne of *Herode*, borne of another woman called *Antipater*. God would that *Herode* should discover, that the accusations against his two dead children were but slaunders, and that *Antipater* (who had aided to forge them) had himselfe conspired to poison his father. Whereupon he caused him to be called before *Quintius Varus*, the governor of Syria for the emperour. The cause being long pleaded and debated, *Antipater* could not purge himselfe of the sayings and proofs against him: and did no other thing but make great exclamations, nothing appertaining to the matter, holding on, that God knew all, unto whom he recommended his innocencie. *Varus* seeing that he could not wel iustifie himself, wished *Herode* to imprison him; and so he did. Certaine dayes after, *Herode* fell sicke, which comming to the notice of *Antipater* in prison, he rejoyced greatly. *Herode* advertised that *Antipater* wished his death, and rejoyced at his sicknesse, sent one of his guard into prison to slay him, which he did. Five daies after, *Herode* died like a mad man, for the evill haps he had in his children, and this rage lighted a fire in his entrailes, which rotted him by little and little, wherupō engendred worms, which eat him alive, with horrible languishments before his death. And who was the cause that *Herode* thus contaminated his hands and all his house with the blood of his own children? Even that most wicked reporter *Salome*, who devised false accusations and slaunders which she blew in the king her brothers eares.

Counsellors  
flatterers.

Com. lib. 1.  
cap. 27. & lib.  
2. cap. 44.

Cornel. T. 1.  
annal. lib. 3.  
& lib. 5.

Besides those kind of flatterers, whereof we have spoken above, which are janglers and Marmosets, there is yet a third kind, which under the name and title of principal Counsellors, and under the pretext and colour of conducting the affaires by good counsel, they abuse the princes authoritie, who are greatly to be feared. To shun the mischiefe that may come thereupon, there is nothing better than to follow the precept of *Comines*, namely; That the king have many Counsellors, and that he never commit the conducting of his affaires to one alone, and that he hold as nigh as he well can, his Counsellors equall. For if hee commit much more to one than to another, he will be master, and the others dare not reason against him freely, or els knowing his inclination, dare not contradict him. Therefore in a criminall cause handled before the Senate of Rome against a gentlewoman of a great house, called *Lepida*, accused of treason; the emperour *Tiberius* (although he were very rude in such cases) would not suffer his adoptive sonne *Drysus* to reason first, least (saith *Tacitus*) thereby had been laied and imposed a necessitie for others to have consented unto his opinion. And in another cause of like matter, where *Gracius Marcellus* was accused in a certaine place to have set his owne image above the emperour: when the

the cause came to handling. *Piso* (whose opinion the Emperour desired first) began thus to say : And you (Sir) in what place will you reason ? for if you reason last, I feare that by imprudencie I shall not dissent from you. For that cause *Tiberius* declared, that he would not reason at all : & indeed the accuser was absolved, although the Emperour had shewed a countenance to be angry against him, as he heard the accusation rehearsed. And there is no dout, but that the counsell of one alone is perillous to the Prince, because naturally men are divers waies passionate, and that which shall be governed by one alone, is often by passion guided. And the indisposition of mens persons causeth, that every one hath not alwaies his head well made, (as they say) nor are wise at all seasons; and mens spirits, as well as their bodies are journals, and have their vicissitudes & changes : for from the wisest sometimes doe escape absurd and strange opinions. An example hereof may well be *Charles* duke of Burgoigne then earle of Charolois : hee having made a peace with the towne of Liege, went soone after to besiege Dinant, a towne nigh the other. They of Liege going against the treatie of peace, made readie an armie to go succour Dinant, but they there arrived after the towne was taken. The duke fierce of his victorie, would needs have rushed upon the of Liege as peace breakers, but an agreement was made, That they should observe the said forme of peace, & for assurance they should give three hundred men for hostages (which were named) the next morning at eight of the clocke. The next morning came, and eight of the clocke, yea noone, but no hostages were delivered ; so that the duke would gladly have run upon the towne of Liege : yet he demanded counsell of the knights of his Counsell. The marshall of Burgundie, and the lord de Countay were of advice to fall upon them, and that there was just occasion, because they had not held their word to send hostages at the houre they promised ; having now good advantage because they were all divided and disperfed. But the earle of *S. Paule* was of a contrary mind, saying ; That a multitude could not be so soone accorded, and that men must not so measure affaires of importance, by houres & minutes, but that it were yet good to summon them by an harrold. This opinion of the earle of *S. Paule* was followed of the most of the Counsell : so that a Trumpet was sent to summon them, who met the hostages by the way comming to the duke. Here note ; if the duke had had of his Counsell none but the said Marshall, and de Countay, what effusion of humane blood had followed of these poor Liégeois, which wold well have kept their word, but they could not so soone effect it : What yet came to passe ? a certain time after, the said men of Liege broke againe the said covenants of peace : so that the said duke would have caused to die the said three hundred hostages, which could not do withall, nor were the cause of the peace breaking, but they were onely pledges and gages of the publicke faith. The duke asked his Counsels advice. The said de Countay was of advice, they should be slaine : but *M. de Imbercourt*, a wise knight, was of the contrary mind, saying : It were best to take God on our side, and not to sleie so many innocents for the fault of their citizens : and for their yeelding themselves hostages it was partly to obey their common-wealth, and partly to employ themselves for the good of their countrie, and for that cause they merited not to die. This opinion was followed, and de Countays rejected as cruell. A litle while after died the said de Countay, as if it were by a judgement of God : although that no man had ever scene him before, either cruell in deed or in opinion. He was also reputed a very wise knight : but there is not so good an hoise which stum-

bleth

Counsell of  
one alone  
dangerous,

Com. lib. 1.  
cap. 27. & 20

bleth not sometimes, nor so good a braine, but it faileth. And it is one of the things most proper to men, often and grossly to erre. They which are best in the braine, are not at all houres the best disposed. Men commonly see also, that mens spirits do never so well handle a matter after dinner, as before in the morning. And therefore the prince to shun such inconveniences, ought to have his Counsell compounded of many.

*Tit. Livius,  
lib. 8. Dec. 3.*

*Scipio* the African, being chosen captaine generall of the Romane armie against *Anniball*, who was in Italie, reasoned in the Senate, that he desired to passe into Africa, to draw *Anniball* from Italie, and desired permission of the Senate to doe it. *Quintus Fabius Maximus*, an old and wise captaine, reasoning upon that matter was of advice, that it ought not to bee graunted unto *Scipio*, and that by naturall reason every one ought rather to defend his owne, than to go to conquer anothers: and that it might come to passe, that *Scipio* should be in Affrica, and yet *Anniball* besiege Rome: in which case, little would the forces which *Scipio* carried into Affrica, serve the necessitie of the Commonwealth. He doubted not but *Scipio* desired to passe into Affrica, by a boyling heart that hee had to winne honour; but yet he (an old captaine, who had also assaied what *Anniball* was) could not be of that advice. *Scipio* to the contrary shewed, that the Carthaginians seeing themselves in danger, would never leave *Anniball* in Italie, for the same reasons that *Fabius* had alledged, namely, rather to defend themselves, than to assaile; and that it was more expedient to give a battaile in anothers countrey, to see if an end could be made of the Punicke wars, than to give it at home. Briefely, he so well delivered his opinion, that that of *Fabius* (how great estimate forever there was of his wisdom) was not followed. And in truth his opinion was of no value, as by effect appeared afterward. For true it was, that the Carthaginians revoked *Anniball* out of Italie (where hee had made warre then sixteene yeares) to come succour Africa, whither *Scipio* had passed; who after *Anniball* came, gave him battaile, which *Scipio* gained, and so put end to the warre which *Anniball* would have made endure in Italie all his life: because the Romans after the journey of Cannas (which they lost against *Anniball*) were as it were resolved to give *Anniball* no more battaile in their countrey. So then the opinion of *Fabius* was of no account at this time, although otherwise hee was one of the wisest of Rome. I could here yet alleage many examples to this purpose, but these shall suffice whereof I have spoken.

*Cron. Tacitus  
Annal. lib. 5.  
Dion in Tib.*

When a Prince is governed by one alone, there happens not onely this inconvenience. That he may be evill councelled; but also it often happeneth that such Councellers as see themselves alone in credit, would master even their master, and often precipitate into ruine themselves and their maister with them. After that the emperour *Tiberius* was become altogether wicked and plunged in all filthy lubricitie (for a long time he carried himselfe onely betwixt good and evill) hee remitted the dealing of his affaires to *Seianus*, and rested upon him alone, and left him all to do and governe, and so loved him, that he gave him his daughter in marriage. *Seianus* being entred into so high a credit, whilest the emperour kept in his house of pleasure, in the fields called Cheurieres, he did at Rome all things which the emperour himselfe could have done if he had bene there. Incontinent men began to honour him as the emperour himselfe, and of him to erect Images all over, before which men sacrificed, and so they accompted of him, that happie was he that could have any part in his good grace. He seeing himselfe so reverenced, swelled so with pride,



pride, as he fell to raile of his maister, taxing and rebuking his filthy and dissolute life which he led at Cheurieres. The emperor was advertised of *Seianus* his evill words: and as there is no blame nor evill words that touch a man so neere to anger him, as them that be true; so fell it out with *Tiberius*, who cleane cast *Seianus* out of his fauour, that would needs maister him, and speake evill of him: therefore he caused him to be taken prisoner, and put into a straight prison. So soone as he was there, all the world begun to crie against him, yea even they which before had set vp images of him (such is the inconstancie of men:) begun to detest him and have him in execration. Finally, the emperor caused him to die ignominiously, him and his children, and all his goods were confiscate; and yet which worse is, almost all they which had beene friends unto him, were also executed to death. For then it was a deadly crime to have beene *Seianus* his friend, which before had beene held for a great good and felicitie.

The emperor *Galba* was a good and wise Prince, but he suffered himselfe to be so governed and mastered by *Titus Iuvius*, *Cornelius Lacus*, and *Icelus Mariannus*, which were all three of so good an accord to rob and do evill, that they brought upon him a bruit and common report, to be a wicked and vnworthy emperor. For his dealings and dispositions were not of one same tenor and constancie as they ought to have beene: but sometimes he shewed himselfe too sparing; sometimes too prodigall, now remisse and negligent; at another time, too neere a taker; often would he refuse things which were not to be refused; & at another time grant that which ought not to have beene granted; he condemned sometimes noble persons upon simple suspitions; yet would he never accord to the Roman people, to punish *Tigellinus* and *Halotus* (the ministers only culpable of the great wickednesses of *Nero*) but contrarily favoured them, yea advanced *Halotus* into a high estate. He suffered these three his counsellours and governors, to sell and give tributes, freedoms, pardons for faults, and all other things. By such meanes *Galba* got the evill will of all estates, noble men, senators, magistrats, and common people, insomuch that he was slain and massacred, when he had reigned but seven moneths. And he receiued this end, for that he let himselfe be mastered by three alone: whereas if he had had a good Counsell, composed of a good number of good & wise people, he had neuer falne into that misfortune for of himselfe he was good and wise.

And upon the talke I have held concerning *Halotus*, whom *Galba* exalted, although he was one of the counsellors and instruments of all the wickednesses of *Nero*, I note; That a Prince which succeedeth a good Prince, whose government hath ben good, ought to retaine his Counsellors & officers: but the Princes which succeedeth an evill Prince, which hath governed evill, and whose government is blamed and cried out on, ought not retain in his service his Counsellors and servants, but to take others. The reason is, because alwaies the world imputeth that evill government of a Prince unto his Counsellors and servants. And if Princes could gently and easily rid themselves of their Counsellors and ministers, when they see that all the world crieth out against their government, they should feldome fall into such dangers as commonly they doe. Therefore did *Galba* evill to serve himself with *Halotus*, and to sustaine *Tigellinus*, which had been the ministers of the cruelties & other facinorous actions of *Nero*. For as soon as he so did, his subjects entred straight into opinion and feare, that they were againe falne into the time of *Nero*; and that in place to be better handled and dealt withall, they were falne from a shaking

Sueton, in  
Galba cap. 14.  
Dion ibid.

Counsellors  
of a Prince  
which hath  
evill gover-  
ned, ought  
not to be  
retained by  
his succe-  
ssor.

Dien. in  
Oibon.

king feaver into an hore ague, as the French proverbe is, For the same reason the emperour *Orho* (*Galba* his successour) was evill beloved of all the people, which were in an exceeding feare to see about him, them which had beene the ministers and Counsellors to *Nero*. For although *Orho* after he was created Emperour, made a reasonable good entrie, and shewed himself very kind, and courteous, and moderate in all things, seeking by liberalitie and such other meanes to obtain every mans good will: yet men could not trust him in any manner, nor hope from him any good as long as he was served with *Nero* his servants. So that being so evill beloved, he endured not long, but being overcome of *Visellius*, he slew himselfe.

Contrarily, king *Lewis* the twelfth comming to the crowne of France, governed himselfe evill, by leaving and forsaking the old and ancient Counsellors & servants of king *Charles* the seventh, his father, such as the Countie de *Dunois*, the Marshall de *Lobeac*, the Countie de *Dampmartin*, *M. Charles de Ambois* the Lords de *Chamont*, du *Bueil*, and other like. For he ought to have considered, that he succeeded a king which was wise, and who had very well managed and ruled his realme, & by consequent, who had good Counsellors and servants, which the rather he should have reserved and retained in his service, as indeed hee did a good time after he was made king, when he knew by experience the fault he had made. For amongst other good parts which were in the said *Lewis* the twelfth, he was not proud, but humble, and could well acknowledge his faults, and amend them: insomuch, that the fault that he made in disappointing the good servants of his father, ought no more to be imputed unto him for an error, since he corrected and amended it. As sayth the Poet *Sophocles*:

*To faile and fall a common thing it is  
To all mankind; but he that hath the skill,  
Salve to provide so heale that is amisse,  
Astray goes not, as he that stands in ill.*

Which never happeneth to any proud man, who alwaies perseveres in his evils: & if a man will shew him any thing for his good, he takes it in evill part, and in place to amend, he addeth more unto them, and commits fault upon fault, wherby followes his ruine. The emperour *Galba* was of that nature: For when a man required any thing of him, or that any shewed him any faults in the government of the Common-wealth, he would provide no remedie for it, fearing to be seen to obtemperate and obey his subiects.

But as for that I have said concerning the change, which sometimes ought by a prince to be made of the Counsellors and servants of his predecessors; this hath often happened in France: That the king hath bin forced to change new Counsellors to appease the Nobilitie and the male-content people. This happened to king *Chilperic*, the first of that name, the sonne of valiant king *Merovee*: for he governed himselfe by evill Counsellors, which the Frenchmen drove from him, whereof hee was so afraid, that he fled. But a certaine time after, he was called againe and governed well by good and wise counsell, and proued a good and a valiant king. The same also came to passe in king *Charles* the wise, beeing Dolphin; to king *Charles* the sixth, his sonne; to king *Charles* the seventh, and *Lewis* the eleventh, and to many others: which is not needfull here to insert. But I must needs say, That sometimes such chan-

Counsellors  
of a Prince  
disliked of  
great men,  
and of the  
people  
ought to  
be put off.

Annal. up-  
on Anno.  
1458.

ges

ges have been procured rather upon envie, than upon just complaint they have made against them which governed: and such envies do often proceed, when kings governe themselves by men of base hand, as they call them: for then are Princes and great lords jealous. And therefore (to shun such jealousies and just complaints that great men may have to see themselves despised) a Prince ought so to advance meane men, that he disgrace not great men: and meane men ought alwaies to acknowledge the place from whence they came, respecting great men according to their degrees, without staggering in their dutie to their Prince & common-wealth. And when they see, that by some accident they are evill beloved of great men, or of the common people, and that for the good of peace it is requisite to extinguish the envie and jealousie conceived against them, they ought voluntarily to forsake their estate, for willingly to retaine it to the detriment and confusion of the common-wealth, therein doe they evidently shew, that they are not good servants of their Prince. King Charles the seventh had Counsellors both wise and loiall, as *M. Tanguy du Chastell*, *M. John Lower* president of Province, the Bishop of Cleremont, and certaine others of meane qualitie, which had done him great services in great affaires he had had, as well when he was Dolphin, as after he was king. At that time this king had civile warre against the duke of Burgoigne, whome secretly the duke of Bretaine favoured: which warre the king would gladly have had extinguished. Therefore hee himselfe openly spoke to the said lords and dukes, which made him answer: That they were content to come to some good accord, provided, that hee would put from him such Counsellors as he had, and take others. These before named Counsellors knowing this, said to the king. Since (Sir) it holds but thereon, to quench this civile warre which is against the house of Burgoigne, let them lay by armes, it shall not come of us that so good a thing shall be hindered: and they themselves desired and counselled the king to accord to that condition. These were good and loiall Counsellors, but they are dead, and there are no more such to bee found. But such there are now adaies, which had rather see the common-wealth in combustion and ruine, than they would suffer themselves to be removed from their places one pace. Yet these good Counsellors abovesaid withdrew to their houses willingly and without constraint; and soone after, peace was accorded and finished betwixt the king and the duke of Burgoigne. These good persons alledged not, That men sought to take away the kings faithful Counsellors, to seduce and deceive him, and that their dutie commaunded them then more than ever to keepe nigh his Majestie, seeing the great troubles and affaires of the kingdome, and that otherwise they might be accounted traitors, and disloiall: No, no, they alledged no such thing; they looked right upon the white, to keepe peace in the kingdome. For they knew well, that if they had used these reasons to the duke of Burgoigne, that he could soone have answered & replied, that they were too presumptuous and proud, to thinke that in all the kingdome of France there could not be found people as wise and faithfull to their Prince, as they. For in all times the kingdome of Fraunce more than any other hath ever bene well furnished with wise and vertuous people of the Nobilitie, Iustice, Cleargie, yea, Marchants, and of the third Estate.

To come againe to our purpose, certaine it is, That a Prince which committeth the government of his affaires to one alone, brings himselfe in great daunger, and hardly can such government be without great mischeefes and disorders. For this



Dion &  
Spart. in  
Severo.

commonly men hold, That being lifted up unto great honor and dignity, they cannot hold a moderation and mediocritie, which is that which giveth take and grace to all our actions. The Emperour *Severus* so high advaunced *Plautianus*, that being Great Master of his household, the people thought (seeing his dealings in his office) that hee was the Emperour himselfe, and that *Severus* was but his great master. Hee slew, robbed, banished, confiscated the goods of all such as hee would, in the sight and knowledge of *Severus*, who contradicted him in nothing. So farre mounted this great and immoderate license, that *Plautianus* durst well attempt to cause *Severus* to be slaine, and his two sonnes. But his wickednesse was disclosed by a captaine, unto whom he had discovered it: insomuch, that *Severus* caused him to come before him, and although by nature he were a cruell Prince, yet was he so firmly affected to *Plautianus*, that he never spoke sharpe or rigorous word unto him, but onely uttered this remonstrance: I am abashed, *Plautianus*, how it came in thine heart to enterprise this against me, who have so much loved and exalted thee, and against my children, whereof *Bassianus* my eldest sonne hath married your daughter, and so is your sonne in law. Truly the condition of men is very miserable, that cannot maintaine themselves in such honour and dignitie, as I have placed you in. I pray you tell me your reasons & defences to purge you of this act. The abovesaid *Bassianus* (seeing that the Emperour his father would receive *Plautianus* to his justification, fearing he should have escaped) caused one of his men to slay him in the presence of his father, adding to the saying of *Severus*: Certaine it is, that great honors attributed to one man alone (as to governe the affaires of a kingdome) not onely makes him go out of the bonds of reason, but also subjects him unto great envies, whereby great mischeefes happen unto him.

Annal. upon  
A. D. 1314  
& 1316.

In the time of *Philippe Bell*, king of Fraunce, *M. Enguerrant de Marigni*, Countie de *Longueville*, a valiant and wise knight, governed almost all the affaires of the king and his kingdome, and especially of his common treasure, which was distributed by his ordinance. Amongst other things he caused to build that great Pallace at Paris, where the court of parliament is held. After the death of king *Philip; Charles Counte de Valois*, his brother, begun criminally to pursue *M. Enguerrant* before certaine commissioners of the said court, delegated for that purpose. And so farre did the said Countie de *Valois* (being a great lord, Prince of the blood, and in great credit with king *Lewis de le Hutin*, his nephew, and sonne of the said *Philip*) pursue the cause against *M. Enguerrant* (who was then out of credit after the death of king *Philip* his master) that he was condemned to bee hanged and strangled on a gibbet at Paris, as he was indeed. This happened onely unto him by the envie he had procured by his great place and too great credit. For true it is, that he was accused of many things, but he was not condemned of any punishable thing. But our hystories say, That he was not received unto his justifications and defences, he was so fiercely pursued by the said Countie de *Valois*, who after he had caused him to bee hanged, and that the hatred he bore him was extinct by his death, from thence forward hee repented & greatly grieved, and ordinarily felt his conscience tormented therewith. After, falling sicke, hee had a perswasion, that it was a punishment sent him of God for the death of *M. Enguerrant*. Then begun he to cause many Masses to bee said, and great almes to be given for the soule of *M. Enguerrant*, and his owne health. But in the end he died of the palsey. So it appeareth by *M. Enguerrant*, that hee was overthrowne by his owne greatnesse. We may also well note, what a perillous thing it

it is, to wound our conscience, for to please our affections; For that is to offend the mistresse, to please the chamber-maids: because the conscience (which is the right judgement of reason, whereby we approach unto God, and go far beyond beasts) is she which ought to be mistresse within us, and our affections ought to be chamber-maids: but when preposterously we alter this course and law given of God, we cannot doe well.



### 3. Maxime.

*A Prince ought not to trust in Strangers.*

**H**E that is driven from his Countrey (saith *Machiavell*) draweth to that Prince which will receive him, not for any good affection he beares him, but as it were constrained by necessity: and therefore, having no other affection, but his owne profit, he betrayeth the Prince which hath taken him into favour, so soone as any other Prince offereth him more profit, whatsoever faith and promise he hath sworne unto him.

*Discourse,  
lib. 2. cap. 31.*

**P**lace not here this Maxime, to the end to confute or reprove it: for it is true, in such manner as he deducteth and understandeth it: but because his disciples understand and practise it otherwise, I thought good not to leave it behind. They then say, That a Prince ought not to give trust to them which are strangers unto him, and which are of another Countrey and Nation than he, but ought altogether (if it can be) serve himselfe with them of his owne nation, yea, and that in the government of the countries and provinces of another nation that is subject unto him. As the kings of England did in the time when they held Guienne, Normandie, the Isle of Fraunce, the most part of Picardie: for they gave the governments and offices of all those provinces unto Englishmen, as being of their owne nation, and not unto Frenchmen, which were strangers unto them: as also did and doth the king of Spaine, who being borne in Spaine, yet holds many goodly countries of other nations, as the Low countries, Burgundie, or the free Countie, the Duchie of Millaine, the kingdome of Sicilie, and of Naples; but the governours and magistrates there, are all or the most part Spaniards. So by those examples, the disciples of *Machiavell* would say, That a Prince ought not to serve himselfe, nor trust in them which are strangers

unto him, or are not of his nation, although they be of his countries, and under his subjection. To the contrarie whereof, I will proove, That a Prince ought to put trust, and to serve himselfe with his subjects although they be not of his nation; yea that hee ought over each nation of his domination, to establish governours and officers of that nation it selfe, as much as he possiblie can.

The reason is evident, because naturally every man loves his owne countrie and nation, and by consequent, a governour or magistrate of the same nation, and of that countrey, shall bee better beloved than a stranger. And being better beloved, he shall also be better obeyed, and shall so bring a better obedience to his Prince: for true and assured obedience must proceed more from love, than from force or feare, as shall be shewed more at large in another place. The other reason is, That other nations are different in manners and complexions, whereunto Magistrates must accommodate and apply themselves, and if they be strangers, they neither can nor know how to doe it. I will not therefore say, that magistrates ought to be of the same towne or of the same province, but onely of the same nation. For contrarie, I thinke, that the ordinance of the auncient Romanes and of our auncient kings was good, That none should governe in that Province where hee was borne; because having there his friends and parents, he would sooner employ his office to favour them, than others. That office also might so be more contemptible, being exercised by one of the same place whose familiat and privat knowledge may make him lesse honoured of his neighbours. I will not say also, but that a Prince, which possesseth some countries of another nation & tongue than his own, ought and may have certaine officers and magistrates of his owne nation; as a lieutenant generall and captaines of fortresses; but he should the most hee possibly can serve himselfe with them of the countrey; yea, his lieutenant Generall ought often to communicate with them, and to call them to counsell. For the estate of a Prince is no other thing than the estate of a Commonwealth; for as much as the power which the people had in & upon themselves, they have transported unto the prince: so that the Prince ought to have the care (as he hath the authoritie) over all affaires which touch the conservation & encrease of the estate and good of the Commonwealth. But although that care do truly appertaine to the prince, yet his subjects have a great interest, that he acquite himselfe wel and duly, because the damage & harme falls upon them, if he doe evill. And therefore this makes, that they are alwayes desirous to know how the Prince governeth himselfe, and when the Prince dooth them this honour, to call them unto some participation of that charge, they receive a great contentment, and doe love greatly their Prince, and the more willingly doe yeeld him obedience. But if the Prince despise them, and give them no offices, but give them to people which are not of their owne nation, they receive a great discontentment; and for that thereby they presume, that the Prince trusts them not, they thereupon inferre, that he loves them not. But hard it is to love, where he is not beloved. Henceof arise afterward, enterprises, rebellions, revolts, & other broiles, which wee see alwayes happen either soone or late, when subjects are discontented with their Prince. There is yet another reason, which is, That naturally men desire honour, which of it selfe is no evill, nor condemnable appetite. For all they that love vertue, are alwayes touched with that desire, not to be honoured themselves, but to the end, that vertue may bee had in that estimation that it deserveth. And therefore when the Prince shutteth the gate to honors from them of his nation, the vertuous people



people thereof are angry, and doe greeve, that they have not whereunto and wherein to employ and make knowne their vertue, namely, a good spirit and prudence, which are best employed, and shine more in a publick than in an household-government. From hence it also comes, that vertuous people being angry and chafed to see themselves despised, as also to see strangers preferred before them, suffer themselves to be governed and guided by turbulent passions, contrarie to their natures. Moreover, it seemeth well, that the Poet *Hesiodus* and *Aristotle* shoot not farre from the white of truth when they say, That by right of nature he ought to dominier and rule, who hath the more able spirit to know how to command well, and he that hath the lesse able ought to obey. And although sovereign principalities are not ruled by that naturall law, because of the difficultie which falleth ordinarily in the execution of their election: yet for all that, that law alwayes sticketh naturally in the spirits and mindes of men: insomuch, as it seemes to them which feeble themselves to have some sufficiencie, that there is wrong done them, when they are put by, to bring into an office one lesse capable. By the above said reasons then, I hope men may see, and usually we reade, how great disorders doe often come, when princes have preferred strangers unto publicke charges, offices, and honours, before them of that nation and country where such charges and honours are distributed and exercised.

The yeares 1158, *William* king of Sicilie (by his originall was a Frenchman) gave the estate of the Chancellor of his kingdome to a person very capable and fit, but he was not that countryman, but a Frenchman. The lords of the kingdome grieved to see a stranger constituted in so high an estate within their country, and that the greatest magistracie of justice must needs be exercised by strange hands, a very cruel conspiracy followed, for not only they conspired the death of that chancellor, a Frenchman, but also all them of the French nation, which were dispersed in the kingdome of Sicilie, Calabria, and Apuleia. For that purpose sent they secret letters through all the townes and places of the said countries, whereby they advertised their friends and adherents (which were already prepared all over) that they should massacre and slay (each one respectively) the Frenchmen of their places and towns, on the day and hour that they would assigne them. Which was executed, and there was made in the said countries an horrible butchery and exceeding great effusion of French blood. Behold the mischeefe that came in that kingdome for having a stranger for their Chancellor. True it is, that some may say, that this massacre of the Frenchmen in Sicilie and other countries of Italie, happened not so much for that reason, that there was a strange chancellor, as for that the Italian race hath alwayes ben much enclined to shed the blood of our nation. For that same race made also another like generall massacre in the year 1282, by a conspiracie, wherein it was concluded, that every one of the country should slay or cause to be slaine his French guest, at the first sound of their Evensong bell even upon Easter day. Which conspiracie was not only executed, but also the rage of the massacres was so great, that they ripped the bodies of women of their owne nation alive, which were never so little suspected to be gotten with child by Frenchmen, to stiffe the fruit they carried. And this cruell and barbarous massacre was called the Sicilian Evensong. By the imitation hereof, the same race conspired and executed (not in Sicilie but in France it selfe and through all the best townes of the kingdome) the horrible and generall massacre of the yeare 1572, which will ever bleed, & wherewith their hands and swords are yet bloodie. Of which exploit, they have since incessantly vaunted

Annale  
1168.

A strange  
Chancellor  
cause of a  
great mas-  
sacre in Si-  
cilie.

Sicilian Eve-  
song.

Parisien  
Matin.

and braved, calling it *The Parisien Matines*. *M. Martin du Bellay*, rehearseth also in his Memories, how the same race murdered a great number of poore souldiers (after the journey of Pavie comming towards France) lame, wounded, and unarmed, slaying them in their high waies. But such is this peoples generositie of heart, alwayes to be tenne or twentie against one, and to brave such as are wounded or unarmed, which haue no meanes to resist. This Messeresque generositie is at this day called in France, Coyonnerie and Poltronerie. But let us come to our purpose touching the disorders that come by strange Magistrats.

Froissart, lib.  
1. cap. 216.  
246. c. c.  
Pla. in  
Martin. 4.

By the peace of Bretaine made betwixt *John* king of Fraunce and *Edward* king of England, the countrie of Aquitaine was acquitted purely and in al sovereignty by the said king *John*, to the said king *Edward*. This king *Edward* from the first possession of the said countrie, gave it to the prince of Wales, his eldest sonne, who came and lay in Bourdeaux, and apart kept a court great and magnificall. The gentlemen of Gascoigne and of other countries of Acquitaine, which by the means of the said peace, should become vassals to the king of England & to the said prince of Wales, his sonne, came straight to find the prince at Bourdeaux: first, to sweare their faith and homage; secondly, to obtaine his favor and good countenance, as is the custome of all nobilitie: The prince of Wales very gently, courteously, benignly, and familiarly entertained them, but in the meane while he gave all the offices & estates of the countrie (as the captainships and governments of the townes and castles, the offices of bayliffs and stewards, & the estates of his court) unto English gentlemen, whereof he had alwayes great store about him. These English gentlemen, although they held no other goods but their estates, spent prodigally, and held as great a traine as the lords of the countrey; and to maintaine that, they committed great extortions vpon the people. Hereupon came it, that the people (feeling themselves oppressed by the English officers, and the nobilitie & vertuous people feeling themselves put by and kept from offices, that the prince gaue all to strangers which were of his owne nation, and that herewith hee would needs impose a new tribute & impost upon the countries) in a little time all revolted from his obedience, and so caused all the towns of Aquitaine to revolt one after another: insomuch that the king of England, and the said prince of Wales his sonne, lost straight all the country, having therewithall procured the euill will of their subjects, by giving offices unto strangers.

Froissart lib. 1.  
cap. 313. c.  
314.

*John* duke of Bretaine, in regard that hee had taken a wife in England, was marvellously affected to the English partie, yea against the king of France his soveraigne lord. The nobilitie of Bretaine were much grieved thereat: insomuch, that one day the three greatest lords of the countrie (that is to say, the lord *de Clisson*, *de Leval*, and *de Rohan*) went to him, and after salutations, sayd to him in this manner: Sir, wee know not upon what thought you shew your selfe so inclinable and favourable to the English; you know that the king of France is our soveraigne lord, and the dutchy of Bretaine holdeth also of the crowne of Fraunce: Wee pray you to rid your selfe of that affection which you have to the Englishmen, and shew your selfe a good Frenchman, such as you ought to bee; for wee come to declare vnto you, that if you do it not wee will abandon and leave you, to serve the king of Fraunce, who is our soveraigne lord. The duke hereat was much troubled, and could not so much cover his courage, but he sayd, That the king of France did wrong the king of England, to despoile him of Aquitaine. Certaine time after, distrusting his sub-

jects

jects, he sent into England to haue Englishmen for his service, and to give them captainships and governments of townes and castles of Bretaine. The king of England sent him people: but the gentlemen of Bretain thinking much that their duke distrusted them, and would prefer Englishmen before them, themselves seized the fortresses and townes of the countrey, before the arival of the Englishmen. In somuch that the duke seeing himselfe brought into a great extremitie, abandoned his countrey and saved himselfe in England. This came vnto him for loving strangers more than his owne subjects, and for that he desired to give them the charges and estates of the countrey.

King *Charles* the eight, in the voyage of Naples, which he made in his owne person, conquered the realme of Naples almost without stroke striking; and was received of all the people, & of the most part of the Nobilitie of that countrey, as a *Messias* sent of God, to deliver them from the cruell and barbarous tyrannie wherein they were before, and had now long time beene vnder their kings, *Alphonse*, and *Ferdinand* of Arragon, usurpers of that kingdome upon the house of Anjou, where unto *Charles* succeeded. Every one may judge, if it had not beene easie for the king (if he had enjoyed a good Counsell) to have kept that goodly kingdome in his perpetuall obedience. For when a people hath been tyrannized by an usurper, and that he comes to recover his naturall prince, which deales with him like a good prince, there is nothing to induce the people to denie him obeisance, or to revolt: Because on the one side they acknowledge, that after God, and reason, they ought to obey him, which is the true and lawfull prince, unto whom alwayes there is more amitie bore, than vnto another; and on the other side, they see themselves discharged & unburdened of that heavy weight of tyranny and of an usurper. But what came there unto king *Charles*? Thus having conquered that kingdome, hee gave all the estates and offices of the countrey unto Frenchmen, which he had with him in that voyage: whereof the gentlemen of the countrey (and especially such as had alwaies either secretly or openly held to the part of the house of Anjou) were so discontented and spighted, that they straight cast off all amitie & good affection to the king, and incontinent entred into practises and complots, to make all the countrey to revolt, which they straight did, and so made voyd that voyage, and (for nothing) the king lost both his people and his money: who assuredly might haue well kept the kingdome of Naples, if hee had given the offices thereof to them of the countrey, and sought meanes to have maintained them in voluntarie obedience.

By the aforesaid example it appeares, That the Frenchmen gained nothing by getting into their hands all the offices and estates of the kingdome of Naples: yet gained they much lesse in the fact I come now to speake of, seeking to take away the honour of the warre from the Spaniards in Spaine at the battaile of Iuberoth. You must then understand, that the king *Iohn* of Castile, being in allie with the king of Fraunce, demaunded succours of him and aid to make warre against king *Denis* of Portingale. The king of Fraunce sent him gallant succours, as well of footmen as horsemen. Our Frenchmen arriving there, were very well entertained of king *Iohn* of Castile: our French desired the vaward of the battaile, to shew both what they could doe in warre, as also their good affection to doe him service. The Castilians contradicted this, being greeved and envious against the French, that so vaunted & preferred themselves before them. Notwithstanding all that the Spaniards could doe, the king graunted them their request, whereof they were very glad, and the Ca-

Comines, lib.  
1 cap. 20.

Froiss. lib. 3.  
cap. 12, 13.  
14, 15, 16.



Castilians as sad. What did the Castilians? Vpon despight and envie they conspired together, to suffer the French to pursue the enemies, without following or seconding them; but onely to make a shew that they would follow them; to the end, that all the glorie might remaine to the French, if they vanquished, or all to them, if after the overthrowing of the French, they were victors. Vpon which resolution, it is worth noting how envie and hatred blindeth judgment: For if they had not been very passionat, they might well judge, That forces divided, might easily be vanquished one after another (as it happened to their ruine and dishonour, and to the ruine of the French) but being joyned together, they might much sooner have beene victorious. Finally, the battaile was given against the Portugals, which were valiantly encountred by the French, but being unseconded by the Castilians, which held the reeward, they were found the more feeble: insomuch, that they were all slaine or taken. And which was a thing very lamentable, of those there were a thousand gentlemen taken prisoners, amongst which there were nineteene great lords, all which also were thus slaine: For as the Portugals, a while after the defeating of the vaward of the French, perceived to arrive the reeward of the Castilians, they resolved to slay their prisoners, and did so, lest they either should make warre upon them behind, or els escape. So having slaine all their said prisoners, they marched valiantly against the Castilians, whom they likewise discomfited. If our Frenchmen had not been so ambitious and covetous of glorie as to seeke it in a strangers countrey, above them of that countrey, they had not fallen into this mischeefe.

2. Kings, cap.  
10 2. Chron.  
cap. 22.

*Ochozias* king of Iuda was son of *Athalia*, a woman stranger, daughter of a king of Samaria. This king governed himselfe by Samaritans, (which were much hated of the people of Iuda,) unto whome hee gave the principall charges and offices of his kingdome, at the perswasion of his mother a Samaritane also, despising and casting behind, the wisest and most vertuous of his kingdome, by which he should have beene governed, after the example of his predecessors. This was the cause of that kings destruction: for as *Iehu* was in destroying the house of *Achab* brother of *Athalia*, hee slue also *Ochozias*, and extermined almost all his race, as a partner and friend which maintained *Achab*, If *Ochozias* had governed himselfe rather by people of his owne kingdome, than by strangers, that evill hap had not come unto him.

Ester, cap. 6.  
7, 8, &c.

That great king *Ahasuerus* which held the empire of the Medes and Persians, and governed over 127 countries, a great while governed himselfe by a stranger called *Aman* who was a Macedonian: this *Aman* seeing himselfe in credit, durst enterprise unjustlie to make die *Mardocheus* (who had alwaies beene the kings good and faithfull servant) under the pretext and colour, that he was not of the kings religion: and to cover the particular enmitie which he had against *Mardocheus*, & in the end to make it seeme that he would not this harme to him alone, he found meanes to the king, to cause a generall commandement for the massacring and murdering of all such as were of *Mardocheus* his religion. But the king having beene advertised that *Mardocheus* had done him good services, and that that which *Aman* did was but upon envie, revoked the commandement, and would not have that massacre to be executed, but caused to hang and strangle the Macedonian, which would have had him brought his kingdome and countries into combustion by so horrible an effusion of blood as hee enterprised to be shed, and withall gave his estate unto *Mardocheus*.

Alex.

*Alexander* king of the Epirots had drawne and gathered into his countrie a great number of Lucanians, banished and chased out of their countrie, and vsed them with such curtesie and hospitalitie, that not only he permitted them to dwell in Epire, but also serued himselfe with them; & reputed them for his good and faithful friends, and vsed them with all the best dealing he could. But it so happened, that the king had warre against the countrie of those banished people, and so thought to be wel serued with them in this war, as indeed they promised him, saying, They desired no more than to revenge themselves of such as had banished and chased them out of their countrie, and to bring the countrie into the obedience of *Alexander*, and to be afterward established in their goods & in authoritie (under him) in the said countrie. But as it ordinarily commeth (saith *Titus Livius*) that such people have spirits & faith as mutable as their fortune, they used the matter otherwise than they promised the king, and than he looked for. For they made secret compacts to betray this king, with their countymen; which promised them a restauration into their goods and authority which they had in their said countrie before their banishment, provided that they would deliver the king either alive or dead: which willing to execute, they did so much, that they perswaded this king to give battaile against the Lucanians, and there should he know the good affection they had to doe him service, and to fight against such as had banished them: insomuch that they came to the battaile, & there this banished people did so much, that they brought this king *Alexander* into a place nigh the flood Acheron, from drowning in which he could not save himselfe, but by swimming over the flood. Being then brought to that place and straight, they begun to shew their treason, and turned themselves against the king, who seeing the perill wherein he was, hazarded himselfe by swimming to passe over that great flood. As he had almost passed it over, and that he had recovered the banks on the other side, behold there came one of the banished people, who with a javeline transpierced and run him clean through the body. The body falling in the water, was by the river carried into the hands of his enemies, which encamped lower. But when they light upon that bodie, they in great derision & disdain, cut it in many peeces. Here is the miserable end that came to this poore king for trusting in strangers.

*Charles* the last duke of Burgoigne, not being able any way to get his will of the towne of Nuis, entred into distrust and discontentment with his owne subiects, although in truth they had done all their duties in the besieging of the towne: yet a Prince must doe what hee will. Ypon this mistrust and discontentment of his subiects, hee resolved with himselfe to be serued with strangers, and amongst all other strange nations, he made choise of Italians. But I leave you to thinke how good his choise was likely to be: for every one knowes well ynough, what account Italians make of the observation of their faith, and how *Machiavell* teacheth, That faith is not to be observed but to a mans profit, which they of that nation doe alwaies well practise. And if sometimes there bee found any loyall and good observers of their promise, it is a thing so rare, as that raritie should not have any thing mooved the duke of Burgoigne, rather to trust the Italians, than his owne proper subiects. Yet having taken it in hand, he drew to his service the Earle of Campobache, which hee entertained with four hundred men of armes, Italians, paid by his hands. Incontinent as *Campobache* was entred into credit with the Duke, hee begun to governe him at his pleasure, so that the duke trusted more in him than in any man in the

*De Cominet,*  
*lib. 1. cap. 83.*  
92.

the world. *Campobache* having gained this credit, straight begun to practise to betray him, and to deliver him to king *Lewis* the eleventh, then reigning, if hee would promise him in recompence 20000 crownes, and a good earledome. But the king (doing as *Fabricius* did towards the king *Pyrrhus*) would not enter into that composition, but advertised the duke of Burgoigne; to the end he might take heed of that traitor, and rid himselfe of him. The duke tooke this advertisement in evill part (his fences were so troubled) imagining, that the king sent him this word to make him keepe his good servants, & therefore trusted more than ever, *Campobache*. When *Campobache* saw hee could not bargain with the king, hee sought a marchant elsewhere: for hee was resolved, whatsoever became of his credit, to draw out a profit, if he could. Amongst these actions the duke thought good to besiege Nancy, the principall towne of Lorraine. The duke of Lorraine was not so scrupulous to enter into composition with that traitor, as the king had been, especially, because the duke of Burgoigne made warre upon him unjustly, & sought to take from him his countrey. He therefore entred into compact with *Campobache*, by the meanes of a gentleman of his, named *Cyfron* and they concluded and agreed betwixt them secretly. Finally, before Nancy was a battaile given by the advice of *Campobache*, who counselled the Duke of Lorraine, to levie the siege of the Duke of Burgoigne, who was there slaine, and his armie defeated by the meanes and treason of *Campobache*. The king after this, tooke a part of the countrey of the said Duke of Burgoigne, which died in the foresaid battaile, because it ought duly for want of heires male to returne to the Crowne of Fraunce; and the rest of his Dukedome fell to his onely daughter, who was his heire, which was married into the house of Austrie. Now you may see how the Duke of Burgoigne did precipitate himselfe into ruine, and his countries fell as a prey unto his neighbours, by trusting straungers, and forsaking his good, faithfull, and naturall subjects and vassales.

*Capitolinus*  
in *Gordiano*.

The emperour *Gordian* the young, prospered greatly whilst his affaires were governed by *Misubens* his father in law, and who was his great master of his household, and his lieutenant generall. *Gordian* made warre against *Sapor*, king of Persia, whom he drave out of Thracia, and from the countries of Syria, and recovered Antioche, Carres, Nisibis, and other great townes which the Persians held: insomuch, that the name of *Gordian* was feared and redoubted through all Persia, whereas before Italie it selfe begun to feare the Persians. But upon the course of his victories and prosperities, arrived by evill hap the death of that good and wise man *Misubens*, and withall, fell another yet greater, which was this: That that young emperour went to give the estate of his father in law to a stranger, an Arabian, called *Philippus*, who straight begun to practise against his master (as we have abovesaid of *Campobache*.) For the first thing he did was this: That he tooke order, that victuals should want in the campe, to make a mutinie of the souldiers against the Emperour, and hee himselfe did sow diffamatorie words through the campe against his Master, as that hee was a young man, and knew not what belonged to the conduction of a Campe, and merited not to be an Emperour, and who would cause all the armie to be destroyed, if they rested upon him. Breefely, he brought the souldiers and men of war to what point he would, by the meanes he tooke. For there is nothing more fancie nor more deafe to heare reasons and excuses, than an hungrie bellie. All the host then being angry against *Gordian*, for the want of victuals, and the principall Captaines thereof being



being corrupted by this Arabian stranger, he did so much, as he got himselfe to be chosen as tutor and governour of the emperour. Having by this meanes gained the authoritie to command, he begun to enterprise to make *Gordian* his master die. Which this young Prince seeing, he besought him humbly, that hee would receive him into the participation of the empire, and that they two might be together emperours: as but a few yeares before had been *Maximus* and *Balbinus*. But *Philippus* would not agree to that, perceiving himselfe strong of captaines, which hee had gained and corrupted. Then *Gordian* demanded of him yet the office which he had given him of the Great master of his houshold, & Lieutenant generall, & that in the place of a master he might so be his servant. But the fierce Arabian denied it him, he was so villanous and ingrate. Finally, he desired him but to save his life, which likewise that wicked Arabian would not accord, fearing that one day he might trouble him, because he was of a very noble race, and that he had many friends as well at Rome, as all over the Roman empire: & by the contrarie, *Philippus* was of a vile and unknowne race. Breefely, this cruell Barbarian and stranger, made forcibly to be brought before his face that young Prince, his master, who had advanced him, and there caused him to be unclothed naked, and so to be massacred and slaine. Would any say, there could be imagined a barbarousnesse, disloyaltie, or crueltie, more strange: so a stranger committed it. Trust such people who list.

The auncient Romans which were wise, tooke good heed of granting charges and offices unto strangers, nay not to their associates of the same tongue that they were. After they had lost the battaile of Cannas, where were slaine fourscore Senators, the Senate seemed to be utterly overthrowne, the number remaining was so small. There was then proposed by *Marcus Emilius*, Prætor, that there should be new Senators chosen to supply and encrease the auncient number. And upon this proposition, he as president of the Senate, demaunded first the advice of *Spurius Carvilius*, Senator. *Carvilius* thought best to chuse some good number of the most notable and wise men of the Latines, their associates, as well for that there was want of men within Rome, as to hold the Latines more united and obedient; by the meanes of which union he said, the Commonwealth should be much more fortified & increased. But *Manlius*, which reasoned after him, was of another advice: for hee denounced high and cleare, That the first Latine that he saw enter within the Senat to sit downe as Senator, he would slay him with his owne hand; and he could never endure, that the Senat should be contaminated with strangers. After *Manlius*, reasoned that wise lord *Quintus Fabius Maximus*, who said, he never heard nor saw any man argue in the Senat so grossely and evill to purpose as *Carvilius* had done, especially (said hee) in this time wherein we are brought to such extremitie, and that it is more needfull than ever, to have in the Senat, faithfull and loyall persons: and euery one may well know, that there can never be good trust and assurance in strangers, which measure faith and loyaltie, by their profit and losse. We had need also to take good heed there be no brute or faine of this foolish opinion of *Carvilius*, but to let it be trodden under our feet, for feare the Latines take not occasion to lift up their hornes, if they perceive any wind or breath thereof. Breefely, all the companie were of this opinion, and 177 Senators were chosen out of the bodie of the towne of Rome, which before had made knowen their vertue, without more looking into the nobilitie of their race. And *Carvilius* was much despited, that he would have advanced strangers into the offices of Senators.

We

We must not be abashed if the ancient Romanes have used this : for even at this day there is not so small a commonwealth that useth it not. Se Venise, Genes, and other townes of Italie, which are in forme of Commonwealths; see Strasburg, Nuremburg, Ausburg, Francfort, Magdeburg, and all the imperiall townes of Almaine which are governed like Commonwealths, and the thirteene Cantons of the Suiffes, you shall find, that they straitly observe this rule, To receive no strangers into office and publicke charges : yea, in many places they will not receive strangers for inhabitants, wherein ( it may be ) they hold too much severitie and rigour : For hospitalitie is recommended unto us of God, and it is a very laudable vertue for men to entertaine strangers, and well to use them in entertainment. But strangers also ought to content themselves to be welcommed and entertained in a countrey or towne, without an aspiring will to master or hold offices and estates: for that desire can obtaine unto them nothing but envie and evill will. The French nation is that, which of all Christendome ( as I thinke ) receiue and loveth strangers most: for they are as welcome all over Fraunce, as they of their owne nation. Yet wee have above shewed, that our predecessors were sometimes discontented with the Englishmen, that would needs have all estates and offices in Aquitaine: as much may happen in this time, for nothing hath beene in times past, which may not againe be in this time.

The Salicke law ( which is observed in Fraunce, and through all Almaine ) was not onely made to barre women from the succession of the crowne, and from soveraigne domination, by reason of the imbecilitie and incapacitie well to commaund, which is in the feminine sex ( for in the masculine sexe happen often such incapacities: ) But especially the Salicke law was made, to the end, That by marriages strangers should not come to the said succession of the Crowne. For it should be as intollerable a thing to a Frenchman, to obey a strange king, as to obey a queene of the French nation, so odious is a strange domination in Fraunce. As also for that the consequence thereof with us should be ever evil. For a strange king would alwayes to estates and offices of the kingdome advance strangers of his nation; a thing which would alwaies cause in the end disorders and confusions, as is seene by the examples which we have discovered.

Annal. up-  
on An. 607.

There is also an auncient example of Queene *Brunehaut*, or *Brunechile*, who advanced to the estate of *Maire du Palais de France*, ( which was as much as governor of all the kingdome ) a Lumbard, called *Proclaide*, who was much in her good grace and amitie. This stranger seeing himselfe lifted up so high, became so fierce and so proud, that he made no estimate of the Princes of the kingdome, but put them to many troubles and vexations. Hee became also very rapinious and covetous, as ( sayth the hystorie ) is the nature of the Lumbards: inso much, that hee did eat up and ruinated the subjects of Fraunce. Breefely, his behaviours and dealings were such, that hee got the evill wils of all men, from the nobleman to the carter. At that time was there warre amongst the children of the Queene *Brunehaut*, *Theodooric* king of Orleans, and *Theodebert* king of Metz. The barons and great lords, their vassales, were desirous to make a peace betwixt the two kings brothers, but this great *Maire Proclaide* hindered it with all his power: which the said lords seeing, resolved amongst them, That it were better that strangers died, than that so many gentlemen & subjects of the two kings should sleie one another; & so indeed they did slay him as an enimie to peace and concord. The example of this Lumbard

Lumbard should be well marked in this time, by the Lumbards which governe in Fraunce.

*Lewis le Debonair*, sonne of *Charlemaigne*, king of Fraunce, and Emperour of the West, altogether gave the Estate of *Maire du Palais de France*, to a Spaniard called *Berrard*, who incontinent mounted into great pride. The king had three sonnes, *Lotharie*, *Lewis*, and *Pepin*, who could not support the arrogant and fiercenesse of this stranger, who (as it were) would parragon them. This was the cause of an evill enterprise of these three young Princes against their owne father: For they seized upon his person, and brought him into the towne of *Soissons*, and there caused him to forsake his crowne of Fraunce, and the Estate of the empire, and to take the habit of a monke in the Abbey of *S. Marke* in the said *Soissons*, within which they caused him to be kept straitly for a time. But in the end the great barons and lords of Fraunce and *Almaigne* medled therein, and dismorrked him, and restored him to his Estate, & agreed the father with the children. This had not happened, if that good king and emperour had had that wisdome, not to have lifted up a stranger so high; a thing which could not be but displeasing to his naturall subjects, great and little.

For a conclusion of this matter, I will here place the witnesse of *M. Martin du Bellay*, knight of the kings order, a man of qualitie, of vertue, and of great experience, who sayth: That hee hath seene in his time more evill happen unto the affaires of king *Francis*, the first of that name, by the meanes of strangers which revolted from his service, than by any other meanes. Amongst which strangers hee placeth the Bishop of *Liege*, the Prince of *Orange*, the Marquesse of *Mantua*, the Lord *Andrew Doria*, *M. Jerome Moron* of *Millaine*, (who caused *Millaine* to revolt) and certaine others. But because these things are not of very auncient memorie, but happened in our world, I will make no longer discourse thereof: Seeing also the examples and reasons which wee have above rehearsed, are sufficient to shew against the opinion of *Machiavels* disciples, That a Prince cannot doe better, than to serve himselfe (in offices and publicke charges of the countrey of his domination) with his owne subjects of the same countreis, as beeing more fit and agreeing to the nature of the people of that countrey, than are strangers. And there is not a more odious thing to the people (as *M. Comines* sayth) than when they see great offices, benefices, and dignities conferred upon strangers. And as for offices, it hath not beene seene aunciently and commonly, that they have beene bestowed upon strangers: but that within this little space of time they have found meanes to obtaine the greatest and best: For of old there was committed unto them, but offices of Captaine-ships, to the end, that under that title they might the better draw people of their owne countrey to serve the king. But as for benefices, of a long time it hath been, that the Italians have held and possessed the best in Fraunce, which the Pope bestowed upon them, and our kings durst not well contradict. Yet notwithstanding it gave occasion unto king *Charles* the sixt, to make an edict in the year 1556, whereby hee forbad, That any benefices of the kingdome of France should be conferred upon strangers; which both before and since, by many royall Edicts hath often beene renewed and reiterated. Which Edicts merite well to be brought into use; but it shall not bee yet, since that they onely are they which yet doe governe all.

*Amal. An.*  
829.  
*Maire du*  
*Palais*, a  
stranger,  
cause of ci-  
vile warre.

Strangers  
enclined to  
commit  
treasons.



But I pray here all them which are good Frenchmen, that they will consider a little neerer the wrong they do themselves, to suffer themselves to be reputed for strangers in their owne countrie, & by that meanes recuiled & kept from the Charges and Estates of the same. For Italians, or such as are Italianized (which have in their hands the governance of France) hold for true the Maxime of *Machiavell*, That men should not trust in strangers, as it is true: and this is because they would not advance any other but men onely of their owne nation, and certaine bastardlie and degenerous Frenchmen, which are fashioned, both to their humour and their fashions, and which may serve them as slaves and most vile ministers of their trecheries, cruelties, rapines, and other vices. For as for good and naturall Frenchmen, they will never advance them, because they are strangers vnto them, and by consequent suspected not to bee faithfull enough unto them, following the said Maxime.

Where is now then the generositie of our auncient Frenchmen, who made themselves redoubted amongst strange nations? Where are now our auncestors vertues, who have caused the Leuant to tremble, & have sent out their reputation into Asia, and hath repulsed and driven back the Gothes and Sarracens out of France, Spaine, and Italie? For it seemeth that at this day the Frenchmen hold no more any thing of their ancestors valour, seeing they suffer (in comparison to them) so few strangers to dominiere so imperiously over them, & do so debase themselves, as to carry on their backs such insupportable burdens, and suffer themselves to be driven from the Charges and Estates of the common-wealth. Truly this is farre from making us to be redoubted and obeyed in strange countries, when strangers constrain us to obey them, and to take the yoke in our owne countrie. This is to do cleane contrarie to our auncestors, who subjected strangers unto them, when contrarie we subject our owne selves to strangers.

The Frenchmen were wont to be reputed franke & liberall, far from all servitude, but now our stupiditie, carelesse & cowardize do make us seruants & slaves to the most dastardly & cowardly nation of Christendom. Our ancestors have vanquished and subjugated in battaile, & by armes, great Italian armies; but we suffer our selves to be overcome by a small number of Italians, armed with a rock, a spindle, & a pen and inckhorne. Shall we alwayes be thus bewitched? see we not that by secret and and unknowne meanes they overthrow, & cause to die by treasons, poysonings, injustice, now one, now another, of the greatest? & that they looke to no other marke but to ruinate the nobilitie, and all men of valour in France, which are suspected to favour the common-weale, or disfavoure them? Be sleepe no longer, for it is time to awake, and to thinke what we have to doe, and not to attend till (from the particular ruine now of one house, then of another) we see all France vpon the earth. It is alreadie but too much established, and we have but too long attended to provide for our affaires, and to oppose our selves against the designs & machinations of these strangers, all which are discovered & knowne to such as will not shut their eyes. Let us then stir up in our selves the generositie and vertue of our valiant great grandfathers, and shew, that we are come from the race of those good & noble Frenchmen our ancestors, which in old time past have brought under their subjection so many strange nations, and which so many times have vanquished the Italian race, which would make us now serue. Let us not leave off (for a sort of degenerate Frenchmen, adherents to the pernicious purposes of that race) to maintaine and conserve the honors,

honors, and reputation of loyaltie, integritie, and valiancie of our French nation, which these bastardly Italians have contaminated and foiled by their cruelties, massacres and perfidies. Wee want nothing but courage to effect all this: for these Messieurs would not stand one whit, if they knew once, that it were in good earnest and with good accord, that the Frenchmen would send them to exercise their tyrannies in their owne countrey, and force them to make account of such as they have committed in Fraunce.

*Here endeth the first Part, entreating of such Counsell  
as a Prince should use.*



H ij

THE



## THE SECOND PART, TREATING of the Religion which a Prince ought to hold.

### ¶ The Preface.



After having before discoursed largely enough, What Counsell a Prince should have, and take; it will not be to any evil purpose to handle, What Religion he ought to hold and cause to be observed in his dominions: For it is the first and principall thing wherein he ought to employ his Counsell; namely, That the true and pure Religion of God be knowne; and being knowne, that it be observed by him, and all his Subjects. Machiavell in this case (as a very Atheist and contemner of God) giveth another document to a Prince: for he would, That a Prince should not care, whether the Religion that he holdeth be true or false; but saith, That he ought to support and favour such falsities as are found therein: And hee comes even to this point (as an abominable and wicked blasphemers) that he preferreth the Religion of the Paynims before the Christian: and yet his booke is not condemned as hereticall by our Sorbonists. But before we enter to confute his detestable Maxims, I will in manner of a Preface, demonstrate in few words the true resolution that a Prince ought to have in this matter. I presuppose then by a certaine Maxime, That the Prince ought to hold the Christian Religion, as it is seene by all antiquitie, simplicitie, and excellencie of doctrine. For in the first place; none can deny but that more ancient than any other of all the Religions that ever were: because it taketh his foundation upon the bookes of Moses, and the promises of God, of Christ and Messias, contained in those bookes, which were made to our first Fathers, from the beginning of the world. But there is no author, Greeke, or Latine, which was not long after Moses: and it is a thing confessed and held amongst all learned men, That Moses writ his bookes many hundred yeares before Homer, Berofus, Hesiodus, Manethon, Metasthenes, and others like, which many men hold for the most ancient Writers. Moreover, when Moses describeth unto us the generation of Noe, and sheweth us that his children have been as the first stem and root of divers Nations of the world (in token and signe thereof, these Nations hold yet at this present, the names of such children) doth not this shew plainly and truly, that Moses began at the worlds beginning? Of Madens came the Medians, of Ianus the Ionians, of Iobel the Iberians, of Riphath the Riphceans, of Tigran the Tigrarians, of Tharsis the Tharsians, of Cithin the Cyprians, of Canaan the Cananites, of Sidon the Sidonians, of Elam the Elamites, of Assur the



the *Assirians*; of *Lud* the *Lydians* and others: all these were the children, nephews, or arrere-nephews of *Noe*. from whence the said Nations have taken their names: it followeth therefore, that they were the first stocks and roots of them. Again, if we looke to the ceremonies that in times past the *Paynims* used in their sacrifices, men shall easily know, that they are but apish imitations of such sacrifices as were ordained of God, which are described by *Moses*: For the sacrifice of *Iphigenia* which the *Gracians* made in *Anlide* to prosper them in the war they enterprised against *Troy*; what other thing is it than an imitation of *Iepthe* his sacrifice? who made a vow of a sacrifice, to prosper him in the war he enterprised; which sacrifice fell after by the divine will, upon his owne daughter. The custome which the *Gaulois* and many other people had, to immolate and offer criminall men when they had an opinion that God was angrie with them; what other thing was it but a following of the sacrifice of *Abraham*, and of the sacrifices that God had commaunded for the expiation of sinnes? The *Paynims* also imitated this of *Moses* his sacrifices, that they immolated the like beasts, and reserved also a part of the beast sacrificed, to eat. So that thereby also it is clearely seene, That the Religion of *Moses* is the primitive and first, and that the other Religions are but fowle and lazie pourtrayures and imitations thereof. From hence followeth it, That our Christian Religion (which draweth his principles from the promises of *Messias*, contained in *Moses*) is the most ancient of the world, yea as ancient as the world is selfe. For I will not vouchsafe to stay upon the refutation of the strange opinion of *Machiavell*, and other ancient Philosophers *Paynims*; which have maintained, That the world had no beginning: but I send them to *Empedockles*, *Plato* and other ancient *Paynim* Philosophers which have maintained the contrarie. I thinke that the ignorance of the Philosophers, which held, That the world had no beginning, shall something excuse them, because they never saw the bookes of *Moses*, and in a thing so difficile and hard to comprehend, the spirits of men might easily faile. But the impietie of *Machiavell* is no way excusable, who hath seene the bookes of *Moses*, and yet followeth that wicked opinion, like a mocker and contemner of the holy Scripture, thinking to shew, that he knowes more than others, he I say, who is ignorant and full of brutish beastlinesse, as (God willing) I shall make knowne.

As for the simplicitie of our Christian Religion, herein it is seene, That the Christians will know God, as he will that we should know him; and as he hath manifested himselfe unto us, simply, without passing further. For they are not so presumptuous as were those foolish *Paynim* Philosophers which disputed of the Essence of God, and disputing upon that point, fell into opinions, the most absurd and strange of the world. Some, after they had much dreamed in their braines, concluded, That the universall world was God: others, That it was the Soule of the world: others, That it was the Sun: and others set forward certaine other like monstrous opinions. They disputed also of his power, of his Eternitie, and of his Providence, by naturall reasons: in all these they knew not how to resolve themselves therein: For how is man so proud and insensible, to thinke, that his braine (which is not halfe a foot large) can comprehend so great and infinite a thing? it is as great a foolery and grossenesse, as he that in the palme of his hand will comprehend all the waters of the sea. A Christian then hath this modestie and simplicitie, To know God by those meanes, and according as he will be knowne of men; beleiving, That to have a will to passe further, is to enter into darknesse, & not into knowledge. From hence followeth it, That the knowledge which a Christian hath of God, is the only true knowledge; and that all the knowledge that others (as *Paynims* and Philosophers) ever had, it neither was nor is any other but a shadow and imagination, very far from the most part of the truth.

Simplicitie  
of the Chri-  
stian Reli-  
gion.

The excellency of the Christian Religion.

Cicero in Somn. Scipi. Plato in Phædo.

And touching the excellencie of the doctrine of true Religion, herein is it first seene; that it is founded upon the promises of God made to the first fathers from the beginning of the world: whereby all they that embrace that Religion, are assured, That God is their father, and that he loveth them, and that he will give them eternall life by the meanes of Messias. Can there then be any thing more excellent than this? Is there any thing in the world that can give more contentment or repose to the spirit of man, than this doctrine? For when man considereth the brevity of his dayes, the languishments and miseries of this world, full of envies, enmities, all vices and calamities, will hee not iudge himselfe more unhappie than the beasts, if hee hoped not for an eternall happinesse after this life? The poore Paynims having this consideration, aspired to an eternitie, some in doing worthy acts, whereof there should be a perpetuall memorie after them; others writ bookes that might be read after their death: others persuaded themselves, that the gods would send good mens soules into the Elisian fields, and the wicked into the Acherontike and Stigian darknesse. Yet were there some Philosophers, which disputed; That the soules of generous and valiant men after death, goe to heaven. All these opinions and persuasions of men, were but to give rest to their minds, which iudged man of all creatures most unhappie, without an eternall life after this. But what assurance had they of these opinions, which they gave to themselves? These poore people had none, neither founded they themselves, but upon some weake and feeble reasons. For thus they argued: That it was not credible, that God, who is all good, would create man (who is the most excellent creature in the world) to make him most unhappie; which he should doe, if he should not enjoy an happie and eternall life after this. They also say, That it is not credible, that God, which is all iust, would equally deale with the good as with the bad: which he should doe, if there were not another life than this, wherein the good might receive a felicitie, and the wicked punishment for their misdeeds. But what is all this? These be but feeble and weake pittie reasons, wherupon the spirits and consciences of men can find no good foundation to repose themselves, and to take an assured resolution of a salvation and an eternall felicitie. But the Christian hath another foundation than this: for he knoweth that God is of old, gone out (if I may so say) from his throne in heaven to communicate and manifest himselfe to our auncient fathers, so speake unto them, to declare unto them his bountie and love towards mankind; he knowes, that God hath made them promises of Messias, which he hath since accomplished, and that in him he hath promised to give eternall life to all them which lay hold of that Messias, and use his meanes to come unto it. These promises have been many times reiterated to our said fathers, and in Ages well distant one from another, that they might not be forgotten, but that they might be so much the more cleare, and knowne of every one: insomuch, that the Paynims themselves (which never read our fathers writings) have had some knowledge of the promises of God touching Messias; they were so cleare, notorious, and well knowne, as we shall say more at full in another place. Heare then for a resolution, a great excellencie in this doctrine of Christian Religion, viz. That it brings us to a certaine knowledge and a firme assurance of an eternall life after this; which knowledge and assurance is not founded upon certaine leane Philosophicall reasons, but upon the promises proceeding from the very mouth of God, which is the truth it selfe, and cannot lie.

And as for the doctrine of manners, I confesse that the Paynims and Philosophers which have held other religions, have spoken and reasoned in reasonable good termes, but yet their doctrine commeth nothing nigh to that which the Christian Religion teacheth us thereof. True it is that the Paynims have spoken something well of Iustice, Temperance,

Clemen-

Clemencie, Prudence, Loyaltie, Fidelitie, Amisie, Gentlenesse, Magnanimisie, Liberalitie, Love towards ones countrie, and such other vertues; he that denieth that they have not spoken well, and that some have not somethings practised them, should do them wrong. And the Christians have this in common with them, To approve and follow all these vertues; and for that cause they disdain not to reade their bookes, and to learne of them the goodlie documents which they have left, touching these vertues: but yet I must say, that the Christian Religion hath lanced and entred farre deeper into the doctrine of good manners, than the Paynims and Philosophers have done. For prooffe hereof I will take the Maxime of Plato: That we are not only borne for our selves, but that our birth is partlie for our countrie, partlie for our parents, and partlie for our friends: behold a goodlie sentence, we can say no other: but if we come to conferre it with the doctrine of Christians, it will be found maimed and defective. For what mention doth Plato make of the poore? where and in what place of this notable sentence doth he set them? he speaks not at all of them: breefly, he would that our charitie should bee first employed towards our selves: which they have well marked and followed, which say; That a well ordered charitie begins at himselfe. But this is farre from the doctrine which S. Paul teacheth the Christians, when he sayth: That Charitie seeks not her owne, and also that which Christ himselfe commaundeth us; To love our neighbour as our selves. Secondly, Plato placeth our love towards our countrie: Thirdly, our love towards our parents: and lastly, our friends. And what becomes of the poore? Let them doe as they can: for Plato his Charitie stretcheth not to them. And indeed a poore person in the time of the Paynims, which had no meanes to live, had no shorter way than so sell himselfe to bee a slave unto him that bought him, who afterward served himselfe with him and nourished him. If such a poore man found no man to buy him, he died with hunger. True it is, that some were sometimes touched with commiseration of humanitie towards poore persons, when they saw them with their eyes languishing and in miserie: but they called not this commiseration, a vertue, but only an humane passion. Neither had they any hospitals to lodge and nourish the poore in, nor their Princes or great lords had their Almoners as Christians have. When a child was borne evill formed, they would kill it, a cruell thing and full of inhumanitie, yet was it ordinarily practised; yea as Rome it was an expresse law of Romulus, whereby he commanded to expose and stifle the children which were borne disformed; which not only was a crueltie against nature, but as it were a despise and iniurie done to the Creator who had created and formed them. They made accompt of poore men as they did of beasts: for they slew their slaves at their pleasure, and when, and for what they would. Vedius Polio a Romane gentleman in the time of Augustus Cæsar, ordinarily caused to sleigh his servants and slaves (whereof he had a great number) choosung alwaies the most profitable, to cast the other bodies into his ponds which he had nigh his house, to feede Lampreys which he had in those ponds. In the Paynims time (to offer pleasure and pastime to the people) they caused to make Theaters for combass to vantage of poore slaves, which they caused to bande in two parts one against an other, and after that, furiously set one upon another with naked swords, and none of them armed with any defensive thing. And (this sport ended) when they of the one part had slaine all the others, or else that all had slaine one another to the last, the people laughed and tooke pleasure to see this, no more nor no lesse than we take pleasure to see Cocks fights. Hereby is it seene that the Paynims had no pitié of the poore, nor of slaves and servants, but regarded them as brute beasts, and made no more accompt of them, but for their service they drew from them. Also we never read amongst all their morall precepts they had, that they ever spake of the poore; nor that

Dionis. Halicar, lib. 2.

Dion in Augusto.



Lampri, in  
Alex.

that they ever established any good policie to help them. Yet notwithstanding this agreeth well with naturall reason, To do well to his like. And this so noble a sentence which the Emperour Alexander Severus caried for his poësie or devise: What thou wouldst not should be done unto thee, do it not to another, agreeth well with the common sence, and seemes well to be a principle of nature, not only in the negative, Not to doe, but also in the affirmative, To doe to another, as we would he should do unto us, Yet although naturall light lead us hereunto, the Paynims have not yet come to this point. The hystorographer Lamprius saith: That the Emperour Alexander learned this excellent device of the Christians, or of the Jewes in his time. Therefore it appeareth by the above said reasons, That the doctrine of manners, which is taught us by the Christian Religion, is much more excellent than that which the Religions of the Paynims and Philosophers teach, seeing they make no account of the poore which are recommended unto us by so many precepts of Religion. Moreover, the Christian Religion abateth the pride of mens hearts, and so makes them know they are sinners: and the Religion of Paynims and Philosophers fill men with pride and presumption, perswading them, That naturally they are vertuous of themselves, and inclinable to do good and vertuous works, which they attribute to their owne vertue, and not to God. Yet more, the Christian Religion teacheth us to be patient, to support the imperfections one of another, and to pardon: but contrary, that of the Paynims and Philosophers perswadeth to seek vengeance. For a conclusion, none can deny, but that the doctrine of Christian Religion is in all points more excellent and perfect than that of the Paynim Religion. But when I speake of the Paynim Religion, I understand all other Religions (unlesse it be the Jewish Religion, out of which the Christian taketh his originall) for I hold for Paynims the Turkes, Sarracens, and all other Barbarous people, which allow neither the old nor new Testament, and that have no knowledge in them.

The Catho-  
like Religi-  
on and the  
Reformed  
are all one.

But I doe not doubt but some will here make a question in this time, wherein wee are, that is, What Religion ought to be accounted Christian, whether the Catholike or Reformed. Herennto I answer: That we ought not to make two of them, and that it is but one same Religion, and as the names Catholike, and Evangelike, and Reformed, are all one name; so is the thing is selfe: for the one and the other acknowledgeth Christ, which is the foundation; and hold the Articles of the Faith of the Apostles Symbole; approve the Trinitie, and the Sacraments of Baptisme, and the holy Supper: Although there be some diversitie in the intelligence of certaine points, we may not for that make them two divers Religions. For in breefe, the one and the other is Christian, seeing they take Christ for the foundation. But for this purpose I will here recite a discourse of a learned man (in my opinion) which I lately heard at my lodging in my iourney from Paris to Basill. By which discourse, this good person (although he was Evangelike) maintained, That the Catholikes and Evangelikes do agree, not only in name, but also in doctrine, although Sophisters will perswade the contrary. This proposition at the first seemed unto me a very Paradox: but when I heard and understood the reasons of that good man, his sayings seemed very true unto me. There was in the companie a gentleman Catholike, none of these great talkers and bablers, but a man very gentle and affable, who tooke great pleasure to heare this discourse, and asked many questions of this good man, whom I cannot name, for I never saw him before. He was no man of great shew, neither was there any great estimation made of him at the beginning, before we heard him speake: but at the end of our Table, when we had given thanks (upon certain talke we had of Religion) he put forth the said proposition. All the company prayed him to cleare and illuminase that point, and to speake his full opinion therein; for there was neither Catholike nor Evangelike, which desired not greatly

to understand that point. He began then in this manner (after he had prayed all the company to take in good part what he should say, and humbly to excuse his faults, if any escaped.) Masters (saith he) I see well, that all this company casteth their eyes upon me, attending to heare of me the proofe of the proposition which I uttered. To satisfie then your desires, although I have not promeditated all the reasons which might be spoken to maintaine that I say: yet I will alleage some, which I hope you will not iudge impertinent. I will then here repeat my proposition, that is, That the Catholikes hold the same points of Christian Religion that we of the Reformed or Evangelike do. True it is, that the Sophisters will needs perswade the Catholikes, that we hold another doctrine than they doe, especially touching the Sacrament of the Altar, or the Supper (for all is one) and touching good works and certaine other points: and in veritie, the doctrine of our Religion differeth farre from that of the Sophisters, yea, in principall points, as is seeme by the conference of our confession of Faith, with their Articles. But I say and will maintaine, That the most part of the Catholikes understand not the articles of the Sophisters, neither can they comprehend them, because they consist in certaine subtilie distinctions, and sophisticall rearmes. The schoole doctors knowing that their doctrine cannot be comprehended by the simple sence and common iudgement of men, make the people beleve, that it makes no matter though they understand nothing, if so be they beleve generally, that the articles of their faith bee true. And this they call an implicit, wrapped, or entangled faith, that is to say, it is so covert and hid, that the people understand nothing. But I meane not to speake of the Sophists doctrine, but of such points of Religion, whereof the Catholikes have some knowledge by the apprehension of sence and common iudgement. For I maintaine, & it is true, That in these points, or in the most part, and especially in the chiefe things they agree with us, although the Sophisters make them beleve the contrary. And by the way to make it appeare, let us a little discourse upon the principall articles of our Christian Religion (as of the Sacraments, of Iustification, of workes, and certaine other points) and we shall see plainly, that the Catholikes agree with us.

First if you aske of a good Catholike, if when he receiveth the Sacrament on Easter day, he crusheth and bruserh with his teeth the very flesh and bones of our Lord Iesus Christ: he will answere you, hee beleves it not, and that he detesteth and abhorreth that talke of crushing, and brusing with the teeth, the flesh and bones of our Savior. If you demand of him, if he do not beleve, that when he receiveth the Sacrament, he receiveth spiritually the body and bloud of our Lord Iesus Christ: he will answer: yea, that he beleves so. If you yet aske him, if when he receives the Sacrament of the Host, he beleve that he receiveth and drinketh by the same meanes, the sacrament of the blood by Concomitance, and that the cup which is given him to drinke in, is not but for him to rince his mouth withall: he will say he beleves not this, and that eating is not drinking, and that he knoweth not what that Concomitance is: and that he beleveth, that receiving the Host, he eateth the Sacrament of the bodie, and that drinking on the cup, he drinketh the Sacrament of the blood. If you demand of him, if he beleve not, that in the holie Sacrament there is made a Transubstantiation: he will answer you, that he beleves it not, because he knowes not what Transubstantiation is, nor what they meane by that long and prodigious word, and that he thinketh it is some obscure word invented by the Sophisters, to hide from simple people holie things, and to darken cleare things. And truly it is a strange thing, and abhorring, from common sence, and from all humanitie and Christianity, so to bruse & burst the humane flesh & bones of our Savior Christ betwixt our teeth. And the Sophisters would so perswade the good Catholikes if they could, and that they found this goodly doctrine upon a Canon, which

Ego Ber.  
de Conse.  
dist. 2.

which beginnesh, Ego Beringarius. Where there is this in proper searmies. I Beringer,  
unworthy Deacon of the Church of S. Maurice of Angiers, knowing the true Catholike  
and Apostolike Faish, detest and anathematize all Heresie, and that whereof I have been  
before diffamed. Therefore I confesse with hart and mouth, that the bread and the wine,  
which are set on the Altar after the consecration, are not only the Sacraments, but are chan-  
ged into the body and blood of our Lord Iesus Christ: and that the Priest toucheth not  
only sensually the Sacraments, but also he handleth with his hands the very bodie of  
our Lord, and that he breaketh it, and that the Faishfull breake and bruse it betwixt their  
teeth. Behold the goodly doctrine of this Canon, which the Sophists would make the Ca-  
tholikes beleve: but of five hundred you shall not find one that will beleve it. And ve-  
rily, this Canon makes me remember what Achæmenides saith in Virgil of the great  
Polyphemus, who did eat the companions of Vlysses.

Æneidi. 3.

Poore humane creatures he did eat, the bodie, blood, and all:  
My selfe did see him claspe and gripe in his so deep a den,  
Two men of ours in his huge hands, their heads on doore Lintall  
He knocked so, that blood gusht out, and in my sight those men  
He tore and brused twixt his teeth, yet dead they were not cleane.

And how should Catholikes beleve this Canon, seeing the Priests themselves beleve  
it not? I proove it. For if they beleve it, they would never say Masse upon Fridaies, nor in  
Lent, or other fasting dayes: and the Charterhouse, Celestines, nor Enfumine Friers and  
Monks would say no Masses, for feare to eat flesh. O, but will one say, This is a strange rea-  
son. I confesse it; but the aforesaid Canon is as strange: and how strange so ever, yet can  
it not be overthrowne, without giving some spirituall interpretation unto the manduca-  
tion of the Sacrament. But straight as soone as a man comes there, behold we are at an  
agreement. You see then how the Catholikes, yea, the Priests themselves beleve not in  
this Canon, which notwithstanding is the only foundation of the Masse. Yea, but you will  
say, The Catholikes go to Masse and find it good. I confesse it, but it is upon custome they go  
thither, not because they understand or beleve any other thing touching the Sacrament,  
than that we have already said. And therefore seeing they do agree with us in the princi-  
pall, there shall be no great danger nor losse for them to send away and banish into the Cy-  
clopian Islands, or into Polyphæmus den their Masse, yea, though but for a time to see and  
prove, whether they might well and commodiously spare it or no. As wee read Pope Cle-  
ment the sixth did, who excommunicated all the people of the countrie of Flanders, for a  
certaine Rebellion that they had made against the king of France their soveraigne; who  
also interdicted all the Priests of the Countrie upon paine of eternall damnation, so say no  
Masses, nor to administer any Sacraments to the Flemmings, till they had obtained absolu-  
tion of his fatherhood. The poore Flemmings seeing themselves without Masses (for in no  
sort their Priests would say any) they writ to the king of England, making unto him great  
complaints. The king of England sent them word not to be dismayed nor troubled for want  
of Masses; for he would send them Priests out of his countrie, so say them Masses ynough.  
But the Priests of England went not, fearing to be comprehended in that fulmination of  
the Pope. In the meane while the Flemmings attending whilst the king of England sent  
the Priests, accustomed so much themselves to be without Masses, being merry and making  
good cheare, that they were well, and no more it troubled them. Many other Countries also  
at this day which have no Masses, passe the time well ynough to their consent, as England,

Scot-



Scotland, and Denmark, and the most part of Almaine. I beleeve also, if men did assay it in France, to obtaine peace and union, they would not find it so evill as they thinke. For already we agree upon the Sacrament, as is abovesaid: we hold also the Epistles, Gospels, & the lessons which are taken out of the Psalmes of David, and the Prophets: for we shall alwayes find that in our Bible, yea, farre more faithfully enregistred than in the Misall: all the remainder is not worth the holding. For as for their massing garments; men of good iudgement know wel, That apparell addes no holinesse to the masse; seeing also that Frenchmen naturally staie not long in one fashion of apparell, but easily chaunge from one to another. I confesse in regard of the common people, which only stay upon that they see, that they will take no great lust in a masse, without the masse garments: as if the Curate said it in his doubles and hose without more, or in his ierkin; it is certaine that commonly the parishioners would greatly scandize it, and would not find it good. And yet a true thing it is, that apparell makes not the masse better; neither have they any sanctitie in them to deserve to be retained. For if it were true, that such garments made the masse better, and added any holinesse unto it; then would it follow, that the better the garments and habites are, so much the better should the masses be; & then would there be found great inequality in the bountie and goodnesse of masses; and so would it follow, that the masses of rich men should be better than poore mens, a thing very absurd and odious: that were also to make village masses of no account, because their masse garments are often tattered and rent. So that then we must come to this resolution, to shun these absurdities, That garments bring no holinesse to the masse; and that in retaining the holy Sacrament, the Gospell, the Epistles, and the lessons of the Psalmes and Prophets, which are in the masse, there would be found no danger to let go all the rest. Now then if we lay by through all France the superfluous things of the masse, are not all the rest of the exercises of religion alike? The Catholikes go to the church to pray unto God; so doe we also. They go to heare Sermons of the word of God; so doe we also. They go thither to praise God in singing of the Psalmes of David; and we also. They go thither to keepe their Easter; & we also. For it is all one to celebrate the Easter and the Supper. Breefly, all our exercises of Religion are alike. I know well you wil say there is a difference, because the Catholikes pray and sing Psalmes in Latin; and we in French. But I answer you, that that is nothing, so that men understand what they say. For God understandeth well all languages. You will say unto me also, that the preachers of the one and of the other preach not the same doctrine. Yet I answer, that though it be so, yet do we agree in all the principall points of Religion, which are necessary to be knowne for the salvation of our soules. If in any other points our preachers cannot agree, we must let them agree amongst themselves, and content our selves to know the articles which are necessary for our salvation. For it cannot be said, that if we cannot be as subtil and sharpe as S. Thomas of Aquin, Bonaventure, Scot, Bricot, or other like docters of Theologie, that therefore we must needs bee damned. It were a very straunge thing to beleeve, that God would have his holy Religion so obscure, that none but Sophists should thinke to understand any thing of it. But contrary, we must beleeve, That God hath given it unto us, simple, cleare, and intelligible, that even plaine people might comprehend and understand it. So if it please God, we need not leave to be saved, although wee know not what meaneth Transubstantiation, Concomitance, and such like rearmes, which are not read in the Bible; and although we be not so sharpe and quick to understand the nature of quiddities the subsistence of Accidents seperated from the subiect, the effects and operations of second intentions, the motion of the Chimare in Vacuities, and other like deepe subtilities of speculative Theologie. But I have above shewed, that the Catholikes and

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we do well accord in the Sacrament of the Altar, or the Supper; so do we in the principall  
 points of Christian Religion. Demand of a Catholik, if he do not beleeve, That he shall be  
 saved by the merits of the death & passion of our Lord Iesus Christ; he will say, yea, that  
 he beleeves it. Aske yet of him, if he do not beleeve, That one onely drop of the precious  
 blood of our Savior, the eternall sonne of God, is sufficient to save all the world; hee will  
 say, yea. Make upon it this consequence, That it followeth then, that the death and passion  
 of Iesus Christ, who shed all his blood for us, is more than sufficient for our salvation; hee  
 will not deny this. Aske him after, if he beleeve, that for our salvation there must be ming-  
 led the blood of martyrs, supererogatorie works, meritts of Saints, & good works, with the  
 blood of Christ, the sonne of God; he will answer you, That hee beleeves not, that there  
 must be such a mingle mangle, since the blood of the sonne of God is sufficient for our sal-  
 vation, and that, that should be to pollute it; and that he knowes not what supererogatorie  
 workes are. And touching good workes, which they say we reieist: aske of the least child,  
 which leames his Catechisme, if a Christian ought not to do good workes, to shew himselfe  
 a Christian; he will answer you, yea. Demand of him also, if good workes be not meri-  
 torious towards God; he will answer you, That they so please God, that (in regard of them  
 as by meritts) an infinit sort of good things are given us, as health, long life, children, and  
 other graces, except eternall life, which he gives us by the only merit of Iesus Christ. I be-  
 lieve there is no Catholike in the world which will say more of good workes than this. As  
 for faith in generall, we receive both the one and the other, the holy Scriptures of the old  
 and new Testament. Touching Bapisme, we agree in the substance, namely, that it ought  
 to be done, In the name of the Father, the Sonne, and the Holy Ghost, and with the signe of  
 the water. We differ about spittle, salt, and the conjurations of Devils, which the Catholike  
 Priests do say to be within the bodies of little children, and they chase them out: we indeed  
 cast off all this, as mens inventions, which would be wiser than God, who prescribeth them  
 what they shall doe therein. And I assure my selfe; that the most part of the Catholikes  
 would willingly, that those things were rejected, and that Priests would not spit in the  
 mouths of their little children; and that they had no salt at all; neither doe they beleeve  
 there are diuels within the bodies of their little children. We also differ in certaine other  
 ceremonies, which I will not discover now at length. But must we hereupon say, that the  
 Catholikes and we, are of two divers Religions? The Friers and Iacobins, and many other  
 sorts of Monkes in Christendome, have all different ceremonies in habits, in rules, in do-  
 ing their services, and in all the exercises of their orders, yet they are all held to be of the  
 Christian Religion. Moreover, though there were some difference betwixt us touching  
 doctrine (seeing we accord in the principall points of Christian Religion) must there be  
 accounted a pluraltie and diversitie of Religion amongst us, for the Canon Ego Beren-  
 garius? Must men make all that stir, to rore out all the Canons and Artillerie of France,  
 and thunder at all the Townes and Castles of the kingdome, to fill all places with armes,  
 souldiors, and all the Townes with the blood of Christians, and to make red the rivers, for  
 such a quarel as this? Must brother arme himselfe against his brother, the Father against  
 his sonne? must needs the Nobilitie ruinate it selfe? must all the people be trodden under  
 feet, and the whole Realme be brought into a combustion. For verily, none makes war upon  
 us, but because we will not beleeve in the aforesaid Canon, and yet they which do this unto  
 us, do not beleeve in it themselves, as we have before shewed. But yet there is a point that  
 seemeth to be one of the most principall points of Religion, wherein we differ, namely, tou-  
 ching the Pope, in whom we beleeve not. But I am of opinion, that the most part of Catho-  
 likes beleeve in him no more than we; and that the matter is not of sufficient weight to  
 make

make any great contention of. Our ancestors in times past have well passed their time without a Pope; and wherefore should not we do so as well as they. In the time of king Charles the sixth, le bien ayme, there were two popes in Christendome, the one at Rome called pope Urbane, and the other at Avignon, who was called Clement. The Christian princes and Commonweales at this time knew not which was the better of them, yet some followed the pope of Rome, and they were called Urbanists; and others the pope of Avignon, and they were called Clementines: and when that the pope died at Rome or in Avignon, men elected alwayes another in his place: so that it appeared, that this pluralitie of popes would ever endure. The king of Fraunce and his Counsell were occasioned to exhort both of them to submit themselves to a Counsell, which might advise and ordaine, which of them two should be pope, or if the one or the other ought not to bee. The king could never persuade them to come to this accord; and especially the pope of Avignon was more backward than the other. Hereupon the king caused to assemble the Vniversitie of Paris, and especially our maisters of Sorbonne, to have their advise what he should doe in this case. At that time was there a learned Doctor in Theologie in Sorbonne Colledge, who was called M. Iohn de Gigenconet, who maintained, That the Catholicke Church might well for a time bee without a Pope, yea, for ever; and alledged many good reasons, which for times sake I will not here recite. Briefely, the Vniversitie was congregated, and thereby it was resolved, that the king ought to withdraw himselfe and all his kingdome from the obedience of both the popes, untill there were another legitimately elected. And that there were good meanes to bee dispatched of the pope, viz. to leave the collations of benefices to the ordinary collators, and also to labour unto the prelates of Fraunce, for dispensations requisit. Hereupon the king made an edict, with the advise of his daughter the Vniversitie, (so names he is) whereby inhibitions and defences were made to all subiects, as well of the Nobilitie and the Clergie, as of the third estate, no more to acknowledge either of the said popes, for popes, neither any more to runne either to Rome or Avignon, for the obtaining and impetration of benefices, dispensations, or other bulls and provisions Apostolicall: but to the ordinarie Collators, and to the Prelates of the French church, upon paine to bee debarred of their pretended rights, and other great punishments: which Edict was observed by the space of three yeares: at the end of which time was a pope chosen at the counsell of Pise, called Alexander the sixth, under whose obedience the king and his kingdome yielded themselves. But the space of the said three yeares they did well ynough without a pope in France: and so likewise during the said time of pluralitie of popes, which endured fortie yeares. And there were then many princes, which acknowledged neither the one nor the other for popes; as the king of Aragon, the count of Hainault, the duke of Bretagne, the commonwealth of Liege. If then in times past so many could bee without popes, why might wee not as well spare them now as then? But as I have said before, I see not why the Catholickes should so much care for the pope, as to travell and iourney so farre as Rome to kisse his pantophle, nor to spend so much money to buy his pardons, beeing such vile and base merchandize. To conclude (my maisters) it seemeth unto me by this breefe discourse, I have made hitherto, that my proposition is sufficiently cleared: That the Catholike and we differ not in Religion, but doe agree in all points necessarie for our salvation. After that, that good man had made us the sayd discourse, truly every one of us thanked him, but especially the Catholike gentleman, saying: That as for him he never beleevd otherwise the points which hee had delivered, but even as he had said: and that he would never have thought, that they of the Evangelike Religion had accorded so well with the Catholikes, as he saw they did. But said he (my maisters) after so serious a discourse, it should not be impertinent to adde another, to make us laugh.



All the company prayed him to doe it: then began he to say in this manner: I have above  
 touched, how habits and apparell brought no sanctitie to the masse: wee may also say, That  
 they adde no sanctitie to the persons neither, according to that common proverbe, Apparell  
 makes not a Monke. Yet I find, that this question hath beene sometime handled with great  
 contention and diversitie of opinions, which endured nigh fiftie yeares amongst the Friers,  
 because they could not accord upon the colour, greasnesse, widenesse, & forme of their habits.  
 For you must understand, that the glorious S. Francis, amongst other articles of his rule, hee  
 had placed one, whereby he ordained, That all that were of his order, for apparell, should cloth  
 themselves with the basest, vilest, and of the lowest price that could be; that they should on-  
 ly have one coat with an hood, and another without an hood; and that they should weare no  
 shooes, nor ride on horsebacke. Upon the intelligence and interpretation of this article, arose  
 great and marvellous altercations and disputations in the order of Friers: insomuch that  
 they held a generall Chapter, to accord these disputations, and to rule themselves all by one  
 sort of habites. For some wore habites of one colour, some of another, some short, others long;  
 insomuch, that they seemed not to be of the same Order. In this Chapter then was there a  
 great disputation, about the intelligence and interpretation of the said article. About  
 the last two points they were they easie to agree: for seeing they were forbidden by the said  
 article to ride on horsebacke, they resolved to ride but on Asses & Mules, or on foot, as com-  
 monly they doe. They considered also, That Asses were fittest for them in their Covenants, for  
 being kept with least charge. As for shooes, they resolved, That they would take away the  
 most part of the leather, leaving only a sole, with a thong, to go overthwart the foot, to make  
 the sole fast to the foot, and so should they not be shooes but soles. But the greatest difficulty  
 and strife was about the fashion of the hood, and of the coat or Iacker. For in the said Chap-  
 ter were moved three principall questions, by certaine subtile and cunning Friers. The first,  
 upon the colour: the second, upon the quantitie: and the third, about the forme. But to han-  
 dle these three questions in order, you must understand, That about the colour there was di-  
 vers opinions, upon which they could not accord. For the blessed S. Francis had spoken no-  
 thing of the colour in his rule: but only ordained, That they of his order should weare habits  
 of a low price. Then fell out a great question, What colour was of least price, and thought to  
 be most vile. Some reasoned, That the greene colour was the vilest, and might bee bought  
 cheaper than any other: and that it was ordinarily seene, that people of most vile condition  
 (as carters, marriners, and other mean people) did weare that colour, in lining to their doub-  
 lers, as the worst colour of al. They said also, That the matter wherewith a greene colour is  
 made, is cheaper than any other: for with hearbes and leaves, greene may bee made, to die  
 both woollen and linnen. Others said, the murrey or smokie colour was the worst and best  
 cheape: for to make that colour, there need no more, but to take white wooll and foot. But  
 the third opinion seemed to bee best taken with reason and equitie. And that was they which  
 said, That there was no viler colour nor more meet for their order, than that which came  
 from the beasts backe is selfe. But it is so, that both white and blacke came from the beasts  
 backe: and it is evident, that the blessed S. Francis did so understand it, they should weare  
 the colour of the beast in token of humilitie and patience; saying further: That all other co-  
 lours cost something, and if it were but labour, but the colour of the beast cost nothing. Ther-  
 fore they concluded, That all the order of Friers ought to weare their garments either of  
 white or blacke colour, and not of greene, smokie, or any other colours, and that it was their  
 opinion. Assuredly these reasons of the first disputers were so pregnant, that they shaked  
 all the rest of the company: yet notwithstanding they which had disputed for Greene, and  
 smokie colours, thinking it not good to be overcome at the first blow, replied more. They  
 which

which have disputed of the colour of the beast (say they) do shew, that they hold something of the beast (speaking under the brotherly correction of their superiours, and the Chapter) for that their conclusion is alternative and indeterminate. For they concluded upon white & blacke, without resolving either upon the one or the other, and that such a conclusion implied evident contradiction. For (say they) there is nothing more contrary than white and blacke. Moreover they said, That if so be the colour of the sheepe should bee worne of them, men would iudge it to be a token of their pride & presumption, which is the greatest of all mortall sins, because for pride Lucifer fell from heaven into bel: for the world may say of them, that they cover themselves with the colour of the sheepe, and notwithstanding are ravening wolves: seeing it is written, That men must take heed of them, that make an outward countenance to be sheepe, & yet are wolves, and by that similitude are they noted to bee false prophets. They shewed also, that already other orders of beggers or Mendicants have taken possession of those two colours, blacke & white. For the Iacobins wore white under, & black above. And the Carmelites contrarie, blacke under and white above: and generally, all sorts of other Monkes, which held the rules of S. Augustine, S. Bernard, and blessed S. Benet, & others were all monkes, either white, or blacke. And that it should not be wel done to take from them their colours, or to enterprise upon them: for so they might oppose themselves against them, & that that was not the way to draw unto them the devotion of the world. Finally, they shewed that if their order of Friars tooke blacke, there are some countries where there are no blacke sheepe, or very few, as in Berry, Limoges & Languedoc; then in these countries must they be forced to dye their wooll, so would it become deare, & then directly should they do against the rule of blessed S. Francis, That bids them weare clothes of the vilest and cheapest price; this should also bee to go against their liberties and priviledges, To pay the least they can: for by their rule they are forbidden to handle any silver. And by the contrary if the Order chuse a white colour, there are other countries, where there are no white sheepe, or few: as in Tuscane, and many other places, so that the Friars there must haue their white clothes out of farre countries, which will be to their great cost, & so will bee directly against the said rule and their liberties. And therefore these disputers persisted still in their first opinion for greene and smokie colours. The others which had reasoned for the colour of the beast, finding themselves pinched & pricked, replied, That that opinion of greene and smokie colour was the most savage opinion of the world, and according to the reason they had whith maintained it. For (said they) greene is a colour fit for fooles. Moreover, in countries, where they say there is nothing but cole blacke wooll, how can they dye that blacke, greene, or smokie? Finally, their disputation became so hot, that it was greatly to be feared they would have salne to fistis, if certaine auniens fathers sitting in highest places, had not imposed silence to the breshren, and made them understand, That truly they had well and learnedly debated the matter, both of the one part and of the other, and that they thought that the question was weightie, high, and hard, and such as merited the advise and resolution of the holy Father the Pope, and that therefore they would reserve unto him the determination thereof. As soone as the Friars heard speake of the Pope, each one held his peace.

After this, the senior Fathers caused to propose the second question of the three, for which the Chapter was assembled, touching the quantitie of habits, that is, if they should be long or short, wide or strait. The first disputers (in great number) were all of advice, That their garments of Order ought to bee short and strait for many good reasons, which they alleaged: For, said they, habits short and strait, are more vile and better cheape than long and large, because they have not so much stufte in them. Therefore since the glorious Sains Frauncis our founder, would and ordayned that wee should weare habits of vile and

little price, we cannot better observe that holy rule (wherein consisteth the estate of perfection) than in making our habits as short and as strait as is possible. Moreover (said they) our father and good founder S. Francis, hath he not appointed we should be Mendicants, & live upon the almes of good people: therefore we must make account to gather our almes to live, and to seeke it sometimes farre off, upon paine to endure hunger and want; for wee shall have little brought into our convent: then must we trot hither and thither at all times, raine it or haile it, be it hot, cold, drie, or wet, yea in Lent and Advents, to preach; but no kind of habits is more meet to overthwart the fields than such as are short, for the long are unfit. Contrary, such as reasoned after, said, That the same opinion was strange and ridiculous; because, if Friars should weare short habits, they would seeme more like Millers than Friars: and it is ordinarily seen, that in those countries where Friars use short habits, the order was much despised and mocked of the world, and men called them curtall Friars: and therefore long and large were most covenable and fit for them; and that (the blessed S. Francis rightly understood) they should weare long habits: for in the said article he useth the word Tunike, which signifieth a long robe or garment. Moreover, long habits are more seemely for Religious men, and short garments for lay men: and that a long garment makes Religious men the most revered and honoured in the world. They said further, that all other sorts of Monkes wore long and wide habits, and it should be a great noveltie, if the Order of the glorious S. Francis should take a short habit. Likewise (said they) when we go into the pulpit to preach, or when we go to say masse, 'tis a goodly sight to have our garments like millers. Therefore they concluded, That their habits should be long and large. But the first reasoners replied to this, saying to the first point, That the good S. Francis had taught them the way of humilitie, and that therefore they ought not to seeke to weare long garments, to bee therefore honoured and revered of the world; for that tasted of pride, and not of his humilitie: and that they which are mocked and despised of the world, are esteemed of God; because the wisdom of the world is folly before God: and so contrarie. As for the second point, they said, That this word Tunike in S. Benet his rule, signifieth not a long robe, but a little cloke or cassocke: and so it is found in Frier Ambrose Calepin his dictionarie (who was of our Order) not a long robe, but Toga; and that therefore the rule makes for them in that point. So is it best that Friars weare short habits, as little clokes, and cassocks, or ierkins. And as for their objection, That other Monkes do weare long and wide garments; so much the better, said they, and the rather should we weare short and strait, that there may be a distinction betwixt us and others. As for their reason, That to weare short and strait garments, would make us like lay men: we answer to that (say they) That the hood will make a difference betwixt us and lay men; for the length of garments cannot distinguish us from lay people, for they also weare long robes, as Proctors, Advocates, Counsellors, Huishers, Physicians, yea even Marchants in their shops. We confesse (said they) that at the beginning it will be a noveltie to see us weare garments short and strait with an hood, but time and custom will take away the strangenesse thereof, for in all things there is a beginning.

The chiefe and aunient fathers, rulers of this disputation, seeing their Friars (who came in place to accord) to enter and grow further into contention and contrarietie of opinions, imposed them silence as they had done before upon the first question, and said unto them, That they would remis to the holy Father, the decision and resolution of this high and hard question, touching the largenesse and length of habits: but yet they must advise, if at the least in this Chapter we may resolve upon the third question, touching the forme and fashion of these habits.

So they began to demaund voyces, for to know whether their habits ought to bee single or dou-



double; if it be lawfull to have some fine and goodly fashion on them, or not; if they should haue collers, or none; or skirts, or none; or sleeves, or no sleeves; or if sleeves, whether hanging sleeves; if there must be an hood, whether it were not best to be pointed and sharpe, as the Carthusian Friers haue, or round, as they of other Religions haue. Upon all those points there was great disputation, and all matters were well and subtilly disputed of in this Chapter. It seemed to some, that it were not best to haue hanging sleeves; for they were not comely, but rather wide & open sleeves, that they might serve for a scrip or pouch. For (said they) since our good father S. Francis hath commanded us to beg and live of almes; and that by an article of his holy rule, he hath forbidden us to carry with us, poke, bag, or scrip; as also is forbidden us in the Gospel, it followeth well, that hee would haue us to understand, that wee should haue great and wide sleeves for to put our almes in. To this some answered, That wide sleeves were dearer than strait; for that they had more matter and stuffe in them, and therefore such sleeves are contrarie to their rule. And as for the difficultie found out upon the forbidding of bags and scrips, and of the inconuenience that might follow thereof, for want of something to put in their almes: they said, for this there were an helpe, viz. to take a man with them (which we may call a Iudas) who may carry a bag or scrip for that use, yea, he may take silver, if any will give it us.

Yet were there made many other great arguments and subtil allegations upon this question of the fashion of habits: and some thought it best, That that fashion of hoods which the Charterhouse Friers used, to be well, and best to be imitated. For that that sharpe point above might allegorically signifie, that they had sharpe and quicke spirits; and having a fame and reputation to be so, their sermons would be more accounted of. But the good Fathers considering, That nothing could be resolved in that Chapter; and that it was as expedient to send to Rome for three questions, as for two; they made the company priue to their aduise, namely, That it were best to send to Rome, to haue the holy fathers opinion and counsell upon these three questions; and that some of them present should goe for that purpose.

Certain time after, delegates of their Order tooke their iourney to Rome, unto Pope Nicholas, the third of that name, who reigned in the yeare 1280. which made him understand all the said disputation, and the great disorder that was in their Order about the said three points. The Pope and his Cardinals were as much troubled to resolve those high and subtil questions, as the said Friers had beene in their Chapter. Yet the Pope by the aduise of the said Cardinals, made them upon this matter this resolution, That hee ordained and commanded, that upon all those questions, that should bee straitly kept and observed, which should be concluded and determined in a Chapter generall, or els in Provinciall Chapters, which to those ends should afterwards bee convoked and assembled: upon condition notwithstanding, that alwayes there might bee seene shine in the Friers, and in their workes, an holy povertie, according to their holy rule. But this was to make them fall into a farre greater contention and disputation, than ever: so as also in their Chapters which they held afterward, they could never accord, following that ordinance of the Pope; but resolved yet again to returne to the pope, which they did, but it was about one and thirtie yeres after the former time, during which time they held many Chapters to handle that matter.

Comming then to no end in their Chapters, they again sent delegates to Rome, to pope Clement the fifth, who then held the Counsell at Vienna, anno Dom. 1311. who gave him to understand, How according to the ordinance of Pope Nicholas, his predecessour, they had done all that which possible they could; to overcome the aforesaid difficulties,

which as length they recited unto him, but they could not accord upon any resolution. But contrarie, that as they disputed, there arose alwayes new difficulties and doubtts in the Friers spirits, and that therefore they came unto him, as to a verie oracle of truth, who could and knew how to resolve all those doubtts, and many others. The Pope having heard them, put the matter unto the determination of the Cardinals, Prelates, Doctors, and others assembled in that Counsell; you must thinke, that this whole Counsell was greatly troubled, as before Pope Nicholas and his Cardinals had beene. Yet that the said Friers might not goe away as they came, without having answer from the Popes Oracle: there was delivered unto them indeed, a true Oracle, that is to say, an ambiguous and obscure answer, whereby the Pope, by the advise of the said Counsell, commanded the gardians and other chiefe ministers of that Order, to iudge the vilitie, colour, length, widenesse, and fashion of their said Order: the consciences of which commissaries and gardians bee burdened, and commaunded all the Friers, That they should obey what their said gardians and ministers should resolve, without seeking out so many scruples and doubtts, and without desire to know more than needed, by inventing so many subtilties. These delegates returned home with a faire Bull, yet was it not possible by any vertue thereof, to set downe a rule in habits. For alwayes the Friers found to speake against the advise and resolutions of their gardians, saying, They understood nothing, and that they had not read the text of the rule of blessed Saint Francis, and that they were but beasts. In this contestation of Friers against their gardians and superiours, remained their affaires by a long and great space of yeares.

Finally, in the yeare 1323. in the time of Pope Iohn, the two and twentieth of that name, who held his seas at Avignon, the gardians and superiours of that Order went to complaine to his Fatherhood, shewing him, That they could not be obeyed upon the resolution they had made by vertue of the power which had beene given them by the said Bull of Pope Clement. So they humbly prayed his said Fatherhood, That hee would vouchsafe to doe some good therein. The Pope to proceed in this matter more iudicially, or rather indicially, would heare the parties, and therefore sent to those Friers which refused to obey their gardians and superiours, That they should either come and make their reasons, or send the cause in writing, why they refused obedience. They sent them. The above said Pope caused to assemble his Cardinals: and being in the Conclave, the allegations of the Friers pretended disobedience, were read, and no doubt found so great and admirable, so doubtfull and sharpe, that a flie could not there haue placed her foot, and indeed they could never giue a resolution thereof. True it is, that the Pope could doe no lesse for his honour, than to ordayne something. Therefore caused he to expediate a Bull, wherein he exceedingly prayseth the Bulls of his predecessors, Pope Nicholas and Clement, and saith. That hee marvelleth how men cannot be contented with the resolution contained in them. After hee makes declaration, That the vilitie of habites should bee measured, according to the custome of everie countrey. After that, hee giveth commission to the gardians and superiours of every Order (as did Pope Clement) to make a rule for the longitude, latitude, thicknesse, colour, fashion, and vilitie, as well of the Tunikes, as of the hood, and upon all other accidents, circumstances, and dependances; willing and commaunding them to obey the rule that should be made, without any more framing so many obiects, arguments, and fantasticall contradictts.

Behold in substance the content of Pope Iohns Bull; whereby it appeareth, That neither hee nor all the Popes Consistorie, could ever give a law or a well determined resolution, upon the matter of the dispute of Friers habits. I know not how since, they are

## The Preface.

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are accorded; but they have taken unto them the white and blacke colour, as it comes from off the beast, and of those two intermingled colours they have made a third colour, which, of them hath taken the name, and at this day are called Gray-Friers. They have also chosen great side gownes and great hoods, as wee see them weare at this day. Briefly, wee see them accorded now of all their differences, which they had touching the fashion of their habits, except for their sleeves. For there are yet Friars with great sleeves, others with strait sleeves.

This is the discourse touching the Friars contentions, and the three Decretals, made by three popes, upon that matter, whereof the last is called an Extravagant, as in truerh it is, and may well bee called Extravagant, and the other two also: Praying you (masters) to take in good part this Historie; for I have not sold it, so displease any man; but to passe away the time whilst our horses eat their provender; I beleieve it will be now soone time to leape on horsebacke, every man to draw to his way. Vpon this, each man rose up from the table, everyone consented to heare this discourse, which they never had heard before, as they all confessed. Then each man tooke his count, payed, mounted on horsebacke, and went away. Now let us come to treat of Machiavel.







## I Maxime.

*A Prince above all things ought so wish and desire to bee esteemed devout, though he be not so indeed.*

Cap. 18. of  
the Prince.

**T**He World (saith *Machiavell*) looketh but to the exterior, and to that which is in appearance; and iudgeth of all actions not by the causes, but by the issue and end: So that it sufficeth, if that the Prince seeme outwardly religious and devout, although he be not so at all. For let it be so, that some, which most narrowly frequent his company, do discover that feined devotion, yet he or they dare not oppugne the multitude, who beleeve, the Prince to be truly devout.



His Maxime is a precept, whereby this Atheist *Machiavell* teacheth the prince to be a true contemner of God and of Religion, and onely to make a shew and a faire countenance outwardly before the world, to be esteemed religious & devout, although he be not. For divine punishment, for such hypocrisie and dissimulation, *Machiavel* feares not, because hee beleeves not there is a God; but thinks that the course of the Sunne, of the Moone, of the Starres, the distinction of the Spring time, Summer, Autumne, and Winter, the politicke government of men, the production that the earth makes of fruits, plants, living creatures, that all this comes by encounter and adventure: following the doctrine of *Epicurus*, (the doctor of Atheists, and master of Ignorance) who esteemes, that all things are done and come to passe by Fortune, and the meeting and encountering of atomes. But if *Machiavel* beleeved, that those things came by the disposition and establishment of a soveraigne cause (as common sence hath constrained *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *Theophrastus*, and all the other Philosophers which have had any knowledge, to confesse it) he would beleeve there is one God, who ruleth & governeth the world, and all things within it. And if he beleeve there is one God, hee would also beleeve, that men ought to honour him as the soveraigne governour; and that hee will not be mocked of his creatures: And therefore will not hee give such precepts, to make a shew to be devout, and not to be. For what is it to mocke God, if that be not? But they that learne such lessons of Atheisme, and which put out their eyes, that they may not see so cleare a light, and which take pleasure to bee ignorant of that which (as *Cicero* saith) even nature it selfe teacheth the most barbarous nations, That there is a God which governeth all things; let them (I say) know, that if they will not know God wel, God wil well know them, and wil make them wel feelee, that such as spit

The order  
which is in  
nature, sheweth us,  
th there is  
one God.

spit against heaven, shall spit against themselves; when they shall feele how heavie his hand weigheth, then shall they know that there is a God, a revenger of them which reverence him not, but this knowledge shall be to their confusion and ruine. Many Atheists have beene seene, which of a brutish boldnesse have made a mocke of God: but it was never seene, that they felt not the punishment and vengeance of their audaciousnesse and impietie, as hereafter we will shew by examples. Yet wee have cause greatly to deplore the miserie and calamitie of the time wherein wee are, which is so infected with Atheists, and contemners of God and of all Religion, that even they, which have no religion, are best esteemed, and are called in the court language, People of service: because being fraughted with all impietie and Atheisme, and having well studied their *Machiavel*, which they know vpon their fingers, they make no scruple nor conscience at any thing. Commaund them to slay and massacre, they slay and massacre; commaund them to rob and spoile good Catholickes, and Cleargie men, they rob and spoile all. They hold benefices with souldiers garments and short clokes, yet exercise no Religion, nor cares, but for the gaine thereof. Commaund them to enterprise the betraying or im poisoning of this or that person, they make no scruple at it: yea, they themselves excogitate and devise all wickednesse and impieties, as the invention of so many new imposts upon the poor people, which they destroy and cause to die with hunger, without having any commiseration or compassion upon them, no more than upon brute beasts. Not many yeares agoe, did not they invent the impost of processees, and contentions of law in Fraunce: by the meanes of which impost, a poor man cannot seeke by law to recover his owne, unlesse before hand he pay the said impost, and that he shewed his acquittance. But by the meanes of that generous prince of Conde (of happie memorie) it was taken away, by his complaints against these Atheists, inventors of such novelties, which both by nation and Religion are Machiavelists. Have not they also invented new customes, tributes, and imposts upon paper, upon Innes, to be payd by travellers, upon the sales of exemptions for lodging souldiers, of wardships, of mariages, of Consulships, Syndikes, and other such like, which cannot bee devised but by impious people, which have neither loue to their neighbour, nor to their country: the impost of the small seale, for sealing of contracts, came it not from the same forge? If it had not beene for the Evangelikes (which alone hitherto durst open their mouthes to complaine of these horse-leeches & bloud-suckers) had they not lately made lawes and coined edicts to command tributes and summes of money for each child that should be baptised? likewise to leuie the twentieth part of every womans dowrie & mariage, upon the first conclusion of every mariage, yea, although after they breake off againe? Have they not established the vent & sale of offices of judgement, and so brought that now into common use, which was utterly abolished by the generall Estates at Orleans? have they not devised the offices of Counsellors without wages within Bailiwikes and Stewardships, and all for silver? Have they not, and yet every day do they not cause, the value of money to be augmented for their owne profit? for after that by the meanes of their bankes, fermes, and other their dealings in the realme, they have gathered great heapes of money, they can at their pleasure enhaunce the value thereof, both in their hands and out of their hands. Yet none complains thereof. But in the end it will produce and bring forth some great disorder and confusion (as hath sometimes been seen for like actions) for the reasons well ynough knowne to wise people. As for peace, these people

Atheists  
esteemed  
serviceable  
men.

Atheists in-  
ventors of  
imposts.

Atheists en-  
cline to all  
wickednes,  
because  
they care  
not the pu-  
nishment of  
God.

Impietie  
punished of  
God.

Suet. in Cal.  
ap 51. Dion  
in Calig.

people never like of (for they fish alwaies in a troubled water) gathering riches and heapes of the treasures of the Realme, whilest it is in trouble and confusion. They alwayes have in their mouthes their goodly Maximes of their *Machiavell*, to impeach and hinder a good peace. A prince (say they) must cause himselfe to bee feared, rather than loved: & this must be held as a resolved point. But if a peace be accorded to these rebels, such as they desire, then would it seeme that the king were afraid of his subjects, whereas he should make himselfe to be feared. True it is, that if such a peace could be made with them, as it might againe procure another *S. Bartholmewes* journey, nothing were so good & pleasant as that. For that is another resolved point and Maxime, That a prince ought not to hold any faith or promise, but so farre, as concernes his profit: and that he ought to know how to counterfeit the foxe, to catch and entrap other beasts, and as soone as hee hath them in his nets, to play the lyon in slaying & devouring them. We have set downe unto us that goodly example of *Cesar Borgia*, who in our coutry could so wel counterfeit the said two beasts. Behold here the language and dealings of our Machiavelists, which at this day men call people of Service: for that there is no wickednesse in the world so strange and detestable, but they wil enterprize, invent, & put it in execution, if they can. From whence comes it, that they be thus enclined to all wickednesse? It is because they are Atheists, contemners of God, neither beleeuing there is a God which seeth what they do, nor that ought to punish them. It is that goodly doctrine of *Machiavel*, which amongst other things complaines so much, that men cannot be altogether wicked (as we shall touch in his place) These good disciples (seeing that their master found this imperfection amongst men, that they could not shew themselves altogether, and in all things wicked) do seeke by all means to attaine a degree of perfect wickednesse. And indeed they have so well studied and profited in their Masters schoole and can so well practise his Maximes, that none can deny, but they are come to the highest degree of wickednesse. What need men then to be abashed, if they see in the world, and especially in this poore kingdome of Fraunce, such famine, pestilence, civile warres, the father to band against the sonne, brother against his brother, they of the same Religion one against another, with all hatred, envie, disloyaltie, trealons, perfidies, conspirations, empoisonments, and other great sinnes to raigne? Is there any marueile if the people goe to wracke, the Cleargie be impoverished, the Nobilitie almost extinct? For it is the first judgement and vengeance of God, which he exerciteth against us: because some are filled with all impietie & Atheisme, which they have learned of *Machiavel*: & others which should resist such impieties, least they should take root, do suffer them to encrease and augment. So that indeed all men are culpable of Atheism, impietie, of the despight of God & religion, which at this day raigneth. Therefore most righteously doth God punish us all. For Atheisme and impietie is so detestable and abhominable before God, that it never remaineth unpunished.

The emperour *Caius Caligula* was a great Atheist and contemner of God. Hee was cunning enough to practise *Machiavel* his Maximes. For, to counterfeit his devotion, he caused to be bruted, That he often spake with *Jupiter*; and that he had great familiaritie with *Castor* and *Pollux*, which he said were his brethren; and that he had good acquaintance with the Moone: by this means he not only perswaded the people that he was very devout, but also that (by the meanes of that privy with the gods) he participated even the divinity with the: & yet never man more boldly despi-



despised all divinitie than he. But consider what such kind of people are : there was never cowardly beast more fearfull than this wicked Atheist ; as soone as hee heard it thunder (saith *Suetonius*) he would cover & quickly wrap his head, and hide him in and under his bed. I pray you what other thing was this but an extreame feare of conscience, when he heares the thundering and resounding voice of him whom he contemneth : One day being beyond the Rhine, with a great and puissant armie, as he passed over a little strait on foote, one that was nigh him began to say vnto him, Sir if now the enemy should appeare and shew himselfe, wee could not bee without feare : What then did this cowardly Atheist ? at the word hee straight mounted on horseback, and fled as fast as he could. But as he was cowardly, so was he very cruell, and so shall you almost ordinarily find in these Atheists, both crueltie and cowardise together. In the end God sent him his due reward, for he endured not long, but was massacred and slaine by *Cassius Charea* and *Cornelius Sabinus*, captaines of his garde, whereby this wicked contemner of God, felt the just divine vengeance, and so knew he, that he was a mortall man, and not God, that caused himselfe to be worshipped as a god. *Dion* writeth, That after his death some did eat of his flesh, to prove if the flesh of the gods were of a good tast.

The emperor *Philippus* (who raigned in the primitive Christian church) was a wicked Arabian, who had no feare of God, but was the most cruell and wicked of the world, as commonly Arabians are : yet to cover his vices & wickednesse, he did that which *Machiavel* commandeth a prince here, for he stained to be a Christian, & something favoured the Christian Religion, which before had beene greatly persecuted ; but God soone punished this dissimulation and hypocrisie, for he raigned but five yeares, and by his souldiers was massacred, both he and his sonne, at *Verone*.

The emperor *Julian* (who was called the Apostata) all the time of his youth, in the time of *Constantine* the Great his uncle, was instructed in the Christian Religion : but upon a foolish curiositie, he gave himselfe to diviners & forcerers, to know things to come, which made him forsake the Christian Religion : yet he alwaies feined himselfe to be a Christian, because for the most part, the nobilitie and the men of warre were so ; therefore to please them, he often went unto the Christian churches, and there used the exercises of their Religion. After he was created emperor in the towne of Paris, and had set a sure foot in the empire, hee began to discover that which he had alwayes kept in his heart : that is, To make open the Temples for Images, & to set up the Painims Religion, which *Constantine* the great had suppressed, and to establish their sacrifices : and although hee durst not prohibit the exercise of Christian Religion, yet under hand he sought by all meanes to destroy it : for he forbade that any should receive any Christians to be regents, and balemasters, and caused to be sown all maner of partialities and divisions (that hee could) amongst the Christians. Finally, after he had raigned by the space of a yeare and seven moneths, he was slaine at the age of two and thirtie yeares, making warre against the Persians. Some write, That as he died, he blasphemed despightfully against Christ, crying : Thou hast vanquished thou Galilzan. Behold the unhappie end of this Atheist and Apostata.

It is commonly scene, That such men as have no God, doe give themselves to forcerers and diviners : for of necessitie they must have a master, and after they have forsaken God, they must needs take the divell for their master and governour. The emperor *Basianus Caracalla* being a true contemner of God, fell to delight in magicke

*Pomp. La-*  
*tus in Phil.*

*Pomp. La-*  
*tus in Iulii*  
*Am. Marel.*  
*lib. 21. & 22*

Dion in An-  
to. Caracalla.  
Herod. lib. 2.

magicke and witcherie : insomuch, that by the art of necromancie he would needs cause to come unto him the soule of his father *Seuerus*, and the emperour *Commodus*, to know of them if he should recover of the disease whereof he was sicke. The soule of his father (or rather some evill spirit) appeared to him, holding a naked sword in his hand, but spoke not a word vnto him : but that of *Commodus* appearing also, said unto him these words: Get thee to the gallows. Being in warfare in Mesopotamia, he had two lieutenants generall, *Andensius* and *Macrinus*, which hee incessantly outraged and mocked, so that neither of them greatly trusted him : he had also at Rome one *Maternianus*, who executed all his affaires, whome hee much trusted : therefore he sent unto him a commaund, to assemble all the diviners, forcerers, and necromancers, that could be found, to consult together, and to search out, if any secret enterprize were intended or practised against him. *Maternianus* executed his commaundement, and upon a consultation of them, they made answer, That *Macrinus* had determined to slay the emperour *Bassianus*. *Maternianus* (which before loved not *Macrinus*) failed not to advertise the emperour hereof : but the packet of letters was presented unto him at a certaine houre, when hee was very attentive and given to take his pastime : insomuch as he commaunded *Macrinus* his lieutenant, who was by, to take the packet and open it, to tell him the substance of them after, at some houre of Counsell. *Macrinus* tooke the packet, and opened it, within which he found many letters, speaking of many of his affaires : and amongst others, one was found, containing the resolution of the said consultation. *Macrinus* then was much abashed, and joyfull withall: abashed he was, that the said deceiving diviners and necromancers laid to his charge a thing, whereof hee never thought. Joyfull also he was, that that letter fel not into the emperours hands, whom he knew to be very cruell, and ready to execute his choller. Therefore he hid from him this letter, and shewed him the other : but thinking of his own cause, he resolved to slay his master, rather than to attend whilest he were slaine himselfe, and the sooner, for feare *Maternianus* should write againe of the same cause. *Macrinus* then suborned a captaine of certaine footmen, called *Martialis* (which also had himselfe a quarrell to the emperour) to slay him : who espying one day the emperor going out of the way to emptie his body, hee slew him with many pricks of a dagger. So that a man may say, that it was the divell which plaid him this part, because he trusted in diviners & necromancers. For had it not beene, that consultation, whereby *Macrinus* was brought in perill of his life, he durst never have enterprised that which hee did. But necessitie makes men enterprize, yea even the most cowards.

Monst. lib. 2.  
cap. 248.

The yeare 1411. the lord de *Rays* in Bretaine, marshall of Fraunce, to come unto great estate and honours, gave himselfe to sorcerie and necromancie, & caused many little children to be slaine for their blood, wherewith he writ his divelish invocations. The divell brought him to that greatnes and height, that hee was taken prisoner by the commaund of the duke of Bretaine, who caused his indictment to be made, and he was publikely burned at Nantes.

There may bee alleaged infinit examples of the judgements of God exercised against Atheists, contemners of God and of all religion, yea even in our time, as of that tragicall Poet *Iodellius*, whose end was truly tragicall, having like an Epicurean eaten and drunken his patrimonie, hee miserably died through hunger : *Lignorelles* also, the courtier, who to make it appeare that he was a man of service, in court made an open profession of Atheisme : and what was his end ? Certaine it is, that from whence

whence he looked for his advancement, he received his merited ruine and destruction. And *la Lande*, *Bissy Gascon*, and others (which I will not name for the respect I have of their parents) had they not unluckie ends, after they had emptied and spoiled themselves of all pietie and Religion? But I will not stay here to make plaine so cleere a thing of it selfe: yet would I set downe one example very notable for hypocrits which make themselves great Zelators of the holy mother church, and under that pretext and colour, they bring into ruine and combustion their owne country saying, That men ought inviolably to keepe the Religion of his predecessors: and in the meane while, their hearts tende to no other purpose but to spoile, laccage, and enrich themselves with the publike ruine.

*Iosephus* rehearseth: That in the time of the emperor *Claudius*, and the emperor *Nero*, the Iewes raised up many ciuill warres in Iudea and Samaria, & that so custumable, that they made no account of any other occupation, but to live by booties & rapines; so that *Vespasian*, lieutenant generall for the emperor *Nero*, was sent against them with a great armie: al the wickedest men of the country which were worth nothing, and which could not live but of the good men, gathered themselves together, & called themselves Zelators, saying, they would fight for the Temple of Ierusalem, & for the conservation of that Religion, which they had received and learned of their forefathers; & that (to die for it) they would not permit any other Religion to be received and exercised in their countries, but their owne that was auncientlie used from hand to hand, of their auncestors, since *Moses* and *Abraham*. Under the shew of this goodly name of Zelators, and under colour of this boasting, that they would fight & die for the conservation of their ancient Religion, they take up armes and elected for captaines the worst persons they could find amongst them. *Vespasian* many times caused it to be told them (euen by *Iosephus* who writ this historie, & was of their owne nation, and had beene a captaine) that he would change nothing of their Religion, but maintaine them therein, and in all their liberties and franchises: but (like verie hypocrites and liers) they thinking one thing with their hearts, and saying another with their mouths, would never hearken vnto peace in any sort, nor upon any condition whatsoever. *Vespasian* seeing their stubbornesse, was constrained to war upon them in all extremitie, which continued long, yea until he came to the empire after the death of *Nero*, *Galla*, *Otho* and *Vitellius*, which reigned not long. Finally these gobbly Zelators, which would never hearken vnto peace, by their obstinacie came to such an extremitie, that they themselves set their temple on fire in Ierusalem (for the conservation whereof they said they fought) and burnt it wholly; they overthrew also both themselves & their Religion, for which they bore armes, and committed a thousand sorts of cruelties & impieties, saying they fought for pietie. Briefly, this deuoute zeale which they bragged they had to the auncient Religion of their fathers (although they had but a masking and false countenance thereof) was cause of the ruine of Ierusalem, and of all the country, and of the death of a million of men.

A Prince then must take another manner of resolution, than that whereof *Asahel* speaketh, namely, That he resolve himselfe to feare God, and to serue him with an heart pure, and without dissimulation, according to his holy commandments, in doing the exercises of the true & pure Religion of God, which is the Christian; if he do this, God will bless him, & make him prosper in his affairs. Hereof there may be alleaged many examples, I will commend my self with a few of the most notable.

False Zelators of the ancient Religion, spoilers and wicked.

*Iosephus* beleeueth Iudaea, lib. 4. cap. 5. & lib. 7.

When I, *Iosephus*, was captaine of the Iewes.

When I, *Iosephus*, was captaine of the Iewes.

When I, *Iosephus*, was captaine of the Iewes.

Godliness blessed of God.



Xpist apud  
Dion in Mar-  
co. Anto. Ca-  
pitul. in Mar.

The emperor *Marcus Antonius* the philosopher, a prince both good and wise, though a *Painim*, making warre against the *Marcomanes* and *Quadiens*, people of *Alemaigne*, was once with all his armie in a very great danger and perill, being enclosed in a withered and drie cuntry, where his souldiers for lack of water died of drought: insomuch as his enemies keeping the passage, intended to vanquish them without any stroke striking. By hap (or rather by Gods providence) the emperor had in his armie a legion of Christians, and it was told him by his lieutenant generall, That he had heard say, that those Christians by their praers, obtained of God whatsoever they demaunded: which the emperor vnderstanding, addressed himselfe to them of that legion (which was a good zeale in the *Painim*, though without knowledge) and praied them that they would pray unto their God for the salvation of his armie: Which presently they did with a good heart; desiring God, in the name of Iesus Christ our Saviour, to conserve that armie, and the emperor their prince, and to draw them from the danger wherein they were. Soone after their praers, God hearing them sent presently a terrible lightning upon the enemies, and a great rain fell upon the Roman soldiers, who had died of thirst, but that they received the raine upon the hollow bottomes of their targuets, bucklers, and morrions. In somuch that the God of hosts fighting for them, they got victorie without stroke striking, cleane contrarie from that the *Marcomans* & *Quadiens* looked for: where upon the emperor was much ravished with admiration, and after greatly honoured the Christians.

Pomp. Latun  
in Licinio &  
Constantino.

Paul. Emil.  
lib. 1. & 2.  
Eguinartus  
in Carolo  
migno.

*Constantine* the Great, the first Christian emperor, besides that he overcame *Licinius* and *Maxentius*, great enemies of the Christian Religion, hee also obtained many goodly and triumphant victories against the *Sarmats*, *Gothes*, and *Scythians*: happie he was & victorious because he had the feare of God and the Christian Religion, in exceeding great honour and reverence. As much may we say of the emperor *Theodosius*, *Iustinian*, and other Christians. As much may we say of our kings of *Fraunce*, *Charles Martel*, and *Charlemaine*, which prospered in the wars they had against the high *Almans*, *Saxons*, *Frisons*, and against the *Gothes*, *Huns*, *Vicegothes*, *Lumbards*, and *Saracens*, all which were then *Painims* & infidels; of which they obtained great victories, and brought them to be subject unto their obedience. This grace came not to them to be such victors by their own forces, seeing their enemies were farre stronger than they, considering their forces and number of armed people: but that grace came unto them by the favour of God, whom they served without faine, nestle, and hypocrisie, having the Christian Religion in great and singular recommendation and reverence. As much may we say also generally, of the most part of our French kings. For amongst them we find none such as *Caligula*, *Caracalla*, or such other monsters full of impietie and *Atheisme*, till lately some few have bene found, not much inferiour unto them.

2. Kin. ca. 11.

2. Kin. ca. 11.  
2. Kin. ca. 11.

*David* was marvellous happie in warre, and alwayes victorious over his enemies, because hee was a good prince, fearing God, and honouring his holy Religion. *Salomon* his sonne, as long as hee served God sincerely, without faining and hypocrisie, hee prospered very well and marvailously, in a great and happie peace, and none durst stirre him. But as soone as hee began to practise the doctrine which *Machiavel* teacheth, namely, To haue a feigned and dissembled Religion and devotion, straight had he enemies on his head, which brose up against him: as *Aadad* the *Edomite*, and *Hadad*, which made warre upon him. So generally may be said of all the

the kings of Iuda and of Israel, one after another. That God hath alwaies caused to prosper, such as were pure and sincere in Religion, & which have had his service in recommendation: and contrary, upon such as were impure, and hypocrites in Religion, he hath heaped ruines, calamities, and other vengeance.

But I pray you consider a little, the reason wherewith *Machiavel* proveth his Maxime. Because (saith he) the people looketh but at the exterior and outward shew of things, it is sufficient, that the Prince shew himselfe outwardly devout, although he be not devout at all. Ought Religion then to serve for nothing but to please and be agreeable unto the people? or ought it not rather to serve, to make men agreeable to God? But how wouldst thou that God should like and take pleasure in thy Religion (he that sees the bottome of thy hart, & soundeth the deepe of thy thoughts) if it bee similed and faigned, and that thou beest an hypocrite? Neither may *Machiavel*, nor the Machiavelistes (that is to say, the Atheists of our time) thinke men so senselesse and grosse, as they cannot soone discover their hypocrisies and dissimulations. Many there are in the world, which thinke by their subtilties and dissemblings to bee covered and hid, yet are sufficiently knowne: and how craftily soever they doe it, all the world knoweth, there is nothing but impietie and wickednesse in their hearts. Suppose therefore these simulations and hypocrisies come to bee discovered in a prince, I pray you into what honour and reputation will he fall? Shall hee not bee mocked, blamed, and despised of his subjects. If seeing himselfe discovered, hee makes an open profession of impietie and of Atheisme (as wee see many persons there are which doe it, because they cannot longer hide their impietie) shall not this be publickely to authorise all impietie and despight of God and of all Religion? For certain it is, That men (which are naturally more enclined to evil than to good) when they see their prince follow that course, will do as he doth: because ordinarily subjects doe conforme themselves to the manners and conditions of the prince. Behold then the consequence of that most wicked and detestable doctrine of that wicked Atheist, which is to bring all people to a despight and a mockerie of God, and his Religion, and of all holy things, and to let go the bridle to all vices and villanies. From which, God keepe us by his grace, and destroy all them, which teach so wicked doctrines, if they will not amend; as certainly he wil do, and so let them looke for.





## 2. Maxime.

*A Prince ought to sustaine and confirme that which is false in Religion, if so bee it turne to the favor thereof.*

Discourse,  
lib. 1. cap. 12.  
13 14.

**S**Age and prudent princes (saith *Machiavell*) do countenance and allow false miracles; because alwaies they are meanes to augment the peoples devotion. For when the people seeth, that the prince approoveth them, none makes any difficultie to beleieve them after him. Christian princes also should therein imitate the old Romanes, which by deceitfull miracles, feigned false revelations to encourage their souldiers to execute some enterprife, and to cause their subiects to obey their ordinances. For they caused to publish, either that they had read in the bookes of the *Sibyls*, or that they had consulted with the Oracle of *Apollo*, or that they had had such or such a revelation, or els that the flight of birds, or other like tokens, had signified unto them a good augure or divination: insomuch, that the people being perswaded, they were true, and denounced of their gods, they obeyed with great good will, that which was commaunded them by their captaines and magistrates, as if the gods themselves had commaunded them. In the meane while the Romane heads and captaines knew of what account this marchandize was.



His Atheist after he hath given the prince a document, To hold all Religion in his heart as a mockerie, and onely to shew outwardly a faire semblant and countenance of devotion; now passeth he further, and desires, That the Prince should maintain falsenesse in Religion. I pray you, can there be found in the world a greater impietie and wickednesse than this? Are wee not beholden to them that have authorized and given countenance unto the writings of this stinking Atheist: yea, unto them, which have into the French made two or three translations, the better to empoysen that nation? Certaine it is, That the truth in all things is very commendable, but most especially, when it deals in causes and matters of Religion. For since that Religion is the thing, which (according to the auntient definition)

Falsenesse  
incompati-  
ble with  
Religion.



nition) bindeth us with God, how can falsenesse, her contrarie, bind and unite us with God, who is truth it selfe? Is darkenesse compatible and sociable with light, or the obscure shaddow with the Sunne? Nay rather, wee alwayes see, that darkenesse vanisheth and dispereth away by the light, the shaddow also flyeth the Sunne, and hideth it selfe alwayes behind some opposit. Therefore have the antient doctors of the Church said and held for a principle of Theologie, That much better it were, a scandale and offence should come, than that the Truth should bee forsaken. Which sentence even the Popes themselves have caused to bee placed amongst their rules of Cannon right, and would to God they had observed it. But I see well it is to no purpose to alleadge reasons against this Atheist and his disciples, which beleevne neither God nor Religion: wherefore, before I passe any further, I must fight against their impietie, and make it appeare to their eyes (at the least if they have any) not by assailing them with armes of the holy Scripture, (for they merit not to bee so assailed, and I feare to pollute the holy Scripture amongst people so prophane and defiled with impietie) but by their proper armes and weapons, whereby their ignorance and beastlinesse, defendeth their renewed Atheisme.

They then tooke for a foundation, humane reason, and prophane and Paynim authors: but in truth both the one and the other foundation, are so much against them, as even by them I will prove our Christian Religion. For first, if wee consider the least creature in the world, and found the causes of his essence and nature, it will lead us by degrees to one God. Take an ante or flie, and consider the causes which makes these little creatures moove; you shall finde it is heat and moisture, which are two qualities consisting in all living creatures, nourishers of nature: for as soon as heat & moisture faile in any living thing, it can no more live, nor moove, & straight is the body occupied with contrary qualities, coldnesse & drought, the enemies of nature. Mount and ascend vp higher, and consider what is the cause, that in the little body of an ante or flie, there are found the two qualities of heat and moisture; you shall finde, that it is because all living creatures are composed of the foure elements, of fire, of aire, of water, and of earth, in which, the said foure qualities, of heat, moisture, colde, and driness do consist; and whilst heat and moisture raigne in the bodie, it liveth; but when colde and drought doe dominiere therein, then dyeth it. Consider further what is the cause of the heat and the moisture, and the other qualities which we see in the foure elements, and in the bodies made of them; you shall finde that the Sunne is cause of the heate, and the Moone cause of the moisture, as sence and experience shew it. Let us yet passe further, and seeke the cause wherefore the Sunne is hoar, and the Moone moiste, and from whence come unto them these qualities of heat and moisture: we must necessarily now come to a first and soveraigne cause, which is one God: for the Sunne or Moone (which are corporall and finite things, as we see with our eyes) cannot be God who is of infinite essence. Behold then how the least creature of the world, is sufficient to vanquish by naturall reason the opinion of the Atheists: how much more if wee come to consider other creatures, and especially the composition of mans body: for there shall you contemplate without going any further, so well ordered a rule, that of necessitie must be concluded, That there is a most ingenious and excellent workeman (other than the Sunne and Moone) which hath disposed that architecture & building: for within mans bodie you shall see appeare an harmonie, very like a well governed common-wealth:

K iij.

Reg. 1. de  
R. g. Inimic  
p. 1.

Every crea-  
ture leadeth  
mā to God.

wealth : you see the mind and understanding of man, which is as the king that is set in the highest place, as in his throne, and from thence commaundeth all the parts : you see also the heart, the seat of amitie, clemencie, bountie, kindnesse, magnanimitie, and other vertues, all which obey the understanding as their king, but the heart as the great master, hath them all under his charge : it hath also under his charge, envie, hatred, vengeance, ambition, and other vices which lodge in the heart, but they are holden, mewed, & bridled, by the understanding : after, you have the liver which is the superintendent of victuals, which it distribureth unto all the parts of the body, by the means of his subakerne and inferiour officers, as the belly & veins, and other pores and passages of the body : briefly, a man may see within man, an admirable and well ordered disposition of all the parts, and it brings us necessarily, and whether we will or no, to acknowledge, that there must needs be a God, a soveraigne architect, who hath made this excellent building : and by these considerations of naturall things, (whereof I doe but lightly touch the points) the auntient Philosophers, as the Platonists, the Aristotelians, Stoicks, and others, have beene brought to the knowledge of a God, and of his providence : and of all the sects of Philosophers, there was neuer any, which agreed not hereunto, unlesse it were the sect of the Epicures, which were gluttons, drunkards, & whoremongers, which constituted their soveraigne felicitie in carnall pleasures, wherein they wallowed like brute beasts. Out of this schoole, *Machiavel* and the *Machiavelists* come, which are well ynough knowne to be all very Epicureans in their lives, caring for nothing but their pleasures ; which also have no knowledge of good letters, contenting themselves with the Maximes of that wicked Atheist.

Touching the doctrine of the Trinitie which we hold, it must be confessed, that the Philosophers understood nothing thereof : and that by humane reason we cannot well be lead to the knowledge thereof : but this knowledge is manifested unto us by the witness of God himselfe, which are so cleare and evident in the holy Scripture, as nothing can be more : but I have no purpose here to recite them ; yet will I say : That the doctrine which I hold in this place, is not repugnāt nor contrary unto humane reason, but consonant enough, although the auntient philosophers have not penetrated so far. For by their own Maximes a very true thing it is, That God (who is an eternall and infinit spirit) is not passible of any qualities or accidents : so that, that which is a qualitie in men, as bountie, love, wisdom, is an essence in God. This presupposed as a thing confessed of the philosophers themselves, it followeth, That, that infinit & admirable wisdom, whereby God knoweth himselfe, is an essence, & not a qualitie in God : yea it is one & the same essence, yet is it a distinct subsistence or hypostasis from him. For, the Wise, and Wisdom, cannot bee without distinction. This Wisdom then, is the second person of the Trinitie, which the scripture calleth the Word, or the Sonne. Neither also is it repugnant to humane reason, to say, That these two persons in one and the same essence, have an infinit and mutuall Intelligence together, which Intelligence proceedeth equally from two persons, the Father and the Sonne, as they are of equall essence, yet cannot be confounded with them, although the said Intelligence be the same essence : for *Intelligens* (understanding) and *Intelligentia* (the understanding) ought to be distinguished. This Intelligence is the third person of the Trinitie, which the scripture calleth the holy Spirit. Behold then, how mans braine may something comprehend by naturall reason, the doctrine which wee hold of the Trinitie, by a rude and grosse description, which is like

The doctrine of the Trinitie is not repugnant to humane reason

like to that which the Geographers take to pourtray all the earth; namely, in five or six grosse lines, in a paper of a handbreadth. For the knowledge that our sense can have of so high a thing, is farre lesse in comparison of the full truth thereof, than is such a pourtrature of the Geographers in comparison of all the earth: and therefore will I well confesse, that we neither need nor ought much to travaile, to dispute by humane reason, of so high a thing, which of it selfe is infinit and incomprehensible to our senses and understanding; and that they which do least dispute with philosophicall reasons, are most wise and most modest, & that we ought wholly to hold and resolve upon that which is written by & in the holy Scripture. But having to do with Atheists, which receive not the witness of the word of God, it hath made me shew in few words, That even by humane reason it selfe, they may bee vanquished by the truth of that doctrine which we hold. Let vs now come to another point.

Naturall reason, and common sense teacheth us, That there is one God, and that he is perfect in all perfection, for otherwise he could not be God: this is a point resolved. Hereof necessarily followeth it, That God is perfect just, and perfect mercifull. Being perfectly just, by the rule of Iustice, hee must needs condemne and reject all mankind: for all men generally are vicious, and vice meriteth condemnation: but if God should condemne and reject all mankind, it should bee repugnant to his mercy, which also ought to be perfect with effect. How then? shal we say, that God cannot bee perfectly just and mercifull together, because it seemeth that his mercie repugneth his justice? God forbid that such blasphemy should proceed out of our mouths. But we say: That thereby natural reason leads us to a Mediator, who being God and perfect, hath satisfied the divine justice: which satisfaction God the creator accepteth of mankind, because the mediator is man also: and by the meanes of this great mediator God and man, which the creator hath given us, hee hath shewed himselfe perfectly just, in receiving of him a satisfaction condigne to his justice, and perfectly mercifull in pardoning us for his sake: without which mediator we evidently see, that God cannot shew himselfe perfectly just and mercifull together, that is to say, that he cannot shew himselfe to be God, for the Father cannot be without the sonne. It is then a true demonstration drawne from most certaine & evident principles: There is one God, therefore he is perfect. If God bee perfect (as no doubt he is) he is then perfectly just and mercifull, but he cannot be both, without a mediator God and man. *Exclude* nor *Archimedes* ever made more certainer demonstrations.

But this mediator which the creator hath given to men, to make manifest his perfect justice & perfect mercie, is his eternall Sonne, the wisdom of the father, in favour of whom, as well before he came into the world, and had taken our nature, as since, men have enjoyed the mercie and clemencie of God, in employing that mediator, to satisfy the justice of God. This mediator was promised and established to men from the beginning of the world, and since that, his promises have beene so often reiterated, that not onely they have beene notorious to the particular people of God which followed the true Religion, but also to other people which follow false Religion. The Historiographer *Suetonius* (a Paynim, who never read any part of holy Scripture) speaking of *Vespasian* as though it were a vulgar and common thing, saith thus: Through all the East countries alwaies there hath beene a constant and aunient opinion, as a thing certaine, that it was so ordained and foretold of God, That from Iudea should come the dominator and ruler of the world. As much saith the



the Historian *Tacitus* (a *Painim* also that never saw holy letters) when he saith (speaking to the same time of *Vespasian*) Many have this persuasion, that within the spirits and writings of the antient priests was contained, that sometime the East should be in great power, and that from Iudea should come the Dominator of the world. By which witness of these two Historiographers, is clearly seene, that the promise of *Messias* the dominator of the world, was knowne to euery one: but not only the *Painims*, but the *Tewes* also themselves understood this of a temporal domination: and indeed these two former Historiographers, and *Iosephus* himselfe (who was a *Tew* interpreted this prophetic of *Messias* of *Vespasian*, who was created emperor of the *Romane* empire, being in *Iewrie* in warre against the *Tewes*. But this foolish and rash interpretation, is nothing excusable in *Iosephus*, who vaunteth that he himselfe was cunning, foretelling things to come, and in the knowledge of the bookes of *Moses*, and of the other Prophets: for all the Prophets doe all cleerely say, That *Messias* ought to be borne of the race of *Abraham*, of *Iuda*, and of *David*: yea especially & plainly, the place it selfe where he should be borne, that is to say, in *Bethlem*, a little towne of the tribe of *Iuda*. But *Iosephus* knew well that *Vespasian* was neither of that race, nor borne in the towne of *Bethlem*: but wee must beleeve that *Iosephus* understood better than he writ, and that falsely he attributed that prophetic of *Messias*, to the emperor *Vespasian*, upon a flattering humor, because hee had received so many great favors and benefits of him.

*Ioseph. lib. 7.  
cap. 12. de  
bel. Iuda.*

Miracles of  
Christ attributed  
unto  
Princes.

*Tacit. annal.  
lib. 20.*

*Dion in Vesp.*

*Popiscus in  
Saturnia.*

*Sueton in  
Vespian cap. 7*

And as for that which *Tacitus* and *Suetonius*, have attributed unto the emperor *Vespasian* that prophetic, rather than to *Christ*, men must not marvaile thereat, for they were great enemies of *Christ*, as is seene by many other places of their historie. With the same faith *Tacitus* saith, That the emperor *Vespasian* being in *Iewrie*, healed a blind man which saw nothing, with his spittle: and another which had a drie hand, wherewith he could not helpe himselfe: for these indeed were the miracles of *Christ*, which these prophane historians would steale from him, to attribute unto their emperours: And the better to discover their theft, by their owne writings, we must first marke, that *Tacitus* himselfe saith, That the blind man comming to *Vespasian*, and falling on his knees before him, said, and declared unto him, that hee had had a revelation from the god *Serapis*, to addresse himselfe unto him: of which god *Tacitus* himselfe saith, that even in his time none knew his originall at *Rome*. But these *Painims* (which knew not *Christ* nor any christian religio, but a little by hearsay) did thinke that the Christians adored that pretended god *Serapis*, as is seene by a missive which the emperor *Adrian* writ to *Serulanus* consul, recited by *Popiscus*, by whom it is said exprestly, That in the towne of *Alexandria*, they which worshipped *Serapis* were Christians. So that hereby we may know, even by *Tacitus* his own confession, that the author of that miracle to heale the blinde man, was that God which the Christians adored, which was *Christ*, and not *Serapis*. But as ordinarily it happeneth, things that are done in far countries, are disguised by such as tell them; so must we understand, that men spoke wel all over the world of the miracles which *Christ* and his Apostles had done in *Iudea*, and in places thereabout, but they disguised them, attributing them to strange gods, and to prophane men, and never accounted them as the very truth was. Of the same stamp is that which *Suetonius* writeth, saying that *Vespasian* healed one which was lame & impotent in his thigh; and a blind man also who had a revelation of *Serapis*, to go for his helpe to *Vespasian*. That also which *Spartianus* writeth in the life of the emperor *Adrian*, That a blind woman,

woman recovered her sight in kissing his knees; and one blind-borne, recovered his sight in only touching him, and by that meanes *Adrian* lost a feaver, which he then had. For we may easily see, that these were Christs miracles, or his Apostles, which the Painims would faine steale from them, to and for their princes, as also to persuade the world, that there was no divinitie in them. For a resolution then of this point, the promises of *Messias* have beene knowne through the world, as also his comming, even to the Painims. For prophane authois doe often make mention of Christ, even *Tacitus*, who saith, That Christ was put to death in the time of the emperor *Tiberius*, by *Pontius Pilate*, his lieutenant in Iudæa. Behold then how the principall points of our Christian Religion may be proved by humane reason and prophane authors: so great and resplendant was, and is that light. For our Religion herein may summarily be comprehended, *To beleeve in God, and in him which he hath sent, Iesus Christ our Saviour*. If these Atheists then, will put out their owne eyes, to the end they may not know God and the Christian Religion, neither by holy scriptures nor by humane reason, nor by the witnesse of prophane authors, which speake thereof, as of a thing divulged and notorious through all the world; we know not how to do any other thing, but to leave them as desperate persons to welter in their ignorance, brutallitie and darkenesse, til God by his just judgement have sunke them into the bottomelesse pit.

*Tacit. Ann.  
nal. lib. 15.*

Now to come to our Maxime: We say, That to maintain falsenesse in Religion, is to tread God and his Religion under their feet. Yet true it is, that the ancient Romanes have approved and maintained the falsenesse of Oracles, although it were not falsenesse invented by men, but very diabolicall illusions, as shall be said in another place. True it is also, that they sustained and allowed the bookes of the Sybils, and the augures, taken by the flight of birds, and such other follies. But these proceeded from the want of knowledge of the true Religion, and for that they suffered themselves to be guided by the Painim Religion, which consisted in vaine ceremonies and foolish lies. Yet notwithstanding, whensoever by good reason they could know, that any falsenesse had slid into their religion, they maintained it not, butooke it away. An example hereof is this. The religion of *Bacchus* was first brought into Rome by a Grecian priest, who made sacrifices and ceremonies in the night time, and at the beginning, women onely assisted, and were present there, who after their sacrifices banqueted together. The Romanes thinking no harme, suffered it for a time: but in succession of time, men also resorted thither with women, pel mel, (as they say) and brought thither a new ceremony; namely, to put out candles, and ring bells, to the end, none might heare such as cried, when they were forced and ravished. There was all villanie committed, not onely towards all sort of women, but also towards young boyes. The Consuls and Senat having discovered this, proceeded criminally against them which were found in such assemblies, as guiltie of the ravishment of women and of Sodometrie: and there were found culpable hereof more than seven thousand, whereof the most part fled, and some slew themselves, others were executed by justice; and an edict was made, Forbidding all sacrifices from thenceforth to be made unto *Bacchus*. Even naturall reason, made those poore Painims, which were ignorant of Religion, to understand, that that Religion could not be true, but is false and rejectable, which containeth in it any punishable crime. And if they could also have knowne the other falsities of their Religion, as well as this, I beleeve they would have cut them off, whatsoever *Michiavel* saith. But in points

Musß, lib. 3.  
de Geog. apus

Siedan, lib. 9

Papon in his  
colleccions,  
ib. 1.

points of Religion, we may not any thing stay our selves upon that which the aunci-ent Romans haue done, or said, unlesse we will seeke light in the darknesse.

In the yeare 1509 (about twentie yeares before the Canton of Berne had forsaken the Papall Religion) the Iacobins of Berne would have introduced certaine new miracles, devised by Apostata persons, to draw vnto them the devotion and offerings of people. But that seignorie would not follow the doctrine of *Machiavel*, to approve such false miracles, but by burning, executed good justice upon the authors thereof.

In the yeare 1534, the parliament of Paris condemned certain Friers of Orleans, which would falsely have made men beleeeve the apparition of a spirit, who desired (as they said) that there might be good store of Masses said, to deliver him from Purgatory: for it was found out to be but an imposture, deceit, & invention, which the Friers had made to abuse the world, and to draw water to their mills.

There were many judgements of the said court of parliament, whereby the falsnesse of reliques was condemned and prohibited. As of the image of our Ladie, which was painted in an old Table, that had many yeares remained in a painters shop for a shew: which Table, a Curate nigh unto Paris, bought good cheape, and boring two holes, where the two eyes were of that noble Lady, and at the time when vines weepe, placed behind in them two sprigs of the vine tree, so that pitifull Lady wept in the church where she stood, which drew great numbers of pilgrims to that parish: insomuch, that the painter himselfe and his wife came thither also in great devotion, who had sold it. But this marred all, that they at last knew it to bee the old Table, which had so long kept their shop: by whom the fame of this abuse came to the knowledge of justice, whereby, by the said parliament the Curate was condemned, and the Table burnt.

But another time the said Court of parliament of Paris did another thing that seemed something to hold of *Machavels* opinion. For upon a controversie of law which happened betwixt the Clergie men of our Ladie in Paris, which said, That they had *S. Denis* his head; and the Abbots and religious men of *S. Denis*, which said, That they had the whole bodie of *S. Denis*. The Court there gave judgement, That they of *S. Denis* had the whole body of *S. Denis* the Athenian, and they of our Lady, the head of *S. Denis* the Corinthian. So that they both were content, althogh before there was never heard of any *S. Denis* the Corinthian. But that was all one, they provided, that their practise diminished not. If they of Rarisbone in Almaine had intermeddled with this strife, it would have beene hard to have agreed them, or els there must have been supposed a third *S. Denis*: for they say also, that they have the whole body of *S. Denis*, and have a declarative sentence of a Pope and his Cardinals, to confirme it (as they say.) But my purpose here, is not to agree them,

I onely conclude, That it is a damnable and detestable thing to sustaine lies and falsenesse, in whatsoever things, but especially in Religion: for that is to follow the Religion of the divell, who is the father of lies.



3. *Maxime.*

*The Paimin Religion holds and lifts up their hearts, and so makes them hardie to enterprize great things, but the Christian Religion perswading to humilitie, humbleth and too much weakeneth their minds, and so makes them more ready to bee iniured and preyed upon.*

**E**Ntring into consideration, what should be the cause, that the force and power of Christians is lesse than that of the Gentiles, such as were the auntient Grecians and Romans: It seemeth (saith this Atheist *Machiavel*) that it was the difference of Religion. For that the Christian Religion makes the honour of the world contemptible & of little estimation, whereas the Gentiles esteemed honor to be the soveraigne good, for which to obtaine, they had an exceeding great fiercenesse and hardinesse in all their deeds and enterprises. Moreover, the Paynim Religion promisseth no happinesse; but to such as having fought for their prince, country, and common weale, were replenished with glory and worldly honours: whereas the Christian Religion promisseth blessednesse to such as are humble and contemplative, and to them which despise most, the goods and honours of this world. So (saith he) is it plainly seene, That the Christian Religion hath conducted and brought the world unto that weakenesse and feeblenesse that we see it in, delivering it as a prey to the wicked and barbarous people, which as they list, can deal with Christians, and vanquish and bring them under the yoke. Because all Christians, to take the way of Paradise, dispoise and arme themselves, rather to receiue blowes, than to give or take vengeance. And it seemeth, that that which makes Christians so effeminate and cowardly, proceeds onely from this, that they esteeme more of an idle repose and contemplative life, than of the active life.

Discourse,  
lib. 2. cap. 5.

Behold



Ehold the Maxime and the reasons, which this most unhappie Atheist hath disgorged in his goodly discourses to blame and altogether to despite the Christian Religion, and to bring us unto Atheisme, and to despoile us of all Religion, feare of God, and of all conscience, feare and loialty which are taught us by our Christian Religion. But God by his grace preserve us from such a pestilence and contagion and make us know and shun that execrable poyson, wherewith that unhappie man hath infected the hearts and spirits of infinite, from whence do pululate and spring at this day, the evils and calamities which wee see in Christendome, and especially in Fraunce. For out of doubt, so many evils and mischiefes as we see and feele at this day, and long before, proceed not, but from a just judgement of God, provoked unto wrath against the world, for the contempt of his most holy commaundements, and of our most holy Christian Religion.

True it is, that our Christian Religion, teacheth us humilitie towards God. For we ought to acknowledge before his face, that we are poore sinners, and to demand pardon of him, as criminall persons doe; which fall on their knees before a prince, begging grace and pardon. Wee ought also to acknowledge, that the graces wee have, proceed from God, and that wee ought not to be proud of any good thing in us. Moreouer, we ought to be modest and gentle towards our neighbour, and to detest all fiercenesse and crueltie. But doe these things debaile and unable the hearts of good men to performe and execute their duties, of fortitude and valiantnesse, in warre? Doth this Christian humilitie diminish their generositie? I will aske the resolution of this point of none other, but even of *Machiavel* his owne nation, which heretofore haue come into Fraunce, to make warre against the Evangelicks. For they have wel felt, if the humilitie of the Christians haue so much abated the French mens hearts, that they durst not well handle them (as they say) both backs and bellies; yet if they will not confesse it, the fields, which are white with their bones, will alwayes giue good witnesse thereof. It is strange, that this villainous Atheist durst utter and send abroad so absurd things, which are so farre from all experience and truth. If that which he saith were truth: it should follow, That no Christian prince could stand against Paynim and Infidel princes: but all ancient and moderne histories, doe they not shew us the contrarie? The emperor *Constantine* the great was a very humble Christian Prince, yea of that humilitie (as some write) as he held the stirrop of the Pope of Rome, till he got on his horse; yet he vanquished *Licinius*, who was a Paynim emperor with him, and made him forsake the empire, and besides overcame many Paynim nations, as we haue said in an other place. The emperor *Theodosius* was so humble, that being reprehended for a certaine fault hee had committed, by *S. Ambrose* bishop of Milan, hee debased himselfe so much to acknowledge his sinne, as he went trampling himke selfe upon the ground upon his foule feete, from the Church doore, unto the place where *S. Ambrose* administred the Sacrament, and by that meanes was receiued to the Communion: yet although hee was so humble, he had verie great and goodly victories against the Barbarians and Infidels, and against other enemies of the Romane empire. The emperor *Valentinian*, who was a Christian, vanquished the Gothes in Gall: and the emperor *Iulian*, overcame them in Italie, and in Affrica. *Charlamaine*, and many other kings of France, which were both christians, & very humble, have notwithstanding gained

Emperours  
and kings  
Christians  
victorious  
ot Painims.

and obtained goodly victories against the Paynims, as wee have elsewhere said. The emperour *Charles* the fift of late memorie, obtained also in his time goodly victories in Africa against the Turke. Breefely, this point needs no further to be debated upon, For it is clearly seene, That *Machiavell* is a filthie liar to say: That the Christian Religion is the cause, that Christians fall to be a prey unto the Paynims. For contrarie, a small number of Christians have often beaten a great number of Gothes, Turkes, and other Infidels. And it is no more true that which the Machiavelists say: That such as doe horribly sweare and blaspheme, with Mordieu, Sang-dieu, and such like, do fight better than they that say Surely and Truly: because (say they) Surely and Truly do effeeblish & weaken mens hearts, for experience sheweth in many places, that this is false.

When I thinke upon and consider where *Machiavell* hath fished this goodlie Maxime, I can hardlie be perswaded but he learned it out of the historie of *Aygolans* a Paynim king of Affrica, of *Mahumess* religion: this king was a great and puissant ruler, who demeaned and maintained great warres with *Charlemaine* king of France, but he was alwaies vanquished, and *Charlemaine* victorious; so that to escape from the hands of *Charlemaine* by the cheapest and best means, he could devise none better, than one day to make *Charlemaine* understand, that he the said *Aygolans*, would become a Christian, and be baptized: *Charlemaine* rejoyced thereat, and caused him to come into his lodging, with intent to feast him, & give him good entertainment. When he came into *Charlemaine* his lodging, he did see thirteene poore men, beggerlie apparrelled, eating on the ground without cloath, as beggers use to do; which *Charlemaine* did, to have alwaies before his eyes an image of povertie, to remember Christs and his Apostels, and their humilitie: *Aygolans* at the sight of these poore men, desired to know what they were; *Charlemaine* answered him; These be the servants of God: yea said *Aygolans*, hath thy God his servants in so evill order, and are thy servants so brave; trulie I will never bee baptised, to be come the servant of thy God, for I will never yeeld to so base an estate, as I see thy Gods servants hold: so *Aygolans*, would not be christened, for the humilitie he saw in the estate of God his servants. So *Machiavell* rejecteth the Christian Religion, because that thereby humilitie is recommended unto us: but loveth much better the Paynim Religion of *Aygolans* because (saith he) it maintaineth the heart, haughtie and fierce.

And as for that that he saith, That the Christian Religion promiseth not Paradise but to idle & contemplative people, he sheweth wel that he never knew what Christian Religion meant; for it commandeth us to travaile, & not to be idle, and everie man loyallie to exercise his vocation. Verie true it is, that amongst Christians there must be some contemplatives, that is to say, studious people, which give themselves to holie letters, for to teach others: but we finde not by the documents of that Religion, That there is allowed any idle contemplation of dreamers, which doe no other thing but imagine dreames, and toyes, in their braines: but a contemplative life of labouring studious people, is onely approved, which give themselves to letters, to teach others: for after they have accomplished their studies, they ought to put in use and action, that which they know, bringing into an active life, that which they have learned by their studie in their contemplative life; & they which use this otherwise, follow not the precepts of the true Christian Religion.

Touching that which he saith; That the Christian Religion disposeth rather men to receive blowes, than to vengeance. I confesse that it is true, that our Religion forbiddeth

L

biddeth

Annals of  
the life of  
*Charlemaine*.

Christian  
Religion  
alloweth  
not an idle  
and con-  
templative  
life.



Men that  
are not quar-  
relous, are  
not the lesse  
generous.

biddeth us to take vengeance of our owne enmities and particular quarrels, by our owne authoritie; but the way and course of justice is not denied us. And if it were lawfull for every one to vse vengeance, that should be to introduce a confusion and disorder into the commonwealth, & to enterprice upon the right which belongeth to the magistrate, unto whom God hath given the sword, to doe right to everie one, and to punish such as are faultie, according to their merites: but what is all this to purpose, touching the generosity of hart that men should have in war? for although a man should not be quarrelous nor vindictative, to find quarrels for needles points, yet wil he not cease to performe his dutie in warfare, for the service of his prince; yet is there one point in Christians, more then Paynims, that is; That a Christian being well resolved in his conscience, that he beareth armes for a good and just cause, as for the good of his prince, or of his countrey, or some such like good cause, hee will lesse esteeme of his life, and will more willingly hazard it, than a Paynim or an Infidell will doe: because hee hath a firme trust and beleefe, that hee shall enjoy the eternall life after this fraile life. *Casar* writeth, That our auncient Gaules were very generous and warlike, because they held as resolute the immortalitie of soules, and that they that die, die not at all. How much more then ought Christians to bee generous, which not onely are resolved of the immortality of soules, but do also know, that God hath prepared for them an eternall rest, an immortall glorie, and a perdurable beatitude, with him & his angels? Surely, as the life and the eternal felicitie are more excellent, than this fraile life full of miseries and calamities: so the Christian will never doubt nor feare, to change the one for the other, but with a magnanimous and generous heart, wil willingly alwaies bestow his life in a just quarrell. *Machiavell* and all his schoole of Atheists, which have nothing, that so much feares their conscience, as to think of God, have no such mind. They shew themselves generous and valiant to execute some massacre, to sleie men unarmed, which have no meanes to defend themselves: but otherwise they are resolute people to hold themselves far from blowes.

A Christian  
may desire  
honour by  
lawfull  
meanes.

Finally, when *Machiavell* saith, That the Christian Religion teacheth us to despise honor, he shewes himselfe a stinking lier. True it is, that a man must distinguish the vertue, and that which is good, from that which is the vice, and the evil which resembleth it. For ambition is a vice which commeth very nigh the desire of good reputation, which good men ought to have. If then a man travaile and take paines to come to some estate and greatnesse by all lawfull and unlawfull meanes, and beeing come therunto, useth it fiercely and to his own commoditie, rather than to the profit of the Commonwealth; we confesse, that our Religion teacheth us to flie & despise such honours. But when a man will maintaine himselfe by all honest and lawfull meanes in a good and entire reputation, although by such meanes he aspire to some estate and dignitie, whereof he feelles himselfe capable, well to use it, and to serve God and the Commonweale therein; we say, That by our Christian Religion there is not forbidden us such an affectation of honor, and, that lawfully wee may, yea, we ought to seeke and pursue to have such an honor. Breefely, the thing which Christians hold most precious and deare, is their conscience towards God, & their honour amongst men.

*M. Philip de Comines*, king *Lewis* the eleventh his chamberlaine, writeth, That this king was very humble in habits, in words, and in all other things, and that hee could well acknowledge his faults, and amend them, and that these vertues were the means

meanes whereby he dispatched great affaires, which he had on his armes at his first comming to the Crowne: so had he ordinarily this notable sentence in his mouth, cleane contrarie from *Machiavell* his Maxime, *When Pride marcheth before, Shame with damage followeth.*

So must we say, That humilitie, kindnesse, gentlenesse, patience, easinesse to pardon, clemencie, and all other vertues, which accord and agree with an humane and benigne nature, are not contrarie to the true magnanimitie, but very covenable and agreeing thereunto. For Magnanimitie is no other thing but a constant and perpetuall will, to employ himselfe courageously in all good and vertuous things, and to flie, abate, and chase away all vices and vicious things. It is then magnanimitie, to be humble, soft, gentle, patient, enclined to pardon, to be far from vengeance, since all those things are vertues, and not vices. And by the contrarie, it is pusillanimitie, to be proud, rigorous, sharpe, impatient, vindicate, and cruell: because all those things are vices, and not vertues. For that vertue of Magnanimitie is never accompanied with the said vices, neither receives them to wait upon her, onely she is waited upon with all other vertues. And for example hereof, there were never men more moderate, more humble, and gentle, nor more enclined to pardon, than were, *Scipio* the African, than *Iulius Caesar*, than *Alexander* the great, than great *Pompeius*: yet were there never in the world, men, which were more magnanimous than they.

As much may wee say of *Charlemaine*, *Philip*, *Augustus* the Conqueror, *Saint Lewis*, *Charles le Sage*, *Charles* the seventh, *Lewis* the twelfth, and many other kings of Fraunce, which were very magnanimous, yet very soft and gentle. But I shall in another place handle this point more at large, and shew, That magnanimitie hath alwayes been joyned with humanitie, gentlenesse, and clemencie: and contrarie, pusillanimitie hath alwaies been accompanied with crueltie, pride, and vengeance.



#### 4. Maxime.

*The great Doctors of the Christian Religion, by a great ostentation and stiffnessse, have sought to abolish the remembrance of all good letters and antiquitie.*

**T**He Christian Religion (saith this Atheist) hath held this practise, to abolish the Paynim Religion, first to deface the memorie of all order, and the ceremonies thereof, and of all old Theologie. After that, it sought to abolish also the Poets and Historiographers, and to extinguish the totall knowledge of the deeds and gests of excellent persons, and of all antiquitie, destroying all old

images, and all that might represent any signe or trace of the world passed, yet it could not altogether abolish good Letters, because it was constrained to use the Latine language, therewith to write her new Law; by the meanes of which language, some part of the ancient workes yet remaineth. But if the Christian Religion could have formed a new Language, in a small time you should have seene all antiquitie quite banished and gone. But *S. Gregorie* and other Doctors of that Religion, which so obstinately persecuted the letters and writings of the Gentiles, were constrained themselves to write them in the Latine tongue. The Paynim Religion at his beginning did the same, to the Religion which vvas before: for Sects and Religions change and varie two or three times in five or sixe thousand yeares, and the last makes alwayes perish the remembrance of all that had been before it; and if any kept any reliques of the memorie thereof, men held them for fables, and gave no credit unto them, more than unto the Hystorie of *Diodorus* the Sicilian, who begins a narration of things done fortie or fiftie thousand yeares before.



*Achiavell*, (desirous to shew himselfe a very Atheist, without Religion, and a man full of ignorance and beastlinesse) advanceth now this Maxime, the very contrarie, whereof is plainly seene in the writings of them of our Religion, which this impostor and deceiver blameth, as altogether false, and against truth. For so much doth there want, that the writers of the bookes of our Religion, would abolish good letters, as the liberall Arts, the knowledge of Tongues, Hystories, Poesies, and other of the Elders sciences, that cleane contrarie they have with them aided and helped themselves to confute the errors of the Paynim Religion. For they were forced to use them against the Paynims, to vanquish them, either with naturall reason, or with allegations and authorities out of their owne bookes, because they received not the authoritie of the Bible. And whosoever reads the ancient Doctors, will witnesse that it is true, That they have filled their bookes with allegations of prophane and Paynim authors: and hee that will see this more at large, let him reade *S. Augustine* of the Citie of God, and the Christian institutions of *Lactantius Firmian*. For he shall see, that the purpose of those two authors in the said bookes, is no other, but to confute and overthrow the Paynims Religion, with the falsenesse thereof, by their owne bookes, and to approve and set out ours. True it is, that often they marke the faults and ignorances of Paynim authors, and admonish Christians to reade them with a spirit of sobriety, and not to give themselves so much unto them, as to leave the holy Scriptures. Which admonitions are good and holy, and also are necessary even in our time. For there are at this day infinit persons, which so much please themselves in prophane authors, some in Poets, some in Historiographers, some in Philosophie, some in Physicke, or in Law; that they care nothing to reade, or else to know any thing

The Christian Doctors have confuted the Paynims by their own bookes,

A Christian ought not to be too much given to prophane authors.



thing for the salvation & comfort of their soules. Some care not at all for it, others reserve that studie, till they have ended the studies of other sciences, & in the mean while the time runneth away, and oftentimes it commeth to passe, that when they must needs dislodge out of this world, their prophane studies are not ended, nor the studie of holy letters commenced, and so die they like beasts. Therefore are not the old doctors any thing to be reprehended, because they admonish men to reade in great sobrietie the writings of Paynims, and that men give not themselves so much thereunto, as for to know humane sciences, they abandon and let goe the divine knowledge, which is as much more excellent than they, as God is more excellent than man. Yet is there some Paynim authors, which ought never to be read of Christians, or at the least ought not to come in the hands of youths, which of themselves are but too much enclined to vices and lubricities. For a young scholler can hee better learne in a stewes amongst whores and ruffians, the tearmes of all villanie and lubricitie, than in that filthie *Marriall*, or in *Casullus* or *Tibullus*, or in certain books of *Ovid*? And therefore, although wee never read any of these poets, and so our youth gave themselves only to *Virgil* to learne al Latine poësie, it were ynough: and that alone author (out of whom all others are but small rivers) might learne them all the poësie that need be knowne. Yet I wil not say, but there are many other good poets very worthy to be read, as *Horace*, *Lucan*, *Claudian*, and others; but hee that well understands *Virgil*, he needs not have to doe with others, for the understanding of poësie. And in every science it seemeth to be the best (that men may wel employ their time, which is deare and short) to reade few bookes, to make good choise of them, and well to understand them. But for prooffe of this which I come to say, and to shew, that *Machiavell* is a shamelesse lier, in that he dare affirm, That the doctors of the Christian Religion would or sought to abolish good letters, I will here set downe the advice and counsell that they have given touching the study of humane letters of the Gentiles. Doctor *Beda* (as *Grasian* reciteth in his decree) sayth; That they which will forbid the reading of the Gentiles bookes, do hinder men from having apt spirits to comprehend and understand the holy writings: because humane sciences doe fashion our minds and understandings to the better abilitie, to understand holy letters; and that *Moses* and *Daniel*, which were learned in the letters of the Egyptians and Chaldeans, doe serve us for an example, not utterly to reject the humane letters of the Paynims. But here I will translate the very words of Doctor *Beda*. He troubleth (sayth hee) and causeth to faile the vivacitie of readers spirits, who esteemeth, that men ought altogether to forbid the reading of secular bookes, wherein we ought to take that which is good, as our own. Otherwise, *Moses* & *Daniel* would not have learned the wisdom and letters of the Egyptians and Chaldeans, the superstition of which people they abhorred. *S. Paule* also doctor of the Gentiles would not have alledged certaine verses out of the Gentiles bookes in his writings. Why then shold we forbid men to read that which by good reason ought to be read? But some read secular letters for their pleasure only, beeing tickled and delighted with poetickall figments and fictions, or els for the ornament of their language: others read them for their erudition, and to detest and confute the errors of the Gentiles, and to applie and make serve the good things that they find there, to the use of the erudition of sacred letters; and these verily doe merit only praise, by studying of secular letters. And for this cause *S. Gregorie* reprehended a certain Bishop, not because he had learned humane letters, but because he expounded them

” unto the people against the dutie of a Bishop, whereas he should have expounded  
 ” the Gospell. Behold what was the opinion of this Theologian doctor, touching the  
 studie and reading of the writings and sciences of the Paynims. *S. Ambrose* upon  
*S. Luke*, speaking of the same matter, saith, That we read the bookes of the Pay-  
 nims to diuers ends; namely, for not to be ignorant of that they handle, and to fol-  
 low the good things in them, and to reject the evill. *S. Jerome* upon the Epistle to  
*Titus*, sayth, That Grammer and Logicke are profitable sciences to know to speake  
 well, and to distinguish the true from the false, and that sciences humane may serve  
 Christians, to apply them to good uses: and therefore (saith he) it is necessarie of  
 necessity to know them, to the end, that we might shew, That the things which have  
 been said by the Prophets many hundreth of yeares before, are since come to passe,  
 and described by the bookes both of the Greekes and Latines. *S. Augustine* also  
 against the Manicheans, saith, That if the *Sibils*, or *Orpheus*, or that other poets of  
 the Gentiles, or the philosophers have written any true thing of God, men must, and  
 may serve themselves therewith, to vanquish the vanitie of the Paynims, but yet  
 ought we not therefore to give authoritie to such authors. By which words he well  
 shewes, that he approveth the reading and studie of the Gentiles bookes, as well  
 poets, philosophers, as others. *S. Basile* also in his treatise he writ of the manner of  
 reading the Gentiles bookes, not onely reprehendeth not the reading thereof, but  
 contrarie exhorteth Christians to reade them, and to applie the reading of those  
 bookes to his true end and purpose, which is the pietie and edification in the faith  
 and Christian Religion. And to conclude, we read, that by a Counsell it was ordai-  
 ned, That everywhere schooles should be established to teach youth humane letters  
 and liberall arts. The article of the said Counsell, recited by *Gratian* in his Decretal;  
 is this: Report is made unto us of certaine places, where they have no care to have  
 schoolemasters for the studie of letters: therefore let all bishops, subiects, and peo-  
 ple, in place where need shall be, performe their duties in placing Masters and Do-  
 ctors, which may daily teach letters and liberall arts, for by their meanes the wri-  
 tings and commandements of God are declared and manifested. What now then  
 will this slanderer *Machiavell* say? Can hee yet say, that the Doctors of the Chri-  
 stian Religion have, or would have abolished good letters, and the writings of the  
 Paynims? Will he not hold himselfe vanquished of a lye by so many authorities, as  
 we have alleaged of *S. Jerome*, *S. Ambrose*, *S. Augustine*, *S. Gregorie*, *Beda*, and  
*S. Basile*, which are the principall Doctors of the Christian Church, and the autho-  
 ritie of the Counsell (which is as an approbation of the universall Church?) shall  
 not all this be sufficient to shew the impudencie of this Florentine?

De quibus-  
dam 37. Diss.

But now am I desirous to know of this Atheist *Machiavell*, what was the cause  
 that so manie good bookes of the Paynim authors were lost, since the time of the  
 auncient Doctors of our Christian Religion? was it not by the Gothes which were  
 Paynims? For at their so many irruptions and breaking out of their countries, upon  
 Gaule, Italie, Spaine, they wasted and burned so many bookes as they could finde,  
 being enemies of all learning and letters: and who within this hundreth yeares hath  
 restored good lettets, contained in the bookes of the auncient Paynims, Grecians,  
 and Latins? hath it been the Turke, who is a Paynim? It is well enough knowne,  
 that he is an enemy of letters, and desireth none. Nay contrarie, it hath beene the  
 Christians which have restored them, and established them in the brightnesse and  
 light wherein we see them at this day. The knowledge of the Greeke, Latin, and He-  
 brew

brew tongues in other countries, have been brought in by others; but into our countries of Fraunce, that they have come and doe so flourish, we may thanke king *Francis* the first of happie memorie: and since the restauration of tongues and humane sciences, men have well experimented, that they are verie requisite and profitable, well to understand the Scriptures of our Christian Religion: so farre are we off from rejecting them.

And as for that which *Machiavell* saith; That our Christian Religion hath sought to abolish the memorie of all antiquitie; how dare he openly oppugne the manifest truth? for none is ignorant, that the true and primitive antiquitie is of the Hebrews, whose bookes have been conserved, translated, and expounded by the Christians. And as for the antiquitie of the Paynims, doth any man finde that the Christians have caused to perish *Homer*, *Hesiodus*, *Berosus*, or any other authors of antiquitie? nay they, they are which have conserved them, which have aided themselves with them, and which have interpreted them. *Eusebius* the great Commentor of *Homer*, was not he a Christian, yea a Bishop? But I shame to stay in the confutation of the impudent lies of this Atheist; for young and meane schollers may easilie impugn his impudent lies.

*Machiavell* saith; That it succeeded not so well with our Christian Religion, as it would, when it went about to abolish good letters, because it was constrained to use the Latin tongue, wherein all humane sciences were written. Herein doth he manifestlie shew his beastlinesse and ignorance, for who constrained our Christian Doctors to write in Latin? the old and new Testament were first written in Hebrew and Greeke: therefore the Latin doctors if they had list, might have written in these languages, as did *S. Chrysostome*, *S. Athanasius*, *S. Basile*, *S. Cyrill*, *Eusebius*, and many others: yet if writers had used these languages, men would nor have ceased to preach in Latin to the Latins; in the French to the French; in the Almaine to the Almaines, and to other nations, to everie one in his language: for it hath been seene not past threescore yeares agoe, that in Italie, France, Alemaigne, Spaine, and other where, the Christian Religion was not written in the mother tongue; yet men left not to hold the said Religion in the said countries: but since it hath been brought into everie of those languages, for the commoditie of the people; as it was brought into the Latin tongue by *S. Augustine*, *S. Ambrose*, *S. Jerome*, *S. Gregorie* and other Latin doctors of the primitive Church of their time: yet if they had written in Hebrew, or Greeke, the Christian Religion had not left and ceased to subsist and stand for that. And although the Latin prophane books had perished, the Latin language which then was vulgar, had not therefore perished: therefore doth *Machiavell* well shew his beastlinesse, to say, that the Christian Religion hath beene constrained to use the Latin language, and that by that meanes, the prophane Latin authors have been conserved. But what means he when he saith; That if the Christian Religion could have formed a new tongue, it had abolished the memorie of all antiquitie? hath there been at any time, in any countrie, any Religion, which hath formed a new language? and how comes it, that a Religion can be received by the means of a new unknowne tongue? If the Christian Religion had invented a new tongue, it could never have been understood, nor received, and by consequent could not have abolished the bookes written in the Latin tongue: likewise using the Latin tongue that was in common use, it could no more abolish the books written in that tongue, according to the saying of the said *Machiavell*: and therefore take it which way you will.




will; if the Christian Religion had invented a new tongue, or that it had used the Latin tongue (as it did and doth) it could not extinguish & abolish the bookes written in the Latin tongue; therefore *Machiavell* knowes not what he saith.

As little knoweth he what he saith, when he holds, That sects and Religions have varied twise or thrice, in five or sixe thousand yeares, & that the last cauſeth alwaies the remembrance of the first to perish; for who hath revealed unto him this secret: who hath told him newes of things done before *Moses* time, if it were not *Moses* himselfe? Briefly, there is neither reason, nor historie, whereupon he may found that impudent lie. But hereby he would shew, that if any doubt whether he be not a very Atheist, that he hath no more cause to doubt: for, for a prooffe hereof, he makes a declaration, that he beleeveth nothing of that which is written in the holy Scripture, of the creation of the world, nor of the Religion of God, which wee hold since *Moses*. For by the holy Scripture it is seene, that there are not yet six thousand yeares since the creation of the world. It is also seene, that the Christian Religion of *Messias* and Christ, changed not since the said creation, but hath alwaies endured, and shall endure til the consumation of the world. And as for *Painim* religions, they have changed from one into an other, in a little time, and in one same countrey, as hystories do shew. At Rome, in the time of *Romulus*, there was a Religion such as it was, which *Numa* changed, and devised an other more ceremonious. After, the religion of *Numa* changed, & strange Religions of the Grecians & others were received at Rome: insomuch that about five hundred yeares after *Numa*, when his bookes were found in his sepulcher, and men read them, they found no part of their Religion in them, as shal be more fully said in his place. Briefly, these *Painim* Religions, still and often changed in regard of their forme and ceremonies, but in substance they changed nothing, since the children of *Caine*, who began to follow the false Religion: for whatsoever outward change there was, within it was alwaies diuillish Religion, having for his author, the father of lies & of falsenesse: and therefore *Machiavell* knows not what he saith, but that he is an Atheist, & so would manifest himselfe to be one, by discovering that he beleeveth not the holy Scriptures. He thought to have immortalized his name, by making himselfe knowne to posteritie, that he was a perfect Atheist, replenished with all impietie, like as *Nero* did, who sought meanes to make men speake of him after his death, in sleying his Mother, his Brother, Master, and many good men of his time, and in burning Rome, and such other wicked and detestable cases. As also *Caligula* wished (to the end there might be a memorie of his kingdome in time to come) that in his time there might happen some great pestilence and notable mortalitie, or some exceeding great famine, ruines, earthquakes, and bumings of townes: Because, saith he, if my raigne do passe in peace and tranquillitie without some great and notable evill luck, none will speake of me in time to come. There be men of such wicked and diuillish natures, which are of this humor, which desire to make their renowne immortall, by vices and wickednesses; as *Machiavell* hath done, who hath so well plaid his part, that he hath obtained the chiefe ranke of all Atheists, and impious persons neere *Aresine* his companion, who lives in his time, and hath written the praise of Sodomie, to immortalize his name.

*Suet. in Nig-  
ron cap. 55.  
in Calig. cap.  
31.*

When

5. *Maxime.*

*When men left the Paynim Religion, they became altogether corrupted, so that they neither beleaved in God nor the Divell.*



He Paynim Religion (sayth *Machiavell*) consisteth principally in the answeres of Oracles and of Augures. And to have good answeres of those Oracles and Augures, they builded to the gods goodly Temples, and with great ceremonies offered Sacrifices unto them. And the world vvas kept in a marvellous devotion by the Oracle of *Iupiter Ammon*, of *Apollo* in *Delos*, and in *Delphos*, and other like. But incontinent as their trumperie and deceit was discovered, and that men knew, that the Priests of those gods made them there make answeres after the fancies of such as gave most liberally, then begun men to despise and contemne those Oracles, and no more to beleave either God or the Divell. Then begun men to become altogether wicked, preft and vwillig to break, burst and destroy all, like unchained slaves, without any more making conscience of any thing. Therefore ought Princes (if they will be obeyed) to hold their subjects alwaies enclined and devoted to Religion.

Discourse,  
lib. 1. cap. 22.



*Achiavell* still continuing to teach his doctrine of Atheisme, and the despight of our Christian Religion, goes about to perswade by this Maxime, That there was a great losse to men, whert they lost the Painim Religion. But certainly, it was the light of the Christian Religion, which caused the darknesse of the Paynim Religion to vanish away, because that Religion only depended upon Oracles, Augures, and other divellish illusions. So that in breefe, *Machiavell* his mind is, That a man should do well to set a packing the Christian Religion, and that it were a goodly thing alwaies to live in the Paynim Religion. What an impietic is this, I pray you? Can any sentence come from the divell or hell more detestable than this? Assuredly it much greeveth me to blot paper to write such things, & to expose and lay abroad before the eyes and eares of good men so hard words, which cannot but sound evill in their eares, that feare God. But the Wise man exhorteth us to speake to the foole after his folly, that he may not waxe proud. Should wee suffer such an

Atheist,

Atheist, that teacheth all impietie, to take his course, and sow his venom amongst us, and yet we should not dare to open our mouthes to discover him as he is? shall we hold our peace in such a time as is most necessarie to speake, to make manifest such wickednesse as commonly run abroad, that they may be shunned and taken heed of? should this be well done, to meet with common poisoners, and fire-brands of hell, which run all about the countie, to empoison, & to set on fire all places; and not to stay them, but to let them do what mischief they will? I beseech therefore all them which feare God, to accept those reasons, as lawfull excuses, that I am so often forced to speake and write so impious & abominable speeches: for although it displeaseth me much to do so, yet I dare not but lay abroad the impietie of this poisoner. He then saith, That it was a goodly thing in the time of the Paynims, to see the world abused with that false opinion (for such he accounteth it) of Oracles and Auguries; but that it was a great mischief, and evill luck, when the world began to discover, that such things were false, faigned, and devised of men; because then the world began to become exceeding wicked, prompt, and willing to all evill, as an vnchained slave.

Atheisme  
brings men  
to perfecti-  
on of all  
wickednes.

*Machiavel* then must note by his owne confession, That men then became most wicked in all wickednesse, as soone as they began to be of the Heathen Religion, that is, without all Religion. What meanes *Machiavel* then openly to teach Atheisme, and the despight of the Christian Religion? yet this he speaks not, to bring us unto Paganisme, which hee confesseth to bee false: but to make men, especially Princes and great lords (for whose instruction he writ his bookes) utterly to forsake all pietie, and to bring them to the highest degree of wickednesse, whereunto hee saith they come, which are of no Religion. But when Princes or others have taken that goodly instruction, and offered that mockerie unto God and Religion, they but advance their owne infallible confusion, and ruine of their estates, as we have in an other place demonstrated by examples.

But to come to the truth of that which *Machiavel* saith, certaine it is, That as soone as Christian Religion came into light and knowledge, the Paynim Religion vanished away by little and little, as the light also by little and little spread it selfe. True it is also, that as soone as the falsenesse of the Paynim Religion was discovered, there were some, which notwithstanding would not be brought to the Christian Religion. And as for such, I doubt not but they became alwaies worse, forsaking the Paynim Religion, as false, to follow Atheisme. No lesse may we wel say of our time, wherein we may see many, which contemne all Religion, because they will not enquire and seeke after the true Religion, whereof they delight to be ignorant, to the end, it may not torment their wicked consciences, nor controul their disordinate covetousnesse. But as wee see many which are not satisfied nor contented to know the errors wherein they were wrapped, but also they have well desired to know the truth, which they ought to hold. So when the Paynim Religion ended, they which forsooke it, contented not themselves in knowing it was false, but they also thought good to know the true, which is the Christian, the light whereof, made the other vanish away. And indeed, by little and little every one embraced the Christian Religion there remaining, but certaine Porphyries and Lucians, which would be without Religion. And would to God that our world were as pure from Atheisme, as that world was; then should wee not see so many miseries and calamities which are in the world.

And



And as for that that *Machiavell* presupposeth, That Oracles were certaine answeres, devised at the pleasure of priests, to deceive men in the Temples of *Apollo*, of *Iupiter Ammon*, or of any other of the Paynim gods, hee sheweth himselfe to be very ignorant, and to have read little: yet I will not deny, but sometimes the Priests entermedled somewhat of their owne many times: but it is certaine, that the said Oracles, were diabolicall answeres, which the devill made himselfe, or caused to be made by some hee or shee priest, which he brought into extasies, and out of their senses, and so caused them to say what hee would: and most often hee answered in verses, but commonly ambiguous, in two senses. For how could those hee or shee priests, which commonly were unlearned, and knew nothing, give an answer in verse. It was also impossible, that they could have advertisements from Religions so far off, as men came to consult of those Oracles, yea, especially of such particularities, whereof ordinarily answeres were demanded of those Oracles, to bee able to give answeres to any good purpose. But I will not stay more amply to proove this point: for they which have read very little of ancient writings, know well how certain it is, that these Oracles were voices proceeding from devils, which the Painims served under these names, of *Apollo*, of *Iupiter*, and other like gods.

*Plutarke* in a treatise he made of the defect of Oracles, sheweth, That the Oracles were not things invented by priests; but concerning the failing of Oracles, he is found very much distracted and troubled, not knowing how to resolve that question. For there must be presupposed, that in his time (which was during the kingdom of the emperor *Traianus*) and before a good while, there were no more Oracles: insomuch, that that good philosopher was much abashed and perplexed, from whence it should come. But because that point is well woorth the knowledge, and doth come well for our purpose in this place, I will handle the same more at large.

You must then understand, that *Plutarke*, who was a great Paynim Philosopher, to finde out the cause of the failing and decay of Oracles, entresth into a question, whereof he (like a Paynim) resolves himselfe: but to prove his opinion, he useth certaine narrations, which may well bring us to the truth of the cause of the defailance and ceasing of Oracles. He then entresth into disputation of the nature of the gods; and after many discourses, hee resolveth, that there are but one sort of gods, which the Elders called Demy-gods, which are mortall; although they lived long, as five hundred, or a thousand years; and he thinketh, that these demy-gods are they which the gods have engendred with mortall women. For the ancient superstition (where-with certaine philosophers have been led) beleeveth, that the gods sometimes descended below, to cohabitate with women: and this served to keepe the honours of great Ladies, which sometimes forgo their duties. *Plutarke* then, would hereof inferre, that it might be, those gods which answered at Delphos and Delos, and other places, were but halfe gods, and so might be dead, and that therefore might happen the said ceasing of Oracles. Yet hee held not this opinion nor any other very resolutely; but he propoundeth it for such as would like it, and it seemes to be the opinion which he himselfe best approveth. But I do not think, that any at this day will be of this opinion: for in truth it tasteth of his Paganisme, being ignorant and far straying from the true knowledge of God & of Religion: yet to prove, that the said demigods are mortal, he makes a discourse very notable & worthy the knowledge. He saith then, that in the time of the Emperour *Tiberius*, one *Epipherfes*, a school-

Of the defailance of Oracles.

An historie of the death of the god Pan.

master in a towne of Greece, embarked himselfe upon the sea, to saile into Italie, and placed himselfe in a ship charged with marchandize, and wherein there were many people. Making their way, they passed one day at night nigh unto the Islands called Echinades, and there the sea was so calme, that they could perceive no wind, insomuch, that the ship floating upon the water, brought them by little and little nigh unto Paxo. Where being arrived, as some supped, and other did other things, behold an high and intelligible voice, which cried *Thamus, Thamus*. This *Thamus* was the master of the ship, whose name the most part of the passengers knew not. This voice cried twice, before the master would answer. At the third time he answered, vnto which the voice yet cried with an higher sound, That as soone as he should be come against the Palodes, he should make knowne vnto the inhabitants there, that the great *Pan* was dead. *Epispheres* said, That at that word, all the companie which were within the ship, were exceedingly afraid and astonished. So it came into a consultation amongst that people, if the ship master *Thamus* should doe that which was commanded him by that voice. And this resolution was taken, That if when they came against the Palodes, the winds were strong & good for them, they should passe on without stay, or saying any thing; but if the sea were calme, and had no winde, that then *Thamus* should signifie unto the inhabitants of Palodes that which the voice had commaunded him. Beeing then there arrived, and having the sea calme without wind, *Thamus* got him into the hind-decke or sterne of the ship, and turning his face towards land right against Palodes, hee began to crie with an high voice, *The great Pan is dead*. He had no sooner atchieved & ended this speech, but all the whole companie in the ship heard a great crying and lamentation of many, mixed with a great admiration. Finally, when they were arrived at Rome, each of them within the ship spread a broad the fame of this thing, insomuch, that it came to the notice of *Tiberius* the emperour, who sent for the captaine or master of the ship, *Thamus*, who told him al at length. *Tiberius* beleeving it was true, that the great god *Pan* was dead, desired to know what god that was. Some learned people which he had about him, told him: That *Pan* was the sonne of god *Mercurie*, and of *Penelope*. Behold here the account which *Plutarke* makes of god *Pan* his death, and further sayth, That in his time many heard this hystorie reberfed by one *Emilianus*, sonne of the said *Epispheres*. But if we consider the circumstances of this hystorie, we shall find, That this voice was a signification of the death of Christ, which caused Oracles to faile, and overthrew the power of the devill. And it is credible, that those lamentations which were heard at Palodes, were the complaints of evill spirits, to which were delivered the signification of their kingdomes destruction. And to prove that this hystorie should bee so understood. First wee must consider, that it is reported to be in the time of *Tiberius*, under whom our Lord Iesus suffered death and passion. Certaine also it is, That *Tiberius* enquired of Iesus Christ, and understanding of his miracles, he required of the Senat, that they would cause him to be enrolled in the Letanie of their gods at Rome; but the Senat would not. Moreover, credible it is, that in the time of our Lord Iesus Christ, when amongst the Paynims the fame was disperfed of Christs miracles; as to rise to life the dead from their graves, to make see such as were borne blind, to heale Paralytike persons, and such like, that they beleeved that he was God: for upon lesse reasons they beleeved others. And because he called himselfe the true shepheard, and the shepheard of shepheards, it is very likely, that the Paynims understanding this, would divine and

and gather, that it must needs bee the god *Pan*, which they said to bee the god of shepherds: and because also that hee said, that hee was sent of God his father to preach to men his will, they sometimes also gave him the name of *Mercurie*, whome they said to be the messenger and deliverer of the will of the great god *Jupiter*. This may be gathered by *Dion*, the historiographer, who saith: That the emperour *Antoninus* making warre against the Marcommans, obtained raine from heaven of the god *Mercurie*. And *Capitolinus* speaking of the same matter, saith, That the emperour *Antoninus*, to obtaine raine, had recourse to a strange Religion: but *Mercurie* was no strange god to those Paynims, so that wee must needs understand that saying of *Dion*, of another *Mercurie* than they knew; yet gave they him that name (as it is likely) because they had heard say he was sent from God, to signifie and preach his will. To come againe then to our purpose, the afore said learned men that were about *Tiberius* the emperour, hearing it spoken, that so many miracles were done by Iesus Christ, they easily resolved, that he was a god; understanding he called himself the great shephard, they concluded thereof, that he was *Pan*; hearing also, that he said he was sent to deliver out the will of God, and that he was borne of a virgin, they made this illation (as is to be presumed) that he must then needs bee the sonne of *Mercurie*, messenger of the great *Jupiter*, and of some chaste woman, such as was *Penelope*: for, as is likely, they could never beleeeve that hee was a virgins sonne, because it repugned the order of nature, that a virgin should bring forth a child. And therefore of all those conjectures laid together, those wise men (or rather ignorant) which were about the emperour, gathered the afore said answer, which they made him, That the god *Pan*, which died at that time, was the sonne of *Mercurie* and of *Penelope*; applying that to their gods, which they had heard spoken of our Lord Iesus Christ. Behold then, how this historie, drawne from the Painims, is a perfect witnesse, that by the death of Christ came the defailancie and ceasing of Oracles: and indeed wee finde in no histories, that since his death Oracles have beene of any account or fame, as they were before. True it is, that the men and women priests of those gods, which answered by Oracles, seeing that their master abandoned and forsooke them, yet delivered answers themselves of their owne devices; but their trumperies, deceits, and fictions were soone discovered by the divulgement & dispersion of Christian Religion, in such sort as the Oracles and Oracle deliverers became greatly discredited. *Nero* himselfe discovering the abuse, overthrew one of the temples of *Apollo*, wherein were delivered Oracles, and slew all the priests belonging thereunto.

For a resolution then I hold; That at the comming of our Saviour Iesus Christ, Oracles failed, as the comming of the Sunne causeth darknesse to depart from the earth: at his comming hee preached the true and pure heavenly doctrine to men, and after him his Apostles and Disciples preached it also: so that by the doctrine of Iesus Christ and of his Apostles & Disciples, all Christians were instructed to feare, love and honour God above all things, and to serve him according to his commandments in puritie and simplicitie, rejecting all idolatries, superstitions, and divine services invented by men. Moreover, they are in true doctrine taught good maners, to love their neighbours as themselves, and none to doe to another that which hee would not to be done to himselfe; to use towards others the like charitie that each one would should be used to himselfe; to obey superiors & magistrats; to live contented every one in the vocation whereunto God hath called him; yea generally

M

Christians

*Dion & Capitolinus* Mar-  
co Antonino.

*Dion* in *Ne-*  
*rone*.

At the com-  
ming of  
Christ the  
world was  
amended.



The vertue  
of the Pay-  
nims in out-  
ward ap-  
pearance.

Christians were taught in all true vertue, whereas before the Paynims did teach nothing (as I may say) but the maske and resemblance of vertue. For Christ & his Apostles taught men to be just, charitable, temperat, gentle, obedient, pitifull, loving, good, shunning evill, and they taught not so to be outwardly only, but inwardly also without feignednesse, or any dissimulation of heart: whereas the Painims cared not to be inwardly vertuous & manerly, so that in outward appearance they shewed so to be, to obtaine honor, glorie, & aduancement unto greatnesse, which was the marke and end for which commonly they desired vertue, and not for conscience sake, nor to please God. The example of *Caesar*, of *Pompey*, of *Cicero*, and generally of all the old Romanes (which have had any great reputation of vertue) doe prove that this is true, and that they never aspired to vertue, but to obtaine honour, and to encrease their greatnesse. *Caeso* likewise of *Vtica*, which seemed in all his behaviors to despise honour, wherefore slew he himselfe? Was it to please God, or to satisfie his conscience? It is very certaine no: for hee was not so ignorant, but hee knew well, that murder displeased God, and that no man should murder himselfe more than another. Nothing could move his conscience, to incite him to slay himselfe: for he felt not himselfe culpable of any thing that deserved it. How then? Wherefore should he murder himselfe? For this, not to receive that dishonour, to fall alive into the hands of *Caesar*: although he knew wel ynough, that there needed no more but a little humiliation, to have his life, goods, and dignities saved, (as hee himselfe confessed and declared to his son and to his friends a little before he slew himselfe,) but his heart was so sore swolne with glorie and honour, that he loved better to slay himselfe, than to humble himselfe to *Caesar*. Here behold, how those Paynims aspired, not to have vertue, but for honour and an outward shew: whereas the doctrine of Christ teacheth us, To desire and to lust after vertues, not only to bring them unto outward appearance, but also to adorne our hearts and our consciences inwardly therewith, & so to please God. Moreover also we haue heretofore shewed, That the Christian doctrine comprehendeth much more perfectly the vertues of good manners, than the Paynims doctrine doth. How then dare that filthy *Machiavell* say, That men became wicked like unchained slaves, when Oracles failed: where found he this? where ever read hee, that men were worse, and more evill conditioned in the time when Oracles failed, than before? Rather contrarie wee read, That when Oracles failed (which was in the time of the Primitive Church) men which gave themselves to the Christian Religion, were of an holy life and conversation, & they which gave not themselves to that Religion, but persevered in their Painisme, did yet alwayes learne of the Christians that which made them better and of more account. Let any read the workes of *Seneca*, *Plutarke*, *Pliny* the Second, and of many other Paynim authors, which were in the time of the primitive Church, and he shall find infinit godly and Christian sentences, which the Paynims learned of the Christians of their time, as may be necessarily supposed: For such sentences were never borrowed of *Plato*, *Aristotle*, or of other Philosophers which were before the coming of Iesus Christ. As for example, when *Plutarke* disputeth of the tranquillitie of the soule, to flie anger, to shun usurie, of the profit that a man may draw from an enemy, of such as God punisheth slowly, and of many other points, hee uttereth many sentences, which are truly Christian, and doe hold nothing of the Philosophers doctrine, which were before Christ our Saviour. And all the workes of *Seneca* are full of Christian sentences: insomuch, that many have esteemed, That *Seneca*

himselfe

In the Pri-  
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himselfe was a Christian, yea, that hee was well knowne of S. *Paule* : which (it may be) was not unworthy to be beleaved. For *Seneca* (who was in the time of *Nero*, and was a learned man, and a lover of the learned) might well have heard *Paule* speake, who at the said time was a prisoner at Rome for the doctrine which he preached, & might well have beene so curious as to talke with him, to understand what was that doctrine, whereof all the world spoke. But whatsoever it was, none can deny, that the writings of *Seneca* in many places do not demonstrate, that he learned many things of the Christians. We may then conclude, That in the time when Oracles failed, & that Christian doctrine began to bee published and divulged through the world, men became better, and not more wicked, like unchained slaves (as this mocker *Machiavel* saith.) For although even in that time, there were found certaine Atheists like himself, men must not therefore inferre, that al the world, or the most part thereof, became wicked. Neither hath *Machiavel* uttered this opinion, as having read it in any good author, but onely thereby to blame the Christian Religion, as the cause of the corruption of manners. But he impudently lyeth, like a shamelesse slanderer, which dare be so bold, as to deliver such talke, without any prooffe, and the contrary whereof is already clearly proved.

6. *Maxime.*

*The Romane Church is cause of all the calamities in Italy.*

**T**He Romane Church (saith *Machiavel*) is cause that Italy (which of old was the most flourishing province of the Romane empire) is at this day dismembred & cut into pettie Seignories, as is seen. By the means whereof, shee that was wont to subiugate & vanquish other provinces, is now exposed as a prey for all straunge kings, which will attempt it with a strong arme. And although of all Christianitie it be nighest unto the Romane Church, yet hath it of all other least Religion : because therein, that most holy Court doth little else but sow partialities and discords. And he that will proove, whether such evils proceed from the Roman Church, let them procure, that she may remoue her seat, such as it is, for a small time, unto the country of the Switzers, where men live in great rest and unitie : For there should you shortly see it fill the whole country with disorder and confusion.

M ij.

Although

The Papall  
seat doth  
evill, rather  
far off than  
nigh.



Although the Romane Church bee contaminated with many vices, yet doth *Machiavel* shew himselfe here a notable slanderer against it: for experience hath made us long time know, that it rather doth mischief farre off than nigh hand, and that shee ordinarily enricheth the place where she abideth. Wee read, That she hath held her seat at Avignon, by the space of seventy yeares; so that by the affluence and plenty of gold and silver, which ordinarily arrived there, the towne became so opulent and rich, that it yet tasteth thereof, and gladly desireth it might be alwayes there. As for the Suisses, of whom *Machiavel* speaketh, I am assured, that there are they who would it cost them much money, that the seat of the Romane Church were amongst them: and if it were there, the Pope should not lacke people for his guard; for they would furnish him of as many as he would, and his Cardinals also, for their pay. And I am also of that mind, for their entertainment, they would also accord them letters to bee denizens and free burgessees in all their townes, though it be contrarie to their customs, to receiue strangers. For so will they be glad, that there shall everie day arrive in their countrey plentie of silver, which they cannot but love, better than either the Popes benedictions or pardons: yet would they also be glad to reape their pardons at a low price. And notwithstanding *Machiavel* saith, That if the Romane seat were there placed, there would be no good peace, for sowing divisions amongst the Suisses; that is not likely, no more than it so did in Avignon, or the countries about it. For whereas *Machiavel* saith, It soweth divisions and partialities in Italie; that rather happeneth by the humor of that country people, which are naturally given to nourish divisions and partialities amongst both themselves and other nations, where they have credit; as experience shewes in France. Moreover, the Italians themselves are not of *Machiavels* opinion, neither doe they complaine, that the Romane seat brings them any damage. At the beginning of that great schisme of Popes, they shewed well, how greatly they feared to loose their seat: For so much were they afraid, that the Cardinals should againe have a French Pope, which might againe dwell at Avignon, where the said seat had so long before remaind, that they constrained the Cardinals by force, cries, and popular violence, to elect a Pope of their owne nation: insomuch, that all through the towne of Rome, and before the place where the Cardinals were assembled to make their election, all the people in a mutinie cried with an high voyce, *Wee will have a Romane, or at the least an Italian.* This was the cause that the Cardinals gave them a Romane, whereof the Romane inhabitants were so joyous, that they tooke him on their shoulders to honour him the more, and so long and so farre carried him through Rome, that they stifled him and smothered him with the great praise amongst their armes. When they saw their terrestriall god dead, they straight returned to the Cardinals, saying their Pope was dead, and they must needs give them another. So by their cries and popular tumult, they were constrained to give them a new Italian. But after they made another in Avignon, who was Anti-pope to him of Rome: insomuch, that it may well bee said, That too immoderat desire of the Romans to have the holy seat at Rome, was the cause of a Papall schisme, which endured nigh fortie yeares, and was the spring of many evils.

I have before said, and it is true, That the holy seat doth more harme farre off than nigh,

Proffulib. 2.  
cap. 22.



nigh, and it is easie to prove by examples. For by tythes, crozades, bulls of benefices, pardons, and other expences, the holy Father, hath ever had cunning enough to draw store of silver from farre provinces, as from Fraunce, Almaine, England, Spaine, and elsewhere. And all those huge heapes of treasure, sell in no other place than at Rome and in Italie. So that a good old Civilian Lawyer was wont to say: The Court of Rome hath long time had good skill, to change lead into gold: which act, the greatest Alchymists, and the best exercised Paracelsians of our time could never do. We also see the Romanes by the meanes of their bulllike and leaden art, maintaine themselves brave, fine, & in good order, whereas these Paracelsians commonly go all ragged and torne, in great povertie and necessitie, having (as they say) spent their fortunes and patrimonies with blowing the coale, and are of all men a despised people, and of no account.

Yet we read in our histories, That our kings of France have many times hindred Popes to draw silver out of the realme, by Annates, Penithes, Bulles, and other meanes, as in the time of Boniface the eight, Bener the eleventh, Julius the second and third. But concerning this matter, it is good to marke the determination made in Anno 1410. by our masters of the facultie of Sorbone, and by all the Vniversitie of Paris, which resolved in a generall congregation held at the Bernardines, That the French Church was not bound to pay any silver to the Pope in any manner whatsoever, unlesse it be by the way of a charitable subsidie, and that in three cases only; namely, To employ the said silver to the conquest of the holy land; For the redemption of the Greekes with the Latines; and lastly, To preach the Gospell to all creatures. In which cases onely, they said, men ought to furnish and provide a charitable subsidie for the Pope; yet with this condition, That the said Pope touch no silver, but that the French Church do appoint and depuie treasurers to dispend & distribute it for the purposes aforesaid, and not otherwise. If this magnificentall determination were observed, verely the Pope would not be contented, but the Realme would be much bettered: and if all Christian princes did agree in the observation of this determination, certainly, that would come to passe which Frier John of Rochetaillade preached in his time against the Pope. And because his sermon wil not be far from our purpose, I will here briefly rehearse it.

Three cases into which the Sorbonists doe limit the popes power to levy silver in France.

In the time that the holy seat was at Avignon, about the yeare 1368, there was a Frier minor, called Frier John de Rochetaillade, which set himselfe to preach against the pride, gourmandizes, and superfluities of the Pope and his Cardinals, which then were at Avignon, and generally against all the prelates and clergie people, also against princes which too sore oppressed their subjects. Hee alwayes tooke for his text or theme some part of the Apocalipse, and properly applied it to the Pope, Cardinals and Prelates. Our Historiographers say, he was a great cleaerke, and that he foretold the captivitie of king John, and that Pope Innocent the sixth, being much greived at his sermons, caused him to be imprisoned, fearing (said hee) that by his great knowledge he caused all the world to erre: for that good S. Peter was of opinion, That ignorance preserveth men from erring, and that knowledge brings them into error. And indeed, he that knowes nothing, wherein can he erre? But this good Frier John amongst other his sermons, he preached one, which was the chiefe cause of his imprisonment, and this was the substance thereof. Masters and Ladies, I will tell you a strange case, which in time past of old happened amongst birds, and it is verie like that now we see, and hereafter shall see, the like happen to our holy Father

A sermon of f. ier John de Rochetaillade against the Pope.

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the Pope. You must then understand, that in old time a bird was ingendred in the world, which was the fairest and most beautifull to see that was possible, but it had no feathers. The other birds hearing speake of this featherlesse bird, thought good to go see it: and being all arrived within the view of her, they found her most excellent, and pitied her, because she could not flie (as they did) for want of feathers. Then held they a Councell, to advise what it were best to doe, that this goodly bird might not die with hunger, for that she could not flie to get her living. They then resolved amongst them, that each bird should give her part of their feathers; which they did, and as she tooke the feathers, she appeared more and more beautifull; insomuch, that the other birds gave her still more feathers. As soone as this bird saw her selfe well emplumed and feathered, and that all the other birds honored her, she begun to become fierce and proud, and to despise the other birds, and yet not contented with the said contempt and despight, she beked also and contraried them in all shee could. Then the other birds againe thought it best, to advise what was best to doe touching this new bird, which they had emplumed, and which was become so stately and insolent. They concluded in their Counsell, That it were best for every one of them to redemaund their feathers, by the meanes of which shee was so exalted in pride, that she made no account of them. Then all the companie of birds finding this new bird, after they had shewed her the proud incognifance of her selfe, and them, each one tooke his feathers; the Peacocke first, the Faulcon after, and all the other birds, so that they left her all naked and featherlesse. So masters (said Frier John to the Pope and Cardinals) shall it happen to you, and doubt not thereof. For when the emperours, kings, and Christian princes have taken from you the goods and riches that in former times they have given you, which you bestow in extreme pride and superfluitie, then shall you remaine all naked. Where finde you, That S. Peter or S. Silvester rid with two hundred or three hundred horses? yea, contrarie, their estate was very simple, enclosed and hid within Rome. Thus Frier John preaching, spoke but the truth: yet this truth (which is so odious to the world) brought him to prison, where they caused him to finish his daies. I will then conclude this recitall, That if all Christian princes would practise the Magistrall determination of our masters of Sorbonne, and of the Vniversitie of Paris, the same would fall unto S. Peter, which fell unto Frier John his bird.

*Fraiser, lib.  
2 chap. 132.  
133, 135, 140*

War for the  
Pope of  
Rome.

Yet is it not onely by the change of lead into gold, that his Holinesse doth much evill to provinces farre from Rome, but also by his interdicts and excommunications. In the time of the aforesaid schisme of Popes, he of Rome, who was called *Vrbani*, sent Bulls unto king *Richard* of England (who tooke his part, and was an *Vrbani*) by which he commaunded him to make warre upon the king of Fraunce, who was a Clementine and gave him power to levie silver upon the English Cleargie. Moreover, he gave so great quantitie of pardons to all them which with a good hart did furnishe silver for that warre that it seemed he meant clean to have emptied both hell and purgatorie of Englishmen: for every man or woman might draw out his father, grandfather, great grandfather, uncles, aunts, children, nephewes, and others ascendants, descendants, and collaterals, by paying so much for every poll. Hee further promised their soules to be guided right into Paradice, which died in this war, or which died that yeare after they had payed the money for that said warre, nor that there should bee any necessitie for the said soules to stray out of their way by pur-

purgatorie and the Limbo, but to goe right to paradise. The said Bulls beeing thus preached and published through England, there was every where a great prease, that yeare to die, and to give silver, so that in a small time, there was heaped up the summe of 2500000. franks. One part of this silver was given to the bishop of London, who was chosen generall to make warre upon the Clementines in Spaine; and the other part was delivered to the bishop of Norwich, who was elected generall of another armie to make warre upon France, which also was Clementine. And indeed these two armies did much harme, as well in Spaine as in Fraunce: yet the bishop of Norwich being a young man, and inconsiderate, entring upon Flaunders an Urbanist the king of Fraunce, meeting him with 100000. men, constrained him to retire homeward with shame and great losse.

In the yeare 1513. happened great damage and hurt unto the king of Fraunce, and of Navarre, by the meanes of an interdict and excommunication which Pope *Julus* the second of that name, cast against all the princes which had sent their embassadors to the Counsell of Pise, whose lands and seignories he exposed and gave as a prey to all men that would take & invade them. For under colour of those wicked and detestable bulls, the emperour *Maximilian* and the Switzers, constrained king *Lewes* the twelfth to abandon and forsake Millaine, and almost all that hee held in Italie. And on the other side, the king of England fell upon Fraunce (which the Pope had exposed as a prey) with an armie of 30000. English, assaying to conquer part thereof. But God suffered it not: for in the meane time this wicked Pope died, and the interdict was revoked, and peace made with the English. On the other side also king *Ferdinand* of Arragon, feigning he would come to prey upon Fraunce, entred into the kingdome of Navarre, and got and usurped it upon king *John d' Albres*, who was displeased thereof, without being defied, yea, before he knew the king of Arragon his purpose: whose successors have alwayes since detained and usurped the said kingdome of Navarre, upon the said king *John d' Albres*, and upon his lawfull successors, as they doe yet by this title onely of usurpation, prey and bootie; yet notwithstanding the said unjust usurpers call themselves most Catholike.

I could here accumulate many other examples, of many great damages & losses committed by Popes in strange countries, and even in Almaine, where they have commonly sowed warres betwixt the emperour and the prince of Almaine, but I will content my selfe with the abovesaid examples: for I will not at length handle such an ample and almost infinite matter: but it sufficeth mee to have shewed, That the contrarie of that which *Machiavell* saith, is true, and that the Pope and his holy seat doe much good in the place where they are, and many evils and mischiefs in far countries.

And as for that which *Machiavell* saith, That Italie is the province of Christendome, where there is least Religion, he saith very true: but what would he now say, if he were alive: hee should then find, that if in his time they had so well profited in his schoole, as to be very great Atheists and contemners of God and of all Religion, that now his schollers know farre more than their master. And there is no doubt, but alreadie long agoe, all Religion is contemned in Italy, yea, and even the Roman Catholicke. Will you have a better example than that which *M. Comines* rehearseth? He saith, That in the time of king *Lewes* the twelfth, there were two houles at Florence, which were principall, that is to say, of *Medicis* and of *Pacis*, which were in quarrel and enmitie together. They of the house *de Pacis* favored the pope, and


Annales  
upon the  
said yeare.  
*Du Bellay*  
lib. 1. of his  
memories,

The pope  
caule of the  
losse of the  
kingdom of  
Navarre his  
the right  
heires,



and the king of Naples, and by their counsell and advice did they enterprife to flay *Lawrence de Medicis* (who was chiefe of his house) and all his race : and so surprife him the better, unprovided and without heed-taking, they resolved to flay and massacre him and all his race upon a solemne fast day, at the houre that the great Masse was sung, and when the priest begun to sing *Sanctus, Sanctus*, it should be the watchword to rush upon them. And indeed they executed their enterprife, saying that they slew not *Lawrence de Medicis* (who saved himselfe in the revelstrie) but *Lotian* his brother, and certaine others of his race, were slaine. I demand of you, if they which enterprised and gave counsel to attempt such an act, beleeved in the Masse: we need not doubt but they were very Atheists. But if in that time (some hundred yeres ago) Italie were so furnished with Atheists and contemners of Religion, what think you it is now?

In conclusion, Italie, Rome, the Pope, and his seate, are truly the spring and fountaine of all despight of Religion, and the schoole of all impietie: and as they already were in *Machiavels* time (as hee confesseth) so are they farre more in this time. For although the papall Church of Rome both heretofore made (and yet dooth) certaine demonstrations to sustaine a Religion, yet in effect it maintaineth it no otherwise, but by subtilties and words: for it commandeth indeed to fast the vigils and Lent; but is there any place in the world, where they care lesse for fasting vigils and Lent, than at Rome? It commaundeth chastitie to priests, but is there any place in the world, where priests, Cardinals, and others, are more furnished with whoores and bauds? It also commaundeth them to serve their benefices, but of an hundredth priests which are at Rome, there is scant one doth it: their Religion forbiddeth the sale of benefices, sepulchres, sacraments, and dispensations; but is there any place in the world, where there is a greater trafficke of them, than at Rome? It forbiddeth simonie; but where are there any simoniakes, if not at Rome and in Italie? I speake onely of the ordinances which the Romane Church hath made, yet her selfe doth not observe them. For if I would alledge the ordinance of God, which shee observeth no more than the other, I should too tediously rehearse them all. But breefely, the Romane Church hath invented a thousand traditions, wherewith it hath burdened the shoulders of poore Christians to their great abashment, but in the meane while the Church it selfe will keepe none of them, rather that holy seat dispenseth with all them of Italie and Rome; and indeed there is no place in the world, where the Popes ordinances are lesse observed, than there, nor where all Religion is in more contempt, as *Machiavel* himselfe confesseth. Let Christians then make their profit of this confession of *Machiavel*, and so let them flie the spring of impietie, of Atheisme, of corruption of manners, and of the contempt of all Religion, least God punish them and make them perish with such wicked men, as make open profession thereof.

7 *Maxime.*

*Moses could never have caused his lawes and ordinances to bee observed, if force and armes had wanted.*



He most excellent men, mentioned in bookes (sayeth our Florentine) which became princes by their owne vertue, and not by fortune, were *Moses*, *Cyrus*, *Romulus*, *Theseus*, & such like: for fortune onely gave them the occasion, and the matter to execute their vertue. As *Moses* found the people of Israel in captivitie and servitude in Egypt. *Cyrus* also found the Persians male-content for the proud government of the Medes. And *Romulus* found himselfe dejected from his birth place the towne of Alba. Lastly, *Theseus* found the towne of Athens full of troubles and confusions. Without which occasions (comming by fortune) the vertue of their courage had not appeared, as also without their vertue, such occasions had served them nothing. All those occasions then, made these persons happie, and their excellent vertue knew well how to make profit of those occasions.



His Atheist willing alwayes more strongly to shew, That he beleev-  
ed not the holy Scriptures, dare vomit out this blasphemy, to say,  
That *Moses* by his owne vertue and by arms, was made the prince  
of the Hebrewes. We see by the bookes of *Moses*, that he was as it  
were constrained of God, to take the charge to draw the Hebrew  
people out of Egypt; to bring them into the land of Canaan, a  
place of the primitive off-spring of this people. And after that he had accepted that  
charge, we reade, That God gave him power to do many miracles before *Pharaoh*,  
and all the people of Egypt; that hee might suffer the Hebrew people to returne in  
peace into the countrey from whence they first came. After, having obtained per-  
mission to returne, we see how the people were guided on the day time by a visible  
and apparant cloud, which went before them, and in the night by a pillar of fire.  
We reade so many miracles done by God in their passage through the red sea, and  
in the desarts, and how *Moses* did nothing but by the counsell and power of God a-  
lone. With what boldnesse then dare this vile Atheist disgorge this talke; to say,  
That *Moses* was made the prince of the Hebrew people by his owne vertue, and by  
armes?

armes. Could he by any other meanes than by the Bible, know how and what way *Moses* came to be governour of the Hebrew people? For all Paynim authors speake little thereof, and that which they speake, is but as they read in the said books of *Moses*, or by hearefay of such as read them, seeing that it is certain, that we have no prophane authors in light, that were not many ages after *Moses*. If then *Machiavel* can say nothing of *Moses* his doings, but by his owne bookes, with what impudencie dare he deliver out a contrariety from that is there written? For, to say he was made prince of the Hebrew people by his owne vertue, and by armes, that is as much as to deny streight, that God constrained him to accept that charge, to conduct the Hebrew people, & that the said people came out of *Aegypt* by the miracles of God, and that they were conducted by the cloud & pillar of fire, & that God nourished them all the way of the desert; which is (indeed) to deny all that is written in the bookes of *Moses*. Assuredly, there is no man of so heave and dull a judgement, but hee may well know, that this most wicked Atheist hath taken pleasure, to search out the most savage Maximes that could be devised; assuring himselfe, That hee should ever find monsters of men, which also would delight in absurd and bestiall opinions, and would give passage and way to his doctrine. And yet the better to shew his beastlinesse, this doctrine may be overthrowne even by the writings of the Paynims themselves. *Trebellius Pollio* writeth, That *Moses* was onely familiar with God. *Cornelius Tacitus* (going about to caluminate and blame the Jewish Religion contained in the books of *Moses*) confesseth, That the king of *Aegypt* made the Hebrew people to goe out of his countrey, for sores, rottennesse, and other maladies, wherewith the *Aegyptians* were infected. The Poets and Philosophers, when they sometimes speake of *Moses* doctrine, they call it sacred Oracles, shewing thereby, that they confesse, That the deeds and writings of *Moses* came from God, and not from his owne vertue.

But with what impudencie dare *Machiavel* compare *Moses* to these idolaters, *Romulus* and *Thesew*? What similitude had they with *Moses* in their life or in their death? *Romulus* and *Thesew* were two bastards, rude & violent men in their youth, whereof the one slew his brother, and the other his sonne; the one finished his daies slaine and massacred of his citizens, and the other was banished and chased from his owne. Can any find the like in *Moses*? But this Maxime of *Machiavel* hath no need of a more ample confutation; for the truth is so cleare and apparant to the contrary, that a man may manifestly see, that this Florentine is a most wicked slanderer and impudent lyer.

Yet thinke I good to marke another beastlinesse and ignorance, in that hee saith, That *Thesew* came to the domination of Athens, because hee found the estate of the Athenians in confusion: for cleane contrarie he came unto it, because hee was avowed and acknowledged for the sonne of *Egeus*, king of Athens, and was exceedingly well liked of the Athenians, because hee had acquired the reputation of a magnanimious and valiant man, in that he slew and overcame many thieves, which brigandized and robbed the countrey of Attica, and the countries adioyning. And to say, the estate of Athens was confused, is a jeast of *Machiavels* invention. And in that he saith, That the occasion and meanes that *Romulus* had to make himselfe a prince, was because he found himselfe dejected from his birth place, the towne of Alba, doth he not shew himselfe a man of good judgement? For can a man say in good fence and reason, that to be dejected from his countrey, disavowed of his parents

*Treb. Pollio*  
in *claud. Cor.*  
*Tacit. annal.*  
lib. 21.

*Plutarke* in  
*Thes.*



rents, as a bastard to be put to nourishment amongst shepherds and beasts, to bee impoverished and destituted of all meanes, that (I say) these are meanes & occasions to be made a prince, and to be the founder of a towne? If this be true, there will bee found men ynough, which have all those goodly meanes to become princes, and so will there be found more princes than other people. But contrarie, the meanes that we reade, whereby *Romulus* became a prince and founder of a towne, were, That he was a man strong and violent, cunning in armes, who gathered together many vagabonds and people of execution, whereof he was made captaine; after, he and *Remus* his brother founded Rome, and to be sole ruler, he slew his brother *Remus*, and made him selfe king.



## 8. Maxime.

*Moses usurped Iudea, as the Gothes usurped a part of the Empire.*

**W**Hen people are oppressed (saith M. *Nicholas*) with famine, warre, or servitude in their country, oftentimes they goe to conquer other countries, wherein they change their name. As the people of Israel, being oppressed with servitude in Egypt, under the conduct of *Moses*, occupied a part of Syria, which he called Iudea: even as the Gothes and Vandales occupied also the West empire. Likewise also the Maurusians, auntient people of Syria, perceiving the comming of the Hebrewes with a great power from Egypt, feeling not themselves strong ynough to resist them, abandoned their countrey, & withdrew themselves into Affricke, where they conquered ground, and chased away the naturall inhabitants. This may bee proved by the authoritie of the Historian *Procopius*, who writ in the life of *Bellisarius*, That he read letters in certaine pillars written, in the country of Maures in Affricke, which contained this inscription: *Nos Maurisci, qui fugimus a facie Iosue Iatronis filij Nave*: that is to say, We are the Mauricians which fled before the face of *Iosue* the theefe, sonne of *Nave*.

Discourse,  
lib. 2. cap. 9.

This



His Atheist having heretofore said, That *Moses* was made prince of the Hebrews by his owne vertue, and by armes, will now persuade, that hee was a theefe and an usurper of anothers countrey, without any title or reason, and that he seized upon Iudea, as the Gothes and Vandales did of Lumbardie; Spaine, and other countries of the Romane empire. I have before protested, as yet I doe, that it greeveth me much to defile my paper with so filthy speeches, yet the more am I vexed, that the eares and eyes of so many persons should bee occupied in reading and hearing things so evill sounding, and so farre from all pietie and veritie: but it is necessarie to discover the doctrine and the doctor of our courtiers at this day; which think, that the damnable bookes of this Atheist should serve for rules to conduct affaires of Estate, as the sterne serves to guide a ship. To confute then this Maxime, wee know, that the land of Iudea was first called the land of Canaan, having taken that name of *Canaan* the sonne of *Noe*, which dwelt there after the deluge, and was the first stocke of the Canaanites in that countrey: one part of that land was called Palestine, or Philistine, which name it tooke of Philistines (a people coming from *Philistim*, *Noe* his rereneephew) which were a mightie and strong people of that land, which had the government of the other people of the countrey: one part also of that land of Canaan was called Iudea, of the name of *Iuda*, who was a prince (even the cheefe) of the twelve parriarkes of the children of *Jacob*, from whence came the people of Israel, which planted themselves in that part of the land of Canaan, which was called Iudea. Wee read not, that in the time of *Moses* this countrie was called Syria, neither that it was comprehended under the name of Syria; for from that time the countrey, which after men called Syria, was called the land of *Aram*, who was the sonne of *Sem*, the sonne of *Noe*: although such as came after, under the name of Syria, comprised the countrey of Assyria also, which in *Moses* his time was called the land of *Assur*, who was also the sonne of *Sem*, the sonne of *Noe*. And therefore is manifestly seene the beaustlineesse and ignorance of *Machiavel*, when he saith, That *Moses* usurped a part of Syria: seeing the name of Syria was not yet invented, much lesse comprised the land of Canaan. But what could a simple secretarie of the towne of Florence either have read or seene, except the registers of their towne-house? but good authors, Greeke or Latine, hee never read, as is easie to judge by his writings, wherein hee alledgeth no storie to enrich his worke, but the bad and slender examples of government of the Genowaies, of the Florentines, of the Pope, of the duke of Millaine, and of other such like pettie potentates of Italie; he alledgeth sometimes some words out of *Titus Livius*, but to so little purpose as may be. Moreover, it is knowne, That the land of Canaan was of God many times promised to *Abraham* and to his seed (as is seene in Genesis) and that *Abraham* dwelt there, and his race after him, after he departed from his nephew *Lot*, unto the time that *Jacob* and his family were by famine constrained to retire into *Egypt*. Should we then say, that when the Hebrews returned from *Egypt* to dwell in their originall land, which was promised of God (who is master of heaven and earth) that they were usurpers, like the Gothes and Vandales? nay contrarie, they were the just and true possessors thereof, and with good right expelled and drave out the Canaanites, occupiers thereof, which usurped from them the land of their education, which God had promised and assigned to them for an heritage.

And

And as for that which he alleaged of the Maurusians, it is a very fable, for the names of all such nations as were vanquished by *Moses* and *Iosua* are plainly set downe in their bookes, but there is found no name of *Maurusians*, neither is there found written in any good author, that in the land of Canaan there ever dwelt any nation called Maurusians: and as for that nation of Africa called Maures, Mauritians, or Maurusians, it never came out of the countrey of Palestine, but out of Media; insomuch as by the tongues corruption these people were called Maures of *Medes* as *Salust* saith, who is a more credible author than this beast *Machiavell*, who saith, that the Maurisians of Africke came ancientlie from Siria.

And as for that inscription *Nos Maurusi &c.* alleaged by *Machiavell*, out of *Procopius*, true it is that *Procopius* saith; that in Numidia in Africke, the Maurisians builded a towne called Tinge, and there set vp two pillars of white stone, where they put the said inscription, in the Phœnician tongue & letters: but *Procopius* saith not, that hee either saw or read (as *Machiavell* saith) the said inscription graved in the pillars. And it is not likely to be true, that they could have endured from the time of *Iosua*, till the time of *Procopius*, (which were 2500 yeares & more,) entier and whole beeing of white stone, no not although they had been of Rocke stone, which will endure longer than the white stone which is soft, seeing the wars and devastations ariving during that space of time, in Africa, and all the parts of the world. Also other authors (far more authentike and ancient than *Procopius*) which speake of the affaires of Africke, do nothing touch the said inscription: absurd also it is to say, that the Maurusians would make knowne to their posteritie, that they were cowards, flying before their enemies without any resistance: absurd also it is to say, that in one same towne they should set up two pillars of one same thing; but rather to mortalize the memorie of their flight, they would have erected two pillars, in divers places distant one from another, to the end that if one perished, the other might remaine. But we need not be abashed of *Procopius*, who was a Rethorician, a Sophister, and a Grecian, which are three qualities yeelding presumption, that he might (as too light and forward in his accompts) figne too much touching that inscription. For in the same place he saith, that the Maurusians a people of Phœnicia, abandoned their countrey, and went to dwell in Africa, flying before *Iosua*, and the people of Israel; and farther, that they were a people composed of the Iebusites, Gessurians, & other people named in the Bible. But the Bible confuteth him therein. For it is written, that neither the Iebusites, nor the other Canaanites, were driven out of their countrey, by the Hebrewes, but were made their tributaries. And therefore to conclude this point, neither *Machiavell* nor *Procopius* (his great author) is therein more to be credited than the *Rabbines* dreames, which hold, That the Romanes sprung from the Idumæans, and the Germaines from the Canaanites. Yet let this be said, not any way to diminish the credit and authoritie of *Procopius*, who notwithstanding I confesse is well to be beleaved in the hystorie which he hath written touching the gests and wars made in his time, by the  
Emperour *Iustinian* and his lieutenants *Belisarius*, *Narces*, and others.

The Maurusians came from Media, not from Siria, nor Phœnicia.

*Salust. bello Jugurthi.*

*Procopius lib. 4. de bello Vandal.*



9. *Maxime.*

*The Religion of Numa, was the chiefe cause of Romes felicitie.*

Discourse,  
lib. 1. cap. 12.

**R**omulus (saith Machiavell) all the time of his kingdome, used the Romane people to make warre, vvhich made them martiall, rude, horrible, fierce, sanguinarie, and without all humilitie and civilitie: But *Numa Pompilius* succeeding *Romulus* in the Crowne, perceiving he had to doe with a people very hard to governe, and to bring under policie vvithout softning and mitigating of their mindes, thought it best to devise some goodly Religion, well adorned and decked with beautifull ceremonies: because without Religion hee thought it impossible to maintaine any policie amongst men. Wherefore assoone as he came to the Crowne, he began to make divers goodly ordinances touching Priests, and the ceremonies of Religion, making the people beleeve, that he had them revealed from the godesse *Egeria*. And this fell out so well for him, that after his opinion (saith Machiavell) the Religion which he instituted, was one of the principall causes of Romes felicitie. For it served to give hart and hope to souldiers, to cause them range in battaile, to hold them quiet in the field, to maintaine good men, and to overthrow the wicked, to appease mutinies in the people, and in all things to make them obedient. But a Prince ought not to thinke it impossible for him, which was possible for king *Numa*, nor to be any thing discouraged, if the subiects he hath to deale with, be any thing wittie, that they will not suffer themselves to be carried to a new faith. For I may well say (saith he) that the Florentine people are not very beastly and rude, yet *Frier Jerome Savonarola* preaching at Florence, made ten thousand Florentines beleeve, that he prively had conference and spoke with God, who revealed unto him such things as he preached in the Pulpit.



*Achiavell* having assayed to instruct a Prince to reiect all Religion out of his heart, and to be an Atheist, & a contemner of all pietie: now would he perswade him to invent and compose a new Religion, that is gallant & beautifull, well farced and stuffed with ceremonies such as *Numa* his Religion was, yet not to beleieve therein, but for his subiects to beleieve: that with the feare of religion they might

might the better be detained in their offices & duties; and that the Prince might be the more encouraged to procure the building of a new Religion, such as that of *Numa* was, he saith; it is no difficult thing to do; alleaging the example of the Florentines, whom *Jerome Savonarola* made beleive what he would, by sayning he had a revelation from God. But it is no metvaile if this Atheist, who hath no Religion, doth thus play with Religions, deriding all, willing also to persuade a prince to forge a new one: for out of a vessell full of poyson, what other thing can come but poyson? But it is strange he will propole *Numa*, for a Prince to imitate in the making of a new Religion, for the greatest thing *Numa* invented in his Religion, was the Temple of Faith, where he established many ceremonies to induce people to reverence their Faith, and to feare perjurie; he ordeined also, that upon controversies happening amongst parties, they should be bound to go to the said Temple, and there swear with certaine great ceremonies, upon the truth of the points of their contentions. Secondly he persuaded the people, that such as usurped upon the limits of others possessions, were predestinate to the gods of Hell, to the end every man might be afraid to take an others goods. But doth not *Machiavell* teach the plain contrarie? doth not he say, That a Prince, nor any other ought to observe his faith but for his profit? doth he not also say, That a Prince should know the art of trumperie and deceit, and that he should make no scruple to be perjured? shewes he not also, That a Prince in a conquered Countrey, ought to plant Colonies, and chase away the ancient naturall inhabitants from their goods and possessions. All which things are directly contrary to the Religion of *Numa*, which he commendeth so much: but it is likely, that this ignorant beast praiseth *Numa* his Religion, without knowing that it contained the points which we now speake of.

I doubt not, but some wil judge at the first sight, That this Religion of *Numa* could not be evill, which taught so good things; as to observe Faith; not to be perjured, nor to vsurpe others goods and possessions; but it must not be approved therefore: for one must not by an evill and false, introduce a good thing. This was good, to bring the people to an observation of Faith; but to build a Temple to Faith, to imagine it was a god, or goddesse, and to doe service and ceremonies unto her, these were damnable and against Gods honour, from whom they steale the glory that belongs unto him, when they, by forme of Religion do honour to another thing than him, be it a creature or devised thing. Therefore was not that a Christian oration, which was made by *Monsier Capell*, the kings advocate in the court of Parliament at Paris, in *Anno 1535*? whereby praising the dead king *Francis*, the second of that name of happie memorie, because he had care of Religion, he shewed, That Realmes and commonweales of the ancient Paynims, which had good care well to observe their Religion, obtained prosperitie in all felicitie: For that (saith he) although their Religion was false, and that they lived in error and darknesse, yet they prospered, because esteeming it good and true, they had it in a singular reverence and observation. This oration of *Capel*, had truly a little of *Machiavell* his doctrine, to say, that a false Religion was cause that the Paynims prospered.

But to shew, that *Machiavell* knowes not what he saith, I will here recite an historie to this purpose. In the year 574 after the foundation of Rome, in the time of the consulship of *Lucius Manlius*, and *Fulvius Flaccus*, as men digged the earth in a certaine place in Rome, they found the sepulchre of king *Numa*, where there were two arches of hewen stone, in the one of which *Numa* was buried, and in the other

*Dionis. Halicar. lib. 1.*

*Tit. Livius, lib. 10, Dec. 4.*

were the bookes found which he had written, wrapped in waxe, in such sort as they seemed to be new, there were seven in Latin, touching the ceremonies of the Religion which he instituted. Incontinent a fame went of these novels all over, how the bookes of king *Numa* were found touching Religion, inso much as every man attended, that they should be divulged, and that by their meanes all abuses in the Romane Religion should alwaies be reformed. Yet to doe nothing rashly, the Consule gave charge to *Quintus Petilius* lieutenant of justice, well to turne over, and peruse those bookes, and to report the truth of them unto the Senat. *Petilius* read them from the one end unto the other, and of them certified his opinion unto the Senat: and it was found, that the Religion which was handled in those bookes, was of no accompt, and that it should be a pernicious and damageable thing to the Common wealth, to bring that Religion into use: so was it resolved by a decree of the Senat, that those bookes should be publickly burnt before all the people, which was done. I would now gladly know of *Machiavel*, who so much esteemeth the Religion of *Numa*, without ever having seen his bookes, if he can yeeld a better judgement of them than the Lieutenant *Petilius*, who read them, and than all the Romane Senat. Is not this as a blinde man to judge of colours, who speakes of a thing he knowes not?

Dei Com. lib.  
2. cap. 35. 53.  
54.

As for Frier *Jerome Savonarola*, the Florentines shewed well, that he was no such man as would lead them to any new Religion, neither preached he unto them any other Religion, but the old Romish Religion, only denouncing unto them sometime, the vengeance and punishments of God, which from heauen should fall upon them, if they repented and amended not their sinnes, and this he assured them as though he had had some revelation from God. But amongst other things which he preached and affirmed most, was, that there should come a king out of France into Italie, which should deliver the Countrey from so many tyrantizers and potentates, as then held the countrey in great servage & slaverie. This talke pleased some which desired change, though others delighted not in it. About the time that hee made those sermons, king *Charles* the eight made a voiage into Naples, who as soone as he was seene in Italie, all the world began to say, and beleve that Frier *Jerome* was a true prophet, and that he had well foretould, that which they see come to passe. The worst was, that the said king did nothing worthie of accompt in the voiage, inso much that the best part of *Jeromes* prophetic (which was to purge Italie of so many tyrantizers) remained yet to accomplish. Then the reputation of this good Frier *Jerome*, began not onely to diminish, but also men began to say and beleve, that he was an abuser; so that in the end hee was accused at Florence, to be a most wicked heretike; and his enemies said, hee was worthie to be put into a sacke and to be cast into the river: and because he still continued to preach his first theme, That the king of France should yet againe come into Italie, to performe that which he had not executed in that first voiage, and that the will of God was so, and if he did not accomplish it, yet God himselfe would punish it, the Pope and the Duke of *Millan*, which were hereat troubled, for they thought this was but a bait to cause the king of France to come another time into Italie, whereof they were greatlie afraid, therefore ioyned they together against this poore Frier, and writ to the seignorie of Florence, to doe justice upon him as upon a seducer and an heretike.

A disputation  
by a  
Frier.

Amongst others which tooke *Jerome* in hand, there was found a Frier (for there never was love betwixt the Friars, and the Iacobins) which would needes maintaine against him, that he was an heretike, and to prove his so saying, he presented  
unto



unto *Jerome* the combat, to commit themselves both into the fire, and that hee which was not hurt by the fire, should be held (as it was reason) for a soothsayer, and the other whom the fire burned, for a lyer and an abuser. Frier *Jerome* was sore abashed to heare speake of such a manner of disputation, and indeed would not accept it: for he was not so learned nor so far a student in Logicke, that he had learned such a kind of argumentation, to prove his doctrine by fire: yet was there found another young *Jacobin*, a familiar friend of *Jeromes*, which accepted the combat, to maintaine his friends quarrell. Then was the day and place assigned in the towne of Florence, for those two valiant combatants, both of them to place themselves upon a great heape of faggots, which were laid to that end, for to set fire thereunto as soone as they came upon them. The day assigned being come, behold the two combatants appeared: but the *Jacobin* had about him (as they call it) the precious bodie of the Host for his defence, which he tooke betwixt both his hands: the Frier and the Seignorie shewed, That that was no reasonable defence for the *Jacobin*, and therefore urged him to let goe the Host: but hee would not for any thing depart from it: insomuch, as by that meanes the combat ended, and each one which came to that place to see those valiant combatants goe to the fire, returned to their houses. But not long after they were all three endited, and I know not how nor wherefore, they were accused and condemned, (for I finde nothing written thereof) but they were all three burnt. Here behold how the Florentines handled this poore Frier *Jerome*, whom *Machiavell* reports to have spoken with God. It may be, some at the beginning had some good opinion of him; but in the end, they made him well know, that he was no such able man, to perswade them either to the Religion of *Numa*, or to any other Religion: for the most part of them cared for neither the one nor the other.

10. *Maxime.*

*A man is happie, so long as Fortune agreeth unto his nature  
and humour.*

**F**ortune may be compared (saith M. *Machiavell*) to a great flood, which nothing can resist, when it overflowes his bankes with great inundations. But when it remaines in his ordinarie course, or when it overfloweth not without measure, the force thereof may easily be resisted, by levies, ditches, rampiers, and other like obstacles: so Fortune is sometimes so unmeasurable in violence,

lence, that no vertue can resist her; yet vertue may afterward repaire the evils which that overflowing violence of Fortune hath brought; it may also verie vwell so resist Fortune, vvhich is moderate, and not too violent, as the forces thereof shall not hurt. I judge therefore (saith he) that Prince happie, unto whose nature and manner of doings, there happeneth an accordant and a consonant time. For the diversitie of times make, that two (by contrarie meanes) come to one same end and effect; and also, that two (by one same meanes) doe come to contrarie ends. So that if he vvhich governes himselfe moderately, encounter and meet vvith a time, wherein his vertue is requisite, he cannot faile but prosper: yet if the time change, he shall undoubtedly overthrow himselfe, if he likewise change not his manners and order of life. Pope *Iulius* in all his actions proceeded vvith extreame fiercenesse and hastinesse, yet his actions succeeded well, but many others have fared evill, by using too precipitate promptitude and hast: Whereof I conclude (saith he) that men are happie, so long as Fortune accordeth to their humour and complexion: but as soone as she beginneth to varie and dissent, then goe they fast downe the wheele; whom also shee determineth to overthrow, shee blindeth them ordinarily; shee can likewise chuse fit men at her pleasure to cast downe the vvheele: commonly shee applies and gives her selfe to young and inconsiderate people, vvhich are most hazardous and prompt in execution, therein imitating the nature of women, which doe best love young men, such as to obey them, must rather be spurred than flattered.



Y this description of *Machiavell* is evidently seene, that he thinks that which the Poets writ for fables concerning Fortune, is the very truth. For the Paynim Poets have written, That Fortune is a goddesse, who giveth good and evill things to whom she list. And to denote, that this shee doth inconsiderately and without judgement, they wrap her head in a cloth, least with her eyes she see and know to whom she giveth; so that she never knoweth unto whom she doth good or evill: Moreover, they describe her standing upright upon a boule, to denote her inconstancie and unstaiednesse, turning and tossing, one while on the one side, another while on the other. Now *Machiavell* would make men beleieve, that this is true, and that all the good and evill which comes to men, happeneth, because they have Fortune accordant or discordant to their complexions. He after saith; That shee commonly favoureth young people, such as are hazardous and inconsiderate; to the end, that thereby men might learne that rule, to be rash, violent, and headie, that they may have Fortune favourable unto them. But all this doctrine tends to the same end as the former Maximes doe, namely, to insinuate into mens minds and hearts

hearts a despight and utter contempt of God and his providence. For let man have once this persuasion; That no good comes unto us from God, but from Fortune; he will easily forsake the service of God: as also when men beleeve, that evill (that is to say, the punishments of vices and sinnes) come not from the just judgement of God, but onely from Fortune, which inconsiderately and rashly gives evils without consideration, whether they merit them, or no, and as soone to the good as to the wicked; then need we not doubt, but straight such a man is emptied of all feare of God, and ready to fall into every vice. Here may you see the scope and end whereunto this wicked man tendeth to bring Princes and other men, leaving no manner of impictie behind to infect and sow his poyson in the world.

But against this we have good preservatives drawne out of the holy Scriptures, whereby we are assured, That nothing fals to us, but by Gods providence, and that such afflictions as are sent us, are for our good, least the slippery way of prosperitie make us fall, to our destruction: insomuch, as we praise God for both good and evill; resolving our selves, that that which unto our small senses appeareth to be evill, is not evill to our soules, but very healthfull and good, because there is a Christian Maxime, That no evill can happen to a Christian, from the hand of God our Father: but my purpose is not here to handle that point of Theologie any further; but I will confute *Machiavell*, even by the Paynims themselves.

And first I oppose against him almost all the auncient Philosophers, which have maintained, That nothing happeneth, nor is done, without some efficient cause, although to us it be unknowne. True it is, that they make a distinction of causes: for they say, that God is the first cause, which holds in action all other inferior causes; which they call Second, and makes them worke their effects. And although oftentimes in this distinction of causes, they attribute some things to second causes, which they should attribute to the first alone, yet notwithstanding, they refer all things to God mediately or immediately. Verie true it is, that sometimes they use that name of Fortune, applying themselves to the manner of speech used amongst the people; but there was never Philosopher so beastly, that ever thought her to be any goddesse: but when the auncient Philosophers say any thing comes by fortune, or by adventure, or contingencie; they meane, that the efficient cause of such a thing is unknowne: for that is their doctrine and manner of speech, to say, that a thing happeneth or chancess by Fortune, and contingently, when they know not the cause thereof.

Learnedly speakes *Plutarke* to this purpose, when he sayth; That the Poets have done great wrong to Fortune, to say, she is blind, and that she gives her gifts to men rashly without knowing them: for (saith he) it is we which know it not: for Fortune is no other thing but the cause (whereof we are ignorant) of things which we see come to passe. And therefore the Stoicke philosophers, although they knew not the second causes of all things, no more than other Philosophers, yet used they another manner of speech than they, and attributed the haps and chances of all things unto the ordinance and providence of God, which they called by the name of *Fatum*: yet indeed the *Fatum* differeth much from the providence of God, which the Christians hold. For the Stoickes held, That God could worke no otherwise than the order of second causes would beare and leade him unto: but we hold, That God is free in operation, and not tied to second causes, without which he can do that which he doth by them, and can change them at his pleasure.

*Timotheus*

God is the  
first cause of  
all things.

*Plutarke*  
in libello de  
*Fortuna.*



Plu. in Silla.

*Timotheus* an Athenian captaine, comming one day from the war, where his affaires had succceeded and sped well, he was much grieved at some, which said, that he was very happie and fortunate : so that one day in a publike assemblie of all the people of Athens, he made an Oration, wherein he discourfed all his giests and victories, uttering by the way, the meanes and counsell which he had used in the conduction of his affaires: and after all this discourse, Maisters said hee, Fortune hath had no part in all this that I have accounted unto you, as if he would say, That it was by his owne wisdom, that these things had so well succceeded to him. The gods saith *Plutarke*, were offended at this foolish ambition of *Timotheus*, inso much, that he did never after, any thing of account, but all things he did, turned against the haire, till hee came to be hated much of the Athenian people, that in the end he was banished, and chased from Athens. Hereby we may see, that the ancient Paynims, meant to attribute to the gods, that which men in their common manner of speech attributed to Fortune, but they never beleevved shee was a goddesse.

De Com. lib. 1.  
cap. 18.

When *Messiere de Communes* speaketh of the Constable of S. Pol, who was so great and puissant a Lord, yet in the end such evill luck befell him, that his head was cut off: Hereof he makes a question, and wisely, and religiously absolveth it: What shall we say (saith he) of Fortune? This man that was so great a lord, that by the space of twelve yeeres, he had handled and governed king *Lewis* the eleventh, and the Duke *Charles* of Burgoigne; he was a wise knight, & had heaped together great treasures, and in the end fell into her net. We may then well say, that this deceitfull Fortune, beheld him with an evill countenance, nay contrary we must answer (saith hee) that Fortune is nothing but a poetically fiction, and that God must of necessitie have forsaken him, because he alwaies travailed with all his power, to cause the war still to continue betwixt the king and the Duke of Burgoigne: for upon this war was founded his great authoritie and estate: and hee should be verie ignorant, that would beleve, that there was a Fortune therein, which could guide so wise a man to obtaine the evill wil of two so great Princes at once, and also of the king of England, which in their lives accorded in nothing, but in the death of this Constable. Behold the verie words of *Communes*, speaking of Fortune, which senteth as much of a good man, and a good Christian, as the Maxime of *Machiavell* tastes of a most wicked Atheist.

Tit. Liv. lib.  
2. Dec. 3.

And as for that which *Machiavell* saith, That Fortune favours such as are most hazardous, and rash: *Titus Livius* is of a farther opinion, who speaking of the victorie, which *Anniball* obtained, nigh the lake *Trafimene*, against the consull *C. Flamminius*, saith; That evill luck came by the temeritie of *Flamminius*, which was nourished and maintained in him, by fortune: whereas before, things had well succceeded with him; but now, he which neither tooke counsell of the gods, nor of men, it was no mervaile, if sodainly hee fell into ruine. This losse of the battaile, was the cause that *Fabius Maximus* was elected Dictator to go against *Anniball*, as indeed after his election, he tooke the field with a new armie: and certain time after, being sent for of the Senat, to assist at Rome certaine sacrifices and ceremonies, he left in the campe *Minutius* his Lieutenant, saying unto him in this manner: I pray you *Minutius* take heed you do not as *Flamminius* did, but trust you more in good counsell than in fortune, better it were to be assured, not to be vanquished, than to hazard your selfe to bee vanquisher. In another place *Titus Livius* rehearseth, That *Cains Sempronius* captaine of the Roman Armie, against the Volques, trusting in Fortune as a thing

Lib. 4. Dec. 1.

cor-

constant and perdurable, because alwaies before, the Romanes had it in custome to overcome that Nation, used no prudence, nor good counsell, in his conduction, but hazard and temeritie : therefore saith *Liue*, fortune and good successe flieth and abandoneth rashnesse, and this happeneth most commonly. Here you see the opinion of *Fabius Maximus*, and of *Titus Livius*, much better than that of *Machiavell*, who would persuade us, That we had better be rash than prudent, to have fortune favourable unto us : for certaine it is, that the haps which men call of Fortune, proceed from God, who rather bleffeth prudence, which he hath recommended unto us, than temeritie : and although sometimes it happen, that he bleffe not our counsels and wisedomes, it is because we take them not from the true spring and fountaine, namely from him of whom we ought to have demanded it, and that most commonly we would, that our owne wisedome, should be a glorie unto us, whereas onely God should be glorified.

*Here endeth the second part, entreating of such Religion  
as a Prince should use*



THE



## THE THIRD PART, TREATING of such Policie, as a Prince ought to hold in his Commonweale.

### ¶ The Preface.

**H**ave before in order disposed all Machiavels Maximes, touching Counsell and Religion; and at large I have shewed, That all his doctrine shootes at no other marke, but to instruct a Prince to governe himselfe after his ownefancie, not delivering his eare to such as would shew him the truth, and to dispoile himselfe of all piete, conscience, and Religion. There remaines now to handle the third part of his said doctrine, which concerneth Politie, whereof there are many parts, for in it are comprehended such Maximes, as concerne Peace, Warre, Faith, Promise, Oath, Clemencie, Crueltie, Liberalitie, Covetousnesse, Conscience, Craft, Iustice, and other vertues and vices, considerable in publike and politike persons. All these things Machiavell handles in such sort, as it is easie to know, that his onely purpose was to instruct a Prince to bee a true Tyrant, and to teach him the art of tyrannie. In which art, verily he hath shewed himselfe a great doctor, yea far greater than Bartolus: for Bartolus, (who was a renowned doctor in the civile Law) in his Treatise written of Tyrannie, makes nothing so deepe in the matter as Machiavell doth, although, reading the Treatise of Bartolus, it seemes that Machiavell hath learned a great deale of his knowledge: but Machiavell applies it contrary, teaching that men should hold it for good, whereas Bartolus speaketh of it as of a damnable thing, which men ought to repulse and shun with all their power: and to conferre a curse thereupon. I will here summarily recite certaine points of Doctor Bartolus, touching this matter of Tyrannie, to shew that which Machiavell hath stolne, yet would apply it to the duty of a Prince, whereas Bartolus attributeth it to the iniquitie and malice of a Tyrant. First Bartolus constituteth two kinds of Tyrants, the one in title, the other in exercise. A Tyrant in title (saith he) is he which without any title, or else with a bad title usurpeth a domination and seignorie: A Tyrant in exercise is he, who having a lawfull title to dominion and rule, ruleth not iustly and loyally as a good prince ought to doe: after this hee numbresth ten sorts of actions, whereby a Tyrant is manifested to be a Tyrant in exercise. The first action is, when he putteth to death the mightiest and most excellent persons amongst his subiects, for feare they should arise  
against



against his tyrannie. The second, when he troubleth and afflicteth good and wise men of his domination, least they should discover his vices to the people. The third action, when he seekes to abolish studies and good letters, so the end wisdom may not be learned. The fourth, when he forbiddeth lawfull and honest assemblies and congregations, fearing men will rise up against him. The fifth, when he hath spies in all places, fearing men speake evill of his evill actions. The sixth, when he maintaines divisions amongst his Subiects, so the end, one part may feare another, and so neither the one nor the other arise against him. The seventh, when he seekes to hold his Subiects poore, so the end, that they being occupied in the meanes to get their living, they may machinate nothing against him. The eighth, when he seekes to maintaine Warre to effeeblish his Subiects, and so abolish studies, and to make himselfe strong, when he needs. The ninth, when he trusteth more in strangers than in his owne subiects, and that he betakes himselfe unto a strange guard. And the tenth action is, when there is partialitie amongst his subiects, and he adhereth more to the one than to the other. Which tenne kinds of actions, Bartolus proveth by reasons of law to be truly tyrannicall, by which a Tyrant in exercise is knowne and manifested to be a tyrant, and especially (saith he) by these three kinds; when he maintaineth division amongst his subiects; when he impoverisheth them; and when he afflicteth them in their persons and goods, insomuch, that the most part of the people are discontented. And finally, he concludeth, That to such Tyrants by right and reason men ought not to obey nor appeare before them, but that they ought to be dispossessed of their estates. But in all this doctrine of Bartolus can you find one onely point, that Machiavell would not have applied and taught to a Prince? All these tenne kinds of tyrannicall actions, set downe by Bartolus, are they not so many Maximes of Machiavell his doctrine taught to a Prince? Saith he not, That a Prince ought to take away all vertuous people, lovers of their Commonwealth, to maintaine partialities and divisions, to impoverish his subiects, to nourish warres, and to doe all other the foresaid things, which Bartolus saith to be the works of Tyrants? We need then no more to doubt, that the purpose of Machiavell, was not to forme a true tyrant; and that he hath not stolne from Bartolus, one part of his tyrannicall doctrine which he teacheth, which yet he hath much augmented and enriched. For he hath added, That a Prince ought to governe himselfe by his owne counsell; and he ought not to suffer any to discover unto him the truth of things; and that he ought not to care for any Religion (as we have shewed before;) neither that he ought to observe any faith or oth, but ought to be cruell, a deceiver, a fox in craftinesse, covetous, inconstant, unmercifull, and perfectly wicked, if it be possible, as we shall see hereafter. So that hereby apparently may be seene, That Machiavell is a far greater doctor in the art of tyrannie, than Bartolus; yet I compare them not together: For that which Bartolus hath written of tyrannie, was to discover and condemne it: but that which Machiavell hath written, was to cause Princes to practise and observe it, and to sow in their hearts a true tyrannicall poyson, under the pretext and name of a Princes dutie and office. Finally, there is no cause nor reason to compare this beastly Machiavell, a simple burne-paper-scribe of the towne-house of Florence, with this great Doctor Bartolus, who was one of the excellentest Lawyers of his time, and for one such is yet acknowledged. But now let us enter into the matter.

That

1. *Maxime.*

*That Warre is iust, which is necessarie, and those Armes reasonable, when men can have no hope by any other way, but by Armes.*

Hebrewes.



*Achiavell* exhorting the magnificent *Lawrence de Medicis*, to get all *Italie*, perswadeth him by this *Maxime*. He shewes him, that *Italie* is fit and readie to receive a new Prince, because it is now falne into extreame desolation, more than ever the *Iewes* were in the servitude of *Egypt*. And that this miserable province hath attended to be delivered from her servitude by a Prince (meaning king *Charles* the eight) which shee esteemed should be sent of God: but that by his acts it appeared that he was reprov'd and abandoned of Fortune, and that now there was no other hope to be delivered from their miserie, but in that illustrious house of *Medicis*, which might well enterprise to make it selfe cheefe of that redemption, with the Churches helpe, (meaning of Pope *Leo x.*) with the aid also of his owne vertue and his owne fortune, favoured of God. And that the magnificent *Lawrence* might well bring it to passe, in proposing to himselfe for imitation the examples of *Cesar Borgia*, and *Agathocles*. And that *Italie* delights in nothing so much as novelties, and the *Italians* surpasse other nations in force, agilitie of bodie, and spirit. True it is (saith he) that when it commeth to battailes, they will never appeare, but men must lay the fault thereof upon the cowardize and little heart of their Captaines, because they that have knowledge will not willingly obey, and every man presumeth to know much. He sheweth moreover, That the magnificent *Lawrence* had good occasion to enterprise the taking of *Italie*, to deliver it from the slavish servitude, wherein it is, and that enterprise should be founded upon good justice, because that Warre cannot faile to be esteemed just, vvhich is necessarie, and all armes are good and reasonable, vvhhen men have no hope elsewhere, but by them.

This



His Maxime of *Machiavell*, is a true meanes to sow both civile and strange warres all over the world: For if Princes had this persuasion, that it were lawfull for them to assaile any other Prince, under the pretext and shew, that he handled not well his subjects, Princes should never want occasions to warre one against another. And therefore to say, that the magnificent *Lawrence de Medicis*, had just occasion to get *Italie*, to deliver it from the evill handling of the Potentates thereof, which there dominiered and ruled: this in no sort could bee called a just cause of war; but it rather may be called an evill against an evill, and tyrannie against tyrannie, because they (*de Medicis*) cannot say, that they have any right or title unto *Italie*. But if we consider what tyrannie is, as the elders have spoken thereof, we shall find, that not onely men in old time called such Princes tyrants, which handled evill and rudely their subjects, as *Caligula*, *Nero*, *Commodus*, and other like; but also such as handled well and kindlie their subjects, when without title they usurped domination upon them, as *Julius Caesar*, *Hierom of Siracuse*, the governours which the Lacedaemonians set over Athens, and other like. And therefore a Prince which hath no title over a Countrey, cannot lawfully invade to get dominion there, but by tyrannie, whatsoever good intent he surmise or have, to use the inhabitants friendly when he hath conquered it: yet he may well aide another Prince, having lawfull title to oppose against a tyrannie: because that is a common dutie, whereby all good Princes are obliged to help all such as by title & legitimate cause, do oppose themselves to resist a tyrannie. But if a Prince go about to usurpe another Countrey (after the counsell of *Machiavell*, without lawfull title, under a vaile to deliver that Countrey from tyrannie) this cannot be well and justlie done, unlesse a man will say, that one tyrant may justly expulse another tyrant.

The Romanes have many times by examples shewed this to be true, and never would they deale in warre against any man without just title. The Samnites (which were a mightie people) made warre against the Campanians, neighbours unto the Romanes, who sent to Rome to demand succours: they shewed, that they were the Romanes neighbours, and that it well became the Romane generositie and vertue to succour their neighbours, seeing also that by marriages there were infinite alliances betwixt the Romanes and the Campanians; and the Romanes might alwaies draw great commodities and profits from Campania, which was a fertill and plentiful Countrey. But they could never obtaine other thing at the Romane Senates hand for all these allegations, but that the Senate sent Embassadors to the Samnites, to pray them to cease making warre upon the Campanians, the Romanes neighbours: Then the Campanians deputies said, Well (my masters) seeing you will not now defend us, against an unjust and tyrannous invasion, yet at the least defend that which is your owne, for we yeeld and give our selves to you, yea us and all that is ours. Then the Senate, taking title and foundation of this dedition, enterprised the defence of the Campanians, which otherwise without title they would never have enterprised.

And truly the saying of the emperor *Martian*, is verie memorable, and deserveth good observation, That a Prince ought never to move warre, whilest he could maintaine peace: as if he would say, That Armes ought not to be employed by a Prince, but in the defence of his countrey, and not to assaile another. And indeed, a man had need looke about him more than once before he moove warre, and well consider

*Tit. Livius*  
lib. 7. Dec. 1.

None may  
move warre  
without  
just title  
and cause.

*Pomp. Latini*  
in *Martian*.



consider and examine, if therein there be just cause, or no: for warres are easie to commence (as *M. Comines* saith) but verie uneasie to appease and finish. And upon this we read, That in the Senate of Rome there was once a very notable disputation betweene *Cato* (one esteemed the wisest of Rome) and *Scipio Nasica* (who was reputed the best man of Rome.) The matter was this: After the first Punicke warre, the Romanes made peace with the Carthaginians, by which peace was accorded, That the Carthaginians might not rig any ship of warre, nor move warre against the Romanes, or their allies. It came to passe a certaine time after this peace, that the Carthaginians gathered together many ships: which being reported at Rome, and the matter propounded in counsell in the Senate, *Cato* and many others reasoned, That warre should be made upon the Carthaginians, because they had gone from the treatie of peace, and that warre might justly be offered unto them, as breakers of peace. But *Scipio Nasica* was of a contrarie opinion, That there was yet no sufficient cause to make warre: for although the Carthaginians had gone against the peace, and violated their faith and promise; yet the Romanes received no offence or damage as yet: and therefore he was of advice, That the Carthaginians should be summoned to lay downe their armes, and untackle their ships, and observe peace, even in the articles which they had broken. The pluralitie of voices were of *Nasica* his opinion, and accordingly, men were sent to Carthage to summon them to obtemperate and obey the treatie of peace, and to repaire contraventions. They would doe nothing therein, but prepared themselves more to set upon *Masiniissa*, their allie and friend. Then (this comming to counsell in the Senate) all agreed, That there was just cause to move warre against the Carthaginians, seeing they had already begun to practise the same against *Masiniissa*, their allie and friend: but there also were diverse opinions, whether they should altogether ruinate from the top to the bottome the towne of Carthage, after they had taken it, or to let it still remaine a towne. *Cato* was of opinion, totally to ruinate and destroy it, because it could not be kept in any fidelitie, but would breake her faith & promise at the first occasion that offered it selfe. *Nasica* was of a contrarie advice, saying, It was good that Rome had alwaies an enemy, upon whom to make warre, that the Romane people might not be corrupt, and become cowards by too great peace and prosperitie, for want upon whom to make warre. The resolution of the Senat was in a meane betwixt these two opinions. For it was ordained, That the Carthaginians should be permitted to remove their towne into any other part tenne mile from the Sea. But the Carthaginians found so strange the removing of their towne, that they had rather suffer extreame things: insomuch, as by long warre they were wholly vanquished, and their towne altogether rased and made inhabitable.

Annales  
upon the  
yeare 1488.

Very memorable also to this purpose is the advice of the Chancellor *de Raibors*, who was in the time of king *Charles* the eight. For many counselling this young king to make war against *Frauncis* duke of Bretaine, to lay hold of his dutchies, the good Chancellor shewed, That the rights the king pretended to that Dukedome, were not yet well verified, and that it were good to seeke further into them, before war was attempted; for it should be the work of a tyrant to usurpe countries, which belong not to him. According to this advice, embassadors were sent to the duke, who then was at Remes, to send on his side, men of counsell, and the king would do so on his side, to resolve upon both their rights. This was done; and men assembled to that end: but in the meane while duke *Frauncis* died; and the king espoused *Made*  
dame

dame *Anne*, his daughter and heire, and so the controversie ended.

The same king enterprising his voyage of Naples, caused to assemble all his presidents of his courts of Parliaments, with his Chancellor, his privie Counsell, and the princes of his blood, to resolve upon his title and right to Naples and Sicilie. These lords being assembled, visited the genealogie and discent of the kings of Sicilie and Naples, and they found, that the king was the right heire of these kingdoms: so that upon that resolution this voyage was enterprised. Hereby is seene the vanitie of *Machiavell*, who presupposeth, That king *Charles* had enterprised that voiage to get all Italie, but that Fortune was not favourable unto him: for that was never his designe nor purpose; neither assailed he to seize upon any thing in Italie, but of certaine townes necessarie for his passage, in determination to yeeld them up againe at his departure, as he did. And if the king would have enterprised upon Italie, he had had a far more apparent title, than the magnificent *Lawrence de Medicis*, seeing all Italie was once by just title possessed by *Charlemaine*, king of France his predecessor. But this hath been alwayes a propertie in our kings, not to run over others grounds, not to appropriate to themselves any seignorie, which appertained not unto them by just title.

We reade also of *Charles* the fifth, called the Sage, that being incited by his nobilitie and people of Guienne, to seize againe that countrey which was occupied by the English. he would not enterprise it without great and good deliberation of good Counciell: and therefore he caused well to be viewed by wise and experienced people, the treatie of peace made at Bretaine, betwixt his dead father and the king of England; for that it was told him, that the king of England had not accomplished on his side that which he was bound to doe. After they had (as they thought) well resolved him of this point, yet he was not content to be satisfied himselfe, but would that his subjects should be also well resolved thereof, and especially such as were under the English obedience: and to that purpose he sent Preachers covertly into such good townes as were occupied by the English; insomuch, that readily by the Preachers inducements there were more than threescore townes and fortresses, which revolted from the Englishmen, and offered themselves unto the kings obeisance.

This then is a resolved point, That a Prince ought not to enterprise to obtaine a Countrey, where he hath no title, under colour to deliver the inhabitants thereof from tyrannie. But here may rise a question, If it be lawfull for a Prince to make war for Religion, and to constraine men to be of his Religion: hereupon to take the thing by reason, the resolution is very easie: For seeing that all Religion consisteth in an approbation of certaine points that concerne the service of God, certaine it is, that such an approbation dependeth upon the persuasion which is given to men thereof: but the means to persuade a thing to any man, is not to take weapons, to beat him, nor to menace him, but to demonstrate unto him by good reasons and allegations, which may induce him to a persuasion. But he that will decide this question by examples of our auncestors, he shall find divers to be for and against. For to reade our French hystories in the lives of *Clowis* the first, *Charlemaine*, and some other kings of France, it seemeth that their studie was altogether bent upon warre against Paynims, for nothing, but to make them become Christians, with handblowes and force of armes. But what Christians? Such, as when the Paynims were vanquished, and that they could no more resist, they were acquitted upon condition

Annales  
upon Anno  
1493.

Froiss. lib. 1.  
(ap. 245. 25.

If by warre  
any can be  
constrained  
to be of any  
Religion.

Annales  
upon Anno  
718.

to be baptized, without other instruction. And most commonly, as soone as they could againe gather strength, they returned to their Paynim Religion. And this is well shewed us by the hystorie of one *Rabbod*, duke of Fricse, who being upon the point to be baptized, and his clothes off, and having one foot in the font, hee demanded of the Archbishop of Sens, which should have baptized him, Whether there were more of his parents in Hell, or in Paradise? The Archbishop aunswered him, that the most must needs be in hell, because his predecessors were never baptized. Then the duke drawing his foot out of the water: Well, said he then, I will goe to hell with my parents and friends, and I will not be baptized to be seperated from them, and so he withdrew himselfe, denying to be baptized. Here I leave you to thinke if this man were well instructed in the Christian doctrine. It seemeth, that at that day, to be a Christian, it sufficed to be baptized, and commonly Paynims were baptized by force of armes.

We reade also, That our auncient kings of Fraunce made many voyages into Turkie and into Affrica for the augmentation of the Christian Religion, and to revenge (as they say) the death of our Lord Iesus Christ upon the Paynims and Infidels. But one time the Paynims themselves shewed them well, that they enterprised such warres by an inconsiderate zeale. For the armie of Fraunce (whereof the duke of Bourbon was cheefe) being in Affrica, making warre against the Infidels, in the time of king *Charles* the sixt, the captaine generall of the Turkes and Saracens sent an Herauld to the duke of Bourbon, to know wherefore he descended into Affrica to make warre upon them. The duke of Bourbon assembled the greatest lords of the Armie to resolve what answer to make to the Herauld. After, by the advice of all, it was answered, That they Christians made warre upon them, to revenge the death of Christ the sonne of God, and a true Prophet, which their generation had put to death and crucified. The Turkes understanding this answer, sent againe to the duke of Bourbon, and the lords of France, That they had by some received evill information upon that matter, for they were the Iewes which crucified Iesus Christ, and not their predecessors: and if the children must needs suffer for their auncestors faults, they should then take the Iewes, which were then amongst them, and upon them revenge the death of their Iesus Christ. Our Frenchmen knew not what to answer hereunto, yet they continued the warre, where was done no notable exploit, but by contagion of the aire they were constrained to returne, after they had lost the most part of their armie.

Likewise in the yeare 1453 the Pope having proclaimed a Croisado in Christendome, to run over Turkie, to avenge the death of our Lord Iesus Christ, and to constrain the Turkes to be christened: the Turke writ letters unto him, wherein he signified, that they were the Iewes which crucified Christ; and as for him, he descended not of the Iewes, but of the Trojans blood, whereof he understood the Italians were likewise descended; and that their dutie were rather, both the one, and the other, to restore rather the great Troy, and to avenge the death of *Heitor* their auncestor, against the Grecians, than to make warre one upon another; as for his part he was readie to doe, having alreadie subjugated the most part of Greece; and that he beleeveth, that Iesus Christ was a great Prophet, but that he never commanded (as he was given to understand) that men should beleieve in his Law by force and by armes, as also on his part, he so constrained no man to beleieve in the Law of *Mahomet*. Behold the substance of the Turkes letter to the Pope, which seemed to be



as well, yea, better founded upon reason than the Popes buls. For verily Iesus Christ would, that by preaching, his law should be received into the world, and not by force of armes.

In the time when Christendome was devided into Clementines and Vrbaniſts, by reason of a schisme of Popes, we may well presuppose, that the one thought the other to be altogether out of the way of saluation: and our hystorians say, That the one part called the other dogs, miscreants, infidels, &c. Their reason was, because they said, that as there was but one God in heaven, so there ought to be but one on earth: and the aforesaid Clementines held assuredly, That Pope *Clement* was the true god on earth, and Pope *Vrbane* the false god, and that the Vrbaniſts beleaved in a false god, and by consequent that they all strayed from the faith. For as no Religion can stand without beleaving in God, so esteemed they, that they which beleaved not in the true earthly god, were altogether without all religion, as dogs & miscreants: and our hystoriographers, which held that opinion as well as the other, said, That from that time the faith was shaken and readie to fall to the ground. The same opinion had the Vrbaniſts of the Clementines, as the Clementines had of the Vrbaniſts. We have before in another place, said, That under colour of this diversitie in religion, the king of England, who was an Vrbaniſt, enterprised to make warre upon the kings of Fraunce and Castile, Clementines. Likewise also the Clementines enterprised no lesse against the Vrbaniſts, yea, against the Pope *Vrbane* himselfe, whom they besieged in the towne of Perouse, where he was in great danger to have been taken, yet in the end he saved himselfe at Rome. The king of France determined to have passed into Italie, by warre to have destroyed the Vrbaniſts, but in the end he tooke another resolution, which was to cause the schisme to cease: so he caused to convocate a great and notable assembly in the towne of Rhemes in Campaigne, whither in person resorted the emperour *Sigismund*, and there a conclusion was made to exhort the two Popes to submit themselves to the new election of a Pope, wherein their right should be conserved unto them: and if they would not submit themselves thereunto, that the Christian Princes and their subjects should withdraw themselves from the obedience both of the one and the other. After this subtraction was made (because the said Popes would not obey the exhortation that was made) there was a new election of a Pope (in a Counsell held at Pise by the emperors and the kings authorities) called Pope *Alexander* the fift, a Frier minor, and the other two Antipopes were cursed, as is said in another place. And thus ceased the warres for Religion in all Christendome.

To this purpose also you must know, That during the said schisme of the Clementines and Vrbaniſts, the duke of Bretaine had peace with the king of Fraunce, and a great assembly was made betwixt them in the towne of Tours. The duke appearing there, some of the kings Counsell shewed him, that he was disobedient to the king, being of another religion than the king was (for the king was a Clementine, and the duke an Vrbaniſt) and it was not meet that the vassale should be of another Religion than his Soueraigne lord. The abovesaid duke answered wisely, That it could not bee called a rebellion or disobedience: for no man ought to judge of his conscience, but only God, who is the soveraigne & only judge of such a matter, and that he beleaved in Pope *Vrbane*, because his election was before Pope *Clement*s. Some of the kings Counsell, of the meanest sort, made a great matter of this diversitie of religion: but the dukes of Berrey and Bourgoigne, the kings Vn-

Froisf. lib. 2.  
cap. 132. 133.  
lib. 3. cap. 24.

Freisf. lib. 4.  
cap. 33.

cles, were of opinion, that it was not a sufficient point to stand upon, to put by an accord with the duke of Bretaine : insomuch, that following their advice, an accord was concluded, yea, a mariage of one of the kings daughters with the said duke of Bretaine.

This example and advice of these two good dukes, me thinks all Christian Princes should follow, and not cease to agree together for diversitie of Religion, but to remit the judgement thereof unto God, who alone can compound and agree the differences of the same. And not onely amongst Princes the bond of amitie ought not to bee broken, for difference of Religion : but also Princes ought not to use armes against their subjects, to force them unto Religion, but they ought to assay all other meanes, to demonstrate unto them by lively reasons their errors, and so bring them to a good way : and if it appeare not that their subiects doe erre and stray, they ought to maintaine them, and not persecute them at the instigation of flatterers and envious people. An example hereof is memorable of king *Lewis* the twelfth, who was called the Father of the people: For in his time certaine Cardinals and Prelates perswaded him to exterminate and utterly to root out all the people of Cabriers and Merindol in Province (which were the reliques of the Christians, called Albi, then sore persecuted for Christ) telling him, That they were soceters, incestuous persons, and heretikes. They of Merindol and Cabriers having some knowledge of the said accusation, sent certaine of their wisest men to demonstrate to the king their justice and innocencie. As soone as these men were arrived at the Court, the said Cardinals and Prelates did what they could to hinder that they should not be heard, and indeed told the king, that he ought not to heare them, because the Cannon Law holds, That men ought not to give audience to heretikes, nor communicate with them. The king replied, That if he had to make warre upon the Turke, yea, against the divell himself, he would heare them. This was an answer worthie of a king. For seeing kings hold in their hands the scepter of justice, this is not to use, but to abuse, To condemne any, and not to heare them. The said king *Lewis* then hearing the said messengers of Cabriers and Merindol, they shewed him in all humilitie, that their people received the Gospell, the Bible, and the Apostles Creed, the Commaundements of God, and the Sacraments, but they beleevved not in the Pope, nor in his doctrine: and that if it pleased his Majestie to send to enquire of the truth of their speeches, they were contented all to die, if their words were not found true: This good king would needs know if it were so, and indeed deputed *M. Adam Fumee*, his master of Requests, and one *M. Parvi*, a Iacobin, his Confessor, to go to Cabriers and Merindol, to enquire of the life and Religion of the inhabitants in those places, which they did: and after they had seene and knowne all, they made their report unto the king, That in those places their children were baptized, they taught them the articles of the Faith, and the Commandements of God; that they well observed their Sabbathos, alwaies preaching thereon the word of God: and as for sorceries and whoredomes, there were none amongst them: moreover, they found no Images in their Temples, nor ornaments of the Masse. The king having received this report, what judgement gave he of it? did he condemne them straight, because they had no Images nor ornaments of the Masse? No, he presently swearing by his oth, pronounced, That they were better men than he or all his people. Here may Princes learne how to use themselves, in supporting against slanderers, such, in whom there is no appearance of error.

*Molinetus de  
la Monar-  
chia des  
Francois.  
Anno 155.*

But

But leaving this question, and againe taking our purpose: certaine it is, That a Prince ought not lightly to attempt warre (as *Machiavell* perswadeth) and upon some necessitie, having warre in hand, he ought to search out and accept all honest conditions to get out of it. For sometimes the Prince which refuseth honest and reasonable conditions, upon hope that his forces are great, falleth oftentimes into great distresse: and it hath been many times seene, that pettie captaines have made head against great and strong powers of mightie Princes.

In the time of the battaile of Poitiers, where king *John* was taken, the Prince of Wales before the battaile, offered the king to yeeld him all that both hee and his people had conquered since his departure from Bourdeaux, & also to yeald him all the pillage: but the king would not accept this offer, but withall asked, that the prince and foure of the greatest lords of the armie should yeeld themselves at his will. The Prince (who was generous) chose rather to fight it out, than to accept so shamefull and dishonorable an accord; so hee and his army fought valiantly, insomuch that a very little number of English, overcame great forces of the French, and the king was taken, and many other great princes and lords; which to redeeme, the kingdome was so emptied of silver, that they were compelled to make mony of leather, which in the middest had onely a note of silver: and from this battaile proceeded infinite evils, miseries, and calamities, which had not happened if the king had beene so well advised, as to have forgone that war by soft and assured meanes, rather than by the hazard of the battaile. But contrary to king *John*, king *Charles* the seaventh, reconquering Guienne and Normandie upon the English, never refused any proffer or composition, fought alwaies to recover that which his predecessors had justly lost, without effusion of blood.

The Romane histories are full of such like examples: For that which overthrew the Carthaginians, the king *Perseus*, the king *Mithridates*, that which abated the pride of *Philip* king of *Macedon*, of that great king *Antiochus*, and of many others, was, they could never accept the good and reasonable conditions of peace which was offered unto them by the Romanes, but would rather experiment, what force, founded upon a good right could doe; I say founded upon good right, because a small force which hath right with it, oftentimes abateth a great force, which is not founded on a good right: the reason is evident, because, hee that knoweth hee hath just cause to make war, and which seeth that his adversary, trusting much in his forces, will not come to any reasonable composition, redoubleth his courage, and fighteth more valiantlie than he which is driven thereunto, rather upon pride than of any generositie of heart; but the principall reason thereof is, that God, who giveth victories, inclineth most often to the right side, and although sometimes it seemes that the wrong carrieth away the victorie, yet alwaies God shewes by the end and issue, (according to which we must judge) that he is for the right.

Above all, the Prince ought to appease the warres in his owne countrey, whether they be raised by strangers, or by his owne subjects: for, as for such warres as he may have in a strange land against strangers, it may happen they will not prove so evill, but he may provide good souldiers in his need: And especiallie this point is considerable, when a Princes subjects are naturallie inclined to warre (as is the French nation) for then necessarily, they must be employed in that wherein is their naturall disposition, or else they will move warre against themselves, as *Salust* saith in these words, If (saith he) the vertue & generositie of Princes, captaines, and men of warre, might

A Prince ought to seeke all meanes to put out war by a peace.

*Freislar. lib. 1. cap. 161. Annales upon Anno 1356. Annales upon Anno 1433.*

A Prince ought to appease war in his owne countrey.



might so well be employed, and shew it selfe of such estimate in peace as in warre, humane things would carrie themselves more constantly, and men should not see such changes of one estate into another, nor all things mixed in a confusion as we see. Therefore a strange warre in a strange countrey, seemeth not to be verie damageable, but some thing necessarie, to occupie and exercise his subjects: but domestike and civile warres, must needs be shunned and extinguished with all our power, for they be things against the right of nature, to make warre against the people of their countrey, as he that doth it against his owne entrails: Therefore saith *Homer*:

*Iliad. 9.*

*Right wicked are those men which love not parents deare:  
Sottish no lesse are they which familie do have:  
But most ungodly they their Countrey which do feare  
Wish civile warres, so dreifull to a quiet state.*

The Prince also ought to consider, that by civile warres, he more weakneth himselfe and his subjects in one year, than by a strange warre he can do in thirty yeares: civile wars also are without comparison, more ruinous and dangerous than strange warres are.

*Lib. 3. Dec. 1.  
Dionis. Halic. lib. 8.*

To this purpose is there in *Titus Livius*, a notable oration made by the Romane deputies, unto *Marcus Coriolanus*, which was unjustly banished from Rome, and who yeilded himselfe to the Volsques, enemies of the Romanes, & was elected capitaine of the Volsques, to make war upon his country: for as he laied siege to Rome, there were sent to him in ambassage, five great Romane lords, whereof some were his parents, and all his friends, the one of which, called *Marcus Minutius* spoke thus for them all: We are not ignorant deere lord and friend, that great wrong hath been done unto you at Rome, to banish and drive you from your countrey, for which you have done so much, and so many times so well fought for it, that you may be accounted as a second father or founder: we know well also that by good right you are grieved & despighted against us, for so unjust a judgement and wrong as is done you: for naturally he that is injured, is watchfull against him that injureth him. Yet we cease not to mervaille, that with reason you discern not them upon whom you may justly take revenge, from them which have done you no evill nor outrage, but you indifferently repute for enemies, as much the culpable as the innocent, your friends as them that hate you: which doing, you violate the inviolable lawes of nature, you confound right and wrong, equitie & iniquitie, yea you forget your self so much, as you make warre upon your selfe, in so doing upon your blood. We which are your friends, & of the ancientest Patricians, are sent hither, by your countrey and ours, to complaine in her name, for that you violate naturall right, & to pray you to cease from this warre, and to hearken unto a good peace, offering to agree unto you, all that shal be to your honour and utilitie: We confesse that great wrong hath been done you, in your banishment; but who hath done it unto you? The people (say you) gave the voice for my condemnation. True it is, we can not deny it, but all the people is but one voice, although the most part were against you; they then which have given their voices for your absolution, do they merit that you shold make war upon them, as heretikes? And we Senators, which have been so sorrowfull at your evill, ought you account us as your enemies? But women and children, what have they done unto you? must needs so many innocents fall into perill and danger to be slaine,

slaine, pill'd and sacked, that have done you no wrong, but rather favoured you. If we demand of you, wherefore you would rase and destroy our goodly buildings, framed by our auncestors, where are the statues and images of their victories and triumphes? and wherefore will you abolished their memories? what can you answer? assuredly you can have no colour to doe this thing, unlesse you will say, that friends and enemies, culpable and innocents, dead and living, ought equally to suffer vengeance for the injurie was done you: a thing unmeet to be done, yea to be thought on by a man that hath never so little reason. You should consider (deere Lord and friend) the inconstancie of the affaires of this world, the mutabilitie of mens spirits, and so excuse the misfortune which hapneth unto you, to our great griefe, and accept an honourable returne into your countrey, which desireth you, that for it you may continue to imploy your vertue, as you have done in times past: by this meanes shal you leave after you, a good and holic reputation of your vertue, to your posteritie, and if you doe otherwise, you shall leave after your death a remembrance, that you were an enemy, a sacker and ruiner of your poore countrey, where you were borne, and where you have been tenderly and honourably nourished: yet more there is, that so long as you live, you shall be an horror and execration to all the world, yea even to the Volques, which are now your friends, yea all the world will flie your companie as a theefe or robber. We therefore pray you (deere Lord and friend) that you will forget the injurie, that you have unjustlie received, and accept an happie, healthfull, and honourable returne into your countrey, into your house, where your poore Mother is, your deere wife, your friends, and deere children, which extremely weepe and lament your absence, and especially since it was made knowne unto them, that you come with a strong hand to put them to the edge of the sword as well as others. After these ambassadours had thus spoken, there was yet sent to *Coriolanus*, *Veturia*, his mother, & *Volumnia* his wife, carrying in their armes his liule children, accompanied with a great number of noble women. When *Coriolanus* see arive in his campe these embassadours, and after his mother and wife, houlding his little children in their armes, were fallen downe on their knees weeping, then nature forced, and burst that hard and obdinate courage of his, so that straight a peace was made, and he ceased to warre upon his countrey.

If wee know not what mischiefes and calamities, come of civile warres, there might be many examples set down therof, but alas we French men know too much thereof, and yet many are enhardned to persevere therein, and they cannot bow their hard courage to desist from ruinating and warring against their mother and countrey. This Paynim *Coriolanus*, may make them ashamed, who did not persevere in making war upon his countrey, although his courage were rude and full of vengeance, but suffered himselfe to be vanquished by reason: but they make warre in a contrary course, not making any accompt either of reason, love, or pietie, that they ought all to have towards their countrey, parents, and friends, letting loose the bridle to their passions and vengeance, bursting, ruinating, massacring, sleying, pilling and destroying from top to bottome, their parents, friends, fellow-citizens & neighbours, and generally all our poore countrey, which our poore auncestors left us so rich & flourishing. I know well, that every one laieth the fault upon his adversary, & that every one saith, that he it is which fighteth for his countrey, which they of the contrary part will needs ruinate: but easie it is to judge (for him whose judgement is free of passion) who is in the wrong, for they seeke not anothers mans, who de-

demand but their owne, and that the kingdome be reformed by their owne Lawes, and brought into her auncient splendour and renowne, can they be called enemies of the country? Is there any thing in the world that is more ours than our soule, our conscience, and our lives? That is true (will some Messier say) you may have assurance of your lives, every one also may have libertie of his conscience, but to speake of reformation, is treason. Yea, but what assurance of life will be given us: even an assurance, that shall be under the safeguard and protection of the first wicked man which will conspire a massacre, who shall be invited to enterprise it by the impunitie of former massacres. What libertie of conscience can we have, unlesse it be of *Machiavels* religion, that is to say, to be without Religion, without pietie, without the power of a franke and free conscience to serve God? Call you it libertie of conscience to be without Religion, or without exercise of Religion? nay, it is rather a verie slavish servitude. But if it be treason to speake of reforming abuses and corruptions which are in the kingdome, it followeth, that they are guiltie of treason, which procure and purchase the Commonwealth, against which both reason and all lawes do pronounce. If therefore the world at this day esteeme enemies of their country, such as seeke nothing but the good thereof, and that they may have left them their soules, consciences, and lives; God and his veritie shall have the victorie, and cause them that come after us to judge otherwise.

Although the horrors and calamities of civile warres are sufficiently knowne in this time, yet will I breiefely rehearse two most notable examples. The civile warre which was in the Romane empire, betwixt *Marius* and *Silla*, was an horrible and fearfull butcherie, which filled Rome and all Italie with blood. For both of them were masters of Rome, and all Italie, one after another; and so being, they did not cease all they could to kill and massacre one anothers friends and partakers: infomuch, that in a manner all men of qualitie and all good people were slain: for there was no notable man, but he held of the one or the other. Amongst other memorable things happening in this warre, this especially concerneth our cause in hand, which fell in the battaile that *Pompeius* the Lieueuant of *Silla*, obtained against *Cinna* the partner of *Marius*: for one of *Pompeius* souldiers having stroken dead to the ground one of *Cinna* his souldiers, hee disarmed him, thinking to spoile him of all he had, but then finding him to be his owne brother, this poore souldier fell in a great rage, and almost to a madnesse, that he had so slaine his owne brother: yet straight he caused a great fire of wood to be made, to turne his brothers bodie into ashes, after the manner of the Paynims then: and making great lamentations and sorrowfull exclamations, he laid his brothers bodie upon the wood, then he put fire unto it, and as soone as it was well kindled, he cast himselfe into the fire also, and was burned with his brothers bodie: infomuch, as death united the ashes of those two brethren, which the civile warres had disunited. But yet a far worse and greater civile warre happened soone after betwixt *Pompeius* and *Caesar*, and it endured and continued all the time of the Triumvirate of *Octavius*, *Antonius*, and *Lepidus*, against *Caesius* and *Brutus*, and ended betwixt *Antonius* and *Octavius*. This warre endured two and thirtie yeares, and spread it selfe almost through all the world, which then was in subjection to the Romane empire; yea, even the people of the East, West, North, and South, felt their greivous part of this civile warre. It was verified, That in this unnaturall civile warre from the beginning, till the fourth Consulship of *Caesar* only, there died of the

citizens

Florus lib. 79

Florus lib. 120.

Plutarke  
in Caesar



citizens of Rome, the number of one hundred and seventie thousand. And you may very well beleve, that many were after slaine; also, that tenne times as many died in so many Provinces as belonged to the Romane Empire: insomuch, as these detestable wars swallowed up many millions of men. But the Triumvirate of *Octavius*, *Antonius*, and *Lepidus*, was a most detestable union, which accorded to take unto them, all the government of the Common-weale, and to slay all their enemies. But because it often came to passe, that he which was friend of one of the three, was the others enemy, when one would have him slaine as an enemy, the other would lay hold of him to defend him as his friend; yet the abovesaid crueltie so surmounted all humanitie, and the desire of vengeance so vanquished all amitie, that these aforesaid captaines entred into this detestable complot, that they sold their friends one to another, to have an enemy in exchange: as that wicked *Antonius* to have *Cicero* his enemy (whom *Octavius* favoured as his friend) was contented in exchange to deliver his owne uncle by the mothers side, called *Lucius Caesar*, to *Octavius* his enemy; so that the one was exchanged for the other, and they both died. Can there possibly in the world be conspired a more barbarous disloyaltie? Is it not a strange thing to heare, that a friend should be betrayed to death, to have that cruell pleasure to slay his enemy? Yet by this course and complot died an hundred and thirtie Senators, besides many other persons of other qualitie. *Antonius* also the deviser of this barbarous exchange, received his due reward even by *Octavius* himselfe, whom he had induced to commit such cruelties. For in the end they were enemies, and *Antonius* being vanquished in the navall battaile at Actium, slew himselfe, so turning upon and against himselfe that barbarous crueltie which he had exercised against *Cicero* and others.

And it needs not seeme strange, if these civile warres of Rome endured so long time, as two and thirtie yeares: for the civile wars betwixt the houses of Burgoigne and Orleans in France, endured threescore yeares, being continued from father to sonne for two generations. And as for cruelties, me thinkes greater cannot be imagined, than them which the Parisians (the duke of Burgoignes partners) committed within the towne of Paris. For they massacred the Constable and Chancellor of France, whom they drew and trayled through the town most filthily, and murdered also many other great Lords, Archbishops, Bishops, Prelates, and more than three thousand other persons, as well gentleman as other notable people, which by force they drew out of prisons to murder and massacre them as they did. The captaine of the commons, which committed those barbarous inhumanities, was called *Cappeluche* the executioner or hangman of Paris. Those companions of the house of Burgoigne, not contented to suscite such popular commotions and firs in France, brought also the English men into France; which were like to have been masters thereof: yet not herewith content, they caused king *Charles* the sixt to war against his owne son, who after was called *Charles* the seventh, and one moitie of the kingdom against another. And not to leave behind any kind of crueltie, no not towards the dead; they caused to be spread and published all over France, certaine Popes bulls, whereby they indicted and excommunicated all the house of Orleans and his partakers both quick and dead; insomuch, as when there died any in the hands of the partners of Burgoigne, either by ward, prison, or disease, they buried them not in the earth, but caused their bodies to be carried to dunghills, like carrion; to be devoured of wolves and savage beasts. What could they have done more, to the

*Monstr. lib. 1*  
ca. 78, 80, 81,  
159, 191, &  
198.

execu-

execution of all barbarousnesse and crueltie: Behold what fruits civile warres do bring: wee see it even at this day with our eyes: for there is no kind of crueltie, barbarousnesse, impietie, and wickednesse, which civile warres have not brought into use.

The Prince then that is wise, will leave nothing undone, to appease civile warres under his owne government, but will spend all his care, power, and diligence, to hinder it, after the example of that good and wise king *Charles* the seventh, and king *Lewis* the eleventh, his sonne. *Charles* the seventh being yet Daulphin, the duke *John* of Bourgoigne, a man verie ambitious and vindicative, after by secret practise he had caused to be slaine *Lewis* duke of Orleance, the onely brother of king *Charles* the sixt, and after hee had filled the kingdome with warres both civile and strange, contented not himselfe herewith, but laid hold of the king (who by a sicknesse was alienated of his wits) and of the Queene, to make warre upon the Daulphin. These occasions seemed sufficient to such as then governed the Daulphin, and at last to the Daulphin himselfe (being yet very yong) to enterprise an hazardous blow. He then sent to the said Duke, that hee would make a peace with him, and prayed him they might appoint a place and day together to meet for that purpose. The day was appointed, & the place assigned at Montean-faut-Yonne, whither the said duke came under the trust of the word of the Daulphin his faith and assurance. As soone as he arrived, making his reverence unto *Monsieur le Daulphin*, he was compassed in and straight slaine, and withall also certaine gentlemen of his traine. *Philip* sonne and successor of this duke *John*, tooke greatly to heart this most villanous death of his father, and sought all the meanes he could to be revenged, which still continued the civile warres. This mean while the English did what they could in France, & conquered Normandie, Paris, the most part of Picardie, and marched even unto Orleance, which they besieged. The abovesaid king *Charles* the sixt, died, so that *Monsieur le Daulphin* his son (who was called *Charles* the seventh) comming to the crown, and finding himselfe despoiled of the most part of his kingdome, inso much, as in mockerie he was generally called the king of Bourges. This wise king well considered, That if civile warres endured, he was in the way to loose all, one peece after another: he therefore laid all his care, power, and diligence, to obtaine a peace and an accord with the duke of Burgoigne. Therefore he sent in embassage unto him, his Constable, Chancellor, and others his cheefe Counsellors, to say, that he desired to have peace with him, and that he well acknowledged, that by wicked counsel he had caused his father duke *John* to be slaine at Montrean, and that if he had been then as advised and resolute as he was at that present, hee would never have committed such an act, nor have permitted it to have been done, but he was young, and evil counselled: and therefore in that regard he offered to make him such amends and reparation thereof, as he should be contented therewith, yea, that he would demand pardon (although not in person) yet by his ambassadors, which should have expressed charge thereof) and prayed him to forgive that fault in the name of our Lord Iesus Christ, that betwixt them two there might be a good peace and love: for he confessed to have done evil, being then a young man of little wit and lesse discretion, by bad counsell so to sleie his father. And besides this, he offered to give him many great lands & seignories, as the Countie de Mâconnois, Si Langon, the Countie de Auxerre, Bar sur Seine, la Countie de Boloigne, Sarmer, and divers other lands: and that during his life he would acquite him and his subjects of personall service, which he

ought

*Monstr lib. 2*  
ca. 175, 180,  
181, 182,  
183, 186,  
187.

ought him as vassale of Fraunce, & yet made many other faire offers unto him. This duke *Philip* seeing his soveraigne prince thus humiliate himselfe to him, bowed his courage, justly exasperated for his fathers death, & harkened unto peace, which was made at Arras, where there was held an assembly of the embassadors of al Christian princes, of the counsell of Basil, & of the pope; in so much, as there were there above 4000. horses. Al or the most part of those embassadors came thither for the good of the king & his kingdom, but there was not one there which found not the kings offers good and reasonable, as also did all the great princes & lords of the kingdom, & all the kings counsell: so that his majesties embassadors (which were the duke of Bourbon, the count of Richemont, constable of France, the archbishop of Rheims, chancellor, the lord de Fayette, marshal, & many other great lords) in a full assembly in the king their masters name, demanded pardon of the duke of Burgoign for his fathers death, confessing (as above said) that the king their master had done evil, as one young & of litle wit, following naughtie counsell, therfore they praied the duke to let passe away all his evill will, & so to be in a good peace & love with the king their master. And the duke of Burgoign declared, that he pardoned the king for the honor & reverence of the death & passio of our Lord Iesus Christ, & for compassion of the poor people of the kingdom of France, & to obey the counsels reasons, the pope & other Christian princes, which praied him. Moreover, besides the aforesaid things, it was accorded to the said duke, that justice & punishment should be done upon all such as had slaine his father, and of such as had given the Dauphin counsell to cause his slaughter, & that the king himselfe should make diligent search through al his realm to apprehend them. Here may you see how king *Charles* appeased the evile wars of his kingdom by humilitie & acknowledgement of his faults: & from thence forward he prospered so wel, that after he had ended his civile wars, he also overcame his forrein wars against the English. And this came of God, who ordinarily exalteth the humble, & overthroweth the insolent & proud. For assuredly it doth not evill become a great prince to temperat his maiesty by a gracious humilitie, softnes, & affabilitie: but (saith *Plutarck*) it is a very harmonious & consonant temperatio, yea, so excellent, as there cannot be a more perfect than this. But if the said king had then had such counsellors as many kings now a dayes have, what counsell would they hereupon have given him; they would have said: That thus to humiliate himselfe to his vassal, as to ask him forgiveness, to cōfesse his fault, to acquit him & his subjects of personal service, these were things unworthy of a king: & that a K. ought never to make peace, unlesse it be to his honor, but such articles were to his dishonor & disadvantage, & that he ought to have endured al extremities, before he had made any peace, wherby he should not remaine altogether master, to dispose of persons & goods at his pleasure. For how would not they say thus, seeing they say at this day, That it is no honorable peace for the king to accord his subjects any assurance for the exercises of their religion, & a reformatio of justice: yet you see, that al K. *Charles*, his counsell, all the princes of his blood, all the great lords of his kingdom, all strange princes embassadors, compelled the king to passe more hard & unreasonable articles to digest, for the good of peace. Shuld we say, that in so great a nūber of great personages, there was not any so wise & cleare sighted as the counsellors at this day, these Messieurs Machiavelists: nay contrary, they were all wise men & of great experience, they were also of great knowledg, as the delegats of the counsell of the university of Paris, & of the parliaments, wheras at this day, men know little more than their *Machiavel*



De Com lib.  
1. cap. 3. 5. &  
others.

Likewise king *Lewis* the eleventh, as soone as he came to the crowne, removed from charges and offices, many great lords, and good servants, of the dead king *Charles* the seventh his father, which had veriuously employed themselves, in chasing the English out of the kingdome of France; and in lieu of such persons, he placed and advanced men of meane and base condition. Hereupon straight arose civile discention against the king, (which was called the warres of the common weale) & these men complained that the kingdome was not politikely governed, because the king had put from him good men, and of high calling, to advance such as were of small estimation, and of no vertue. It was not long before the king acknowledged his great fault, and confessed it, not onely in general, but also in particular to every of them, which he had recoyled and disappointed: and to reparaire this fault, hee got againe to him all the said lords, and antient servants of the dead king his father, delivering them againe their estates, or much greater: and in summe he granted to these common wealth people, all that they demaunded, as well for the generall, as for the particular good of all people, and all to obtaine peace, with extinguishment of civile warres. If he had had of his Counsell the Machiavelists of these dayes, they would not have counselled him thus to do, but rather would have told him, that it became not a king to capitulate with his subjects, nor so to disable himselfe unto them, and, that a prince ought never to trust to such as once were his enemies, but much lesse ought he to advance them to estates, and that he should diligently take heed of a reconciled enemy: yet notwithstanding he did all this, and it fell out well with him, for he was very well served, of the pretended reconciled enemy: and to this purpose *Messier de Commynes* his chamberlaine, saith, That his humilitie, and the acknowledgement of his faults, saved his kingdome, which was in great danger to be lost, if he had staid upo such impertinēt & foolish reasons, as these Machiavelists alledge: for all things may not be judged by the finall cause. What dishonour then can it be to a prince, to use pettie and base means, if so be thereby he make his country peaceable, his estate assured, and his subjects contented and obedient: what makes it matter, for him that is to ascend into an high place, whether he mount by degrees and staires of wood, or of stone, so that he ascend?

Peace  
ought to  
be well  
observed.

But this is not all, to say, That a prince ought to be vigilant and carefull to make peace in his countrey; for he must after it is made, well observe it, otherwise it is to no purpose made: unlesse men will say, that one ought to make peace, for (after in breaking it) to trap and ensnare them which trust therein. But they which hold this opinion, are people which make no account of the observation of faith, as are the Machiavelists, of whom wee will speake upon this point, in another Maxime. But indeed, that a peace may be well observed, it must bee profitable and commodious to them with whom it is made, to the end by that meanes it may bee agreeable unto them, and that they may observe it with a good will, and without constraint: for if it be damageable and disadvantageous, making the condition of them, to whom it is given, worse than of other subjects and neighbours; certaine it is, it cannot long endure: for people that have either heart or spirit in them, cannot long endure to be handled like slaves.

Titus 1. 1.  
Lib. 8. Dec. 2.

Hereunto serveth the advise of that noble and sage companie, of the auntient Senators of Rome. There was a neighbour unto the Romans, which were called the Privernates, upon which the Romanes made warre, and many times vanquished them. They seeing it was impossible any more to make warre against the Romanes forces,

forces, sent embassadors to Rome for peace: they were caused to enter into the place where the Senate did sit, & because they had not well observed the precedent treatie of peace, some Senators seemed hard to be drawne to give their cause any hearing, thinking it a vaine thing to accord a peace unto such as would not keepe any: notwithstanding, some demanded of those embassadors, what punishment they judged themselves to have merited, which had so often broke the precedent peace. One of them speaking for all, and remembring rather the condition of their birth, than of their present estate, answered, That the Privernates merited the punishment, that they deserve, which esteeme themselves worthy of a free condition, and which have a slavish condition. This answer seemed to some Senators, too haucie, & unbecoming vanquished people, yet the president of the assembly (who was a wise man) benignly demanded of them, if they were pardoned the invasion of the former peaces, and if now they had a new peace granted them, how they would observe it? The same embassador, with such like hautinesse of heart as before, If said he, yee will give us a good peace, we will faithfully and perpetually observe it, but if you give us an evill peace, it will not hold long. Some of the Senators disdained and disliked this answer, saying they spoke too proudly, and as it were alreadie to threaten a revoult, and that it did not becom a vanquished people, to carry such high minds: but the wisest and discreetest part of the Senat, thought not this answer evill or impertinent, but that this embassador spake like a franke and free man, and that men should not find it strange, if every man detained in servitude, would be remitted into his naturall libertie, as soone as he can, and hath meanes for his purpose: and therefore resolutely they conclude, That the Privernates must have such a peace, as to bee received Romane citizens, enioying the same liberties and priviledges, that they of the towne of Rome did. This was performed, and very notable is the reason of their motive: For, say they, there is the peace loyall and assured, where men do willingly appease themselves, and a man cannot looke or hope for an assured peace, where men are brought to a slavish subjection.

Here is also to bee marked, the advice and opinion of *Titus Livius*, dictator, which he spake in a full Senat, upon that which the Latins demanded, that the treatie of peace, that they had with the Romans, might be confirmed unto them, which notwithstanding they themselves had broken, in rebelling against the Romanes, and being vanquished: Masters (said he) my advice is, that wee ought to use kindly and moderately, the victorie which wee have had against the Latines: for it is the most excellent praise that can come, either to publike or private persons, not to suffer themselves to be corrupted by prosperitie, but to know how to use that is good, with a modest and equal courage; because all prosperities are accompanied with envy, yea although they come to oppresse the vanquished, that make no resistance. Moreover we ought not, so much to trust in fortune, which is too inconstant and mutable (as wee have many times experimented) and therefore ought not to constrain our adversaries to come to the last remedie, that is dispaire, which often elevateth the heart, yea and often the fortune: we have cause also to feare the evil grace and disfavour, of such as we would command, which should come to passe, if wee should alwaies shew our selves rude, and sharpe towards such as we find faulty. For our ancestors have not obtained the seigniory & domination, which they have left us, by shewing themselves sharp & rigorous, but rather by appearing gentle, benign and easie to pardon: moreover, we must consider, that nature hath given all men

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*Dionysius  
Halic. lib. 6.*

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" a desire of libertie, inſomuch as the faults which men commit, being drawn on with  
 " deſire, are greatly to be excuſed, & he that would puniſh them, which deſire a good  
 " thing, certainly it were the next way to overthrow all good order, and to bring in  
 " amongſt men a confuſion, to murder and ſley one another. Finally (maſters) wee  
 " muſt conſider, that the beſt and moſt firme domination, is that, whereby ſubjects  
 " are more detained by good deeds in obedience, than that whereby they are contain-  
 " ed in their duties by puniſhments: for a good will and well liking accompanieth  
 " the one, & feare the other; but whatſoever is feared, is alſo naturally hated: we muſt  
 " alſo imitate our anceſtors, which made themſelves great in building of townes, not  
 " in ruinating them; in drawing their neighbours into their citie, not in ſlaying them.  
 " I therefore conclude, that wee ought to renew and confirme to the Latins, the trea-  
 " tie of peace. This opinion of dictator *Largius*, was ſeconded by *Servius Sulpitius*,  
 " who reaſoned next after him, and generally by all the Senat, as full of all reaſon and  
 " equitie. And if at this day, men be governed by reaſon, certaine it is, that that opini-  
 " on of *Largius*, ſhould be ſufficient to ſhew to any prince, that to have a good and  
 " durable peace, hee ought to grant ſuch a one, as men will willingly obſerve, which  
 " will bee done, when thereby ſhall bee accorded a reaſonable libertie, under a good  
 " aſſurance.

Affurances  
 of peace.

And as for aſſurance of peace, the elders in ſtrange warres, were wont to uſe ho-  
 ſtages, but the principall bonds there, was publike faith and oth, whereof wee ſhall  
 ſpeake in another place: as for civile warres, they had ſome other particular meanes  
 beſides faith and oth; for they beſtowed offices of charge, and publike eſtates, upon  
 ſome of them on the other partie, if not equally, yet ſo juſtly as they could to con-  
 tent both the one and the others. This often happened at Rome, the commons of  
 the third Eſtate, being oppreſſed of the greateſt and richeſt, for which cauſe there a-  
 roſe up oftentimes popular inſurrection: Then the meanes they uſed to appeaſe  
 ſuch ſtirres, was almoſt ordinarily to receive them of the third Eſtate, to the conſul-  
 ſhip, or to be cenſor, prieſt, or Prator, or to other offices; inſomuch as in the end all  
 offices and Eſtates, were open to all ſorts of people, without diſtinction of nobles, or  
 baſeſt trades, onely regarding their vertue & good reputation, which alwaies carried  
 away the prize, until they which were rich, began to buy the voices of election. And  
 truly it ſeemeth, that when they of the one partie ſee themſelves rejected from the  
 eſtates & charges of the body of the commonwealth (whereof they are members) &  
 that they are rebutted & eſtranged as ſuſpected perſons, that thereby they have juſt  
 occaſion to diſtruſt themſelves, as other men put no truſt in them. And to this pur-  
 poſe, the anſwere of *Brutus* is well to be marked (for ſuch as were of the third eſtate  
 in Rome) to the delegates and embaſſadors of the nobles and Patricians. Maſters,  
 (ſaith he) they of the third eſtate in Rome, know well that you lords Patricians are  
 indeed men of your word, and that for nothing you will contradict your promiſes,  
 as we never knew you did; and that you will very well obſerve towards them, all that  
 you promiſe, without any need of other aſſurance, than your faith and oth: but  
 they doe farther conſider, that after you which at this preſent doe governe, they  
 which ſucceed will not obſerve that which you have promiſed, but will enterprize  
 to handle the people tyrannouſly: And therefore there remains but one ſole  
 aſſurance to the moſt weake, which feare them which are ſtronger than themſelves;  
 namely, to find means, that the ſtrongeſt may not hurt them, when they would: for  
 ſo long as there remains any meanes to hurt, there will never want will in the wicked

Transſer-  
 pt of the 6.



ked to execute. After that *Brutus* had uttered this speech to the embassadours, the Senat found it was founded upon reason, and they accorded to the people of the third estate, magistrates which were called Tribunes of the people. These had the charge to defend the common people, against great men, with power to imprison all such as seemed good unto them, and this magistracy proved very profitable, whilest they used it well, but as soone as they abused it, it fell out to be very pernicious; so is it of all other offices.

To demonstrate, that men cannot keepe a peace, when thereby they are handled like slaves, the example of the Saguntines is very notable, & admirable. The Saguntines a people of Spaine, were besieged by *Annibal* of Carthage, who held them so straightly in their city, that they had no meane left to escape or resist. They being reduced to this extremity, *Annibal* sent them word by one of his nation called *Alorcus* to yeeld themselves to save their lives. For courages (said he) must needs be vanquished, when forces failed: and *Annibal* would save their liues, if they would yeeld to him, and of his grace would deale well with them. These poore people well considered the extreame daunger wherein they were, and that they had no meane to escape *Annibal* his hands, but with yeelding unto him: and to yeeld they should change their free, into a servile condition, which they feared so much, as they chose rather to lose their lives; therefore resolved so to deale, as nether their bodies nor their goods should ever come into the power of *Annibal*. So they tooke choyce of certaine yong men of the towne, which they caused to sweare, to defend the gates of the towne, even to the death; that in the meane while the other townes-people, might have leasure to execute their determination: after this the chiefe of the town resorted to the common market place, and there caused to be laid on a heape, all the goods and treasures of the towne, and about it to light a great fire, within which many cast themselves, and were burned, least they should fall into *Annibals* hands, others shut themselves up in their houses, with their wives and children, after putting fire thereunto, burnt the said houses, themselves, & their goods; & the said yong men, which were trusted with the gates, made an end of fighting and living together. Was not here (thinke you) an admirable love of libertie? for if they would but a while have lived under *Annibal* his yoke, there had beene hope that the Romanes their allies, would have delivered them; but yet they rather tooke choice, to lose their lives, yea, and that by a most strange and cruell death, than to suffer for a small time, a servile subiection under *Annibal*.

But as it is rare and unlikely, that a servile peace should bee long and well observed; so it is a very great fault, to breake a peace when it is sufficiently commodious and tollerable. This was the onely cause of the totall ruine of that great & flourishing commonwealth of the Carthaginians: for after they had many times broken the treatise of peace which they had with the Romanes, and had beene many times vanquished; in the end they were altogether destroyed, and their towne rased: and the cause that moved the Romanes thus to do, was, for that they considered that the Carthaginians would never observe faith nor promise they made, which alreadie so many times they had violated, especially since they were not at any time bound to any hard condition of peace, but onely hindered to rebell or waxe great.

But the example of king *Philip* of Macedon, and of *Perseus* his sonne, is very notable in this matter. This king *Philip*, about some light occasion, enterprised warre against the *Ætolians*, a people of Greece the Romanes allies. The *Ætolians* called to

*Tit. Liv.*  
*lib. 21. Dec. 3.*

A tolerable  
peace  
ought not  
to be broke

*Tit. Liv. lib.*  
*3. Dec. 4. &*  
*lib. 4. Dec. 5.*  
*& Plutarch*  
*in P. Æmil.*

their aid the Romas, who sent an armie into Greece against *Philip*, under the charge of captaine *Sulpitius*, as well to succour the *Ætolians*, as also the Athenians, which *Philip* would have destroyed, and lastly to revenge themselves of the king, who covertly had aided with silver *Annibal*, to make waire upon them: after certaine conflicts, this king fearing the forces and vertue of the Romanes, did so much as hee wrought a peace with them: after that they had made this peace, hee observed it very well, all the rest of his life; and the better to keepe it from point to point, hee had ordinarily in his hands, the articles of that peace, which hee ever read twice a day, that he might not breake any point of it. When hee was dead, *Perseus* his sonne succeeded him, unto whom a Macedonian gentleman, called *Onesimus* (a faithfull friend & counsellor of his father *Philip*) gave this advice to have ever in his hands, and often to read the said treaties & articles of peace, that as his father had done, hee might inviolably observe them, as the onely meane to maintaine him in his estate. *Perseus* at the beginning did but despise the admonitions of that good servant *Onesimus*, but in the end, he had him in suspition, and put him out of credit: insomuch as the good person, fearing worse unto himselfe, fled to Rome. After this, *Perseus* gathering great store of money, and esteeming himselfe strong ynough to warre against the Romanes, by little and little broke the articles of peace one after another, altogether contrarying the contents of the articles, and in the meane time covertly prepared for warre: finally the Romanes sent against him the Consull *Pau-us Æmilius*, with a Roman armie, which in lesse than a month seised upon all Macedonia, & brought it into the Romane obedience, and tooke prisoners, the king *Perseus* and his sonne, which he carried to Rome in a triumph, where they miserably dyed in prison: behold the evil haps of *Perseus*, for not imitating the example of his father, in the obseruation of the treatise of peace.

Verily the prince which wel considereth the good that comes by living in peace, will alwayes seeke to maintaine it, but at the least within his own domination, for in peace all things do flourish, and in warre all things are in ruine and devastation. We read, that in the time of *Antonius Pius*, all the Romane empire was in good peace, and that by the same meanes all the provinces were rich and flourishing, not onely in goods, but in vertues & sciences: for at that time good letters flourished all over, and especially the civile law, which was so well practised, and in all places so good justice administred, that the whole empire was a most excellent, & admirable thing at that time. Moreover, that good emperour rooke a great delight to fabricate and build great works, & common buildings, as the Amphitheater, which he builded at Nismes where he was borne (it is called at this day *les Arenes*) the temple of Adrian his sepulchre, and another Amphitheater at Rome, and many other goodly houses and publike buildings most sumptuous to behold; hee also caused to bee repaired, bridges, gates, waies, & to furnish many townes with store of money, as wel to make new buildings in them, as to renew the old; here in imitating the example of the emperour *Traian* his predecessor, who immortalized his name by his publike works & buildings which he made, even in building new townes and ioyning rivers one to another, or to the sea by great and deepe channels, to aide and make easie the commerce of all countries; also in drying up great fennes and marishes, and in laying plaine rockes and mountaines, to make fit wayes for travellers, and in doing other notable works. Such actions as these, are meet works for peaceable times, and as honourable, and proper to immortalize the name of a prince, as to make warre

to

Capitol. in  
Antonius Pio.  
Plinius in  
epist ad Tra-  
ianum.

to have victories and triumphes. We see that the restauration of good letters, which king *Francis*, the first of that name (of happie memorie) brought into France in his time, did more celebrate and make it immortall, in the memorie of all Christian nations, than all the great warres and victories which his predecessors had. And truly, princes which love and advance letters, do well merit, that learned people should send their honourable memorie to all posteritie: and such as despise them, and hold them under feet, are not worthy that historiographers, and men of learning, should bring their warres and victories into honour and reputation, much lesse to immortalize them in the memorie of men. For as lawyers say, that they ought not to enjoy the benefit of lawes which offend and despise them; so the prince, which makes no account of learning, ought not to enjoy the benefit thereof, which is to make immortall, generous and vertuous men.

But if we make comparifon of the magnificence and Estate that a prince should hold in the time of peace and prosperitie, with that he should hold during war and povertie, there is such difference as betwixt the day & the night: for prooffe hereof, I will alledge but the time of *Philip de Valois*. For we read, that in that time (which was a time of long peace) that king had almost ordinarie in his court, foure or five kings which resided with him, in regard of his magnificence, as the king of Boheme the king of Scotland the king of Arragon, the king of Navarre, the king of Maiorque, & many great dukes, counts, barons, prelates; the greatest part of whose charges hee defraied, that it might appeare, that the king of Fraunce was a king of kings. It is certaine, to maintaine this magnificall and great estate, there must needs follow exceeding great expences: but he might well do it, for his people beeing rich and full of peace, they had better meanes to furnish and provide for him a crowne, than in the time of warre to give him a three halfe pence. At that time a king of England passed into France to do homage unto king *Philip*, for the dutchy of *Guienne* which the English had long time held of the crown of France: when the English king saw the traine of the court of France, he was ravished in admiratio, to see so many kings, dukes, counts, barons, princes, peeres of France, constable, admirall, chancellor, marshal, and many other great lords, which reputed themselves happie to obtaine the good grace of king *Philip*. This moved the king of England farre more easily, and in other meanes to do his homage than he thought to have done: and at his returne into England, he said on high, That hee supposed, there was neither king nor emperour in the world that held so magnificent and triumphant an estate, as the king of France did. Should not we desire to see such a time againe? but we are farre from it, and take no course thereunto: for civile warres cannot bring us unto it, but onely a good and holy peace, well and inviolably observed, by a good reformation of justice, and of all estates, which was corrupted in Fraunce: For without it the people can never prosper, but shal alwayes be gnawne and eaten even to the bones, and the people being poore, the king cannot be rich, no neither his nobilitie, nor cleargie: for all the kings renewes, all tallages, all the nobilities and cleargies rents, proceed from the poore people.

By this which we have above handled, this Maxime of warre is sufficiently understood, I will add no more thereunto, but that *Machiavel* shewes himselfe a man of very good grace, when he saith, That the Italians are a people of nimble and light spirits & bodies; for he cannot more properly note them of inconstancie & infidelitie: & when afterward he saith, That willingly they never go to battails, he cannot bet-

*Froissart, lib. 7  
cap. 353-4:*



better tax them of cowardise and puslanimitie : but the reason, wherby he would seeme to cover this fault, is more to be accounted of than the rest : For saith hee, this proceedeth of the little heart and cowardise of the captaines ; as if he said, That all Italian captaines, are faint hearted & cowards, which rather discourage than adde hart unto their souldiers to fight. And herein I beleeve he saith truth, for of so many Italian captaines as we have seene in Fraunce this fiftene yeres, there hath not been one found that hath done any memorable exploit : they can indeed make many vaine and brave shewes, and in many subtile stratagems there are found no better warriors ; but in battailes and assaults of townes, they never by their wils will come, as their owne *Machiavel* beareth them witnesse.



## 2. *Maxime.*

*To cause a Prince to withdraw his mind also together from peace and agreement with his adversarie, he must commit and use some notable and outragious iniurie against him.*

Discourse,  
lib. 3. cap. 32.

**B**Ecause (saith *Machiavel*) men are naturally vindicative and desirous to take vengeance of such as offend the, it consequently falls out, that they which have outraged or iniured any, but especially if the iniurie bee great, they can never trust him they have so iniured. For every man feares and distrusteth his reconciled enemy. And therefore to find meanes, that a prince may never set his heart and mind upon peace, nor reconcile himselfe to any adversarie, he must be perswaded to practise some outragious act upon his said adversarie : So by that meanes he will never trust him, nor be reconciled with him.

Samuel,  
lib. 2. cap. 26.



Ehold here, the very counsell that *Achisophel* gave to *Absalon*, to make him irreconcilable with *David* his father, and to place a division and perdurable confusion in all his kingdome. For he advised *Absalon* to cohabite and dwell even with his father *David*'s wives, which was the greatest and most villanous iniurie that he could have done unto him: and to this end he did it, that *Absalon* and all they which followed him, might be utterly out of hope to make peace with *David*, and by that meanes playing upon the desperado, they might gather double courage, and make themselves possessors of the kingdome. For necessity and dif-

dispaire make men hardie and valiant. But what was the issue therof? even this, that *Achitophel*, the author of this counsell, hanged and strangled himself, either with dispaire or feare that hee had, that *David* would have punished him. *Abfalon* also soone after miserably perished, as a reward for his adherence and cleaving to so bad counsell.

The like happened to *Tolumnius*, king of the Veians, which had caused the Fidenates to revolt from the Romanes: for as the Romanes had sent embassadors to the Fidenates, to know the reason of their revoltment, *Tolumnius* counselled them to slay (as indeed they did) the embassadors; to the end (saith *Titus Livius*) that the Fidenates might be to him the more faithfull, and out of hope to be reconciled with the Romanes, perceiving themselves guiltie of so strange a crime. So the Romanes made warre upon the Fidenates, unto whose succour came *Tolumnius*, and as hee was in the battaile, *Cornelius Cossus* a Romane, espying him said, Behold the breaker of humane leagues, the violater of peoples right, now shalt thou be sacrificed for the death of our embassadors: and couching his speare against *Tolumnius*, ranne at him, and carried him to the earth, where he slew him, cut off his head, and shewed it in the front of a number of the enemies, who as soone as they saw the kings head, turned their backs and fled.

The Capuans, after they had received many good turnes and succours of the Romanes, against their enemies (even when they yet had in their towne a Romane Garrison) enterprised to make their profit of the Romanes calamitie, received in the journey of Cannes: for they seeing that by that journey *Annibal* had much enfeebled the Romane forces, revolted from them, and ioyned to *Annibal*: they also sent embassadors to Rome, to make the Senate understand, That if they would receive the Capuans in the same degrees of equalitie with the Romanes, in matters of government of the commonweale, by according, That from thenceforward one of the consuls of Rome, should be a Capuan, and the other a Romane; that should be a good and an assured meane for the towne of Rome to bee succoured by the Capuans against *Annibal*. The Romane Senators, perceiving the foolish and proud demaund of these effeminate Capuans, which were no better warriors than common strumpets, yea so delicate and cowardly with luxurie and lubricitie, vouchsafed not to make them any answer, but caused them to be chased out of the Senat. These embassadors seeing themselves repulsed from their demand, returned to Capua, and made report to the Senators of Capua, how they had sped in their embassage. Then these divellish Capuans (according to the guise & nature of all effeminate cowards, which are alwayes cruell for their owne advantage) enterprised with *Annibal*, to massacre all the Romane garrison, which they had in their towne of Capua; and as they enterprised, so they executed it. The Romane garrison being thus massacred, the Romanes incontinent sent to besiege Capua. *Annibal* not being able without his great perill, to leave the siege of Capua, besieged Rome, hoping thereby to draw their siege from Capua: but hee was no sooner removed, but the Romans approched more nigh, & gave an assault to the towne: and to enter in, *Quintus Fulvius* lieutenant generall of the Romane armie, caused a proclamation to be made, in the hearing of the Capuans, whereby they made knowne to all the inhabitants of Capua, That all such of the towne as would resort to his campe within certaine daies, should be held inculpable as not consenting to the revolt and massacre made by the Capuans: but none durst enterprise to trust this pro-

*Tit. Liv.*  
*lib. 4. Dec. 1.*

*Titus Liv.*  
*lib. 3. &*  
*6. Dec. 3.*

proclamation; not that they knew not well (saich *Titus Livius*) that the Romanes would hold their words, but because they had left no hope to obtaine any pardon: yet the most part of the Senators of Capua, concluded to send embassadors to Rome to obtaine grace and pardon, having some hope in the clemencie and placabilitie so many times proved in the Romane Senat: and indeed their embassadors obtained letters of grace. But one *Virius*, the principall author of the said revoltment and massacre, was not of that opinion to have recourse, nor any hope in the Senat, judging his crime to be so great, as it was impossible to obtain pardon: and therefore he and 27. other Senators of Capua of his opinion, resolved thus to sleie themselves. They caused a great banquet to bee prepared, furnished with viands and wine, the most exquisit that could be gottē: & there at their last banquet they thought it good to drinke, till their senses were taken from them; & for their last farewell they drunke every man a glasse of poison, then embracing one another, they begun all to weepe and lament the ruine of them and their country, and to detest the wicked counsell they had taken, to use so outrageous a part against the Romans, to take away all hope of peace and reconciliation: so having long wept and lamented, they fell dead vpon the earth one after another. Is not this a notable example, to detest the wicked counsell of *Machiavel*, to seeke meanes to be irreconcilable? Is there any prince in the world, unto whom a necessitie may not sometimes come to bee reconciled with his inferior adversarie? And if reconciliation may alwaies come in good time and for good purpose, how durst this wicked Atheist lay downe this Maxime?

Reconciliation may  
alwaies  
come in  
good time.

*Lucius Catiline* (a man devoid of all vertue, and a bundle of all vice) resolving in his braine to practise a conspiracie against his country (to assay either to bee an exceeding great man, or altogether nothing) drew to his league many Roman gentlemen, such like as himselfe: and considering that he could not bring to effect his conspiracie, without declaring and communicating it to the chieftaines of his aid, and yet fearing that some of them would discover it; hee thought good to make them all take a most execrable oth, that thereby might be foreclosed from them all hope of retiring from his side. So he caused wine to be mixed with humane blood in pots and made all his companions drinke of it, and withall procured them to sweare with an execration, that they would never disclose the enterprise he would tell them, but employ themselves with all their power to execute it. After which oth made, his parteners, as already culpable of humane blood (which they had already drunke) were so secret, that there had nothing ever beene discovered, if God had not permitted an harlot, called *Fulvia* (being greeved, that *Curius* her ruffian, who was one of the conspirators, came not so often to lie with her as he accustomed) to draw certain words out of his mouth, as she demāded of him where he lay the precedent nights. Which *Curius* being drunke, to enjoy his curtizan, discovered unto her, that the former nights he had been in a company, with whom he should make an enterprise, which would make him rich for ever. As soone as *Fulvia* knew all the conspiracie, shee discovered it to the Consul *Cicero*. *Cicero* did what he could truly to open al the enterprise: but all the conspirators held so well their horrible oth, that not one of so great a number would ever reveale a word. But yet *Cicero* found means to know al, by the declaration which the *Allobroges* made, which *Catiline* had appointed to furnish him with people for the executiō. But the end of *Catiline* was such, that he was slain fighting, with a great number of others, and the chiefe of his complices were executed by justice. Briefly, all they which have practised that wicked doctrine of *Ma-*

Sabst in  
Catilin.

*chiavel*,



*chancel*, to commit outrageous acts to be irreconcilable, their ends and lives have alwayes proved very tragedies.



### 3. Maxime.

*A Prince in a conquered countrey must place colonies and garrisons, especially in the strongest places, to chase away the naturall and old inhabitants thereof.*



He best remedy (saith M. Nicholas) to conserve a countrey or a province newly conquered, is to erect colonies, placing strangers there, and from thence banishing all the princes antient and naturall inhabitants: For by that meanes the prince should keep that countrey with a small charge, without troubling the countrey with great garrisons, onely injuring such as he expulseth those places, to make roome for new inhabitants. And as for them which are chased away, he need not feare them: for they will be but some small portion of the inhabitants of that province, which remaining poore and exiled, shall from thenceforth be little able to hurt: and as for such as shall bee left in peace, it is likely that they wil enterprise nothing, fearing by their rebellion to procure a banishment also to themselves as the others have. For men must be tamed by a certaine kindnesse, either in not foyling or altogether discouraging such as are left in the province, or els ought hee utterly to destroy and impoverish them all, as in chasing away and exiling the inhabitants of those places, where he will establish colonies: for iniuries done to a man, ought to be executed in such sort, as they may not bee subiect to feare of vengeance. The Romans knew well how to obserue this Maxime, sending colonies to all the nations which they vanquished, by the meanes of which Colonies, they held the most feeble in their weakenesse, not suffering them to gather strength, and they also weakened the power of such as were great and most eminent.

Cap. 3. of  
the Prince.

The



The propri-  
etie of  
goods is  
from the  
right of  
nature.

He distinction of the proprietie of the goods of this world, where-  
by every man ought to be master and assured possessor of his own,  
hath been introduced by the law and right of nature, which wils,  
That to every man be yeilded that which belongeth unto him: or  
els by the right of nations, which comes all to one end. This di-  
stinction of proprietie maintaineth the commerce and trafficke a-  
mongst men, it entertaineth buyings and sellings, permutacions, loanes, and such  
like, which are the bonds of all humane societie: and if the distinction of proprie-  
tie of goods, be not maintained in the world, all commerce is destroyed, and al con-  
societie decayed and resolved. For although some poets and philosophers prayse  
the communitie of goods, remembring us of that old goldē world of *Saturne*; yet it  
is plainly evident to all people of judgement, that communitie induceth and brings  
a carelesnesse, idlenesse, discord, and confusion into the commonweale, as learnedly  
*Aristotle* demonstrateth in his *Politiques*. Therefore very necessarie it is, that the  
naturall right therein be observed, and every man maintained in the enjoyance of  
his owne good, and that to everie man be rendered that which is his owne: yea, this  
right ought to be so observed, that it is nor lawfull for the prince to breake or violate  
it: because by reason of naturall right it is inviolable, and none can derogate from it.  
And hereunto agreeth the divine right, whereby it is shewed unto us, that *Achab*, a  
king, ought not to take away the vineyard from *Naboth* his subiect: and hereunto  
also accord the rules of civile right, whereby it is said, That the right natural, and the  
right of nations are inviolable, in such sort, as that right civile and positive, neither  
can nor ought to derogate any thing from them.

Hereby therefore is seene the absurditie and manifest iniquitie of this Maxime  
of *Machiavel*, who counselleth a prince, as soone as he hath conquered a new coun-  
trei, to dispossesse the masters and right owners, of their goods, in townes and places  
where hee shall know it to be expedient to make himselfe strong; and to place there  
other new masters and possessors of his owne nation, in their places who are dispos-  
sessed and banished. For if the prince use this Maxime, certaine it is: first that hee  
violateth the right and law of nature, which he ought not to doe: secondly, hee  
acquireth the enmitie of the inhabitants of that new conquered countrey, which  
may be a meanes to deject him from all: For in the love of subiects and in their vo-  
luntarie obedience lyeth the firmenesse and assurance of a princes estate, as we shall  
speake in another place. It is folly to alledge, that there will bee no malecontents,  
but only they which are driven away: For such (saith *Machiavel*) as remaine in the  
countrey, will be satisfied, because they abide stil: but (as I say) it is folly to thinke so.  
For certainly, alwayes every one feareth that which he seeth happen to his neigh-  
bours; and further, not onely our owne losses engender in us discontentments, but  
also others losses, as of our parents, friends, allies, yea, of such as are not joynd unto  
us with other bond, than to be of our countrey, of our tongue, or of our religion, al-  
though that in all these there is a distinction of more and lesse. Thirdly, they whom  
the prince chaseth from their possessions and goods, will ever be so deadly enemies,  
that all their lives they will leave no stone to remove, to have right and vengeance of  
such injustice done against the law of nature. And the prince hath no cause to think  
they cannot hurt him, because they are poore banished people: for it is certaine, that  
there is no little enemy but will be hurtfull. Of how small a beginning did *Sertorius*  
arise?

arise? He was but a simple Romane gentleman, without authoritie and meanes: yet with certaine troupes of Barbarians (trained as well as he could) he possessed a good part of Spaine: The Romanes sent against him *Metellus*, with a great hoast, which could do nothing to him; insomuch, as they were yet forced to send *Pompeius* with an armie, whom *Sertorius* braved, calling him the little prentice of *Silla*: and it appeared, that if *Sertorius* had not been slaine of his owne people, he had sooner overcome *Pompeius*, than he him: Yet *Sertorius* was but a simple souldier, who had neither silver nor treasure; he had no authoritie to command, neither did any obey him against their wils. *Spartacus* also was but a poore slave, which escaping from his master, gathered together a great number of people, and made strong warre upon the Romanes, whom he many times vanquished: And but that *Pompeius* and *Crassus* with great armies were greatly busied to hinder his desseignes, he had made himself master of Italie. And was not *Cleon* another poore slave, yet gathered under his conductiō an armie of 70 thousand other slaves, wherewith he had like to have gotten a Sicilie? And *Virgatus* was but a shepheard on the mountaines of Spaine, and gathering together a great number of shepheards and theeves, he made infinit worke for the Romanes: yet in the end certaine Romane captaines sent against him, not being able otherwise to overcome him, caused him traiterously to be slaine: This the Senat found not good, but greatly blamed those captaines, which overcame by so villanous a meane. After *Virgatus* was slaine, his people disbanded not, but still made warre upon the Romanes; insomuch, as the Romanes were constrained to give unto them, to appease them, the towne and territorie of Valence in Spaine to inhabire, and so they were satisfied, and gave over their armes. Of late memorie, *Philbert de Chalon* Prince of Orange, *Ansonie de Leva*, *Andrew Doria*, the Marquis of Mantua, and many others, whereof we have spoken in other places, which revolted against king *Francis* the first, and did him more hurt, than all the forces of the emperour *Charles* the fift: yet were they no great lords, in comparison of the king. Therefore he which is a wise Prince, will estimate no enimie to be petite and little, but will guard himselfe from justly offending any man, fearing least by that meanes he procure enemies: For enimities will come too fast on a man, before he looks for them.

As for that he saith, That the Romanes had colonies in countries which they conquered, they did it not to serve their turnes as fortresses in that countrey (as *Machiavell* saith) but to disburden the citie of Rome of their too great a multitude of people which were still stirring up rebellion and seditions in their towne; as in the time of the consulship of *Marcus Valerius*, and *Quintus Apuleius*: The towne (saith *Titus Livius*) was brought to a great quiet and tranquillitie, by discharging it of a great part of the common people, by deduction of colonies: which when they were sent into any countrey that the Romanes had conquered, the publike & common fields were divided amongst them; yet the old inhabitants were not chased away, neither were their goods taken from them, but only mingled with the Romanes goods; which dwelt with them in their townes in houses they themselves builded, or else, which were publike and conquered to the Roman commonweale. The Romans also set up colonies, as a multiplication of their race, but not to serve them for fortresses in conquered countreys: and that it was so, appeares, because they erected not colonies in all the countreies they conquered, no nor in the most strongest places, but rather in the amplest, fattest, and fertilest places: These said colonies

*P. ut. in Sertorio et Crasso. Florus lib. 3. c. 55, 56.*

*Tit. Livius lib. 10. Dec. 3. & lib. 7. Dec. 5. & lib. 8. Dec. 4.*



also were no more faithfull unto them, than the other subjects, but often rebelled, as well as others, as was seen after the battaile that the Romanes lost at Cannas, against *Anniball*: for then twelue Romane colonies revolted from them, and entred league with *Anniball*. And it is commonly seen, that citizens transported into other countries doe incontinent degenerate, taking the manners and conditions of the country; as came to passe in the townes of Alexandria in Ægipt, Seleucia in Siria, Babilon in Parthia, which were colonies of the Macedonians, and to the towne of Tarentum, a colonie of the Lacedæmonians: for all these foresaid townes, were straight despoiled of the manners, natures, and the originall generositie of their nation, and became soft, effeminate, and cowardly, as they were into whose countries they were removed.

*Tit. Livius*  
*lib. 10. Dec. 4*

A great and memorable calamitie, fell to *Philip* king of Macedonie, by removing to other places, the naturall inhabitants of the maritime and sea townes of his country. This king fearing to enter into warre with the Romanes, because many of his neighbours went to complaine of him to the Senat of Rome, thought it good to stand upon his guard; and something distrusting the inhabitants of such townes as were nigh the sea, he tooke away from thence, the naturall inhabitants, and gave them grounds in Emathia to dwell in, and in their places, planted the inhabitants of Thracia, in whom he trusted: This caused in all Macedonie a great discontentment, for every one saw, to their great griefe, their ancient poore dislodged, carrying their children on their shoulders, weeping and lamenting their calamities, and making execrations and imprecations against the king, that it might so happen to the king and his race, to be driven from his kingdome and countrey: The king being advertised of this universall murmuration, began to enter into a distrust of every man, and especially of the children of certaine gentlemen, which hee had caused to die, and he feared, that the said children, making use of the peoples discontentment, should attempt some enterprise against him: and therefore determined to have seased certaine yong children, of the slaine gentlemen, for his better assurance. *Theoxena* the widdow of a great lord (which was slaine by the king, called *Herodicus*) resolved rather to make die the children of her and her dead husband, than that they should come into the hands and power of the king: So she resolved to save her selfe and them at Athens: and yet if the worst fell, she provided good swords & poisons: after shee was embarked with her children, to obtaine the towne of Athens, she was followed by another boate of the kings people, which when she saw that they rowed with great diligence to the barke where shee was: Loe (said she) my children, you have now no other means to shun the tyrannie of king *Philip* but death, which you may see (shewing the swords and the poison) chuse which you had rather die on, either on sharpe whetted swords, or to swallow this poison, on (my children) let the eldest shew themselves most hardy and couragious: This exhortation perswaded so much, that they slew themselves, some with swords, some with poison; then she caused them all to fall into the water, even when they yet had breath, and cast her selfe after them. Straight the kings people ioyned to the barke, but they found it emptie of the persons they looked for. The crueltie of this fact, added a new flame of envie and evill will towards the king, so that it seemed to every one, they heard the infernall furies, preparing themselves to bring upon the king and his race, the imprecations which all the world made against him: and indeed it came to passe, by the just judgement of God, that as this poore gentlewoman had caused her owne children

to

to die; so *Philip* made to die by poyson, his lawfull sonne *Demetrius* (a Prince of exceeding great towardnesse) by the false accusation of *Perseus*, his bastard-sonne. After certaine time, this king having discovered, that by a false accusation he had murdered his owne sonne, hee would needes disinherit the bastard *Perseus*, and being continually tormented with the shadow and resemblance of his sonne *Demetrius*, which his conscience alwaies brought before his eyes, he dyed desperately, detesting and execrating that wicked *Perseus*. This *Perseus* then, his only sonne which remained to succeed him in his kingdom, after a few yeares raigne, was taken prisoner by the Romanes, and led in a triumph to Rome, where he miserably died in prison: So the imprecations and curses, which the poore people (chased from their countrey and goods by the king) had poured out against him and his race, fell upon him and his. Is not this an example, to make the haire to stand upright on Princes heads, when men perswade them to dispossesse naturall inhabitants of their countrey and goods? yet at this day, are there too many Machiavelists, which say, It is good to chase away the naturall inhabitants of France, or at the least from certaine places and corners, and to people them with some race, that is good, faithfull, and loyall, as Italians and Lombards: yea what wants there of an Italian Colonie, in the towne of Lyons? for besides that a great part of the inhabitants are Italians, and that other people of the countrey, conforme themselves by little and little to their actions, behaviours, manner of life, and language; that scant shall you find any so vile or paltrie an artisan, but he will studie to speake Italian: for these magnificall Machiavelists, will give no countenance, nor willingly heare any, but such as use their owne language; by that meanes, seeking to bring credit both to themselves, and their tongue. The townes also of Paris, Marseille, Grenoble, and many others of France, are they not full of Italians?



#### 4. *Maxime.*

*A Prince in a Countrey newly conquered, must subvert and destroy all such as suffer great losse in that conquest, and altogether root out the blood and the race of such as before governed there.*



En (saith *Machiavell*) doe willingly change their lords, thinking to amend themselves; and this opinion commonly makes them revolt; but most commonly they find themselves deceived, seeing by experience themselves in worse case than before: Wherefore (to shun such kinds of revoltings) a Prince ought to take out of the way all such as he thinks are displeased

Q. ij.

Cap. 3. of  
a Prince.

fed with the change, by any enormous or great losse that he hath suffered: For I am perswaded (saith he) that all men of good judgement hold this without doubt, that the estate of a Prince or Commonweale cannot long endure in a Countrey, unlesse all such be taken away, which for some great harme they have sustained by the change, are contrarie unto him. And herein *Lewis* the twelfth, king of Fraunce, dealt not wisely; therefore in as little time lost he the dutchie of Millane, as before he had conquered it: For the Milanois found themselves deceived in opinion, and frustrated of the advantages and commodities which they looked for at his hands, and also could not suffer the proud handling of that new Prince: here was then his fault, that he tooke not away all Male-contents, which suffered losse in the change, and especially because he utterly rooted not out the race of the *Sforces*. But *Cesar Borgia* did not thus: for having occupied Romania, of all the Lords that he had dispossessed, he left not one alive that he could catch, and verie few escaped. Therefore it is better to follow the example of *Borgia*, than of king *Lewis*: For sometimes it succedes not well to imitate the best men: For it was damageable to *Pertinax* and *Alexander Severus*, to imitate the mildnesse and bountie of *Marcus Antonius*: and to *Caracalla*, *Commodus*, and *Maximine*, that they desired to resemble *Severus*.

*Dionysius*  
*Haic. lib. 4.*



*Machiavell* meaning to shew, that his purpose tendeth and aimeth onely to instruct a Prince in all sorts of tyrannie, giveth him heere a precept, which in old time *Thrasibulus* the Milesian gave to *Periander* a tyrant of Corinth, and *Tarquine* the proud king of Rome, to *Sextus* his sonne. For *Periander* having tyrannouslie obtained the domination of the crowne of Corinth where he had no right, fearing some conspiracie against him, sent a messenger to *Thrasibulus* his great frind, to desire his counsell and advice, how to be assured master and Lord of Corinth: *Thrasibulus* made him no answer by mouth, but commanding the messenger to follow him, he went into a field full of ripe corne and taking of the highest eares there, and the most eminent, hee brused them betwixt his hands, and wished the messenger to returne to *Periander* his master, saying no more unto him. As soone as *Periander* heard speake of brusing of the most ancient eares of corne, hee presently conceived the meaning thereof, to wit, to overthrow and take out of the way, all the great men of Corinth, which suffred any losse, and were grieved at the change of the Estate, as indeed he did. As much did *Sextus Tarquinius*, the sonne of *Tarquinius* the proud: for hee making a countenance of some great discontentment with his father, for his great crueltie towards him, purposely caused a fame, secretly to run to the *Gabinians* (then his fathers enemies) that for his safegard hee would flye unto them (if it pleased them to receive him) and would bring with him a good troupe of



of his servants and friends: These poore Gabinians, not suspecting the intelligence betwixt the father and the sonne, sent him word, he should be verie welcome: He failed not with a good troupe (by stealth) to go thither; where arriving they welcommed him; and (because he gave them to vnderstand that he would make warre upon his father, to revenge the injurie done by his father to him & them) they elected him their captaine. As soone as hee saw his foot in, he secretly sent a messenger to his father, to let him understand what command he had in the Towne, and to send him word, what he should doe: The abovesaid *Tarquin* led the messenger into a garden, where amongst many other hearbs, then growne up to see, there were great store of poppie, whose highest heads he struck off a pace, with a little staffe he had in his hand, and made no other answer to the messenger, who returning to Gabium, told *Sextus*, his fathers actions; so as he well understood what he should doe. Then made hee the people understand, That *Anisifius Petra* (the chiefe lord and magistrate of the Gabinians) with certeine of his complices, had conspired to deliver him to *Tarquin* his father, either dead or alive; and he shewed letters found in the house of *Anisifius*, written by *Tarquin*, and sealed with his seale, directed to *Anisifius*, which were found about him (where *Sextus* had secretlie put them) which he caused to be read before all the Gabinians: as soone as they had heard them, they were so angred and moved against good *Anisifius* (who knew not what to say of this thing he never thought) that straight they stoned him, and suffered *Sextus* himselfe to punish the compartners of *Anisifius*: Then *Sextus*, having the bridle loose, caused to be massacred in their houses, all the greatest and noblest of the towne of Gabium; and by that meanes, he and his father proved masters of that poore desolate Towne. But this tyrannie and others they committed, caused on the other side, that they lost the kingdome and domination of Rome; so that fishing for a frog, they let go out of their net a lamprey; so happeneth it ordinatilie, to such as will needs practise this detestable doctrine of *Machiavell*.

If we looke into the manner of government, practised by all great conquerors, (not such petie and tyrannous governors as *Borgia*) and generous monarches, which became the greatest and noblest of the world, as *Cesar*, *Alexander*, the great, *Cyrus*, *Charlemaine*, &c. we shall finde, that they used most contrary meanes to *Machiavels* doctrine: for they exercised no cruelties towards great or little as they made their conquests, but so far as the necessitie of warre carried them: Yea, they used conquered people with all kindnesse & clemencie; they embraced and entertained very well, such as were great personages; & altered nothing in the publike state, religion, policie, customes & liberties; but maintained them all, contenting themselves onely with the soveraigntie: And this was the cause, why many people desired not to resist them, but to be their subjects: and they which resisted them, yielded againe easily, without abiding any great batterie or assaults. Therefore most generously and nobly, dealt king *Lewis*, to imitate the kindnesse and gentlenesse of those great Monarches, when he conquered Millan: For although he after againe lost it, yet it followeth not that the fault proceeded hereof, That he would not be so cruell as to exterminate the whole race of the *Sforces*; but rather hereof proceeded that losse, by the inconstancie of the Millanois, and the machinations of Pope *Julius* the second, with the Venetians, which thought it not good to have so great a master so nigh them; as the French and Italian hystories doe evidently demonstrate.

And whereas *Machiavell* maintaineth, That it succeeds not well, for a Prince to

Spartian &  
Dion. in Se-  
vero &  
Caracalla.

Capitol. in  
Maximino.  
Lamprid. in  
Alexand.

Herod. lib. 6.  
Capitol. in  
Marco.

imitate sometimes the vertuous actions of generous Princes, and that therefore he ought to follow the vicious actions of such as are of no account; he sheweth that he is together both wicked and ignorant: for what more wicked doctrine can be given to a Prince, than to say, he ought to imitate wicked actions, because sometimes they succeed well? This is as much as to say, that we must by the high waies cut merchants throats, and be theeves, because theeves gaine thereby. But if *Machiavell* and all his favourits would judge of the successe of all things by their end (as they ought to judge) they should find, that those glorious and goodly successes that happen to the wicked, are but meanes wherewith God serves himselfe to bring them into ruin and utter overthrow, which they merited, as amply I have elsewhere shewed by many examples. And as for the examples he alleageth, he shewes himselfe by the application he makes, a verie beast. It succeeded not well (saith he) to *Commodus*, *Caracalla*, and *Maximinus*, in that they would imitate & resemble *Severus*, ô bravely applied and to good purpose spoken! for *Pertinax* succeeded *Commodus*, and *Severus* *Pertinax*; so that *Commodus* did never see nor know *Severus*, who in his time was yet unknowne, being a simple waged souldier, of a base and unknowne race: how should then *Commodus* propose him for an example to imitate? and as for *Caracalla* his sonne, and *Maximin*, they were never imitators of *Severus*, but in his vices, namely in crueltie; and therefore wee need not mervaile, if it succeeded not well unto them. The emperour *Severus* had verie good vertues, for he was verie well learned, and aduanced to estates learned people; he maintained a verie good policie in the Romane Empire; he made good and holy lawes, which are yet in use; he caused good justice to be ministred to the people, and kept barbarous Nations in a due obedience. *Caracalla* his sonne had none of these vertues, although *Machiavell* being verie ignorant of hystories, saith he was endued with excellent vertues: for hystories attribute no vertue unto him, but that from his youth he was accustomed to live a *la Souldarde*, like a souldier; that he was not delicate, but patient of labour, but otherwise the most wicked man in the world in all things. And as for *Maximin*, he in all things resembled *Caracalla*, but that he was issued from a vile and base race, and a barbarous nation, and *Caracalla* was an emperours sonne: and as for that which *Machiavell* saith, That it succeeded not well to *Pertinax* and *Alexander Severus* by their imitation of the emperour *Antonius* the philosopher, he still shewes more his ignorance, and that he hath not read the hystories of their lives. For hystories shew, that *Pertinax* was slaine of his souldiers, because he appeared to them more covetous than he should have been: So likewise was *Alexander* slaine for the couetousnesse of *Mammea* his mother towards the souldiers. But we never read, that *Marcus Antonius* was ever spotted with that vice of couetousnesse: but contrarie, that he was a verie liberall Prince, nothing holding lesse than a couetous mind: and that herein, as in all other vertues, he was a true philosopher, that is to say, loving good, and hating evill. And therefore *Machiavell* knowes not what he saith, when he saith it succeeded not well with *Pertinax* and *Alexander Severus*, to have a mind to imitate *Marcus Antonius*: he had better have spoken only of the gests and matters written in the registers of Florence, whereof he was Secretarie, than so with a foolish interpretation to inquitate and corrupt hystories he knowes not.



## 5. Maxime.

*To be revenged of a Citie or Countrey, without striking any blow, they must be filled with wicked manners.*

**V**Anquished Cities or Provinces (saith this Florintine) do mercellously well revenge themselves of the vanquishers, in receiving them gently, and filling them with wicked manners: for so do they easily prepare and dispose them to be vanquished, by vvhomsoever assaulteth them: as it hapned to *Annibals* souldiers at Capua. For having a long time sojourned there at their ease in all delights and pleasures, they became all, so effeminate, that they vvere never after good for any thing. This corruption of manners comes ordinarily when corrupted nations frequent amongst others: for they infect them with evill manners. And therefore it is, that the *Almgaine* nation remaines so entier and constant in his manners, because the *Almaignes* were never curious to trafficke with their neighbours, nor to dwell in other countries, nor to receive strangers into their countrey, but alwaies have contented themselves with their owne goods, nouriture, manners, and fashions of apparell: insomuch, as shunning the frequentation of Spaniards, French, and Italians (which are the three nations of the world most vicious) they have not yet learned their customes and corruptions.

Discourse,  
lib. 1. cap. 34.  
or lib. 2. cap.  
19.

**H**ave not here set downe this Maxime, to say it is not verie true. For besides the examples we read in hystories, we know it by experience and sight of eye; seeing we see at this day all Fraunee fashioned after the manners, conditions, and vices of strangers that governe it, and have the principall charges and Estates: and not onely many Frenchmen are such beasts to conforme themselves to strangers complections, but also to gaggles their language, and doe disdaine the French tongue, as a thing too common and vulgar. But if wee well consider this manner of vengeance taught by *Machiavell* in this Maxime, we shall find it is a most detestable doctrine, as well for them which practise it, as for them against whom it is practised. The example even of Capua, which *Machiavell* alleageth, prooveth it. For the Capuans in receiving into their towne *Annibals* armie, corrupted

*Tit. Livius*  
lib. 3. Dec. 3.



Pluin Alex

rupted and infected the souldiers of *Anniball* with all excesse and effeminate wantonnesse; and also by the same meanes they procured their owne ruine and entire destruction, which soone after hapned unto them. The Persian lords, which with their manners corrupted king *Alexander* the Great, did nothing to their owne advantage: For *Alexander* becomming vicious, they got the evill will of the Macedonians, which tooke displeasure to see their king corrupted. and finally, after the death of *Alexander* (which came unto him by his dissolutenesse, learned of the Persians) these lords had part of the evill lucke, whereof they were cause: And generally we may see, that the corrupters of Princes and people, take part alwayes in the evill whereof they are cause, as in other places we have shewed by many examples of flatterers, which have corrupted their Princes. We Frenchmen may yeeld good witnesse of what account the Italian and Neapolitane nation is, by the frequentation we had with them in the voyage which was made to Naples, in the time of king *Charles* the eight: for from thence brought they this disease, which at this day is now called the French poxe, and that we have ever since kept: but yet so, as the Italians and Neapolitanes are not exempt therefrom, but both the one and the other have part of that corruption. Breesely, we ought to detest and hate this wicked doctrine of *Machiavell*, and reject all vengeance, and follow *S. Paules* lesson; who commands us to converse with good people, and of good manners, because the conversation of the wicked, not onely corrupteth good manners, but also soweth those that are wicked.

And as for that which *Machiavell* saith of the Almaines, we know and see the frequentation of the Almaines in France, & yet till this present we have not seene, that they have yet gathered corruption of manners. And whereas he sets downe the French nation amongst such as are most corrupted, we cannot denie it: but we may well say, That the doctrine of *Machiavell*, and the frequentation of them of his nation, are cause of the greatest and most detestable corruption which is at this day in France: For of whom have the Frenchmen learned and knowne Atheisme, Sodomie, Trecherie, Cruelty, Vfurie, and such other like vices, but of *Machiavell* and of them of his nation: So that they may brag, that they are well revenged of the warres which our auncestors have made in Italie.



## 6. Maxime.

It is folly to thinke, that with Princes and great Lords, new pleasures will cause them to forget old offences.

Cap. 7. Of  
Princes.  
Discourse,  
lib. 3. cap. 4.



*Asar Borgia* (saith *Machiavell*) during the life of Pope *Alexander* the sixt, his father, usurped the domination of Romania (which

is

is a land belonging to the Church) and was called duke *de Valentinois*. In making those usurpations in favour of the Pope his father, he offended many Cardinals, and amongst others the Cardinall of Saint *Peter ad vincula*: yet after he consented, that hee should be elected Pope, after the death of *Alexander* his father, vvhwhereof hee soone repented. For this new Pope, called *Iulius* the eleventh, straight betooke himselfe to armes to recover that which *Borgia* had usurped, although he had favoured him in his election, which hee should never have done, nor suffered any election of a Pope which was his enemy: For (saith he) new pleasures never make men forget old injuries and offences: and therefore *Borgia*, which in all other things had governed well, committed a foule fault in the creation of *Iulius*, and himselfe deliuered the mean of his finall destruction. The same fault committed *Servius Tullius*, king of the Romanes, in giuing his two daughters in marriage to two *Tarquins*, which quarrelled for the Crowne, and which thought that *Tullius* would usurpe it upon them. For not only this alliance extinguished not the envie and rankour which they had to *Servius*, but that which is more, it caused one of the daughters to enterprize to sleigher owne father.



T seemeth that this which *Machiavell* telleth of *Borgia*, boweth some thing from the truth of the hystorie. For *Sabellicus* writeth, That during the election of Pope *Iulius* the eleventh, *Borgia* was shut up in the Popes tower to be safe and guarded by his enemies: So there was no likelyhood, that a man brought into such an extremitie, as to hide himselfe, and to be shut up in prison, for the great multitude of enemies which he had procured, should have such great credit in the Popes election. But suppose it was true, that *Borgia* helped Pope *Iulius* to the Popedome, and that Pope *Iulius* was unthankfull for that benefit, for the remembrance that he had of the old and ancient injuries that *Borgia* had sometimes done him: what followes hereof? That all great lords will alwaies doe the like (will some *Machiavelist* answer) and that therefore they ought not to be trusted. Is not here a goodly doctrine for a Prince? Briefely, it is *Machiavels* mind to teach a Prince to trust in no lord, which hee hath once offended: and againe, that none which hath made a fault, or offended him, shall any more trust him, whatsoever reconciliation, peace, concord, amitie, pleasure, and good offices may happen since the offence. Here, behold a most wicked and detestable doctrine, to say, That an offence ought to take so deepe root in the heart of the offended, that by no pleasures, services, or other meanes, it can be rased out. But *Machiavell* seemeth something excusable to maintaine this Maxime: for according to the honour of his Nation, vengeance, and enmities are perpetuall and irreconcilable: and indeed, there is nothing wherein they take greater delectation, pleasure, and contentment, than to execute a vengeance; inso much as, whensoever they can have their enemy at their pleasure, to be revenged upon him, they murder him after some strange & barbarous fashion, and in murde-

Irreconci-  
lable ven-  
geance con-  
trary to na-  
tural right.

murdering him, they put him in remembrance of the offence done unto them, with many reprochfull words and injuries to torment the soule and the bodie together; and sometimes wash their hands and their mouthes with his blood, and force him with hope of his life to give himselfe to the divell; and so they seeke in slaying the bodie to damne the soule, if they could: God by his grace keepe all Countries, but especially France (which alreadie is so spotted with other vices, and with the doctrine that *Machiavell* teacheth, and which they of his Nation practise) that they be not soiled and infected with that immortall and irreconcilable vengeance. For how should it be possible, that any man should be without infinit quarels, and continual and ordinarie butcheries and murders, yea, with parents and friends, and with all other persons, with whom he hath any frequentation, if offences may never be blotted out but by vengeance? Every one may well know by experience, that they which are amongst themselves great friends and familiars, yet commit offences one to another, and sometimes have great stirres, despights, and contentions amongst them: But must men as soone as they receive any offence at the hand of a parent, friend, or of any other, forget and blot out all amitie, Christian and brotherly charitie towards his neighbour, and to pardon no faults, but seeke the ruine of him that offendeth us? Surely, this is not only far from all Christian pietie, but also from all humanitie and common sence; yea, brute beasts, which have no reason, are not so unreasonable: for a dog which we have offended, will be appeased with a piece of bread, yea, will fawne upon him which beat him, and as much will an horse do and an ox which hath been pricked and beaten, when he is given them. And as for such as say, That vengeance is lawful by right of nature, they are greatly deceived, as the beasts named before do shew: True it is, that nature teacheth man & all living creatures to put backe violence with violence, when a man is upon the act, and instant it selfe, when as violence is inferred: but it teacheth not, that after the act of violence and outrage is committed, a man ought to seeke vengeance, to put backe that violence and outrage: for this is not to repell and repulse injurie, which already being received, cannot be repulsed; but rather to inferre a new injurie & violence: and withall, that naturall right (To repulse violence with violence) it must be understood with reason and equall moderation; that is to say, That such right hath place, when by no other meane in any other sort, we can shun the violence which is offered unto us. And indeed the brute beasts themselves shew us we must so use it: for you shall not see a wolfe, nor a swine seeke to put backe the violence offered him, whilst they have place enough to flie, and that they be not brought to a strait: and therefore it is a beastly ignorance, to colour that detestable vice of vengeance, by the right of nature: for it is cleane contrarie, and especially to the irreconcilable vengeance whereof *Machiavell* speaketh, which he saith, cannot be defaced nor forgotten by new pleasures. But I doe well know, that some Machiavelist will replie upon this doctrine, that *Machiavell* speaketh onely of Princes and great lords, unto whom he saith; That new pleasures cannot extinguish old injuries, and that hereunto accordeth that which *Homer* saith:

*H-m. Iliad.*  
*lib. 1.*

*A mightie king that angry is against one lesse than he,  
Can hide full deepe in spightfull heart, that hard it is to see  
His fierce and angry wrathfull mood, till he espies his time,  
Revenge to take, according to the greatnesse of the crime.*

But



But let the case be so, that the wrath and irritations of great Princes and lords, dwell longer in their hearts than in other persons of lesse qualitie, as the meaning of *Homer* seemes to be: hereof it followeth not, that a Prince is implacable, and that he cannot be appeased by any pleasures or services. It seemes that *Homer* noted no other thing in the particular natures of kings and great lords, but that they know how for a time to dissemble despights and offences perpetrated against them, and can attend opportunitie to revenge them (a thing verie true, and that we see often practised:) But it is far from *Homer* to say, that kings and Princes cannot be appeased by pleasures and good services that may be done unto them after the offence, yea, in humiliating and reconciling themselves to them. *Homer* speaks here of cholericke kings, which are not masters of themselves, not being able to command their passions and affections which raigne in them, and which doe darken their reason and judgement, such as was king *Agamemnon*, of whom he especially spoke in the place above alleaged. For many good and wise kings and Princes are seene, which can so well make their passions and affections obey reason, that not onely their wise judgement never suffereth, that a desire after perpetuall vengeance shall take roote in their hearts; but rather will not leave in their memorie the offences that are done them, but will forget and pardon them of their owne motion, before any pardon be demanded: for their wisdom judgeth, that those passions of vengeance, besides that they doe but torment and make leane the heart of a Prince, are altogether contrarie to the principall vertue, which ought to shine in a Prince, as clemencie, gentlenesse, and goodnesse, a vertue making a Princes estate pleasing and assured, which ought principally to shine in privat offences, as justice ought especially to shine in publike offences, as shall be spoken more at large in another place: although even in publike offences it is sometimes requisite for the publike good and utilitie, that the Prince use clemencie and forgetfulnesse.

To this purpose is verie regardable the opinion, that in the Senat, that great and wise person *Quintus Fabius Maximus* held. When the Romanes begun to get up and reprosper, after their ruine at Cannas, many of their allies which had revolted to *Anniball*, profered to come to them againe: Amongst others there was one *Clasius Alinius Arpinus*, who came to Rome, and made the Senat understand, That he had meanes to bring the towne of Arpos, where he inhabited, into their hands: The matter comming to deliberation in the Senate, some argued, That it was not good to trust in this *Alinius*, nor in any other Arpinos, seeing they had violated their faith by revolting unto *Anniball*, & that it were folly to make accompt of such people, which have their faith as variable as fortune: and as for his offer, to deliver the towne of Arpos, he did it for no good affection he bore to the Romane commonwealth, but because he saw the affaires thereof dissolue and decay. But *Fabius* reasoned in another sort: Masters (said he) they which have spoken before, seeme to give their opinion, as if we were already in good peace, forgetting the time lately passed, and not considering that we are yet in the heat of warre: As for me, I think we stand in need to devise all the meanes wee can find out, to containe our allies from revolt: But if the necessitie of times lately past, and their weakenesse have drawne them on once to a revolt; and if after, it be not lawfull for them to returne and to reconcile themselves, who can doubt, but at length all our allies wil turne from us to the Carthaginians: My advice then is, That we should not reject a reconciliation with such as revolt from us, although they have not been so constant as they should bee in a faithfull

Good Princes encline to pardon.

*Titus Livius lib. 4. Dec. 3.*

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faithfull adherence unto us. The opinion of *Fabius* was followed by all the Senates, and by the meanes of *Astinus*, the Romanes released the towne of Arpos.

But it seemeth, that the persuation which *Quintus Metellus* used in the name of all the Senate, unto *Emylus Lepidus*, and *Fulvius Nobilior*, censors of Rome, is verie worthie the marking, to shew, that vengeance and enmities ought not to be perdurable in great lords, but ought to appease themselves, and be reconciled one to another. The said two Censors being two of the greatest Princes and lords of Rome, which had been Consuls, and endued with other great offices and estates, and at that time were Censors, which was the greatest office of all: For Censors tooke cognisance of all the abuses of magistrates and Senators, and might put them out: These two being enemies (although companions in one charge) the Senate determined to seeke meanes to agree them: so they sent unto them a great number of the principall Senatours, amongst which, *Quintus Metellus*, who had the charge to speake for all, in a temple where the Censors were, begun to remonstrate and tell unto them, as followeth: Wee know (right honourable censors) that you are now in an estate to reprehend and correct the manners and faults even of Senators, yea, it is in you to gouerne and correct us, and not in us to reprehend you: Yet have we one thing from the Senate to say unto you, whereat all good men in you are offended and scandalized: When we consider of you apart, we know you to be such, as in all the towne there cannot be found men more capable and fit to be Censors and correctors, than you: but when we looke on you together, we feare you are not well coupled; neither is that where in you please us, so profitable unto us, as it may be damageable unto us, if that you two disagree together: Therefore we all in generall entreat, that you will finish in this temple your enmities and rancours, and that in a good union of counsell and amitie, you will establish and elect Senators, review our knights, and exercise all other points of your censorship. *Titus Tatius*, and *Romulus* warred one against another, yet after governed in this citie together in good concord and amitie: When warres are finished, it is often seen, that men become good friends & faithfull allies, which before were mortall enemies: There is a common proverbe worthie of obseruation, That amities ought to be immortall and enmities mortall: Therefore good masters Censors, we beseech you be reconciled together, and hearken unto the Senates just petition. Straight after this short oration, although either of the said Censors desired and were instant to make it appeare to the said Senators, that with good and just cause they hated one another; yet they both submitted themselves to whatsoeuer arbitrement of those Senators. The said Senators then thought it good, that they should give their hands and faith one to another in token of reconciliation and amitie, and that both should sweare in that temple, that earnestly and without all fiction they finished their hatred, and in all true love reconciled themselves: This they did, and solemnely swore, that with a good heart, and without all hypocrisie, they banished and departed from all evill will, and became ever after good friends: All the Romane Senate (saith *Titus Livius*) praised and greatly approved this reconciliation in these Censors.

It is then an act of a good man, and of an honourable nature, to be facile and prompt to reconciliation, and not to engrave in our hearts perpetuall enmities and rancours, as *Machiavell* teacheth: and good men ought not only to be facile in reconciliation, but they ought also to contemne and disdain all revenges by way of action and violence, as being a course unlawfull, unfitting, and unbecomming him

Amities  
ought to be  
immortall,  
and enmi-  
ties mortal.

him that would conserue in himselfe the reputation of an honourable and good man. And this is it, which the hystorian *Salust* notably saith: A good man (saith he) loves better to be vanquished, than by evill meanes to doe injurie: and to vanquish, in what sort soever it be, if on the vanquished there be practised too bitter a revenge, it is an evill and damageable thing, which often bringeth the totall ruine of Commonweales.

Moreover generous and vertuous princes, ought not onely to burie and blot out all old injuries, with new benefits, but also even recent and new offences (which doe more nigh than old touch the heart) ought to bee forgotten, in consideration of ancient pleasures and merites. The *Cærites* the Romanes allies and neighbours, breaking their faith and treatie of confederation, aided and succoured the *Tarquinius* people, which made war upon the Romanes: The *Tarquinius* and their succours being vanquished, the *Cærites* could doe no better, than in all humble manner submit themselves to the Romans, unto whom they sent embassadors, which in substance made this oration to the Romane people: Masters (said they) may it please you to remember, how in the time of your calamitie, when the Gauls tooke, pilld, and burnt the citie of Rome, that you sent into our towne of *Cæres*, all your priests, Vestall nuns, and al the sacred images of your gods, insomuch as then *Cæres* was as your holie revestie, yea the onely refuge & safegard for all your holy things, which there were well received and conserved: Wee therefore pray you, in favour of the gods, whose sacred Images wee have preserved, in the ruine and combustion of Rome, that now in this prosperitie, you will take pitie and be mercifull unto us, as wee had of you in your adversitie. If now wee have committed any hostile thing against you, it came rather vpon furie and follie, than of any good counsell: wee beseech you therefore, that you will not suffer our ancient good deeds, which we placed and bestowed upon people far from al ingratitude, to perish by a new evill deed, and in your prosperitie, handle not as enemies them which in your aduersitie, you elected for friends. The people (saith *Titus Livius*) were much moved by the ancient merit of the *Cærites*, rather to forget the new fault, than the old benefit, and a peace, and remission of their offences, was accorded unto them.

The same inoderation of mind, used *Francis* the first of that name of good memorie, towards the inhabitants of Rochell, in Anno 1541. The Rochelois falling to mutinie against certaine of the kings officers, about the impost of Salt, but acknowledging their fault, they humbled themselves before that good king, demanding pardon, which he granted in an oration, with a grave and discreet admonishment, very worthie such a king and Christian prince in these words: My good subjects and friends (for such may I well call you, since you acknowledge your faults) the office and dutie of subjects is so great towards their prince, that they which faile in that dutie, commit so great a crime as they cannot perpetrate a greater, nor more punishable for the inconveniences which may thereupon follow: For every estate of a well instituted Monarch, and commonweale, consisteth in two points: namely, in the just commandement of the prince or superiors, and in the loyall obedience of subjects: If either of these want, it is as much as (in the life of a man) the seperation of the bodie, and of the soule: for in man, life can no longer endure, than the soule desisteth to command and governe the bodie, and that the bodie desisteth from obeying the soule. God grant mee grace, that I may not faile in the commandment, which hee hath given mee over you, which I doe acknowledge to hold of him, as a

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An old pleasure  
putteth  
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*De Bellalib.*  
9. of his  
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Crueltie  
takes love  
from Sub-  
jects to  
their Prin-  
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*Spartian in  
Adrian.*

Ascending  
unto honor  
is descen-  
ding from  
vengeance.

Annales  
upon Anno  
1488.

thing whereof I must make account unto him : and although according to that command I have over you, I may reasonably practise the punishment of justice upon you ; yet because it is a thing more covenable for a prince , to prefer mercy and clemencie, before the rigour of justice (but especially towards such as repent , and demand pardon) I pardon you with a good heart : seeing likewise, that I know you are children of good fathers, whose fidelitie hath been many times experimented by my predecessors, I had rather forget your new misdeed, than your ancient merits; I hope also that from henceforth, you will as willingly bee enclined to obey mee, as my naturall inclination is to pardon you. I will not doe to you, as the emperor did to them of Gaunt , which having committed them under the slavish servitude of a citadell , defiled his hands with their blood : My hands ( thanks bee to God ) are cleare from the blood of my subjects ; and indeede hee lost the hearts and amitie, of his subiects, by shedding their blood; but I hope that my mercy and clemency, shal confirme your hearts and love towards me your king, who kindly dandleth you as a good father ; and that if you and your predecessors , have beene in times past good and faithfull subjects , you will bee much better hereafter : I pray you forget this offence which is happened, and for my part, I will not remember it at any time of my life : I pray you also bee as good subiects, as you have heretofore beene , and I hope God will give mee grace to bee better towards you, than I have beene. God our Lord and creatour , pardon you , and I doe heartely forgive you all you have done without excepting any thing . At this word , proceeding from so magnificall and generous a king, all the Rochellois began to weepe for joy , and crying *Vive le Roy*, they prayed God to conserve in all prosperitie so good a king, so kind and mercifull. Then upon the kings commandment; all the bells of Rochell were rung, all their gunnes were shot off, and bonfires made, in signe of great rejoycing.

And somuch there wants, that good princes have beene enclined to vengeance, that contrary, the principalitie it selfe, makes them forget all affection of vengeance that they had before : as wee reade of the emperor *Adrian* who being come to the empire, forgot all his former enimities ; inso much as one day soone after he came to the empire , encountring a capitall enemy of his, hee said unto him : Thou art escaped.

King *Lewis* the twelfth, before hee was king , being but duke of Orleance , had many troubles : For , in the time of king *Charles* the eight his predecessor, his enemies thought to have taken him prisoner, but hee saved himselfe in Bretaine , whither hee was persecuted with an army, and battaile was given him, and the duke of Bretaine, who tooke his part at S. Aubien (where the kings armie got the victorie) and the said duke of Orleance, were taken prisoners, led to the castle Luzignen, and from thence brought to the great towre of Bourges. After all this, there was a concord amongst them and the said duke came to the crowne: Being king, they which followed him into Bretaine, and to other places during his adversitie , perswaded him to bee revenged of such as had made warre upon him, at the kings command: and they shewed unto him, that the cause of his then persecution, came not by king *Charles* his motion, who was then within age, but by his principallest Counsellors and governours, such as was *Messire Lewis de la Trimoville*, and others. But that good king *Lewis* shaped them this answer; worthie of so gentle and Christian a king, that could command his choler and passions: Nay (saith hee) a king of France may revenge injuries done to the duke of Orleance.

King

King *Philip* the hardie a gentle prince, a lover of peace, and verie easie to graunt pardon: The count de Foix in his time rebelled, but at the request of a sonne in law of the count, this good king pardoned him his fault, and gave him againe certaine land, which he had caused to be seized, & moreover made him knight, and at Court retained him into his service. This is far from nourishing enmities, and perpetuall vengeance, as *Machiavel* teacheth.

But here might I accumulate and heape up many other examples, of *Cesar*, *Augustus*, *Traian*, *Marcus Antonius*, *Constantine*, *Charlemaine*, *S. Lewis*, *Charles le sage*, *Alexander* the great, of *Cirus*, and generally of all the good princes, which ever have beene, all which were endowed with that excellent vertue of clemencie, and were far from all vengeance: but these I have recited, I hope may serve sufficiently, to shew by good reasons and notable examples, that that passion of irreconcilable vengeance, is unseemly and unworthy a good prince.

And as for the examples wherewith *Machiavell* serves himselfe, they bee but examples of tyrants, and such as were of no account: and of such people I know men had need take heed: for although for a time they dissemble their choller & their appetite to vengeance, yet will they not faile to discover it, as soone as they see a commodious time, to be revenged with advantage. But all Princes do not resemble the *Tarquines*, or pope *Iulius*, whereof *Machiavel* speaketh: For *Tarquin* who enterprised to slay king *Servius Tullius* his father in law, to obtain the kingdom of Rome, shewed well by that act and many other, that he was a very tyrant, his end was also such as commonly tyrants have: for he was driven from his kingdome, which hee had unduly and unjustly usurped, and was compelled to passe the rest of his dayes in great povertie, as a privat person, banished from Rome with all his children. And as for pope *Iulius* he was knowne for an untrue and disloyall tyrant, who greatly abused the bountie of king *Lewis* the twelfth: For that good king tooke from the Bentivolians, Boloigne, and many other townes from such pettie lords as occupied them, and delivered them into the Popes hands, because they were lands belonging to the Romane Church: Yet in recompence, this good Pope, by published bulls, exposed the whole kingdome of France for a prey, to whomsoever could take it, together with all the countries and lands of the allies of France: and so *Iohn de Albert* king of Navarre, lost his kingdome, and king *Lewis* lost Millaine, and almost all that he held beyond the mountaines, as we have said in another place. And this was the recompence the king received for all his benefits, of this disloyall and wicked Pope; of whom in his time was made a Pasquil at Rome, & registred in our annales, which in this sort speakes to his holiness.

*Of Genua thy father was from Greece thy mother came,  
A child thou borne upon the sea: what good in thee can bee?  
Genuais deceivers are, Greekes lyers are by fame,  
No faith in sea: thou holdst these points most fully all in thee.*



## 7. Maxime.

*A Prince ought to propound unto himselfe, so imitate Caesar Borgia the sonne of Pope Alexander the sixt.*

Cap. 14. of  
the Prince



It is not possible for me (saith M. Nicholas) to give better precepts to a new prince, than to lay before his eyes for an example the acts of *Caesar Borgia*, duke de Valentinois, sonne of Pope *Alexander* the sixt: And although his affaires little prospered, yet it was not wholly his fault, but rather the malignitie of an extraordinarie Fortune. First then by the means of the Pope his father, he troubled al the Estates of Italie, that he might the more assuredly seize upon part of the: a thing he easily effected: For at the instigation of the pope his father, & of the Venetians, the king of France, *Lewis* the 12. passed into Italie, and so soone as he arrived at Millaine, hee gave succours to the Pope to subiugate Romania, which straight was reduced under the hands of *Borgia*, for the reputation of the French puissance. Secondly, because at Rome there were two mightie factions, the Colonoise, and the Vrsine, against whose enterprises he feared they would oppose themselves, hee got on his side the Vrsine faction by faire words and promises, by the meanes whereof, he beat downe the French forces, and overthrew the Colonois: This being done, he gained the gentlemen, as well of the one faction as of the other, honestly according them, retaining them in his house, giving them governments of townes, and other honorable charges, after their merits and qualities: insomuch, as within a little time the Vrsine and Colonois faction remained without chieftaine. After this, by faire and sweet words, accompanied with good presents, he caused the Vrsines to come to him unto Synagyllia, which being once together in his hands, he slew them all. Having thus suppressed those two Factions, and seeing himselfe peaceably possessed of all Romania and the dutchie of Vrbino; to make himselfe feared, & to repress the insolencies of the pettie lords of that countrey, he sent thither, for governour, *Messiere Remiro Dorco* (a severe and cruell man) unto whom he gave full power: Who

exer-



exercising his crueltie, committed many executions, by meanes whereof, he with feare made all the countrey tremble, and so, as peaceable and obedient as might be. What then did *Borgia*? To make the world beleeve, that such cruell executions were not done by his commaund nor by his consent, suddainly he caused publickly the head of *Messiere Remiro* to be cut off. After this, being afraid of the Frenchmen, he refused any more to be served with the French forces; so he put them away, and to assure himselfe against them, he sought alliance with the Spaniards, which then made warre in the kingdome of Naples, and so were farther off to hurt him, than the French which abode at Millaine. Besides all this, he put to death all the lords which he had wronged, and all their generation, and verie few escaped; least a new Pope after his father, should take occasion to warre upon him, to reestablishe those lords, or their posteritie, in their heritage: and as for the lords which he had not offended, he drew them almost all on his side, to helpe him to bridle a new Pope, that hee might not enterprise any thing against him: his purpose was to make himselfe lord of all Tuscan, and after lord of all Italie: And alreadie hee had under his protection Pise and Sienna, and Luca enclined unto him. But Pope *Alexander* his father died, and failed him at his need, so that his domination beeing yet as a thing hanging in the ayre, which was nothing solide, Pope *Innius* the eleventh easily dispoiled him. *Borgia* seeing that fortune (which before had shewed him so good a countenance) turned her backe, and proved so maligne and contrarie unto him, fell sicke and died; and upon his death bed he said; Hee had prevented and thought upon all inconueniences that might happen unto him but death, which hee never supposed would so soone have come.



Is not here a gallant life, and a goodly historie to propose, for princes to imitate, or rather a marke of Gods just judgement, which we see, he ordinarily exerciseth against such detestable tyrants, which by all maner of cruelties and disloyalties seeke to dominie: For God in the end, brings all their dissignes and goodly enterprises into smoke, and makes them die in languishment and confusion, and in displeasure, that they have ever lived to see themselves false into a mockery and reproch with all the world, by their wicked enterprises. Yet this is not all, for dying full of all vices, not grieved for the evils they have done, but rather, for that they had no meanes nor leisure to doe more mischief, they depart from this languishing life, to goe suffer eternal paines, by the just judgement of God, who yeeldeth to the wicked

persevering in their vices, the reward of their merit. Is not this wicked *Borgia* a faire example to us (who at his death confesseth, that he thought not to have lived so little a while) to admonish us, to be alwaies readie prepared to appeare before God? *Horace* himself an heathen poet, teacheth us to make no assurance upon the time to come, neither to set our care and hope thereon, when he saith:

*God covers, as with night obscure,  
Alwaies the end of lifeasure;  
And laughes to see afraid the man,  
Of that which no wayes see he can:  
Of time present be carefull then;  
All other things do flis from men,  
As water in the river.*

*Hor. lib. 3.  
car. Ode. 29.*

*Sabellicus  
Enrad. 10.  
lib. 9. and  
Enrad. 11.  
lib. 2.*

But to understand the goodly patterne which this Atheist proposeth here for a prince to imitate, I thinke it good a little more amply to discoure the life and genealogie of *Caesar Borgia*: He was a bastard sonne of Pope *Alexander* the sixt, but it is likely he legitimated him: for according to the cannon law, the Pope may legitimate the bastards of other priests, and by consequent also his owne. This Pope by nation was a Spaniard, and before he was Pope, called himselfe *Roderic Borgia*: but coming to the Popedom, he took the name of *Alexander*; that hee and his son, carrying the names of two of the most victorious monarches that ever were (that is, of *Alexander* the great, and *Iulius Caesar*) they might make all the world tremble under them: He came to the Popedom by the art of Nigromancie, as some have written which say he made a composition with the divell, which appeared to him in the forme of a protonotarie; but others write, he came to it by silver, in buying cardinals voices. *Philip de Comines* (one of that time) saith, that he came to it by silver; as also *Iovinianus Pontanus*, who writ this Epigramme.

*Christ, Sacraments, altars are sold by Alexander Pope,  
He bought them very deare, he deare then may sell them I hope.*

But it is not much respective I hope, whether he came to the Popedom by Nigromancie, or by silver: for it is not impossible, but hee might come to it by both. This *Roderic*, besides the said *Caesar* had many other bastards, and especially one, which in the night time, during his lascivious whoring in the towne of Rome, was massacred, and the next morning his bodie was found in a sack, cast into Tiber, and it was never knowne who did it: Hee had also a bastard daughter called *Lucrece*, which (either for that hee avowed her not for his, or otherwise) was married to one of his bastards, yet entertained by him, as *Pontanus* writeth:

*Here lyeth shee that Lucrece is by name,  
But Thais is indeed, also by fame:  
Pope Alexanders daughter in law she is,  
His wife most vile, his daughter eke I wis.*

But above all his other bastards, hee most singularly loved that *Caesar Borgia*, in-  
somuch

Great and  
vaine del-  
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*Cesar Borgia*

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ces are so detestable, that the users of them cannot but light on the like end, that *Borgia* did. First, because God customably doth so reward such wicked tyrants: Secondly, because it ordinarily commeth to passe, that they are greatly hated of every one; insomuch as every man guards himselfe from them, as from a furious beast, & the first that can get him at advantage, thinkes he doth good to the common weale, when he riddeth him from the world; yea, each man watcheth to catch him in his snare: Therefore no man will give a prince, so daungerous and detestable counsell, as to use *Borgia* for a paterne of imitation; unlesse he would carrie him unto the top and fulnesse of all wickednesse and cruell tyrannie, which seemeth to bee the end whereat *Machiavel* aimeth, as we shall see more at large hereafter.

But whereas *Borgia* (saith he) caused the head to be taken from *Messier Romiro Dorco*, the executioner of his crueltie; I confesse it was true, and avow, that hee did well therein: For if *Messier Romiro*, would excuse himselfe and say, that his maister *Borgia* commaunded him to do such cruell executions, that were no good excuse, because hee should rather have forsaken his estate and government, than to commit cruelties, without any forme of justice, against the law of God and reason. The civile lawes themselves willeth, that none should obey his prince, when he commaundeth any massacre or unjust slaughter, till thirtie dayes bee past after the command; that in the mean time either their friends, or the magistrate, may persuaide the prince to pacifie his choller, and to hearken unto reason. And because the law hereupon made by the emperour *Gratian*, *Theodosius*, and *Valentinian*, is worthy to bee marked, I doe thus translate it: If it happen that hereafter (say they) wee command any rigorous vengeance contrarie to our accustomed maner against any, we will not that straight they suffer punishment, nor that our command be straight way executed: but that the execution surcease the space of thirtie dayes, and that in the meane time, the magistrate keepe the prisoner safely: Given at Verone the fifteenth of the kalends of September, in the yeare of the consulship of *Antonius* and *Syagrius*. It is then seene by this law, that *Messier Romiro* was justly punished, as a man too prompt and forward to execute crueltie: And if this law had beene well observed in Fraunce, there had not beene found so many, and such rash massacres, but the commonwealth had beene in farre better estate, and the meanes of peace more facile and easie.

True patterns which a prince ought to propose to imitate.

Moreover, the prince which will propose one man alone as his patterne, and exemplar to imitate, hee shall finde many, which have beene as vertuous as *Caesar Borgia* was vicious: But seeing the greatest and most excellent persons at all times, were ever men, that is to say, not every way absolute, but defectuous & vicious some way; it is best therefore that a prince do adiect himselfe to imitate all vertuous men in generall, and each of them in their particular vertues: As if we speake of heathen princes, hee may propose to imitate the clemencie of *Julius Caesar* in using his victorie: for hee ever simply contented himselfe to vanquish, without crueltie, & without bloodshed, as farre as he could: He may propose to follow the moderation of *Augustus Caesar* in the government of the commonweale, and his diligence to establish peace, in the whole Romane Empire: For he never omitted any thing, which might bee a meane to bring all the world to peace and tranquillitie after the civile wars; and he managed the commonweale with such moderation, as it seemed rather a civile government, than a monarchie: He had also another vertue, well worthie of imitation: for he was a good justicer, and himselfe not only dealt in making laws and ordi-

ordinances according to the rules of justice, but also he himselfe often heard mens causes, and judged them their right: hee was also a lover of learned men, and of knowledge, and greatly rewarded them; and these vertues of *Augustus*, were fit for a prince to imitate. The bountie & lenity of *Traianus*; the love of peace in *Pius*; the deepe wisdome, the humanitie and facilitie to pardon, and the love and studie of good letters in *Marcus Antonine*, are also worthy vertues for a prince to follow. But without any longer stay upon Paynim princes, which had not the knowledge of Christian religion, a prince shall find sufficient to imitate, yea, and not to goe farther than the kings of France. *Charlemaine* was as generous and victorious, as ever was *Caesar*; yet besides this, hee was very liberall towards good people, a prince continent, gentle, facile to pardon enemies, and endowed with a singular pietie & feare of God; For he caused ordinarily the Bible and *S. Augustine* to bee read unto him; and nourished poore people in his palace, which sometimes served himselfe at the table. Saint *Lewis* was a good and wise king, fearing God, and a good justicer; for hee often sent into all his provinces commissaries, to bee informed of the abuses, covetousnesse, and rapines of magistrates, and caused them which were found faultie, to be well punished. Wee read one thing of him, not unworthy to bee remembered, That one day as he was praying unto God, reciting certaine petitions of the psalmes of *David*, fit for that action, one comes sodainely unto him, to desire a pardon for one that had committed a fault, which was death by law, hee as sodainely graunted it; but straight falling into a verse of the psalme, which saith: *Beati qui faciunt Iustitiam in omni tempore*, Blessed are they which doe justice at all times: hee immediately called him againe, unto whom hee had graunted the said pardon, and revoked it, with this notable sentence: That the prince which may punish a crime, and doth it not, is as culpable himselfe as hee that committed it; and that it is a worke of pietie, and not of crueltie to do justice: Besides he was very chaste, far from all lubricitie, and never thirsted after revenge. *Charles le Sage* was a very benigne & humble prince, who did nothing but by well digested counsell without rashnesse, loving the good and safetie of his subiects, hee was also a prince that very much feared God, he tooke great delight in reading the Bible, & would his people should read it, and to that end, hee caused it to bee translated into French. The Prince then which will determine with himselfe, onely to imitate those three kings, in the afore-said vertues, certainly he shall have for himselfe a true pattern and example, such as Christian princes ought to have, & not to propose to himselfe this bastard priests sonne, who was a very monster, and an exemplar of all wickednesse: I name him a bastard, because according to the divine and civile law, hee was not legitimate, although by the cannon law, the Pope may legitimate priests bastards, and by consequent his owne, as hath beene above touched. Yet notwithstanding this question is not without doubt, whether the Pope can legitimate his owne bastards: and the reason of the doubt is, because the doctors of law hold, That legitimation is an act & exercise of jurisdiction: But it is an undoubted Maxime, that none can exercise jurisdiction in his owne deed; & therefore it seemeth, that the illation doth not evill conclude, That the Pope cannot legitimate his owne bastards. But seeing wee are entred into this talke, we will deeper looke into the matter, to draw out some good resolution, from this question, by the way onely of a tentative and pleasant disputation, and not of a full determination hereof: For as *Cato* saith amongst serious things ioyous and mery things would be sometimes mixed.

Question if  
the pope  
can legiti-  
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Vpon

Vpon this question then, namely, Whether the Pope can legitimate his own bastards: there do appeare unto us many strong and ample arguments, as wel in law, as in speculative Theologie, and as well for the affirmative, as the negative. For, on the affirmative, they alledge that by law and right of nature it is given to man to procreate his like; so that when the Pope exerciseth the act of procreation, therein he doth nothing which agreeth not with the law of nature: This for the first. Secondly they alledge that Popes are called fathers, and therefore they ought to have children, for the name of father is relative to the name of the son, & one of them cannot be without the other. Thirdly it is a point altogether peremptorie, and such as no reply can be made against it, namely, that by the canons and papall constitutions, it is expressly determined, that the Pope ought to be garnished and furnished with genitories, otherwise he were incapable and unable to bee Pope, by the disposition of law, without any other declaration. In so much as if there happen so great a mischief and unhappy hap to Christendome, as by adventure they elect an eunuch Pope, all whatsoever hee doth were nothing woorth, nor of any value; so that his bulls and collations of benefices, his dispensations, fulminations, aggravations, pardons, legitimations, and other like provisions should have no strength, vigor, nor effect: which is an admirable point in law, to say that a privation of genitories should induce a nullitie of bulls, as if the Popes power depended altogether upon his genitories: But hereof some yeeld this reason, because (say they) eunuches commonly are effeminate, having neither the force nor power which naturall men have, so that it should not be found strange, that the canons will, that the Pope must be accounted without force & power, when he is without genitories. Others whom this reason satisfieth not, do say, That the canons in this place containe a right positive; & whatsoever hath been constituted by a positive right, a reason cannot be rendered of it; and that we must content our selves and be satisfied, that it hath beene so ordained, That the Pope ought to have genitories, without further enquiring the reason thereof: Yet if it were requisit to yeeld a reason of that constitution, wee must rather say, it was ordained, to shut the gate of the Popedome from Papeesses or she Popes, which otherwise might have crept into that holy seat, as the Papeesse *Joan* did. But out of this doctrine of the canons, which importeth, That all Popes ought to bee furnished with genitories, men draw out corolaries & consequences, which marvellously serve to the confirmation of the affirmative of our question: For if it bee so, say the canonists, that it is requisit by a necessitie, that the Pope must have genitories; it followeth, that it is for some end and use: For it were very absurd to say, that by the canon law, any thing hath beene ordained without any end, because all humane actions are done to some end and utilitie, and by consequent (with stronger reason) the ordinances of the canon law ought to tend to some end: But it is so, that genitories can serve for nothing but for generation; and therefore it followeth, that the Pope ought to use them to that worke. And if any object, that he ought to use them for generation in the estate of marriage; the replie to overthrow it, is very ready, founded upon the universall vow of the Catholicke Romane Church, whereby all Ecclesiasticall persons (and especially the Pope, chiefe of them) have made a vowe never to be married: If then it be not lawfull for the Pope by the doome of the Catholike Romane Church to be married, as also by canonicall constitutions, it is of necessitie that he have genitories (which he cannot have but for some use) it necessarily followeth, that he may and ought to have bastards. This argument may be reduced



reduced under the first forme of the first figure of Syllogismes in *Barbara*; which (as the Logicians say) of all other are the best concluding arguments. But (say they) taking now this conclusion for a cleare and well approved Maxime, that the Pope by disposition of right ought to have bastards; wee shall easily come to the affirmative of our question: For they are called legitimate children, which are procreated after the ordinance and permission of law and right, and therefore the Popes bastards shall be found alreadie legitimate from their creation; but much more, when farther the Pope himselfe (which can doe all in all) legitimateth them: For this legitimation is a superabundant act, which cannot but serve, and at the least cannot hurt; because that which is abundant, impaireth not the rest; and that each act ought to be taken to some end and profitable operation.

They which hold the negative part of our question, have other contrarie arguments. The Pope (say they) is bound, as other Ecclesiasticall people are, to the generall vow of the Church, and therefore he ought to observe the vow as well as others; especially, that he may be a good example to other Priests: For if the Pope (who commonly is an oldman) dispence with himselfe to have bastards, and doe breake chastitie and continencie required in the Priestly order; what an example should that be for a companie of young priests, which are idle and at their ease? To say that nature hath given men genitories for procreation, it is true (say they;) but they must be used in marriage: And if that be a good reason, we may then say, that it is lawfull for all Priests to breake the vow of chastitie: But the truth is contrarie: For none ought to make himselfe Priest, nor to bind himselfe unto that vow, unlesse he know in himselfe a power to observe it. To say also, that Popes are called fathers, this is true (say they) but it must be understood spirituall fathers, not carnall fathers: And whereas by the holy decrees it is ordained, That the Pope ought to have genitories, that is to shew (say they) that he is a perfect man, having all his members, as it is requisite he have: And when that decree was made, that the Pope should have genitories, wee must not understand thereby a dispensation from the vow of the universall Church, whereunto he remaineth alwaies tied and bound: For by the Cannons, the Pope cannot dispence against a statute and ordinance of the universall Church: So that by consequent (say they) he cannot have bastards, which are not alwaies bastards and illegitimate; and he cannot justly legitimate them, because hee cannot exercise an act of jurisdiction in his owne cause or action. These are the reasons of such as hold the negative part of our question. True it is, that they accord well, that by plenitude of power, the Pope may legitimate his owne bastards, when hee expressly declareth, that he will have it so of his full and absolute power: and herein all the Canonists agree. For when they speake of the fulnesse of the Popes power, they speake as of a deepe pit, which is bottomlesse, from whence none can come out, when they are once in, no more than if a man were sunke into some unmeasurable and infinit deepe gulf of the sea: For they hold, that it is an infinite thing, which hath neither end nor beginning, neither up nor downe, neither banke nor bottome, neither middest nor extremitie: yet without wading too far in it, we will speake a little thereof something merrily: for the matter is pleasant ynough, as it hath beene handled of the Doctors of the facultie of Theologie, which doe not well accord in this point with the Canonists and Decretists.

We must then presuppose and understand, that there is an old and ancient question, which is not yet decided for want of a judge, that is, Which is the great master, the

Of the power of the Pope and of their Councils.

the Counsell or the Pope. This question hath been many times disputed upon, but it could never find a competent judge to dissolve it: For who durst take upon him to judge the Pope, seeing kings and emperours are his subjects and vassales (as hee saith) and doe owe him obedience, and are bound to hold his bridle and stirrups, when he mounteth on horsebacke? The subject and inferior cannot be a judge over his lord and superiour, this is certaine: And in deed there was never found king nor superiour, which durst enterprise to end that strife betwixt the Pope and the Counsell: so that untill this day it remaineth undecided: yet during this said strife and contention, the Cannonists have alwaies firmly held their opinion, which is, that the Pope is the greatest master; but the Doctors of the facultie of Theologie have held and practised the contrarie, that the Councell is chiefe master: The Cannonist doctors doe found upon many reasons, which seeme not to bee weake, nor evill, to such as will not examine things too subtilly: For (say they) the Pope and the Councell represent God and the Church; and even as God is above the Church, so the Pope ought to be above the Councell: Moreover, a certaine thing it is, that every Councell is compounded of men in kind (I doe discreetly say, in kind, to cut off an objection, namely, that the Councell might be composed of beasts in wit and knowledge: ) But the Pope is more than a man, and by consequent is greater than the Councell. As for this point, that the Pope is more than a man, there need no doubt be made therof: for there are expresse texts ynough in the Cannon law, which hold and resolve it in proper termes: These Cannonist doctors also hold upon this point, That the Pope is neither God nor man: not that therefore they meane, that hee is a beast, but that there is a certaine thing betwixt them, which is more than a man, and lesse than God. The third argument of the Cannonists, is, that they say: That the Pope representeth the great and chiefe shepheard, and the Councell the pettie and underling shepheards; and that therefore the Pope must needs be above the Councell, as the head shepheard is above inferiour shepheards. The fourth argument is, because the keyes of Paradice were given to S. Peter, who after left them unto the Popes his successors, not to the Councell: So that (say they) if the Pope would rigorously deale with them of the Councell, he would not suffer them to enter into Paradice; for, to enter into it, we must only speake unto him, seeing he only carieth the keyes thereof; yet he will not do his worst unto them, although they give him great occasions, calling themselves greater masters than he.

The doctors of the facultie of Theologie (to sustaine the contrarie, and to make appeare, that the Councell is greater than the Pope) use many subtile and speculative arguments, into which every man cannot enter, for their great subtiltie: for when they speake of this matter, they seeme to beat, into as smal dust as Epicures Atomes, the subtilties of S. Thomas de Aquin, and Scotus: For they distinguish the Pope from the papaltie, and say, that there is a spirituall papaltie, and a potestative papaltie, and that both of them are not alwaies concurrent in one papall subject. For the spirituall papaltie may be deficient in the subject, by a defectuositie of science, and the potestative by a defectuositie in the election: After this, they give many limitations to the said double papaltie, according to which, they say the Popes power and actions ought to be governed. But without entring into these so subtile arguments, out of which I cannot dispatch my selfe with credit, I will only touch such as may best be comprehended of men of meane understanding. They first say, that the Councell may create and depose the Pope, as hath been many times scene; therefore the

C. quarto.  
et sim. ex  
de translat.  
Episcopi.

the Counsell is greater than the Pope: for hee that hath power over another, to make and unmake, must needs be the greater master. Secondly, they say, the Counsell representeth the universall Church, which cannot erre in faith: and the Popes have often erred in faith, and amongst them have beene found many heretickes, which for such have been condemned in Counsels: and therefore men ought rather to preferre the Counsell, which cannot erre, before the Pope, which is subject unto error. They also say, that even after the Cannons themselves, the Pope alone cannot decide the articles and differences of faith, but that it appertaineth to the Counsell; and therefore that the Counsell which hath a more excellent power, than the Pope, must needs be reputed greater than hee. Fourthly, the Pope, although he be president of the Counsell, yet he neither hath nor ought to have but one voice, no more than a simple bishop; and therefore all the body of the Counsell must needs be more than hee, as the body of a court of parliament is more than one of the presidents thereof. Fifthly, they say, that when our Lord promised to give the keyes of paradise, hee said thus: I will give you the keyes of the kingdome of heaven: Here you must note, that he speaketh in the plurall number, addresseing his speech to many, namely to all his Apostles, not to S. Peter alone, and he speaketh also of many keyes, which can be in no lesse number than two, seeing there is a plurall number: but these two keyes, are the keyes of knowledge, and the key of power, whereof the first belongeth to the Counsell properly, yet the Pope beareth them both in his armes: without the key of knowledge, they say the other is not to bee accounted of, neither can in any sort open the gate of Paradise, for the doubtful crookes and bendings of the inward parts of the locke, and the hidden bolts thereof, which cannot be opened, but by the key of knowledge: insomuch, as seeing the Counsell holdeth the principall key, it followeth, that it is greater master than the Pope. These are in summe the cheefe arguments of these doctors, that I remember at this present: But besides these arguments, there is also a practise held in that cause, as well by all princes as universities, which have ordinarily judged and practised, that the Counsell is above the Pope: As in the time of king *Philip le bel*, the fourth of that name, Pope *Boniface* the eight made a Decretall, whereby he generally forbad all emperours, kings, and princes of Christendome to levie any tribute upon the cleargie, upon paine of a present excommunication, without any other commissance or declaration: The king, because this was against his priviledges, (by the advice of his Counsell, the prelates of his countrey, and the facultie of Theologie of Paris) appealed from the Pope, as inferior, to the first future Counsell, as superior. Likewise, in the time of Pope *Alexander* the fift, who would needs levie tenthes upon the French cleargie, it was resolved by all the universitie of Paris likewise, to appeale from him and his bul to the first generall Counsell. And to be short, appellations have been common from the Pope as inferior, to the Counsell as superior: And indeed, the doctors in Theologie hold all determinately this Theorique, That the Counsell is greater than the Pope: yea, some Theologians have gone so farre, as to say, that men may well be without the Pope.

By the abovesaid discourse is scene, that our masters of Theologie have desired to circumscribe the infinite plenitude of the Popes power, by giving him a master, and a superior; namely, the Counsell, to keepe him within his limits. But I finde his power cut much shorter by other meanes: and first, upon this generall rule, *The Pope may doe all*; they adde a condition and moderation thus: *Clave non errante*, Provided,

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Annal upon  
Anno 1296.  
Aust. lib. 1.  
cap. 67.

1. Limit of  
the Popes  
power.



ded, that the key do not erre. This is a moderation right pleasant, which comprehendeth as much or more than the rule it selfe: For if you will search the bulls, ordinances, and dispositions of the Pope, you shall not find one which containeth not some derogation from law and right: which derogation & repugnancie from right, the Pope doth, by vertue of his power, and because it so pleaseth him: So that according to the said condition, laid downe by the divines, we may wel say, such bulls are of no value, because they containe an error in law, against which the Pope hath no strength, according to that saying, *Clave non errante*. Likewise, by the same moderation and restriction it may be said, that a great part of the Cannons and Decretals are nothing worth, because they are derogatorie from the divine law, or equitie, and naturall reason; or els, because by these Cannons and Decretals, there is added to the holy Scripture, which God hath forbidden: The key then of Popes being thus falsified in so many sorts and manners (as every day it is) there can little good remain in any thing the Pope hath ever done or yet doth, but all or the most part shalbe nothing for want of power, which is the greatest nullitie that is.

2. Limita-  
tion.

There is yet another restriction or exception from the foresaid rule, which Saint *Thomas de Aquin* maintaineth firmly & stoutly, that is: He saith, That the Pope may do all things, but except that he can make no new articles of the Faith: This is an exception, which stretcheth far and wide, & much diminisheth the infinit power of the Pope: For if it be true, that he can make no new articles of faith, it followeth that we ought not to beleve nor give credit to any thing the Pope hath invented himselfe: and so we ought simply to hold our selfe to the word of God, and not to looke to any additions, subtractions, nor multiplications of the Pope: Wherefore by *Thomas* his limitation, what precepts soever are added to the Decalogue, as this; *Dominicus diebus missas audire*, On Sundaies heare Masses and such like, are utterly to be rejected: And generally, all that the Popes have ordained, which is contrarie, or in any manner repugnant from any place of holy Scripture, must be cast off as a new article of the faith. For we must as wel in deed as with the mouth, confesse and beleve al that is contained in the old and new Testament, and all the verses generally of the whole Bible ought to bee unto us so many articles of the Faith; although there are some more principall and necessarie than others: inso much, as all the Popes doctrine, which repugneth the least verse of the Scripture, is to be rejected as a new article of the faith, by the said exception of *S. Thomas*.

3. Limita-  
tion.

Besides the two foresaid limitations, there is yet another very common amongst the Theologians and Canonists: For herein do they agree, That an hereticke Pope hath no power nor ought to have any obedience yeilded unto him. This hath often served for a mean to cut off and to limit the Popes power: For ever when he waxed too wild, furious, and troublesome to the world, then would they cast him this bone to gnaw on, to say, *Thou art an hereticke*; and so was hee often abandoned, so that none made any account of him: as it happened to Pope *Benedict* of Avignon, successor of *Clement* the sixth: For this *Benedict* sent bulls to the king of France, whereby he flatly excommunicated the king and all his realme, because the king would not suffer silver to goe out of France into Avignon: the abovesaid king had his recourse to the Vnivertsie of Paris, and especially to our masters of the facultie of Theologie, which straight concluded and resolved, That Pope *Benedict* was an heretike unworthie the name of a Pope, and that men ought not to obey him, his bulls being of no value, as grauted by one without all power: and therefore according to that resolution,

olution, the said bulls were rent and torne in pieces, and all obedience denied the Pope. You may demaund why this Pope was called an hereticke: I answer, that I know not, for our hystorians have not set downe in what articles of the Faith he erred: And it may be, that of purpose they imposed the name of an hereticke, and not because he was so, for he knew nothing of the Scriptures, neither knew he what the name of an hereticke meant: yet for such was hee accounted and pronounced, although he knew no Theologie, nor had ever seene any thing of the Bible, but onely that which is drawne out of it, and inserted in the Missall and Breviarie: He was also a reasonable good clarke in the Cannons, yet not one of the profoundest therein, but he knew sufficient for his provision. Likewise, the Pope *Boniface*, of whome wee have before spoken, was declared an hereticke by the said Vniversitie and facultie of Theologie, not that he erred in the Faith (for it was a thing whereof hee had little care) but because he would needs enterprise upon the kings priviledges: But as soone as he was declared an hereticke, all the kingdome of France retired from his obedience. Pope *Julius* the second, was not declared an hereticke by the Vniversitie, because they thought it better so to proove him in Itaile at a Counsell there, that so Italic it selfe might also withdraw from his obedience: And indeed (do the Pope what he could) a Counsell was held at Pise, where he was endicted for an heretike, but he died before the sentence was given. Briefely, of old it was a good and gentle meanes to bridle the unmeasurable power of the Pope, to declare and descrie him for an hereticke: Our masters also of that time (I know not what they do now) defined an hereticke to be he, which either in fact or opinion doth contrarie to the doctrine of the Church: So it was very easie to convince Popes of heresie: for although they maintained no opinions contrarie to the doctrine of the Catholike Romane faith, yet no doubt they did many things reprehensible by that doctrine; and that sufficed straight to make them hereticke.

You have heretofore understood the controversie betwixt the Pope & the Counsell, and how the Counsels favorers & partakers have often beaten down the Popes hornes, and cut his come. Now will I recite, how that the Pope got a good revenge once: It was in the year 1437, when Pope *Eugenius* the fourth held the Romane seat: At that time a Counsell was kept at Basil, by which amongst other things, it was decreed, That *Eugenius* should loose his Popedom, & in his place should come *Ame de Savoy*, called Pope *Felix*, who a little before had resigned to his son *Lewis* his dutchie, lands, and seignories to become an hermite at Ripaille, a solitarie place in Chablais. This Pope beeing chosen, *Eugenius* begun straight to cause very rigorous bulls to be published against him, and anathematized him, if hee continued to call himselfe Pope. *Felix* the new Pope stood stiffe, and all the Counsell for him, which was translated from Basil into the towne of Geneva, where this Pope held his seat, and from thence dispatched as forcible bulls against *Eugenius*, & made no account of his anathematizations, but hoped well that hee should remaine master and head of the Church (at the least on this side the mounts) if once he could place his seat at Avignon, as other Popes had done: But because he placed his seat at Geneva, the king of Fraunce would not depart from the obedience of *Eugenius* Pope of Rome, although he something enclined to the Counsell of Basil, and approved the resolutions made there. Moreover, hee did somuch, that in the end hee agreed Pope *Felix* with Pope *Nicholas*, successor of *Eugenius*, in the year 1447: And Pope *Felix* contented himselfe to be the Popes perpetuall vicar in Savoy, after hee had

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enjoyed

*Manitrel.*  
lib. 2. cap.  
221, 237.  
lib. 3. cap. 5.  
103, 112.

Pope *Felix*  
sate at Ge-  
neva.

*Felix* late  
Pope at  
Geneva.

enjoyed tenne yeares the Popedom; having alwayes his seat at Geneva, as well of Pope, as of the Popes great perpetuall vicar. And after this concord made, *Felix* acknowledged Pope *Nicholas* for true Pope, as also did all they which had elected *Felix*, & remained with him at Geneva: Therefore from that time forward was there no Pope at Geneva, neither would they of Geneva receive any into their citie again as I heare. And for as much as the Pragmaticke sanction (which were certaine articles touching the matter of benefices, which were resolved upon in the said Counsell) greatly diminished the Popes revenues, and the Bullists and Datances at Rome; the Pope never ceased, till he had abolished it in Fraunce, by the meanes of a bishop of Arras, a great favourite of the kings, whome the Pope made Cardinall, giving him a red hat in recompence of his paines. So from that time was abolished the said Pragmaticke, which had endured and was after a sort observed & kept in France for the space of thirtie yeares, to the great discontentment of the nobles and of such as were rich (who could not so easily and fitly, whilest the Pragmaticke lasted, abuse the Popes bulls and indulgences) as they did before and since. True it is, that whilest the Pragmaticke was in force (which favored learned men) the noble and rich men by quirkes and litigious contentions of law, so troubled the poore graduates, that they were commonly repelled from the fittest benefices: for officers of justice have commonly more respect to the money of the rich, than to the learning of the poore: and they found it an unseemely thing, to give to some poore master of art, or to some bachelour or doctor in Theologie, an abbey or bishoprick of ten or twentie thousand pounds a yeare: They thought such fat & pleasant morsels were not for men of base qualities, which had not used to keepe abbots and bishops tables in Sorbonne, or other colledges. Therefore that rule of equitie, which wils, that poore & base men should not soare & mount so high, as they might become too rich, and so destroy and corrupt themselves, caused our master of the parliament still to drive away all poore masters of Art, bachelours, doctors, and licentiates in Theologie, and in the Decrees, from great and fat benefices, notwithstanding the Pragmatick sanction, but they maintained them to enjoy cures, chapels, monachall portions, and other little prebends of small revenue: And surely, this equitie of the courts of parliament was great and admirable: For they considered, that there is nothing that corrupteth more, vertuous men, nor that sooner causeth them to be idle & given to voluptuousnesse and other vices, than the great abundance of goods and riches; and that there is nothing more proud than a base proud man, which suddainly ascendeth into some great degree of honour and riches: And therefore esteemed they, that it was more expedient to give the good and rich benefices to noble and rich people, than to these poore and base masters of art, and doctors, Sorbonnists and Decretists: for these would but have been corrupted and made proud thereby, and the noble and rich men could not have been more corrupted, neither prouder than they were already. But finally, the Pragmaticke having been after a sort practised and used by the space of thirtie yeares, it was quashed and abolished by king *Charles* the seventh: And a certaine time after, Pope *Pius* the second (who in poesie had before beene another *Ronsard*, and was called also *Aeneas Silvius*) utterly condemned to all reproch, the poore pragmaticke sanction, namely, to bee publickely trailed and drawne through the streets of the towne of Rome, in token and signe of irrisiō, ignominie, and infamie thereof, and of the Counsell that made it, which so durst fasten himselfe unto the Popes



Popes sanctitie : After sentence was pronounced, this poore Pragmaticke was ignominiously drawne through the towne of Rome: And there might you have seene all the Dotaries, Bullists, Copists, and Notaries, about the court of Rome, leape, daunce, laugh, gibe, and mocke at this poore Pragmaticke, in revenge of the losses and damages which they had by it sustained. And heerein truly the Counsell received a great checke, which made it well appeare to the Pope, That hee was greater master than the Counsell, whatsoever our masters, *Occham*, *Gingencours*, and *Gerson* have said, written and maintained to the contrary, and whatsoever all the facultie of Theologie have resolved, that the Counsell is greater than the Pope.

The Pope not onely saith he is greater than the Counsell, but also, than all the kings and emperours of the world, as is proved by many of the Popes Cannons and Decretals: and therefore, upon this point it is not amisse to rehearse the storie of Pope *Innocent* the third, and of an emperour of Constantinople, which raigned about the yeare 1200. This Pope had written certaine letters unto that emperour, whereby he rebuked, and spoke to him as to his varlet: The emperour made him a modest answer, sending him word, That hee was much abashed, that hee should write unto him in so loftie and imperious a stile, and that therein hee observed not the comandement of Saint *Peter* his predecessor, who wils and enjoynes all persons to obey and be subiect unto the king, as to the most excellent, and unto magistrates under him, his deputies: concluding by this place, That the Pope ought to acknowledge himselfe to be subiect unto the emperour, and not so bravely to speake to him, as to his inferiour. But Pope *Innocent* failed not to frame him this answer: Thy imperiall sublimitie marvelleth that wee durst rebuke thee, because thou hast read in *S. Peter*, prince of the Apostles, That every man ought to be subiect unto the king, as to the most excellent, and to magistrotres, by him established: But thou hast not well considered the person of him that speaketh: For the Apostle writeth to his subjects, That in all humilitie they will yeld him obedience: and when he sayth, to the king, as the most excellent, it must be understood of the temporaltie: for without doubt, the Pope in spirituall things is the more excellent, and is so much the more to be preferred before kings and emperours, as the soule is to be preferred before the bodie: And if thou haddest read that which is written of the sacerdotall and priestly prerogative, thou mightest better have knowne this: for it is written, Behold I have appointed thee over nations and kingdoms, that thou mayest root out, dissipate, build, and plant: Thou oughtest also further to know, That God hath placed in the firmament of Heaven two great lights, the Sunne to lighten the day, and the Moone to lighten the night: Likewise for the firmament of Heaven, that is, for the universall Church, God hath made two lights, that is to say, two powers, namely, the Papall, which lighteneth the day, and that is spirituall things: and the Royall or imperiall, which lighteneth the night, that is to say, terrene and earthly things: If then thy emperiall greatnesse did well vnderstand theserthings, thou shouldest know as great difference to bee betwixt us and thee, as is betwixt the Sunne and the Moone: and that kings and emperours are subiect under the Pope, as the Moone is under the Sunne. Behold in summe Pope *Innocents* answer unto the emperour of Constantinople; which containeth a profound Theologicall exposition, to make flies laugh. About this time there were also erected and set up in the Church two strong pillars of the

Papall power and doctrine; namely, the orders of the begging Friers, and the Decretals.

For the last point which we wil touch of the Popes power, shall bee that which the learned Poet *George Buchanan* saith, who speaking of this matter, toucheth the white: for he saith, That the ancient governors of Rome (which were kings, consuls, and emperours) have subjugated and vanquished both earth and sea; but that this was nothing, or small in regard of the moderne dominators of Rome, which are the Romane Bishops: For the first bishops of Rome, as *S. Peter*, *S. Clement*, and certaine others, by their good and holy life gained heaven and paradise, which is already more than the earth and the sea, which the old Romanes conquered: But what have the last Bishops done, as Pope *Gregorie* the seventh, *Boniface* the eight, *Silvester* the second, *Julius* the second, *John* the two and twentieth, *Alexander* the sixt the father of *Cesar Borgia* above mentioned, and other Popes their like: they have done more than their predecessor bishops, or the ancient kings, emperours, or consuls of Rome: for they have valiantly conquered hell (saith *Buchanan*) and have made themselves masters and peaceable possessors thereof, notwithstanding all the forces and resistance of *Pluto* and all his sequell, which would not suffer, that Popes should dominier in hel, but would only receive them as his vassales: But the chance hath happened contrarie, for the Pope is at this day, and hath beene long time, a peaceable dominator and lord of hell, and *Pluto* is no more but his vassale, and the simple executioner of his commandements, and as it were the gaoler of the Popes prisons: insomuch, as when at this day the Pope dispatcheth bulls of pardons, or croisadoes (as did Pope *Leo* the tenth in his time) he commandeth the angels of paradise to go seeke the soules of prisoners in hel (after once their rancome be paid) and *Pluto* and his officers to open their gates, and set them at libertie without contradiction, upon paine to loose their charges and estates: And thinke you that *Pluto* durst disobey one onely word of the Pope his soveraigne? It is very certaine, that he durst not once grunt nor contradict him any thing, but (all he can possible) maintaine his amitie, and to doe him all the services he can. Here is the substance of that which *Buchanan* speaketh of the Popes power, in these verses:

Popes have  
conquered  
hell.

*In alder time with yron sharpe, and by their navall warre,  
Old Rome subdued sea and land, though nigh it were, or farre:  
But after that, the Romane bishops soar'd to heaven on kie,  
By knowledge, bountie, patience eke, and their humilitie:  
No more remaines to their succeeding Popes, but only hell,  
Whereof possessors are they sure, they have it conquered well.*

8. *Maxime.*

*A Prince need not care to be accounted cruell, if so be that he can make himselfe obeyed thereby.*



*Cesar Borgia* (saith *Machiavell*) was reputed cruell, yet by his crueltie hee brought into order, and into his obedience the whole countrie of *Romania*. Wherefore the Prince need take no great care, to see himselfe reputed cruell, so that thereby he maintaine his people in a faithfull union and obedience. For the cruell and rigorous executions of a Prince, doe but privately hurt certaine particulars, which ought not to be feared; and the too great lenitie of a pitifull Prince, is the cause of infinite evils, which grow up and engender in their kingdomes; as murders, thefts, and other like: Inso-much as a man may well say, That a pitifull Prince is cause of more evils than a cruell Prince. The example of the emperour *Severus* may serve vs for prooffe hereof, for hee was verie cruell, and by his crueltie overcame *Albinus* and *Niger*, and the most part of their friends, and so wrought himselfe a peaceable empire, which hee long time held, being well obeyed, and revered of all the world.

Cap. 17. of  
a Prince.



Have heretofore shewed, how *Cesar Borgia*, by his crueltie obtained for enemies, almost all the Potentates of *Italie*, and thereby so well assured his estate, that incontinent as his father was dead, he was environed with enemies, destitute of friends, despoiled of the lands he had usurped, and constrained to hide himselfe to save his life. This tragicall issue accordeth not verie well with that which *Machiavell* here maintaineth, saying, That the crueltie of *Borgia*, was the cause that hee got the peaceable domination of *Romania*: For to say truth, it was not his crueltie (which easilie might have been resisted, *Borgia* of himselfe being without power) but it was the favour and feare of the Pope his father, who commanded the French powers, and made himselfe feared of all christian Princes. For at that time men feared more the popes simple bulls, than at this day they feare either the keys of *S. Peter*, or the sword of *S. Paul* (which he said hee had) or all his fulminations, excommunications, agravations, reagravations, interdicts, anathematizations, or all the forces and meanes hee can make. And who

*Borgia* was  
erected by  
the credit  
of his fa-  
ther, & not  
by his cru-  
eltie.



who would make account of all those at this day? seeing even the Romanes themselves make but a mocke of them. But in the time of *Alexander Borgia*, yea in the time of Pope *Iulius* the cleaventh his successor, all that the Pope would and ordained, was held of Christian Princes for an ordinance, as from the mouth of God, yea, even when the Pope ordained things manifestly wicked: as when *Iulius* delivered as a prey, the whole kingdome of France, and the lands of the kings allies. For the king of England, of Arragon, and the emperor *Maximilian*, beleevd all, that it was a sufficient cause to set upon the king and his allies, and that it was even as an expresse commandment of God. The world then, and even Princes, being so overtaken with that beastly superstition and follie, wee need not bee abashed, that *Cesar Borgia* had the meanes to possesse Romania, under the shadow and favour of the Pope his father, & that with the aide of the king of France: and it was plainly seene, that that good hap to subjugate Romania, proceeded from favour, and not from crueltie (as *Machiavell* saith) because as soone as that favour ceased, all his case was overthrowne, and it was straight seene that his utter ruine arived, as is said. I doe then maintaine cleane contrary from the Maxime of *Machiavell*, and say, That crueltie is a vice which ordinarily bringeth to Princes the ruine of them, and their estates, and that clemencie & gentlenesse is the true meanes, to maintaine and establish a Prince firme and assured in his estate.

For prooffe hereof, reasons are cleare and manifest: for we call crueltie, all executions which are committed upon men, their lands and goods, without any forme of justice, or against all right and equitie: hereupon it followeth, that as violence is directly contrarie to right and equitie, so also is crueltie, and that crueltie is no other thing but manifest violence. But according to the Maximes, even of Philosophers, *No violent thing can endure*, So it followeth, that an estate founded upon cruelty, can not long endure. Moreover crueltie is alwaies hated of every one; for although it be not practised upon all particulars, but upon some onely; yet they upon whom it is not exercised, cease not to feare, when they see it executed upon their parents, friends, allies, & neighbours: But the feare of paine and punishment, engendreth hatred; for one can never love that, whereof he feares to receive evill; especiallie when there is a feare of life, losse of goods and honours, which are the things we hold most precious: and of that which we hate, we by the same meanes desire the losse and entire ruine, and search out, procure and advaunce it with all our power. But it is impossible when all a people shooteth at one same marke, that a tyrant or cruell Prince (for all is one) can long endure, or that he can doe so much, as there shall not arive unto him, some disastre or evill fortune. And if sometimes it please God to suffer him to live long, it is to cause him to take the higher leap, that in the end he may have the forer fall: As we see it well painted in poets tragœdies, where many tyrants are seene (which enduring long time, have done no other thing during the space of their life, but knit cordes, fasten gallowes in some imminent places, whet swords and daggers, & temper poisons) for afterward to drinke the poison, to stab the dagger in their bosomes, or hang themselves on the gibet, in the sight of all the world; which laughing and mocking them, say, it is well employed: & we must not say, that such tragœdies are but poetical fictions; for hystories are full of such tragicall ends of tyrants, which have delighted to shed their subjects blood, and to handle them cruellie.

This vice of crueltie, proceeding from the weaknesse of such as can not command their choller and passions of vengeance, and suffer themselves to bee governed

Cruell people are commonly cowards.

ned by them, never happened in a generous and valiant heart, but rather alwaies in cowardly and fearefull hearts. Therefore when one day, one advertised the emperor *Mauricius*, that the captaine *Phocas* intended and wrought evill against him; and another maintained he was but a coward, and too fearefull to bring any thing to passe: the emperor *Mauricius* answered, So much the more ought I to take heed: for those cowardly and fearefull people, when they enterprise a crueltie, and that they have advantage, they can never hold any measure therein. And this vice of crueltie (saith *Marcellinus*) may be called the ulcer of the soule, proceeding of feebleness of the mind, and cowardise of the heart: And therefore sicke and diseased people are more chollericke than they that are in health, and miserable and desperate men, more than they which are at their ease and contented. And hereupon (saith *Marcellinus*) that the cause why *Valentinian* was a cruell man, came because of the choller which so ruled in him, that as soone as any spoke unto him any word that displeased him, he changed colour, voice, and gate, and could not command himselfe, nor keepe from committing many cruelties and injustices, his judgement was so with choller oppressed. Finally, it was the cause of his death: For one day the *Quadians* demanded peace of him, and by their embassadors excusing themselves of a rebellion, he began to speake to those embassadors in so great anger, rehearsing his kindnesse & humanitie before used unto them, that at once his voice and words failed him, as if he had been stricken with a deadly blow, and withall begun to send out a mortall sweat: he was incontinent carried to a chamber, and laid upon a bed, and by the advice of one of his physicians, a veine was opened, but it was not possible to draw a drop of blood out, the said choller had so burned and dried his inward parts: so he died. A notable example, for princes to take that consideration of their health, that they never suffer choller nor crueltie to abide in them: for such passions once taking an habit in them, they burne & roste their entrailles, and so will not suffer them to live long. But they ought further to consider, that such vices also doe soile and defile the reputation of that generositie and magnanimitie that ought to be in a prince: For we have seene, and doe ordinarily see, that chollericke and cruell men have almost alwayes been and are cowards and feareful, but generous and valiant men are gentle and full of humanitie. Princes ought further to consider that if they be once spotted with crueltie, they never make good end; and God will have it so: because he that committeth crueltie, violateth the divine law, which forbiddeth to shed mans blood, and to sleigh, but by forme of justice. He also violateth the law of nature; for he destroyeth his like, which nature hath produced, and which hath given that instinct even to brute beasts, not to destroy beasts of their own kind; there is also a precept to the law of nature, not to offend another. Hee likewise violateth the civile law, whereby is forbidden all murder and homicide, upon paine of death: Is it then any marveile, if sanguinarie and bloodie Princes have commonly evill ends, seeing they violate the divine, naturall, and civile lawes, approved of all people and nations?

There was never a more cruell nor a more cowardly man, than *Caligula* the emperor: for he quaked and trembled as he went to warre, to heare speake onely of his enemies, without seeing them. Making warre in *Almaigne*, in a forrest nigh unto him, he caused certaine *Apostata* *Almaignes* to lie in ambush, and commaunded one of them when hee was at dinner, to declare unto him that the enemy was discovered in the said forrest: As soone as he heard this, hee incontinent founded the

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*Amian.**Mar. lib.*

27.

*Sutton. in*  
*Calig. cap. 45,*  
*46, 47, 52,*  
*58, 59.*

trumpet, and placing his battaile in array, he caused them to assault that poore Forrest, which he made to be cut all downe: and having so obtained this goodly victorie against this Forrest, he came backe againe with great vaunt and fiercenesse, taxing and reproching the cowardise of such as remained behind, and were not present at this great overthrow: Was not this an act of a generous & a valiant Prince? Another time he caused to ordaine and place his battaile strong and in good order to fight, and commanded that euery one should march in his ranke, and that all their artillerie and all other furniture for an assault, should be prepared ready for a fight, yet no man knew his intent what hee would doe: When his armie had marched in order of battaile to the shore of the great Ocean sea (which was nigh) he then commanded all his souldiers & men of warre to fish, and gather into their hose, bosomes, and murrions, as many oysters as they could carrie, saying, it was the spoile and bootie conquered from the Ocean, which he would have to bee carried to the Capitoll of Rome, in signe of that notable victorie obtained against that great Ocean: Also he caused to be builded upon this shore an high tower, for a memoriall of this happy journey. After, he sent to Rome to prepare against his coming a goodly triumph as could be, to triumph upon the great Ocean, which he had so valiantly vanquished, and the spoiles thereof did bring to the Capitoll. Are not these heroicall acts to overthrow a Forrest, and fish for oysters? For crueltie, whereof this monster was full, I will say no other thing, but that he had alwaies a servant expert in cutting off of heads, which ordinarily at his dinners and suppers beheaded poore prisoners in his presence, and for his pleasure. I leave to speake of so many good people as he brought to their deaths: for I should never have done to rehearse all his cruelties. His end was, that his people conspired against him, taking for their watchword *Redoubles*, when they all fell upon him, and massacred him with thirtie blows in his age of 29. yeares, after he had reigned three yeares and ten months.

The crueltie of *Nero*, which caused to be slaine *Agrippina* his mother, *Brisannicus* his brother, *Octavia* his wife, *Seneca* his master, and all the most vertuous and good people of Rome, even of the Senate, are notorious ynough, and should bee too long to recite: And never man was more feminine and cowardly, than he: for he was never found in any warre: But he had good & valiant lieutenants, which acquitted themselves well, whilest he played upon the citheron amongst singers and common players of enterludes. His death was strange: For being abandoned of all the world, but of some foure or five servants, he sought to hide himself in a little house of pleasure in the fields, which appertained to *Phaon*, one whom he had enfranchised: being there, his men pressed him to slay himselfe quickly, least he fell alive into the hands of his enemies: for none of them would doe him the pleasure, as to slay him: Then he commanded them to make for him a grave, and laid him downe upon the earth for a measure therof: but whilest they were making of the grave, behold a lacquey of *Phaons* came, who brought a decree from the Senat, whereby *Nero* was declared anemie of the Commonwealth, with commandement to seeke him out, & to punish him as a publike enemie: After he had read this decree, he took his two daggers, and proved whether they both were sharpe ynough: after, hee put them in the sheath, saying his houre was not yet come: yet straight he prayed his men, that they would begin a little to weep & lament. Soon after, he desired, that some of them would shew him by example how he should sleie himselfe: But perceiving knights arriving, and doubting they came to take him, hee gave himselfe a stroke with his dag-



dagger in the throat, with the help of Secretarie *Epaphroditus*: and he being yet alive there entred a centenier, which fained, that he came to succour him; unto whom he answered, that it was too late, & the last word that he spake, was *Voila la foy*, See what faith. He died at the age of 30 yeares. And it was an admirable thing, that he which had caused so many others to be slaine in his time, could never find a person, that in a need would sleigh him, but was forced to doe it himselfe. A thing also worthie it is to be marked, that at his last sigh he complained, that none kept faith with him, with him I say that was full of all disloyaltie: And wherfore should they? do tyrants think, that men will keepe faith with them, seeing they themselves breake it with every one: If they so thinke, they are deceived. For to abandon a tyrant, and not any way to support him, is to observe faith to his Countrey and to the Commonweale.

We have before in another place discovered the cruelties and unhappie ends of *Commodus*, & of *Balsianus Caracalla*, both which were faint-hearted & cowardly princes, never performing any warlike act, or which tasted of any generositie or courage, Wee may number with them *Didius Iulianus*, *Heliogabalus*, *Gallienus*, *Maxentius*, *Philippus*, *Phocas*, *Carinus*, *Zeno*, and many other sluggish and faint-hearted Princes, that never did any good thing, which also by their crueltie have brought themselves to miserable ends; for they died violent deaths, and reigned not long. We may also adde to those examples of Princes (or rather tyrants, which were verie cruell and of little generositie) the example of *Herodes* crueltie towards his children, whereof we have spoken before: The example also of the emperour *Tiberius*, who constrained men to die by languishing in prison, by no means willing to accelerate their deaths, though they praied him; and he took from them their solace, to studie, to read, or to talke with any person. The examples also of the emperors, *Orho Virellus*, *Domitianus*, *Macrinus*, and other like, all which were very cruell, & little generositie in them, they all in small time finished their lives, & by the sword. But for as much as the death of *Domitian* is worthy the noting, to shew, That tyrants cannot shun the divine justice, I will here recite how he was massacred. First we must understand, that this cruell tyrant caused many great lords to die, which were the principal senators of Rome, and even some which had had the consularie dignitie, yet had they done nothing that merited so much as a reprehension: as *Cerealis*, *Salvidienus*, *Glabrio*, which he caused to die, saying, that they were enterprisers of novelties: without either prooffe or vailable conjecture: He made also to die *Ælius Lamia* (whose wife *Domitia Longina* he had taken from him) only because he spoke these words: *Alas I say not a word*: and *Salvius Cocceianus*, because he celebrated the day of the nativitie of the emperour *Orho* his uncle: & *Metius Pomposianus*, because there was a brute, that he was born in a royall constellation; and going to a certaine place, he caried with him a figure of the world, and the orations of kings and captaines, which he found in *Titus Livius*, and because he imposed those names, *Mago* and *Anniball* to certain his slaves: He also caused to die *Salustius Lucullus*, because he had invented a new forme of halberds, which he called *Lucullienes*: and *Iunius Rusticus*, because he had written the praises of two very good men deceased, called *Tatus Trasea*, and *Elvidius Priscus*, whom *Rusticus* had called most holy persons; and therefore were all philosophers banished both Rome and Italie: He caused his cosin *Flavius Sabinus* to die, because the trumpeter or common crier, had (according to custome) openly proclaimed, That he was chosen new emperour, & he should have said, new consull: he put to death also *Flavius Clemens*, another cosin, for a light matter of suspition: and many other great cruelties towards good

Sueton. in  
Tib. cap. 6.

Sueton. in Domitian, cap.  
10, 13, 14,  
15, 16, 17,  
&c.

Admirable  
meanes of  
*Domitians*  
death.

good people and men of qualitie, which for prolixitie I rehearse not: yet will I say, that to make himselfe be the more feared and reverenced, and to heape up his execrable wickednesse, when his officers made any publike crie, or sent any command to the people, the subscription was alwayes thus: *Your Lord and God commands it so to be done*: In the end seeing himselfe evill beloved of all the world; he would needs know of all the divines and astrologers, what should be his end: he sent for a verie famous astrologer, called *Asclepius*, of whom he demanded, when and how hee should die? *Asclepius* answered him: Sir, not to hide any thing, I know by art, and I find that you shall be soone slaine: And thou, said *Domitian*, of what death shalt thou die? Sir, answered he, I find by art, I shal be eaten with dogs: Well (replied *Domitian*) I will keepe thee well from that adventure: and straight to convince him of a lie, he commanded him to be slaine, and to be buried, and after, his bodie to be burnt into ashes, according as the Romanes used to burie their dead: But it hapned after hee was slaine, as they thought to have burnt his bodie into ashes, in a publike place, the fire being lighted to burne the body, there suddenly arose a great tempest, which ejected the bodie (halfe burnt) out of the fire, which incontinent was torne in peices and eaten of dogs. This beeing reported to *Domitian*, he was much afraid of this hap: So that as well, for that *Asclepius* had said unto him, as for that other diviners had told him the day and houre he should be slaine, he thought it good to stand upon his guard: and the better to see them which came behind him, he caused to floore all his gallerie (where he most often walked) with a kind of shining stone, from which as in a glasse there proceeded such a brightnesse, as hee might easily see whatsoever was behind him. The fore-told day being come, and the houre approaching (which was five) he asked what of the clocke it was: one expressly answered him that it was sixe of the clocke, to assure him that the danger was past: but about that houre of five there knocked at his chamber dore one *Stephanus* his chamberlaine (who was one of the conspirators against him) his left arme hanging in a scarfe, as if it had been hurt, signifying to him that he would declare the conjuration intended against him. This was the cause that *Domitian* suffered him to enter: who straight after his entry, after reverence, presented unto him a brieve, containing the discourse of the conjuration, whereof he let him read a good part, at which, seeing him astonished, he stabbed a poinard in his bellie: wounded as he was, he would faine have revenged himselfe, but his other household servants entred to massacre him, giving him seven mortall wounds. Behold an admirable example to shew, that there is no prudence, nor humane foresight, that can hinder that the judgements of God be not executed upon tyrants. But if any demand, how diviners and astrologers could so justly fore-tell the death of the emperor *Domitian*: I answer, that we must beleieve, that this said prediction was not by art or science: but the evill spirit would give boldnesse of enterprising, unto *Domitians* enemies, in making them know by frivolous divinations his fatall houre, that they might beleieve, the starres and heaven, to aid their enterprife. And God above (who serves himselfe with such meanes as pleaseth him, to exercise his justice) gives efficacie to the spirit of error. The same effect came of the divination of *Caracalla*: for it was the cause that *Macrinus* enterprised to sleigh him, although he never before thought of it, till the astrologers declared their divination; nay, he would never have done that enterprife, if that divination had not constrained and drawne him unto it.

Master *Philip de Comines* reciteth to this purpose a verie memorable hystorie, that

that happened in his time : He saith there was at Naples a king called *Alphonfus*, a bastard of the house of *Arragon*, who was marvellous cruell, a traitour and dangerous : for none could know when he was angrie, he could so wel manage his countenance, yea, and often betray men, as he made them good cheare : & he was a man wherein there was neither grace nor mercie, neither had he any compassion of the poore people : This king *Alphonfus* had a sonne also as wicked as he, called *Ferrand*, who had found means to bring before him (under his fathers assurance) many princes and barons of the countrey, to the number of foure and twentie ; and amongst them the prince *de Rosane* his brother in law, having married his sister ; all which hee caused to be imprisoned, notwithstanding the faith and assurance which he had given them, insomuch, as some remained foure or five and twentie yeares prisoners. As soone as the king *Alphonfus* was dead, and *Ferrand* his sonne was king ; the first thing hee did at his comming to the crowne, was to massacre all those said great princes and barons (which he himselfe had imprisoned, during his fathers life) by a Moorean slave of Affrica, which he rewarded, and straight after the execution sent him into his countrey. This king *Ferrand*, or *Ferdinand*, having newes of the said murder, (as the king of France *Charles* the eight, enterprised the conquest of Naples) judging himselfe unworthy to be king, because of his great and abhominable cruelties, sent embassadors to the king to agree and to be at an accord with him, offering to yeeld himselfe tributarie to the crowne of Fraunce, to hold the kingdome of Naples of him, and to pay him 50000. crownes yearly : But the king, who knew there was no fidelitie in the *Arragonian* race of Naples, would enter into no treatie with the king *Ferdinand*, who being in dispaire to be ever able to hold that kingdome against the king of Fraunce, having his owne subiects his enemies, died for sorrow and dispaire, and left his sonne *Alphonfus* his succesor. This *Alphonfus* the new king was as wicked as his father, and had alwaies shewed himselfe pitilesse and cruell, without faith, without religion, and without all humanitie ; insomuch, as perceiving that king *Charles* approched Rome, his conscience also judging himselfe to be an unworthy king, he resolved to flie into Spain, and to professe himself a monke in some monasterie : But before he fled, he caused to be crowned king at Naples, a young sonne of his, called *Ferdinand*, who was not yet hated in the countrey, his nailes beeing not yet either strong or long ynough to doe evill : This done, he fled into Sicilie, and from thence to Valence in Spaine, where he tooke the habite of a monke, and in a little time after died of an excoriation of gravell. But it was marvellous that this cruel tyrant should be so seized of feare, as he should go in no good order away, but left all his moveable goods, and almost all his gold and silver in his castle at Naples : And this feare proceeded to him from a faintnesse of heart ; for (as *Comines* saith) never cruell man was hardie. And when one desired him only to stay three dayes to pack up his goods : No no (said he) let us quickly depart from hence, heare you not all the world crie France, Fraunce ? Men may see how an evil conscience leaves a man never in quiet : This wicked man (knowing, that by his crueltie he had procured the hatred of his subjects, the wrath of God, and the enmitie of all the world) was tormented in his conscience, as of an infernall furie, which ever after fretted his languishing soule in the poore infected and wasted bodie. And to end this tragodie, straight after he had saved himselfe, the king of Fraunce obtained the kingdome of Naples. And a litle while after, the said yong *Ferdinand* sonne of the said *Alphonfus*, died of a feaver and a flux : So that within the space of two yeares,



God did justice on foure kings of Naples, two *Alphonfes*, and two *Ferdmands*, because of their strange cruelties, which were accompanied with disloyall impietic & oppression of subjects, for alwayes those keepe companie together.

*Comin. lib. 1.  
cap. 32. 133.  
and Bellay  
lib. 1. of his  
memories.*

A like punishment happened by the conduction and judgement of God, to that cruell king *Richard* of England, king *Edward* the fourth his brother. This king *Edward* deceasing, left two sonnes and two daughters all yong, and in the tutelage and government of *Richard* duke of Glocester his brother: This duke desiring for himselfe the crowne of England, caused his two nephewes cruelly to be slaine, & made a report to go, that by chance they fell off a bridge, and so were slaine: His two nieces he put into a religion of Nunnes, saying they were bastards: because (sayeth he) the dead king *Edward* their father, could not lawfully espouse their mother, for that before he had promised to espouse a gentlewoman, which hee named; and the bishop of Bath beeing present, protested it was so, and the promises of marriage were made betwixt his hands. The duke of Glocester having thus dispatched both his nephewes & nieces, caused himselfe to be crowned king of England, and because many great lords of England, murmured at his cruelty; this new tyrant king (which named himselfe king *Richard* the third) made to die of sundry deaths, all such as hee knew had murmured against him or his tyranny: After all this, when he thought he had a sure estate in the kingdom, it was not long before God raised him up for enemy, the earle of Richmond, of the house of Lancaster, who was but a weake lord in power, without silver and without force, who but a little before was detained prisoner in Britaigne: To whom certaine lords of England, sent secretly, that if he could come into England, but with two or three thousand men, all the people would come to him, & make him king of England. The earle of Richmond, hastened to king *Charles* the eight then raigning in France, by whose permission hee levied people in Normandie, to the number of about 3000. men; after, he embarked with the troupe, and tooke his course to Dover, where king *Richard* attended him, with 4000. men; but God conducted that businesse, sending a contrarie wind, which landed the said earle in the northerne parts of England: where without all interruption landing, they which sent for him met him, & by consent marched toward London: King *Richard* met him on the way with 40000. or 50000: as they came nigh one another to give battaile, the most part of king *Richards* people turned to the earle of Richmonds side: Yet that king (who dispaired otherwise to be maintained in his estate, than by a victorie upon his enemy) gave battaile to the earle, and was slaine fighting, after he had raigned about a yeare. And the earle of Richmond went right to London with his victorie, and the slaying of that tyrant: Then tooke he out of the monastery, king *Edwards* two daughters, whereof he espoused the elder, & was straight made king of England, called *Henry* the seventh, grandfather of the most illustrious Queen *Elizabeth*, at this present raigning.

*Froiser. lib. 1  
cap. 270. 231  
241. 242.  
243.*

*Alphonfus* king of Castile, the 11. of that name, who began his raign *Anno* 1310. & raigned 40. yeares, left after him *Peter* & *Henry* his bastard son. This king *Peter* was a prince very cruel & inhumane, & amongst other cruelties he committed, hee caused to die madame *Blanche* his wife, daughter of duke *Peter* of Bourbon, sister of the queene of France, & of the duches of Savoy: He made also to die, the mother of the said *Henry* his bastard brother, also banished & slew many lords & barons of Castile: Insomuch as by his cruelty, hee acquired the hatred of all his subjects, yea of strangers his neighbours; so that his bastard brother, being legitimate by the Pope, at the

the earnest sute of the nobilitie of Castile, and the help of the king of France *Charles le Sage* (who sent him a good armie under the conduction of master *John* of Bourbon, count of March, & of *Messier Bertrand* of Guesclin, after constable of Fraunce) he enterprised to eject king *Peter* out of his kingdome of Castile, and to make himselfe king, and did according to his enterprise: For, as soone as he was entred with forces into Castile, all the countrey of all sorts, abandoned that cruell king *Peter*, who fled and retired to *Bordeaux*, towards the prine of Wales, praying him to give him succours, against his bastard brother: This prince who was generous and magnanimous, graunted his demaund, under colour that the sayd *Don Peter* was a little of his parentage (but in truth, moved with desire of glorie, and to acquire the reputation to have established a lawfull king in his kingdome, against a bastard which the French had set in) so did he enterprise to go into Castile with a strong army, to establish king *Peter* in his kingdome: All succeeded so well unto him, that hee got a battaile at Naverret against king *Henry*, who fled into France, and king *Peter* was established in his kingdome: The prince of Wales exhorted him to pardon all such as before had borne armes against him, and from thence forward to become gentle and kind towards all his subjects, which he faithfully promised to bee: But hee did no such thing, but againe exercised his cruelties and vengeance, as well upon the one as the other. In the meane while, *Henry* the bastard, gathered a new army with the helpe of the king of France, which was conducted by the said *Messier Bertrand* of Guesclin, & unlooked for, they gave an assault (nigh unto Montiel in Castile) to king *Peter*, and put him to flight, with a great overthrow of his people: King *Peter* saved himselfe in a castle, which was incontinent besieged, and seeing himselfe evill provided within it, he by stealth sought to save himselfe with a few people, but hee was encountred by the said *Henry* his bastard brother, who slew him with his owne hand: By which meanes the said *Henry*, with his race, remained peaceable kings, in the kingdome of Castile, and king *Peter* finished his life unhappie by reason of his great crueltie, whereof he could never be chastised.

By the abovesaid examples it seemes unto me, That a prince may easily judge (if he be of any judgement) how pernicious and damnable the doctrine of *Machiavel* is, to instruct a prince to be cruell: for it is impossible that a cruell prince should long raign, but we ordinarily see, that the vengeance of God (yea by violent means) followeth, pace by pace, crueltie. *Machiavel* for confirmation of his doctrine alledgeth the example of the emperour *Severus*, who indeed was a man verie cruell and sanguinarie, yet raigned eightene yeares, or thereabouts, and dyed in his bed. But unto this I answer, that the cruelties of *Severus* seeme to bee something excusable, because that he had for competitors in the empire *Albinus* and *Niger*, two of greater nobilitie than hee, and which had more friends: Insomuch as it seemed necessarie for him (to weaken the two competitors, & to withstand their friends from hurting him) to use that crueltie to kill them; Yet he pardoned many Albinians, & reconciled himselfe vnto them: moreouer, he exercised part of his cruelties, in the revenge of the good emperor *Pertinax*, which was a lawful cause; yet withal had he in himselfe many goodly and laudable vertues, as wee have in other places rehearsed: so that, as his crueltie made him much hated, his other vertues wrought some mitigation thereof. Lastly, he made no other end, than other cruell princes: for hee dyed with sorrow (as saith *Herodian* who was in his time) for that hee saw his children such mortall enemies one against another, and that *Basianus* the eldest, had enterprised

terprised to kill his father, who yet did pardon him: But *Basianus* pardoned not his fathers physitians, which would not obey him, when he commaunded them to poyson his sicke father; for as soone as his father was dead he hanged and strangled them all. Herein also God punished the crueltie of *Severus*, that having exercised all these cruelties and slaughters, well to establish the empire in his house, hee was frustrated of his intention: For of those two sonnes *Basianus* and *Geta*, one slew the other; and *Basianus* after he had slaine *Geta*, endured not long, but was slaine by *Macrinus*, and left behind him no children. Therefore although it seemed that God spared to punish *Severus* crueltie, for his other good vertues, yet remained not hee unpunished; for seeing his sonne (who had learned of him to be cruell) durst enterprise to sleigh him, he dyed of griefe and sorrow: And wee need not doubt but his conscience assaulted him greatly; for he might well thinke, that it was a just divine vengeance, to see himselfe so cruelly assaulted by his owne blood, and to see machinated against himselfe, by his owne sonne, the like crueltie which hee exercised against others, yet he dissembled this, and pardoned his sonne: For how durst he punish that vice, that he had learned him? therefore this example of *Severus* serveth little or nothing to maintaine the doctrine of *Machiavel*; neither is one example so considerable against a million of others contrarie: for men must make a law of that which happeneth most often, and in many examples, not of that which seldome happeneth.

When *Annibal* began to execute evill his businesse in Italie, and that the Romans having taken courage, began to follow him neere, and to hold him short, he tooke a cruell counsell, which much advanced his ruine: For the townes & fortresses, which he could not guard, hee ruinated and destroyed, that his enemies after him, might not draw any commoditie from them, nor make any vse of them: This was a cause that their courages, which tooke part with him, were alienated from him; for sayeth *Titus Livius*, Example toucheth men more than doth calamitie and losse.

It was a great crueltie in the duke *John* of Bourgoigne, when hee durst so much enterprise, as to cause to bee slaine the duke of Orleance, the kings onely brother; which crueltie cost many heads, and was cause of infinite evils in the kingdome of France, and finally was the cause that the duke himselfe was massacred, on the same manner that he had caused to massacre the duke of Orleance: But yet it is a thing more strange, that this duke durst maintaine that he had great need to commit that massacre: Yea he found a doctor in Theologie, called master *John Petis*, who durst affirme in termes of Theologie, that that act was goodly, praiseworthy, and worthy of remuneration. True it is, that in the time wherein we are, there are found many such doctors of the bottle, patrons, & defenders of sinnes and vices, such as this *John Petis*: but as in the end he was knowne to be a lyer and a slanderer, and his propositions condemned hereticall; so God will cause his imitators of this time, in the end to bee found like him: but that the asse may appeare by his cares, I have briefly set downe his Oration.

The duke of Bourgoigne, having made himselfe the stronger in armes within Paris, hee tooke order that there should be held a Counsell, and an assembly, therein to propose his justifications: In which Counsell assisted *Monsieur le Dauphin*, the king of Sicile, the cardinal of Bar, the dukes of Berry, of Bretaine, of Lorraine, and many contes, barons, and many other great lords, and the rector of the Vniversitie of Paris, accompanied with many doctors, clearkes, and bourgeses: There was brought



brought in by an usher, master *John Petin* a doctor in Theologie, before al those nobles, to justifie the act of the duke of Bourgoigne. Then they giving him audience, with both his hands, hee tooke off his great square doctorall bonnet from off his head, and began to speake in this manner: My most redoubted lords, *Monseignior* the duke of Bourgoigne, count of Flanders and Arthois, twice peere of France, and deane of the Peares, is come before the most noble, & most high Majestie royall, as to his soveraigne lord, to do him reverence in all obedience, as he is bound by foure obligations, which commonly are set downe by doctors in Theologie, and of the cannon & civile law; Of which bonds the first is, of neighbour to his neighbor; the second, of parent towards his parent; the third, of vassale towards his lord; and the fourth will bee, that the subject not onely offend not his lord, but also revenge such offences as are done against him. There are yet other obligations, that is, That the king hath done much good & honour to my lord of Bourgoigne: For it pleased him that *Monseignior le Dauphin* should espouse his daughter, & that the son of my said lord of Bourgoigne should marry madame *Michelle* daughter to his royall Maicstie; and as *S. Gregorie* saith, *Cum crescunt dona, crescunt rationes donorum*, that is, when gifts encrease, so doe their obligations also. All these obligations are cause that my lord of Bourgoigne hath caused to sleie the duke of Orleance lately dead, which act was perpetrated for the very great good of the kings person, of his children, and of all the realme, as I shall so sufficiently shew, as every man shall bee satisfied: For the said *Monseignior* of Bourgoigne, hath charged me by expresse commaundement to propose his justification, which thing I durst not denie, for two causes: The first because I am bound to serve him, by an oth taken of mee three yeares agoe: The second, because hee hath given mee a good and great portion, every yeare to keepe me at schoole, because he considered I was smally beneficed, which pension did me great good towards my expences, and yet will so doe mee long, if it please God and my said lord of Bourgoigne. But when I consider the great matter I have taken in hand to handle before this noble company, great feare troubleth my heart: for I know I am of small sense, feeble of spirit, and of a poore memorie, so that my tongue and memorie flieth away, and that small sense I was wont to have, hath now altogether left mee, so that I see no other remedie, but to commend mee to my God and creator, and to his glorious mother, & to *Monseignior S. Iohn* the Evangelist prince of Theologians: And therefore I humbly beseech you, my most redoubted lords, & all this companie, if I say any thing which is not well said, to attribute it to my simplenesse and ignorance; that I may say with the Apostle, *Ignorans feci ideoque misericordiam consecutus sum*, that is, I did it of ignorance and therefore am I pardoned. But some may here make a question, saying, It appertaineth not to a Theologian to make the said justification, but rather to a jurist: I answer, That then it belongeth nothing to me, which am neither the one nor the other; but a poore ignorant man, as I have said, whose sense and memorie faileth: yet a man may say and maintaine it, That it well belongeth to a doctor in Theologie, to defend his master, and to say & preach the truth. Men need not the be abashed if I lend my poor tongue to my lord and master who hath nourished me: For it is now in his great need that I lend him my tongue; & they that love me the lesse for it, I thinke they commit a great sinne, and hereof every man of reason will excuse me: Then to begin this Justification, I take my theame upon that which *S. Paul* saith, *Radix omnium malorum cupiditas, quam quidam appetentes, erraverunt a fide*. These words are in the first to *Timothie*, the sixt

chapter, and are thus englished: Lady Covetousnesse of all evils is the root, which makes men disloyall. Some may object to me, that pride is the first of all finnes, because *Lucifer* by his pride, fell from Paradise into hell; and also because it is said in *Ecclesiasticus*, chap. 10. *Initium omnis peccati, superbia*: that is; Pride is the beginning and root of all sinne. All men may then argue from this place: Then is not dame covetousnesse: But the answer hereunto is, that there are three manner of covetousnesse, that is, of Honor, of Riches, and of Carnall delectation: but the first kind comprehendeth pride, *ergo, &c.* This covetousnesse also of honor, comprehendeth vainglorie, wrath, hatred, envie; insomuch, as hee that is spotted with this kind of covetousnesse, is enflamed with vaine glorie, and angrie against his lord, whose place and domination he would gladly occupie, and moreover hateth and envieth him: And all these crimes together, which proceed from covetousnesse, when they are committed against his prince, are called Treason, which is the greatest crime that can be. Thus much for the first point of my theme, That dame covetousnesse is the root of all evils. The second point is, That she maketh them become disloyall: for with a desire to dominier, they enterprize against their lord, whereas they should be loyal unto him, as I shal shew hereafter by many goodly places. But as is fit, to shew my lord of Bourgoignes justification, I will take that place of dame Covetousnesse, which I have alleadged for my Maior, and after I will come to my Minor, and so to the Conclusion.

For prooffe then of my Maior, I will note and propose eight principal Verities, by manner of a foundation, out of which I will inferre eight Conclusions, as it were correlatives, the better to ground the justification of *Monsieur de Bourgoigne*. The first Veritie is, That every subject & vassale, which upon covetousnesse enterpriseth against the corporall health of his king and soveraigne lord, to take away his most noble seigniorie, committeth the horrible crime of treason, and is worthy of double death, that is, of the first and of the second. I prove it, because every disloyall subject and vassale against his soveraigne, sinneth mortally. *Ergo, &c.* Also I prove it by *S. Gregorie*, who sayth thus: *Tyrannus est proprie qui non Dominus reputatur, non iuste principatur, aut non principatu decoratur*: That hee is a tyrant, which is not the true Lord, or which ruleth not justly, or which is not honoured by his principality. Also I prove it by *S. Iohn* the Evangelist, who saith: *Qui vicit non morietur nec ladesur a morte secunda*: that is to say, That he that shall have victorie upon Lady Covetousnesse, and her three daughters, Ire, Hatred, and envie, shall not need to feare the second death, namely, eternall damnation.

The second Veritie is, that in the afore said case, wherein the subject or vassale is worthy of double death; yet the vassale is more to be punished than the simple subject; and a baron more than a simple vassale; and a count more than a baron; and a duke more than a count; and a kings allie more than a stranger. I prove it, because the obligation of a duke or the kings kinsman towards the king, is by many degrees greater than of a count, baron, or of a vassale: *Ergo*, then the punishment must be in an higher degree: And that my consequence is good, I prove it, because the degrees of obligations and prerogatives doe correspond and fully answer to the degrees of the punishment, and so as they are greater, so ought the punishment to be greater, as I have before alleadged out of *S. Gregorie*: *Cum crescunt dona, crescunt rationes donorum*. As gifts encrease, so ought the reasons of gifts (that is obligations) to do: I prove also my said Veritie by another argument. It is a greater scandale, that

a duke or the kings allie should go about to take away the kings seigniorie, than if it were a poore subject: *Ergo* then, the punishment ought to bee greater, seeing the scandale is greater. Thirdly, I prove my said Veritie, because there is a greater perill of a great man, than of a little; therefore the remedie of punishment ought to bee greater to withdraw great men from yeelding and obeying the enimie of mankind, and dame Covetousnesse.

The third Veritie is, That in the case aforesaid, when the vassale committeth treason, meriting double death, then is it lawfull for every subject, according to the laws morall, naturall, and divine, to kill without any commaund that traytor and disloyall tyrant; and it is not onely lawfull, but also honourable and meritorious. I prove this veritie by twelve reasons in the honour of holy Theologie: The first, of a doctour, which upon the second booke of the master of Sentences, sayeth, *Qui ad liberationem patriæ tyrannum occidit, premium accipit, & facit opus laudabile & meritorium.* That is: He which sleiyeth a tyrant, to deliver his countrey, receiveth a reward, and doth a laudable and a meritorious worke. The second authoritie is taken out of that excellent doctour *Salceber* in his booke of Policraton, who saith: *Amico adulari non licet, sed aurem Tyranni mulcere licitum est, quia ei licet adulari quem licet occidere:* that is, It is not lawful for any to flatter his friend, but with faire words he may wel bring a tyrant a sleepe, for it is lawfull to kill him. The third authoritie is of many doctours in Theologie, all which I set downe but for one, that I may not exceed the number of three, namely, of *Richard de Mirville*, *Alexander de Hales*, and *Astensis*, which hold the foresaid conclusion: And for a greater confirmation, I adde hereunto the authoritie of *S. Peter*, who sayeth: *Subditi estote Regi quasi precellenti:* that is, Let each man obey his king, as the most excellent and soveraigne. My three second reasons of the twelve, are founded upon the authoritie of three morall Philosophers. The first, *Licetum & laudabile est cuilibet subditorum occidere tyrannum:* that is, It is lawful & praiseworthy for every man to sleiy a tyrant. The second authoritie is from the noble morallist *Tully*, who saith in his Offices, That they which killed *Julius Caesar*, were worthy of praise, because he had usurped the seigniorie of Rome by tyrannie. The third authoritie is out of *Boccace*, who sayth: That men may well conspire and employ armes against a tyrant; and that it is a thing most holy and necessarie, that a tyrant ought not to be called king nor prince, & that there cannot bee a more pleasanter sacrifice, than the bloud of a tyrant. After these authorities alledged out of Theologians and Morallists, I come now to the authoritie of Legists: And because I am not a Lawyer, it sufficeth me to speake the sentence of the lawes, without alledging them: for in al my life I never studied the cannon and civile law but two yeres, and that was twentie yeares agoe, so that I could learne but a little, and might easily forget that little by the length of time, since I learned it. The first authoritie out of the civile law, is, That it is lawfull to kil forsakers of knighthood: but who can more forsake knighthood, than he which forsakes his king, who is the chiefe of all knighthood? The second authoritie is, That it is lawful to kill theeves and robbers by high wayes: It is lawfull then to kill a tyrant, which continually watcheth and intendeth the death of his soveraigne lord. I come now to three authorities of the holy Scripture. The first is that of *Moses*, who without authoritie slew the Egyptian who tyrannized over the people of Israel: For at that time *Moses* had not the authoritie of a iudge over the people of Israel, which was delivered unto him nigh fortie yeares after that he had slaine the Egyptian. The second authoritie is the example of *Phineas*



neas, who without any commandemēt slew the duke *Zambry*, because he allied him selfe by carnal love with a Sarracene woman: whereupon *Phineas* was commended and revered in three things, loue, honour, and riches. The third authoritie is that of *S. Michael* the archangell, who without the commaundement of God or any other, fought against the tyrant *Lucifer*, so disloyal to God his soveraigne, who went about to usurpe the Seigniorie of God: The said *S. Michael* was favourably rewarded in three things, that is, in honour, love, and riches: in love, because God loved him more than any other Angell: in honour, because God made him a perpetuall prince of the heavenly hoast: in riches, because God gave him riches as much as he desired or could carrie away: so it appeareth, that my third Veritie is well proved by twelve reasons, in the name of the twelve Apostles: of which reasons, three are taken from the holy Theologians, three from Moralists, and three from Legists, and the three last from the holy Scripture, and they goe alwayes from three to three.

My fourth Veritie is this: It is more meritorious and honorable, that a tyrant be slaine by the kings parents, than by a stranger; and by a duke, than by a count; and by a baron, than by a simple vassale; because therein shineth more the love and obedience of the sleier, and is more honourable to the king to be revenged of a great man, than a base and meane man.

My fift Veritie is: That alliances, promises, othes, or confederations ought not to be kept, if for keeping them, there come any prejudice to the prince or to the commonweale; but to keepe them, is to do against the morall, natural, and divine lawes. I proove this Veritie by thus arguing: Whensoever two contrarie obligations are concurrent, a man must keepe and observe the greatest, and breake the least: But in this case, the bond unto the prince and commonwealth is greater than any other promise or confederation: *Ergo* then we must obserue the obligation towards the prince and commonwealth, and breake all other obligations, othes, and confederations. Also in arguing thus: Whensoever a man doth a thing better than that which he sweares to do, he is not perjured in doing that better thing, & omitting that thing which he swore to do (as expressely the master saith of Sentences in the last of the third) but in this propounded case, it is better to kill a tyrant, although a man have sworne not to kill him, than to let him live, as hath bene above shewed: *Ergo* then it is no perjurie nor evill done, to sleie a tyrant against his sworne promise, alliance, or confederation that he hath with him. Also *Isidorus* in his book of soveraigne good, sayth, That we must not observe an oth, whereby a man shall bee forced rashly to commit an evill: but in our case a man shall be forced to an evill by such a promise and oth: *Ergo* he must then not observe it.

The sixt Veritie is: That if so it happen, that the alliances, othes, or confederations turne to the prejudice of one of the promisers, he is in nothing bound to keepe them. This veritie is proved in thus arguing: The end of every commaundement is charitie, as the Apostle saith: but the cheefe charitie beginneth at our selves: *Ergo* the commaundement to observe the faith and promise, ought not to be observed, if it be contrary to the charitie, which we ought to have towards our selves, according to that which is said of the Cannonists: *Frangemus fidem fides frangatur eidem*: He that breakes faith, faith ought to be broken to him againe: Also in all promises that are made, every man must include, If it please God: But certaine it is, it pleaseth not God, that we should do any thing against the law and order of charitie: *Ergo* &c.

The

The seventh Veritie is : That to every subject it is lawfull, honourable, and meritorious to kill a tyrant by deceits, speculations, and dissimulations. I prove it first by the authoritie of the morall philosopher *Boccace* above alledged: Also by the example of king *Iehu*, who dissembled to approve the service of *Baal*, to trap the sacrificers, for which he was praised: Also by the example of *Ioiada*, who by treason caused *Athalia* to be slaine, for which he was praised: Also of *Iudith*, who slew *Holofernes* by dissimulation, whereupon she is praised: And this is the fittest death for tyrants to die on, that is, to be slaine villanously by watchings and espiments.

The eight Truth is: That every subject which enterpriseth and worketh against his soveraigne lord by Necromancie and invocation of divels for covetousnesse to have the crowne, is a violater of the Catholike faith, and worthy of double death, the first and the second: For *S. Bonaventure* (in his second book, Distinction the sixt) saith, That the divell never pleaseth the will of such men, but first idolatrie and infidelitie are mingled together: For as faith serveth much to the operation of the miracles of God, so infidelitie is as requisit in the operation of divellish things: The divell also will do nothing for such men, unlesse they agree to yeeld him the domination over them, whereof he is very desirous: Also that great doctour in the ninth article, in *Secunda Secunda*, saith and affirmeth, that invocations of divels never come to effect without a fore-going of a corruption of faith, idolatrie, and an expresse compact with divels. And this opinion do the venerable doctours, *Alexander de Hales*, *Richard de Mirville*, and *Astensis* hold, and commonly all the other doctours which have writ of this matter.

Here you see my eight Verities well proved: I come now to eight Correlatives. The first is: If it come to passe, that in the case aforesaid, these invocators of divels and traitors to the king be imprisoned, and some of their partakers deliver or cause to deliver them, hee ought to bee punished with the same punishment as they are themselves, namely, with the first & second death. Secondly, every subject that maketh a bargain with any man to empoison his soveraigne lord, although the enterprise come not to effect, is also well worthy of death. Thirdly, every subject that by dissimulation of pastime causeth apparell to bee made to put on his soveraigne lord, and to put fire therein, thinking to burne him, is also worthy of double death. Fourthly, every subject making alliance with the mortall enemies of the king & the kingdome, is also worthy of death. Fifthly, every subject which fraudulently setteth dissention betwixt the king and the queene, making the queene understand that the king hateth her, and counselling her to goe out of the realme, shee and her children, offering safely to conduct her out, is worthy of the like death, as above. Sixthly, every subject that giveth the Pope to understand false things, as to make him understand, that his king and lord is not worthy to hold the crowne, nor his children after him, is worthy of like death. Seventhly, the tyrant that hindereth the union of the church and the deliberations of the Cleargie, for the utilitie of the holy mother Church, ought to be punished as an hereticke and schismaticke, and meriteth, that the earth should open and swallow him, as *Dathan*, *Core*, and *Abiron*. Eightly, the subject which by empoisonments and viands, seekes to cause the king or his children to die, is worthy of the aforesaid death. The last is, that every subject which hath souldiers causeth the people and countrey of his soveraigne to bee eaten up and exiled, and which taketh and distributeth his money at his pleasure, and makes it serve his turne to procure alliances with his lords enemies, ought to be punished as a very tyrant with

» with the first and second death. And here I make an end of my Maior of the justifi-  
 » cation of *Monsieur* the duke of Bourgoigne.

» But I come now to declare my Minor, wherein I have shewed, That *Lewes* late duke  
 » of Orleance, was so much embraced with ladie Coverousnesse, of the honours and  
 » riches of this world, that hee would have taken away the seigniorie and crowne of  
 » Fraunce, from the king his brother and his children, by temptation of the enemie of  
 » hell, using the aforesaid meanes: for he found an Apostata monke, expert in the di-  
 » vish art, unto whom he gave a ring and a sword, to consecrate them to the divell:  
 » This monke went into a solitarie place, behind a bush, where hee put off all his gar-  
 » ments to his shirt, and fell on his knees, so invocating divels: Straight there appea-  
 » red two divels, apparelled in darke greene, whereof the one was called *Hernias*, and  
 » the other *Estramain*: Then this monke did unto them as great reverence and honor  
 » as he could doe to God our Saujour: and one of the divels tooke the ring, & the o-  
 » ther the sword, and after vanished away; the monke went away also. He returned in-  
 » to that place againe, and there found the ring, having a red colour, and the sword,  
 » wherewith he thought to have slaine the king: but by the helpe of God, and of the  
 » most excellent ladies of Berry and Bourgoigne, the king escaped. Also the sayd  
 » duke of Orleance made an alliance and confederation with the duke of Lancaster,  
 » who in like manner warred against king *Richard* of England his lord, as is above-  
 » said. *Item*, He went about to have carried away the queene and her children, which  
 » he meant to have carried into the countie of Luxembrough, to take his will of her,  
 » which the queene would not agree to. *Item*, Hee practised to make *Monseignior le*  
 » *Daulphin* eat an impoysoned apple, which was given to a child, who was charged  
 » to give it to none, but to the said *Daulphin*: but it so happened, that the child gave  
 » it to one of the sonnes of the said duke of Orleance, who died thereof. *Item*, The  
 » said duke hath alwayes favoured the Pope in the extraction of money out of  
 » the kingdome, to obtaine of him a declaration against the king and his generation  
 » of inhabilitie to hold the kingdome, and to give it unto him. *Item*, Hee hath held  
 » armed men in the fields by the space of 14. or 15. yeares, which did nothing but  
 » pill, exile, rob, ran sack, and sleigh the poore people, and force women and maids. *Item*,  
 » Hee laid tallages upon the kings subjects and employed the silver in making alliances  
 » with our enemies, to come to the crowne, and besides hee hath committed many  
 » great crimes, which my said *Monseignior le Bourgoigne*, reserveth to declare in time  
 » and place.

## Conclusion

» It followeth then by good consequence, that my said lord of Bourgoigne  
 » ought not to bee blamed for sleighing the said duke of Orleance, and that the king  
 » should like that deed well, and to authorize the same as much as were needfull:  
 » And besides, hee ought to be rewarded in three especiall things, that is, in Love,  
 » Honour, and Riches, as were Saint *Michael* the archangell, and the most valiant  
 » *Phineas*: that is to say (as I thinke in my grosse and rude understanding) That the  
 » king our lord ought more than before to beare amitie, loyaltie, and good reputati-  
 » on to my said lord of Bourgoigne, and to cause to bee published letters patents  
 » through all the realme. God graunt it may be so, who bee blessed world without  
 » end. Amen.

Here is in substance the Oration of that venerable doctor in Theologie, unto  
 which I have not added one word, onely I have shortened certaine long and reite-  
 rated allegations, whereby might be seene the beaftlineffe of this our master, a man  
 hired



hired to justifie one of the most execrable murders that ever was committed. Very notable is the rethoricke and art of this venerable doctors Oration: which in the Exordium or beginning to obtaine benevolence, confesseth, that hee is an ignorant man, without sence or memorie: And to make a reason why he hath enterprised to be in these causes an advocate, he saith it is for a pensiõ, which the duke of Burgoign gave him towards his living: After for prooffe of his Maior, hee alledgeth places of Scripture so evill applied, as children at this day will discover his folly: And for notable authors he alledgeth a sort of sottish scholasticall sophisters of Theologie, as *Alexander de Hales*, *Salceber*, *Mirvile*, and other like. His Correlatives and his Minor, are the false imputations wherewith the duke of Bourgoigne charged the duke of Orleance. Moreover, this Oration was reviewed by the masters of the facultie of Sorbonne, with the Bishop of Paris, and the Inquisitor of faith, and there were condemned for heresies these propositions following. Every tyrant may be slain by his vassale and subject, without commandement of justice. Secondly, *S. Michael* slew *Lucifer* without Gods commandement. Thirdly, *Phineas* killed *Zambry* without the commandement of God. Fourthly, *Moses* slew the Egyptian without the commandement of God. Fifthly, *Judith* sinned not in flattering *Holofernes*, nor *Iehu* in lying, that he would honour *Baal*. Sixtly, it is not alwayes perjurie, when a man doth that, which he hath sworne not to doe. Which articles having beene declared hereticall, they were condemned to be burnt publikely, as also *M. John Peris* bones, who had maintained them (for he was at this judgement dead and buried at Hefdin) and the said articles were executed and put into the fire, but not the doctors bones, for they could not be gotten, because the duke of Bourgoigne then held Hefdin.

Surely it is a strange thing and very deplorable, that there should be any such men in the world, which durst maintaine with reasons so horrible a crime farre from all common sence, and all reason and humanitie; as is a massacre done and executed practisedly, without any forme of justice. Is not this to call things with contrarie names, that is, to call injustice, by the name of justice; crueltie, by the name of clemencie; night, by the name of light; evill, by the name of good, and the diuel, by the name of an Angell? Is not this to prayse that which is to be despised and detested, to follow that which is to be fled, to love that which is to be hated, to bring into a confusion the distinction of good and of evill, and to overthrow the order which God and nature have established in the distinction of good and evill things. But after I have shewed, that crueltie cannot bee but pernicious and cause of a princes ruine (whatsoever *Machiavel* saith to the contrarie) it will not be to any evill purpose now

to shew, That kindnesse, clemencie, and goodnesse, are the true means to esta-


blish a princes estate in firmnesse & assurance: But because we shall

handle hereafter another Maxime, where it shall bee

more proper to discourse this matter, wee

will reserve the speaking thereof

to that place.



## 9. Maxime.

*It is better for a Prince to be feared than loved.*

**M**En (saith our Florentine) do loue as it pleaseth them, & do feare as it pleaseth the prince: Therefore the prince (if hee bee wise) ought to found himselfe, & to leane that way which dependeth upon himselfe, and not that way which dependeth upon another. If the prince can have both together, to be feared and loved, that is the best: but it being a very difficult thing for to embrace both, it is more assured to be feared, than to be beloved.

*Suetonius in Calig. cap. 30.*



His Maxime is a saying or proverb, which our elders have attributed to tyrants, *Oderint dum metuant*: that is, Let them hate, so bee it they feare. *Caius Caligula* usurped this auncient proverbe, as *Suetonius* saith, and put it in practise during all the time of his raigne; and he ended (as commonly such princes doe end) which will rather be feared than loved, as in another place wee have said. The emperor *Tiberius* would needs something mitigate this proverbe, not allowing to make himselfe feared, & yet disdained not hatred: For he was wont to say, as by the way of a proverbe or device, *Oderint dum probent*, that is, Let them hate, so they allow. But it seemes he made an evill match in coupling hatred with approbation: for that which a man hateth, hee doth not willingly allow; and that which a man alloweth, hee hateth not also. Moreover, all such sayings and proverbes (Let them hate, so they feare, and Let them hate, so they allow) are but tyrants devices, and our forefathers have so esteemed them, and tyrants have alwayes practised them. As *Nero*, when he perceived that by his cruelties he was feared and redoubted, he bragged, that none of them which had been emperors before him, had any understanding how to command, neither knew they the power they had, to make themselves be obeyed: But that power was well made knowne to himselfe, for men made him well to feelee, That power evill exercised, acquireth hatred to him that exerciseth it, and hatred, ruine and destruction: So happened it to *Caligula*, so to *Tiberius*, and so will it alwayes fall unto them, which seeke to be feared, rather with hatred, than with loue.

As for that which *Machiavell* sayth, That the prince is feared as he will, and as it pleaseth him: If this were true, all should goe well for him: for he would alwaies be so feared, as none should oppose themselves against his desseignes and commandements, but that every one should come under the yoke, and obey him purely and simply.

simply: But experience shewes us the contrarie, and makes us see and know, That a prince cannot long be obeyed, if that which he commandeth be disagreeable and found unjust of him that should obey: insomuch, as at the first occasion that presenteth it selfe, they unyoke themselves, and their obedience endureth no longer than force and necessity endureth: And because no force nor necessity can actually endure long time (because no violent thing naturally lasteth) therefore it followeth, that disagreeable commandements cannot long be observed; and that obedience, founded upon feare, is incontinent broken: For the equitie and justice of a commandement is the sinew thereof: And as the bodie cannot move without sinewes, unless onely for a leape like a stone; so a commandement, which for want of equitie displeaseth the obeyers, shall never be well put in action and practised, unless it bee for a small time, and at the beginning.

And as for that which *Machiavell* saith, That it is very hard for a prince to bee feared and loved together, it is cleane contrarie: For there is nothing more easie for a prince, than to obtaine them both, as reason sheweth it: Because it is certaine, that a prince which maintaines his subjects in good peace, keepeth them from oppressions, causing all them to bee punished, which would oppresse them, and which will maintaine their liberties, and punish the breakers of them, and who will observe a good police in his countrey, that therein there may bee a free & assured commerce, without imposition of tributes or burdens, and he that shall cause good justice to be ministred to every one, it is certaine, that such a prince shall be greatly beloved of his subjects, yea, and feared thus: When men understand, that the prince ministreth good justice in every place, without support, favor, or corruption, leaving not punishable faults unpunished, and is not prodigall in graunting favors and pardons, unless they have a good foundation upon reason and equitie, certaine it is, that hee shall be redoubted and feared, not only in his own countrey, but in strange countries also. For example hereof are all the ancient and good emperours, as *Augustus*, *Traian*, *Adrian*, *Antonine*, and others, which were together feared, beloved, and revered. I could here alleadge almost al our auncestor kings of France, which with good justice, were not onely redoubted of their subiects, but also of all their neighbours: yea, that good reputation of justice in them, was a cause, that often strange princes have submitted their contentions to the judgement of the Court of Paris in France, as we reade in histories: And because they caused to be ministred good justice, think you they were the more hated? no, not of the wicked sort, which are forced by their consciences to love and admire the good and vertue, although their lives bee contrarie: And how should they not be beloved of their subiects, beeing good kings as they were, seeing Frenchmen are of that nature, that they can never hate their king, how vicious soever he be, but alwaies impute vices and faults to some of his governors and Counsellors, rather than to him? Truly, if princes had alwaies good men

about them, they could never be vicious, at the least to the detriment of the Commonwealth: Therefore by good right, men do impute the evill government of a countrey, rather to a princes Counsellors, than to himselfe, as we have proved in another place.

Equitie is the sinew of the cōmandement.

A prince may wel be feared and loved together.





## 10. Maxime.

*A Prince ought not to trust in the amitie of men.*

Cap. 17. of a  
Prince.

**M**En generally (saith *Machiavell*) are full of ingratitude, variable, dissemblers, flyers from dangers, and covetous of gaine, and so long as they profit by thee, so long thou maiest hold them in thy lap, and they will offer thee their lives, goods, and all they have, even when there is no need; but in a necessitie they will turne their garment and away: So that a prince which leaneth upon such a rampire, shall at the first fall into ruine: yea they vwill sooner be offended when a man will use love towards them, than if by rigour hee seeke to bee feared, because men make lesse accompt to offend him vvhich useth them gently and lovingly, than him of vvhom they are affraid: Because amitie is onely founded upon some obligation, vvhich easily may bee broken; but feare is founded upon a feare of punishment, which never forsakes the person.

*Amian. Mar  
cellus. lib. 16.*



Swell this Maxime as the former, is a plain tyrannous precept: For as saith the Poet *Æschilus*:

*No friends to trust, what common more?  
Each tyrant hath this ill in store.*

*Lamp. in  
Commod.*

This is the reason why *Denis* the tyrant of Sicilie, caused a strong house to be built, where he dwelt, environed with deep ditches full of water on all sides, over which there was no entrie but a draw bridge, which was every night taken in by himselfe, and certaine loose planks of the bridge brought into his bedchamber, which ever the next morning hee carried himselfe to the bridge againe: Hee caused also his daughters to learne to bee barbars, to poule and trimme his head and beard, and all this did he, because hee durst trust no man in the world to doe those things. Yet *Commodus* a cruell tyrant also, used another more sure receipt: For, trusting no man with his haire of head or beard, hee himselfe burnt them with a candle. I leave you to thinke, if such people bee miserable, whose consciences are tormented in such sort, that it judgeth them worthie to have all the world for a capitall enemy, in such sort as they dare put no confidence in any, but are in continuall feare and torment.

For

Far contrarie from this doctrine of *Machiavell*, is the exhortation which *Mispfa* the good king of Numidia gave, a little before his death, to *Jugurtha* and his other children, admonishing them amongst themselves to maintaine a good amitie and concord: It is not (sayth he) puissant armies, nor great treasures, by the meanes of which a prince ought to conserve and maintaine his estate, but by his friends, which are not acquired, either by force of armes, or by gold & silver, but by good offices & loialtie: But who ought to be a more loiall friend than one brother to another? or whom can he trust, who shall be an enemy to his owne blood? I leave you a kingdom firme and assured, if you be good; but feeble and weake if you be wicked: for by concord small things encrease, but by discord great things fall to ruine. Behold a brieffe exhortation, but very weightie, to shew how necessarie it is to have good friends, and to maintaine good amity and loyaltie amongst parents. Like unto this is the oration which *Silla* made to king *Bocchus* of Mauritania: Wee are very joyfull (said he) that thou rather seekest to be a friend, than an enemy of the Romane people: for, even from her birth, the Romane people being poore, have alwaies better loved to acquire friends than slaves & servants, & have ever thought it more assured to command voluntary people, than any by constraint: King *Bocchus* then cannot chuse a better amity than ours, which can both favour thee, & aide thee, & wil never hurt thee, & to say truth, neither we, nor any other can have too many friends.

The amitie and friends which a prince may obtaine by a good and just government, may serve so to assure him of every man in his estate, that hee shall have neede of no guard, if hee thinke good to bee rid of them, as did that good emperor *Traian*, who often went to visit & see his friends, onely accompanied with foure or five gentlemen, without any guard of souldiers: The like did the ancient kings of France, which knew not that kind of guard we have now, of gunners and halberdiers, but ordinarily marched without other companie than gentlemen, which onely bare their swords about them.

Amitie (sayth *Cicero*) is the true bond of all humane societie; and whosoever will take amitie from amongst men, as *Machiavell* doth from amongst princes, hee seekes to take away all pleasure, solace, contentment and assurance that can bee amongst humane creatures: For the friend is another our selfe, with whom wee rejoyce in our prosperitie, and our joy encreaseth, when wee have unto whom to communicate it: for we are also comforted with him in our adversitie and sorrowes, and our sadnesse is more than halfe diminished, when wee have upon whom to discharge, by amiable communication, the bitterness of our heart. Moreover although we be sometimes blind in our owne causes, yet our friend marketh our faults, and kindly sheweth them unto us, and giueth us good counsell in our affaires, which we cannot take of our selves: Briefely, humane life without amitie, seemes no other thing than a sad widowage, destitute of the chiefe sweetnesse and comfort, that can bee gathered in humane societie, as *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, and other great philosophers, have learnedly discoursed, unto which I send them, which will more amply understand the good and utilitie of Amitie.

I will not deny, but many such friends will be found, like them wherof *Machiavell* speaketh; which will seeme to bee our friends, as long as they hope to draw any profit from us, and which will make us faire offers, when they see we have no need, but will turne their backs in our necessities: Ther are indeede but too many such, and wee are but too often deceived with them; yet wee may not disdain the good

Saint in  
bello Jugurth.

Disin Tra-  
ian.

Sueton. in  
Ang. lib. 66.

for the evill; neither may wee defame friendship, for the viccs and incommodities which accompanie it: For, amongst corne, commonly growes darnell, and amongst wholesome hearbes, some are venomous, which in outward shew seeme to bee faire and good, yet men may not cast away a thing so necessarie as corne, for the feare to find a darnell or drauke in it, nor the wholesome hearbs, for such as bee venomous: But wee must seeke as much as may bee to know, and to separate that which is evill, from that which is good. And heere, that manner of electing friends, which *Augustus Caesar* observed, is worthie observation: for hee did not easily retaine every man in his friendship and familiaritie, but ever tooke time to proove and finde their vertues, fidelitie and loyaltie. Such as hee knew to bee vertuous people, and which would freely tell him the truth of all things (as did that good and wise *Marcus*) and which would not flatter him, but would employ their good wills sincerely in the charges he gave them, after he had well proved them, then would he acknowledge them his friends: but as he was long and difficle to receive men into familiar amitie, so they which hee had once retained for friends, hee would never forsake them, but alwaies continued constantly his frindship towards them: Adversitie also is a true touchstone to proove who are fained or true friends: For when a man feeleth laboriathes of troubles fall on him, dissembling friends depart from him, and such as are good abide with him, as saith *Euripides*:

*Adversitie the best and certain'st friends doth trie,  
Both good and evill friends alike doth fit prosperitie.*



## II. Maxime.

*A prince which would have any man to dye, hee must seeke out some apparent colour thereof, and then hee shall not bee blamed, so that hee leave his inherisance and goods to his children.*

Cap. 17 Of  
the Prince.



When a prince (saith master *Nicholas*) will pursue the death of any man, hee ought to colour it with some iust colour; and when hee puts him to death, hee must abstaine from the confiscation of his goods: for his children which abide behinde, will sooner forget the death of their father, than the losse of their patrimonie: And withall, let him know, That nothing makes a prince so much hated, as when hee comes to touch the goods and wives of his subiects.


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His is also another tyrannicall precept, like to the former. For it is a custome with tyrants, to impose false accusations and blames against such, as they will cause to die, sometime before the execution, sometimes after. Wee have shewed before, an example of *Domitian*, who for light and no causes, tooke occasion to make many great Romane lords to dye, which were of him suspected, as to tyrants all good and vertuous men are ordinarily, which are better than themselves. The emperour *Tiberius* (saith *Tacitus*) at the beginning of his raigne, hated men of eminent vertue, and such also as were extreemely vicious, suspecting the vertue of some, and fearing to be dishonoured, and despised by the vicious: But after he came to the fulnesse of all vices, and loved most such as were most vicious; hee practised too much this principle of *Machiavell*, against many vertuous and honourable men: for, hee caused to dye a learned and most excellent man called *Crematius Cordus*, because hee writ an hystorie, wherein hee praised *Cassius* and *Brutus*: He slew also *Emilius Scaurus*, for writing a tragoedie which pleased him not, and many other like railors, whereby hee sought to cover his tyrannie. *Nero* likewise after hee had slaine his mother, writ lies to the Senat, to bee published all over, how he had discovered a great conspiration, that his mother had intended against him, to cause his death; and that hee was constrained to sleigh her, to prevent her. In like sort *Caracalla* after hee had slaine *Geta* his brother, caused a fame to bee spread all over, that hee himselfe escaped faire, for his brother would have slaine him. Briefely all tyrants use to doe so, practising their cruelties and vengeance, ever under some pretext or false colour, as *Machiavell* teacheth: And there are none at this day, which cannot exemplifie this position, with many late and fresh examples in our time. For the massacres of Paris, executed on *S. Bartholmewes* day, and the execution after, made of captain *Briquemand*, of *M. Arnaud* of Carignes, of Cont *Mongomey*, and of the lord of Monbrum, and other like, were all coloured with false imputations, by these *Messieurs Machiavellists*, and by wicked judges their slaves, as every one knoweth.

And as for that which *Machiavell* saith, That the children, of such as are unjustly caused to die, take no care, if so bee their goods bee not taken from them: I beleeve few men will accord with him, in this point, for every one which hath a good mans hart, will sooner make account of honour and life, than of goods. But certaine it is, if the successor, his sonne or other kinsman, despise and make no account to pursue by lawfull meanes, that justice be done, for the unjust death of the slaine man, whom hee succeedeth; that he lefeth his honour, and by the civile lawes is culpable and unworthie of the succession. Moreover the injurie done in the person of the father, is reputed done to the sonne himselfe: and the contrarie: As also every man esteemes himselfe to suffer injurie, when any of his parents or friends doe suffer it: Insomuch as such violent executions are without doubt more intollerable, than the losse of goods, and do much more strongly wound the hearts of men, which are nor destitute of naturall loue towards their blood, and such as have their honour in any recommendation, than al other losses and damages that they can suffer: and although the *Machiavellists* hold for a Maxime, That a dead man biteth not or makes no warre, yet the death of a man, oftentimes is the cause of many deaths, and of great effusion of blood, as more at large shall be said, in another place.

12. *Maxime.*

*A Prince ought to follow the nature of the Lion, and of the Fox: not of the one without the other.*

Cap. 18. 19.  
Of the  
Prince.



You must understand (saith this *Florentine*) that men fight in two manners: the one with Lawes, when matters are handled by reason: the other with force. The first is proper to men, which have the use of reason: The second appertaineth to beasts, which have neither reason nor intelligence. But because the first is not sufficient to keepe men and to maintaine them in inioying of things belonging unto them, they must needs oftentimes have recourse to the second, which is force. Wherefore it is needefull, that a Prince can well play the beast, and the man together: as our elders have taught, when they writ, that *Chiron* the Centaure, halfe a man and halfe a beast, was given as an instructor for the prince *Achilles*: For heereby hee gave to understand, that a prince ought to shew himselfe a man and a beast together. A prince then beeing constrained well to know how to counterfeit the beast, hee ought amongst all beasts to chuse the complexion of the Fox, and the Lyon together, and not of the one without the other: for the Fox is subtile, to keepe himselfe from snares, yet he is too weake to guard himselfe from vvolves: and the Lyon is strong enough to guard himselfe from vvolves, but hee is not subtile enough to keepe himselfe from nets: A man must then bee a Foxe to know all subtilties and deceits, and a Lyon to bee the stronger, and to make vvolves afraid. The emperour *Didius Iulianus* knevv vvell howv to play the Fox, to come to the empire in promising men of warre great summes of monie, to obtaine the empire: For after he vvvas chosen, hee played them a Foxes part, deceiving them, in giving them much lesse than hee promised: but not knowing vvithall howv to play the Lyon, hee vvvas incontinent overthrowne: For *Severus*, vvho was cunning to play both, came against him vvith great force, insomuch as hee vvvas flaine

slaine by his owne souldiers of his garde, which went to *Severus* side. And in the meane while *Severus* seeing that the captaine *Albinus* was in Gaule with a puissant armie, and captaine *Niger* in the Levant likewise with a great army, hee played the Fox, to allure them by faire vvords, That they would not hinder him to obtaine the empire: for hee feared them, because they had great forces in their hands, and that they were more noble, and of more ancient houses than hee: Hee made them great promises, especiallie hee promised *Albinus* to associate him in the empire, and to give him the name and authoritie of *Cesar*, vvhich was the like title, as at this day is king of the Romanes, And as for *Niger*, hee held his children in his hands as hostages, under colour of honour and favour, so that hee the lesse feared him. As soone as hee had thus by playing the Fox, and deceit, stayed *Albinus* and *Niger*, he ended his enterprife, by making himselfe knowne a peaceable emperour. But after this, taking unto him the nature of the Lyon, hee turned his forces against *Albinus* and *Niger*, and overcame them both, one after another: So that by knowing vvell how to play these two beasts, the Lyon and the Fox, hee made himselfe a peaceable emperour without competitor. Contrary, the emperour *Maximin*, after hee was elected emperour by the souldiers of his hoast, could not play the part of the Fox, but onely of the Lyon, which was the cause that hee endured not, and that many were elected, to hinder his quiet possession of the empire, insomuch as in the end he was overthrowne and slaine of his owne souldiers.



**M**achiavell hath not yet handled a discourse more worthie of his sufficiency than this: For hee teacheth by this Maxime the manner to be a beast, and especially how a prince should in all his behaviours use himselfe like a beast. Thinke you I pray you, that to teach, how being a man, you may imitate a beast, is a small matter? I know well that our *Machiavelists*, will say, that herein is hid a secret of philosophie, and that *Machiavell* meaneth that a prince should be as subtile as a Fox, & violent like a Lyon; not that he must go with foure feet, or that he must dwel in the deserts of Arabia, or in holes in woods, or commit other such like actions, as the Fox and Lyon doe. Well I am content to agree unto them this morall sence; and that their master meant here to declare some singular and memorable doctrine: Let us now come to examine it. He saith then, when a Prince cannot fight like a man, that is by reason, he ought to fight like a beast, that is, to use force and subtiletie. To this I answere, that a Prince in his quarrell hath either reason or right on his side, or else he hath them not: If he hath them not, he ought not to fight against any man: for each war ought to have his foundation upon reason, as other where wee have shewed. If the Prince hath



Force is a  
servant of  
reason.

hath reason on his side, and he with whom hee hath to doe, refuseth to come to reason, then the prince may justly constrain him by force of armes: and this is not called to fight like a beast, nor like a Lion, but it is to fight as a man using reason, who employeth his owne corporall force, and the force of his horses, of his armies and wals, and of all other things offensive and defensive, to serve for instruments and meanes to execute that which reason commandeth and ordaineth: so that force employed to his right use, is no other thing but a servant of reason, which obeyeth her in all her commandements: and therefore therein there is nothing of a beast, and they which thus employ their forces, doe nothing that holds of a beast. As for guile and subtilty, I say likewise, that in warre a man may lawfully use subtilties against his enemies, if so be his faith and the rights of warre bee not violated, and this is not called foxlike subtiltie, or unlawfull deceiving, but it ought to be called military prudence: And therefore in warre to use subtiltie, fraud, and military sharpenesse of wit (for all those names may be well used) is not to counterfeit the beast, nor to play the Fox. But I know well, *Machiavell* is of another mind, namely, That a prince is not bound unto right, faith, or religious promise, to hinder him that he may not use now force, and now subtiltie, according as the one or the other may best serve him, to come to the end hee pretendeth: For of faith and promise, or of right and reason, men may not speake in *Machiavels* schoole, unlesse it be to mocke at them, which esteeme such most holy bands of humane societie: but concerning faith and promises, we shall have another Maxime, wherein we shall rip up this matter to the bottom: but here onely I wil shew that these foxlike subtilties and deceits, whereof *Machiavell* meanes in his speech, doe not ever succeed well to them who use them, but most commonly they fall into their owne nets.

*Tit. Livius,*  
*lib. 7. Dec. 3.*  
*lib. 3. Dec.*  
*4.*

When *Anniball* (by meanes of an ambuscado) had entrapped the captaine *Marcellus*, lieutenant generall of the Roman armie (who was slaine upon the place) he found about him his sealing ring: hee considered straight upon a subtile device, namely, to write unto the Salapians (which dwelt nigh) in the name of *Marcellus*, by which he sent them word, that the next night he would come into Salapia, and that they should hold the garrison of the towne ready. *Crispinus*, the lieutenant of *Marcellus*, knowing *Anniball* to be a master of subtile inventions; doubting this, sent suddainly through all the townes, word, that *Marcellus* was dead, and his ring in *Annibals* hands, and that they should beleieve no letter under the name of *Marcellus*: The Salapians having received this advertisement, and *Annibals* letters also, put their garrison in armes; and as *Anniball* approched the towne, he caused such to march first as could speake the Roman tongue: As soon as they arrived at the gates, they called the guards therof, which playing well their parts, at the last tooke up the port-cullis on high, & suffered about six hundred of *Annibals* souldiers to enter in: then let they fall the port-cullis, and cut in pieces all them which entred, which caused *Annibal* thus to be taken in his own net. Thus was he known and discovered for a Fox, so as often they turned his owne nets upon him, as they do upon Foxes, when they catch them, by bending their nets backward. And truly, it is most often scene, that such subtilties as tast of trecherie and disloyaltie, succeed not well: For as captaine *Quimius* said to the *Aetolians*: Subtile and audacious counsels are at the first very agreeable and pleasant, but to guide they are difficill and hard, and full of sorrow in the end.

Counsell of  
subtiltie pe-  
rillous.

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*Tit. Livius,*  
*lib. 2. Dec. 5.*

Concerning this subtiltie and perfidious deceit, a notable advice is given by the Senate

Senate of the auncient Romans. The Romans being upon the point to move warre against *Perseus* king of Macedonie, they first sent embassadors unto him, & amongst them, *Martinus Philippus*, to know the desseignes of that king, and to trie if he would repaire the faults and injuries which he had committed against the Romanes. The said embassadors found the king but slenderly prepared for warre, and altogether evill disposed to acknowledge or repaire his faults: Therefore making him understand, that he need to looke for nothing at the Romanes hands but amitie, and that at their hands he might easily look for a good peace or truce, with this hope leaving him, they returned to Roine. Soone after they were arived, they declared in full to the Senate, all that they had done in Macedonie, and especially, how they deceived king *Perseus*, in making him beleve, that hee might at his pleasure have peace or truce, wherein they thought to have wrought well: But the abovesaid old Senatours begun to answer them, That they liked not, neither would countenance such treaties as be not becoming the Romanes: & that their auncestors used not to vanquish their enemies by deceits and subtilties, nor by nocturne battails, nor by simuled and fained flight, and so suddenly to returne, nor by other deceits, but by true and perfect vertue: For their custome was ever, to denounce warre before they begun it, yea sometimes they assigned the place of bataille. Our auncestors mooved with this sinceritie and loyaltie, would not employ the physitian of king *Pyrrhus* their enemy, who offered to poyson his master for a certaine summe of silver, but they discovered to the king the disloyaltie of the Physician: that also by this said sinceritie they would not take the children of the Falisques, which were delivered them by their owne schoolemaster, but sent the schoolemaster bound and all his schollers backe againe to the Falisques: And that such doings become Romanes well, and not to use the subtile deceits of the Punickes, or the craftinesse of the Grecians, which esteemed it more honorable to deceive their enemy, than to vanquish him: And that although for the present time, subtiltie hath profited, yet the enemy vanquished by deceits, never holds himselfe for vanquished, but hee onely which acknowledgeth himselfe surmounted by true vertue without any subtiltie or deceit. Behold what was the opinion of these old and wise Senators, which rejected and despised the Fox-like subtilties, whereof *Machiavell* makes such great account.

In the year 1383, the duke of Anjou, brother of king *Charles le Sage*, went into Italie with a puissant armie to conquer Naples and Sicilie: Amongst other lords which accompanied him in this voyage, was the earle of Savoy, who led with him a good companie of knights: as they were in Poville and Calabria, seeing none to resist them, they begun straight to devise of a place where they might assuredly have resistance: and it was made knowne to the duke of Anjou, that the strongest place of all that countrey, was the Egge castle of Naples, which is builded in the sea, within which *Charles de la Paix*, a competitor of the said kingdome of Naples, remained: The duke of Anjou enquired by what meanes he might come to have it: There came then straight an Enchanter unto him, who said, that he would helpe him unto it in like maner as he helped *Charles de la Paix*, who now held it. And how is that, answered the duke? Sir, answered the Enchanter, I will cause a grosse and thick cloud to arise out of the sea, which shall have the forme of a bridge, whereof your enemies shall be so afraid, that they shall yeeld themselves to you: Yea but (replied the duke) can men passe upon that bridge? Sir (said the Enchanter) I will not assure that, for as soone as any do make the signe of the crosse as they passe, or do any way crosse their legs

*Titus Liv.*  
*lib. 3. Dec. 5.*

Treaties of  
craftinesse  
rejected of  
the Romanes

legs or their armes or otherwise, all will fall to the ground, and goe to nothing. The duke of Anjou began to laugh, and after sent for the Count of Savoy to have his counsell upon this matter, whereof hee made a recitall: The Count entreated the duke as soone as the Enchanter came againe to him, to send him to his chamber, for I would talke with him a little: The duke the next morning sent him unto him. When this Enchanter was come into the earle of Savoyes lodging: Well sir (saith the earle) you say you will make us enjoy the Egge castle: Yea (Sir) for *Charles*, which now possesseth it obtained it by my meanes; and I know he feareth me more than all the forces than can come against it: Well (replied the Earle) I will deliver him from that feare, and I will not have him say, that so many brave knights as wee are, could not vanquish so weake an enemy as *Charles de la Paix* is, but by the meanes of an Enchanter: So (saith he) call hither the hangman; who being come, he commanded, that in the court the Enchanters head should be cut off, which was done. For this wise earle had no mind to vanquish by deceits, and enchantment, but by true and naturall vertue: And surely generous hearts doe alwaies disdain craft, subtilties and deceits, which also cannot long last: for after a prince or captaine hath a name that he useth it, and then especially when a thing is to be done seriously and plainly, men doe alwayes thinke they intend some subtiltie or deceit. And if it succeeded well to *Severus* his using of deceit, so it doth not to all men, nor to the most part: and *Severus* was greatly diffamed for such frauds, but his other vertues made him prosper.


But should we call this beastlinesse, or malice, which *Machiavell* saith of *Chiron*? or hath he read, that *Chiron* was both a man and a beast? Who hath told him, that he was delivered to the prince *Achilles*, to teach him that goodly knowledge to be both a man and a beast? *Xenophon* saith, that *Chiron* was *Iupiters* brother (so great a man he makes him) full of great knowledge, and of all vertue, generositie, pietie, and justice: nay he saith further, that *Æsculapius*, *Nestor*, *Amphiaraus*, *Peleus*, *Telamon*, *Theseus*, *Ulysses*, *Castor*, *Pollux*, *Æneas*, *Achilles*, and almost all great persons, which the grecians place amongst their gods, of him learned these vertues, whereby they have obtained immortall praise, and the reputation to be gods: Hee saith also, that *Chiron* was not in the time of *Achilles*, but long time before: but because the prince *Achilles*, was instructed and nourished in his discipline, vertue, and manner of life, men say he was *Achilles* his instructor. True it is, that the Poets have called him a Centaure, because he tooke great pleasure in riding of horses, and in hunting, which are exercises well befitting a prince: But although he loved horses, and the exercise of knighthood, yet was he never esteemed to hold any thing of a beast, but rather of the divinitie, as being endowed with all excellent vertues, which bring men nigh God, and take them farthest from beasts. And therefore the beastly malice of *Machiavell* is scene, in perverslie abusing the example of that valiant and generous prince *Achilles*, to perswade a prince not to stick to governe himselfe after the imitation of beasts; seeing that *Achilles* was instructed, as is said, by *Chiron* the Centaure, a man and a beast which learned him how to live both like a man and a beast: for this is false and devised; for *Chiron* rather held of divinitie, than of a beast, neither was *Achilles* instructed, but in all heroicall vertues: And we never read, that hee ever used any Foxlike subtiltie or unlawfull policie, or any other thing unworthie of a magnanimous prince, well nourished and instructed in all high and royall vertues.

*Xenoph. de  
Venat.*

But



But since *Machiavell* travaileth so much to persuaue princes to learne how to play the Lion and the Fox, wherefore doth he not persuaue them also to carry those two beasts in their armes? We see many which beare Lyons (because it is in some things a generous and a noble beast) but there are sildome scene in armes any Foxes pourtraied; because every noble and generous man which loveth vertue, disdaineth and hateth all deceit, falshood, and Foxlike dissembling, as things very unfit for gentlemen. The Machiavelists, which esteeme it so fit, that a prince should know how to play the Lion and the Fox together, the more to authorize this Maxime, should carie Foxes in their armes: But they would not be knowne to be that they are, to the end they might the better deceive the world, and left men crie after them, The Fox, The Fox.

13. *Maxime.*

*Crueltie which tendeth to a good end is not to be reprehended.*

**R**omulus (saith *Machiavell*) at the beginning of his kingdome, slew *Remus* his brother; and afterward consented to the death of *Tatius Sabinus*, king of the Sabins, whom hee associated in his roialtie, that hee might unite together in one same citie, the two people, the Romanes and Sabines. It would seeme to many men of grosse conceit, that *Romulus* proceeded evill, to begin his kingdome with the murder of his owne brother, and that it was an act of evill example: But as for me (saith *M. Nicholas*) I am of a far other opinion: For it is a generall Maxime, That the state of the Commonwealth can not be well laid and compounded of new lawes, if the Lawmakers and Iudges bee many, but there ought to bee no more than one onely person and spirit, to doe, rule, and ordaine all: And therefore the prince which desireth to come to that point, is not worthy of any reprehension, if he commit any extraordinarie exploit to come thereunto: For that violence which destroyeth all, is greatly to be reprehended, but so is not that which tendeth to make things in better state: Therefore is *Romulus* worthie of praise, that he himselfe slew his brother, and caused to sleie *Tatius* his companion, that hee alone might establish a good policie at Rome, as after hee did, erecting there a Senate, by which hee

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Discourse,  
lib. 1.

was counselled in all his affaires both of peace and vvarre, and they made also good rules and ordinances. A like praise is due to *Agis*, king of Sparta, who sought to conforme the corrupted state of the Lacedemonians, and to establish in use, the auncient ordinances of *Licurgus*, but knowing that *Ephori* might hinder and contradict him in his desseignes, hee caused them all to be slaine, whereby hee got great renowne, yea, as much or rather greater than *Licurgus* himselfe, the first author of such Lawes: True it is, that *Agis* could not make an end of his good entents and purposes, because of the unluckie desseignes of the Macedonians, who making warre upon him, vanquished him to the hinderance of his gallant enterprises.



Here was never murder nor crueltie, which is not coloured with some pretext or shew of good: some cover themselves with justice, affirming all that they doe, to be founded upon a good reason and equitie, and that justice would have done no lesse, than that which they have executed; and that their execution is the shortest way of justice, which would otherwise have been too long: so that in place of murderers, cut-throates & massacers, they are not ashamed to call themselves abbreviators of justice: and why should they bee ashamed; seeing that justice at this day, is so practised, as they make her serve but as a palliation or coverture, for all assassinations, murders, and vengeance? Euery mans eye seeth, that in many places justice serveth to no other turne, but to lend her name to such as will seeme to doe well, when they doe evil against their owne consciences, therein following the doctrine of *Machiavell*: Murderers therefore and massacers, may well from henceforth cover themselves, with the name of abbreviators of justice, without reprehension, seeing officers of justice take also that trade upon them, and cause as unjust and wicked executions to bee done as they. Both of these truly (according to this Maxime of *Machiavell*) doe pretend for their mischievous wickednesse, a laudable end, and doe say, it is to minister and exercise justice, when they doe the aforesaid executions: Others cover their murders with another end, namely, the publike good, saying that their murders and massacres, are done to shun a greater evill, which would have come by him or them that they have slaine or murdered. There are some which make a covering of peace and tranquillitie, and so will say, That the murders which they did or caused to bee done, were executed to establish peace, and to make troubles to cease. Breefly, after *Machiavells* doctrine, there cannot bee found so cruell a tyrant and murderer, but hee should be justified, praised and remunerated, because all murders, massacres, and assassinations, are alwayes found done to a good end, and the most cruell hangmen and executioners, will never want a colour for their most detestable & sanguinary actions. Notwithstanding what palliations & shewes so ever they take, the worke alwayes shewes who was the workeman; and in the end their colours will deceive them, like the deceitfull painting of barlots: so that their make or visard taken from them, murder will alwayes bee found murder, and theft, theft, and they wicked men, as they are, although most subtrillie they play the

foxes, according to their masters doctrine, yet in the end, they will be alwaies known for foxes: And though they sometimes deceive, before they be knowne, they are therefore double punished, in regard of the profit they get by deceiving, when none will beleve or trust them in any manner, no not even then, when they have an intention and will, not to deceive at all: For alwaies men perswaine of them, as men ought to perswaine of deceivers and wicked men, which are without faith and promise, for men hold them for such, and they can bee held for no other; in regard of their actions and behaviours, of their lives past. This then is the first evil proceeding from *Machiavels* doctrine, which is, that they themselves which practise it, bring evil to themselves, and are discred, hated and evil beloved of all men.

The other inconvenience, which followeth this Maxime, is that if the prince permit men to commit murders, under colour of a good intent and end, he shall breake the order of justice, which he ought to observe in the punishment of offenders, and so shall turne all upside downe, and bring his estate and countrey into confusion & perill: for when justice goeth evill, all goes evill, & when well, all goes well, as in an other place shal be shewed more at full. Murders and massacres also never remaine long unpunished; for God incontinent sends them their reward, as came to *Romulus* (*Machiavels* owne example) who was an unjust murthurer, and in the end was murdered himself. And in our time we see examples enough, and I beleve we shall see more, in such as the hand of God hath not touched: But amongst these evils & inconveniences, which ordinarily lay hold of these murderers, and follow them, even to their graves, with furies, feares, and torments, which vex their consciences, I could here alledge, for a confirmation of this Maxime, that which *S. Paul* saith, That we must not do evill, that good may come thereof: But I have already said in another place, that I will not imploy the sacred armour of the holy Scripture, to fight against this prophane & wicked Atheist, but I will still give him this advantage, to contend with his owne armes; namely, with prophane authors, which were not Christians, and which herein alone resemble him; for in other things he holds nothing of them, and especially in the matter whereof we speake, they have been most farre from his detestable doctrine.

When *Tarquin* the proud king of Rome, saw that hee had so behaved himselfe, as he had utterly lost the amitie of his subjects, then resolved to cause himselfe to be obeyed by feare; and to bring it to passe, hee tooke to himselfe, the knowledge of capitall causes against great men, which before appertained to the Senate, to make himselfe the better feared and obeyed, and so hee put to death, such as hee thought good, under certaine pretexts and colours, thinking thereby the better to assure his estate: But how did he assure it? Thus, he so practised this doctrine of *Machiavell*, that hee became extreemely hated of all men, in such sort, as his subjects not being able to beare his tyrannie, did drive him out of his kingdome, where hee miserably dyed.

And so much there wanteth, that the antient Romanes delighted in massacring and slaying, that they hated even the too rigorous punishments of offenders, as the punishment of *Metius Sufferius Albanois*, who was with foure horses drawne to death, for a strange and damnable treason by him intended: For although hee merited to be so handled, yet the Romanes had the crueltie of the punishment in so great disdain and detestation, that every body turned away their eyes (saith *Titus Livius*) seeing so villanous a spectacle: And it was the first and last time, that ever they

Murder is  
alwayes  
murder, to  
whatsoever  
end it be  
done.

Cruelty o-  
verthrow-  
eth justice.

*Titus Livius*  
*lib. 2. de*



they used that rigorous punishment. Likewise it greatly displeased the Romans, that some (thinking to doe well) caused to be slaine a Tribune of the people, a very seditious man called *Genusius*, who ceased not to trouble the commonwealth, by divisions, whereby he stirred the common people to uproares: If *Genusius* had had his lawfull triall, it is likely hee would have beene condemned: but therein there was this mischiefe, that none darst lay hold upon him, for the reverence of his estate during that yere, but he must needs have been suffered either to do what he would, or els to resist his designs by other meanes, than by accusation, and not at all to condemne him, before he were out of his office: This seemed a goodly colour to dispatch him, to shun seditions and troubles, which this Tribune railed, yet the execution which was made without course of law, was found nought, and of an evill example and consequence, and was the cause of great mischiefs and broyles which followed after.

*Dion. Halic.*  
*lib. 2.*  
*Tit. Livius*  
*lib. 1, Dec. 8.*

*Plutarch in*  
*Romulo.*

*Titus Livius*  
*lib. 3. Dec. 8.*

*Dionysius 14.*  
*Halic. lib. 10*


*Plutarch in*  
*Agis.*

And as for that which *Machiavel* writeth, that *Romulus* caused to sleie *Tatius* his companion in the kingdome, the better to rule and governe the towne of Rome, this is false: for histories doe witnesse, that after he had caused this execution to be made, he became cruell, and proud towards the Senators, exercising tyranny in many things, inso much as the Senators themselves slew him, even in the Senat house, and cut him in little peeces, whereof every man tooke one peece in his bosome: so that the bodie of *Romulus* was not found: for they hired one to say, that hee did see the bodie flie into heaven, and the said Senators helping this bruite and report, placed him in the letany of their gods, and perswaded the people, that he ascended into the heavens both in body and soule. But they gave *Romulus* his reward, for the murdering of his brother *Remus*, and his companion *Tatius*, and they murdered him, as he had done them. For briefly it is a generall rule, that murderers are alwayes murdered, which rule hath seldome any exceptions.

But whereas *Machiavell* saith, That well to rule and governe a commonwealth, there would be but one person to meddle therein, there hath been alwayes the contrarie practised. When the Romanes thought it good, by good lawes and ordinances to governe the estate of their common weale, they considered, that the number of two Consuls (which were their soveraigne magistrates) were too few, and therefore they abrogated and tooke them cleane away, and elected ten men in their places, unto which they gave the same authoritie which the Consuls before had, and especially gave them power and expresse charge, to make lawes and ordinances, for the policie, government and justice of the commonweale. They made the lawes of the twelve tables, which endured long after them, yea at this day some of these are in good use and observance. Naturall reason also sheweth us, that a law and rule made and examined by many braines, must needs be better, than when it is made by one alone: but because I have touched this point more at large in another place, I will wade no further therein.

As touching that which *Machiavell* saith of *Agis*, *Plutarch* in his life speaketh otherwise thereof; for he saith, That he was the most meeke and quiet man, in the world, who sought to reforme the estate of Sparta, by all good and honest meanes, and to bring into force and use, the antient lawes of *Licurgus*: and because the *Ephori* opposed themselves against his designs and purposes, hee practised that *Lyfander* and *Agisilaus*, should be advanced to the estate of *Ephori*, as they were: But *Agisilaus*, overtaken with avarice, refused to sticke to the effecting of this

this good purpose of king *Agis*, so that hee could not any way bring to passe that good reformation which he intended. Here is all which *Plutarch* saith, he speaks no word that *Agis* should cause the *Ephori* to bee slaine, but contrarie that the *Ephori* brought *Agis* to his death, neither speaks he of any enterprise of the Macedonians: And I know not where *Machiavel* hath fished for that he here writeth, unlesse hee take it out of his owne braine, and then oweth hee nothing to any man, seeing it is his owne: But howsoever it be, he can learne it of no author, which shall not bee alwayes convinced of a lie, by that learned *Plutarch*, who speaketh as I have set it downe.

14. *Maxime.*

*A Prince ought to exercise crueltie all at once, and to doe pleasures by little and little.*

**H**E which will invade a principallitie (saith our Florentine) whatsoever is to be sharply and cruelly practised, would at the first entry bee dispatched with all expedition, that there may bee no occasion to returne often to one businesse, to the end, that afterward by gracious & good dealing he may the sooner bring under and tame his subiects: for iniuries and offences ought to be committed all at once, that beeing the lesse time felt by subiects, they may stirre and anger them the lesse: And contrarie, pleasures must be done by little and little, that by often iteration thereof, they upon whom such benefits are bestowed, may the more desirously and pleasantly drinke them up, and imprint them in their hearts. It is true indeed, that many there have been, which because they were cruell, could not long continue their principallitie in peace; but that happened unto them, because their cruelties were not handsomely and well exercised: But they may be accounted well exercised, when they are committed but once, as it were upon a necessitie to assure himselfe, and to avoid and shun a greater inconvenience, for augmentation of the Commonweale. *Agathocles* the Sicilian, by the practise of this *Maxime*, became king of *Syracuse*: This gallant was but a potters sonne, and all his life wicked and full of vices; yet those his vices

Cap. 17. of a Prince.

were accompanied with a great bravenesse of courage he followed arms: By little and little he did so much by his iournies, that hee became Prætor of Siracuse; and being in that estate, desirous to make himself king and to usurpe the tyranny, he caused the people and the Senat of Siracuse to be assembled, making them understand, that he would execute some great matters of importance before them. The people and the Senate being assembled (at a watchword he had given unto his souldiers) they put to death all the Senators, & the most noble of the people, and so made himselfe soveraigne lord of the towne, without any impeachment. Whosoever then considereth the prudence of *Agathocles*, and the greatnesse of his courage, to enterprise and to execute so great a thing, men would not judge him inferior to any other capitaine before him. In our time during the raigne of Pope *Alexander* the sixth, *Oliver de Ferme* was educated and brought up yong, by one that was his mothers brother, called *John Foglian*, who sent him to learne the militarie art under capitaine *Paulus Vitellius*, thereby to come unto some honourable estate. This *Oliver* being a gallant and personable man, and of a quicke wit, after a good space he had followed the warre, *ala Solde*, for wages, he scorned this base manner of life, and determined with the helpe of certaine citizens of the towne of Ferme, to get possession, and to make himselfe master and lord of the towne: To obtaine this, he writ a letter to his uncle *John Foglian*, whereby he signified, That where as he having beene long time out of his countrey, had not all the time seene his parents and friends, and now comming to visit them, that they of the towne might thinke he had beene honorably employed in his pursute of warre, desired his said uncle to find meanes that hee might as honorably enter, with an hundred horse of his friends and servants; and that hee would doe so much as in some good order also to meet him; which should be not only to his honour, but also to his uncles that had nourished him. *Messier John* greatly reioyced at these newes, and failed in nothing to prepare all that was possible to honour his nephew, inso-much, as the whole towne every way celebrated and reioyced at his comming thither, conducting him with all honour agreeable to his discent, unto the Towne-house, where he abode certaine daies, whilest he made all things readie for the execution of his enterprise: At the last he prepared a great banquet, unto which he invited his uncle, and all other most noble persons of the tovvn of Ferme: At the banquets end, he begun to fall into talke of vveightie matters concerning Pope *Alexander* and his son the duke de *Valentinois*, and their enterprises, vwhere-  
unto



unto his uncle, making a certaine answer; *Oliver* began to smile, and withall told him, that such an answer would have beene made more privat, as also all their whole talke of that matter: Therefore giving them to understand, that he would discover unto them certaine secrets of that matter, he drew them apart into a chamber, and as soone as his uncle and the noblest & greatest of the company were there set down, suddenly entred a great company of souldiers (which he had hired and hid in some place nigh) who massacred and put to death in a moment his owne uncle and all others in his companie: This murder beeing executed, *Oliver* being followed of his souldiers, overran straight all the towne, besieged the soveraigne magistrate in his pallace, and did so much, as finally every one was constrained to yeeld him obedience: This done hee made himselfe soveraigne lord of the towne, and he there established a certaine politicke government, but yet caused all such to be slain as might be malecontent vvith that change, or could any vvay hurt him: And vvithin a little vvhile after, by good, civile and militarie ordinances, he not onely made himselfe assured in the seignorie of the citie of *Ferris*, but also made himselfe redoubted of all his neighbours: Yet the evill lucke vvvas, that he suffered himselfe to be deceived by *Cesar Borgia*, vvho by faire vvords drevv him to *Sinagallia*, vvhere catching him, he caused him to be hanged and strangled, and if had not beene this evill adventure, he vvvas a man likely to haue done great things.




*Machiavell* persisteth in giving tyrannicall precepts unto a prince, teaching him by this Maxime a very exquisite meane, to tame a people newly reduced into his obedience, & to obtaine their grace and favour: That is (saith he) that a prince at his first entry and at once doe make an horrible slaughter of all such as he doth suspect might hinder his designs & purposes; the others which remain, he may bring on with gentleness, and assure them unto him, by bestowing pleasures upon them by little and little. But I pray you, is there so brutish a man in the world, who sees not the absurditie and wickednesse of this doctrine? How is it possible, that a prince should make himselfe either loved or obeyed in a new conquered countrey by such barbarous usage, seeing they themselves which use all the kindness they can, have much a doe to obtaine it? Assuredly, there is no nation so effeminate and servile, that wil not suffer themselves to be cut in peeces, before they wil subject themselves under such a prince, whose entry hath beene so cruell and sanguinarie, as *Machiavel* counselleth: yet if it so fall out, that for a time a people be forced under such a yoke, it is impossible that such a subjection should longer endure than that force continueth. The example alledged of *Oliver de Ferris*, doth wel shew it: for he continued not long no more than did *Cesar Borgia*, vvho by the like means had usurped the

Great cru-  
elty cannot  
be put out  
of mens  
hearts.

the domination of Romania, as hath beene before said. But can a man imagine a more cruell and detestable act, than that which *Machiavel* rehearseth of *Oliver de Ferme*? who (under the pretext of amitie) massacred most wickedly his owne parents, and such as had given him so honourable an entertainment as was possible? Yet *Machiavel* proposeth this gallant example, for a prince to imitate, as hee had before done, with the example of *Cesar Borgia*: And as for *Agashocles*, true it is (as *Suidas* and others write) he usurped the tyrannie of Sicile, by causing with treason and treacherie the chiefe rulers of *Siracuse* to bee slaine: but what end made hee also? even such as he merited: For, being desirous to make great his domination over Italy, hee thought best to practise with intelligencers, which kept not their word with him, insomuch as his purpose being broken & annihilated, by the same means of treason and unfaithfulnesse, by which hee made himselfe great, hee died with griefe and heavinesse of mind. And still are not these the judgements of God, who ruins tyrants by the same wayes, which he suffers them to get up and come to advancement? And although *Agashocles* had so bad an end, as his life also had beene very wicked, yet dare *Machiavel* compare him with the greatest and most vertuous captaines, that have in times past beene, and to offer him as an example, for a prince to imitate: So that men may well say, that this wicked Atheist, hath no other purpose in his bookes, than to perswade a prince to become a tyrant and most wicked, by embracing all vices, and chasing away all vertue: but heretofore I have sufficiently discoursed upon the effects of crueltie, and therefore need speake no more hereof.

But is not this a wise reason, to say, That crueltie ought to be exercised all at once, that it may not bee too often felt, as that is which is practised by little and little at many times: And why? that which is practised all at once is not felt, but at the instant it is practised: Nay contrarie wee commonly see, that such great cruelties as men commit against a great number of persons, doe so wound and irritate the hearts of all the kinsfolke & friends of them that be murdered, that they feele it during their lives, yea sometimes the wound bleedeth even to the third generation: But the cruelties which are committed at many and divers times, doe not so farre penetrate the courage, nor prick men so lively to the quicke, although continuance encreaseth discontentment. No man also can deny, but that it is a thing farre more fearefull and horrible to our senses, to see a great slaughter, and a great heape of murdered persons, than to see onely one or two: And no man can promise to himselfe, that that prince will handle him kindly, who practiseth such a generall massacre and slaughter, as *Machiavel* counselleth, whatsoever good countenance hee after sheweth of his gentle and kind carriage: For the first apprehension of crueltie, will be found so fast sticking and engraven in the hearts of men, that no demonstrations of gentlenesse and humilitie succeeding, can abolish or rase it out.

15. *Maxime.*

*A vertuous tyrant to maintaine his tyranny, ought to maintaine partialities and factions amongst his subiects, and to sleigh and take away such as love the Commonwealth.*

**T**H most commonly happeneth (saith *Machiavell*) in countries governed by princes, that that which is profitable to him, is damageable to his subiects, & that which is profitable to his subiects, is damageable unto him: Which causeth oftentimes princes to become tyrants, better loving their profit, than their subiects: As also the contrarie makes subiects often arise against their prince, not able to endure his tyranny and oppression. To keepe subiects then, that they doe not conspire and agree together to arise against his tyranny, hee must nourish and maintaine partialities and factions amongst them: For, by that meanes shall you see, that distrusting one another, and fearing that one will accuse and disclose another, they will not dare to enterprize any thing: But herewithall hee must cause all them to be slain which love libertie, and the commonwealth, and which are enemies to tyrannie. If *Tarquin* the last king of Rome had well observed this Maxime, and had caused *Brutus* to be slaine, no man would have beene found that durst have enterprised any thing against him, and then might hee alwayes after have exercised his tyranny at his pleasure without controlment.

Discourse  
lib. 2. cap. 2.  
and lib. 3.  
cap. 3.

**H**ERE before *Machiavel* hath shewed, how a prince should best become a tyrant; namely, by exercising all manner of crueltie, impietie, and injustice, after the examples of *Cesar Borgia*, of *Oliver de Ferme*, and of *Agathocles*: Now hee shewes how hee in his tyranny, may maintaine and conserve himselfe, that is, by feeding and maintaining partialities and divisions amongst his subiects, and in causing such to die, as appeare to be curious lovers of the common weale, because none can love the good and utilitie of the common weale, but hee must bee an enemy of tyrannie: as contrarie, none can love tyrannie, but he must needs bee an enemy to the common weale: For, tyrannie draweth all to himselfe, and disposeth subiects of their goods and commodities, to appropriate all to himselfe, making his particular good of that which belongeth to all men, and apply-



Tyrants  
draw all to  
themselves.

applying to his owne private profit and use, that which should serve to all men in generall: So that it followeth, that whosoever loveth the profit of a tyrant, by consequent hateth the profit of his subjects, and hee that loveth the common good of subjects, hateth also the particular profit of a tyrant. But thus speaking, I doe not meane of tributes, which are lawfully levied upon subjects: for the exaction of taxes, may well be the worke of a prince, and of a just ruler, but we speake of the proper and particular actions of tyrants.

Tit. Livius  
lib. 4. Dec. 4.

Surely indeed if there be any proper and meere meane to maintaine a tyrannie, it seemes well, that that which *Machiavel* teacheth is one, To maintaine subjects in partialities and divisions: For as *Quintius* saith, (when hee exhorted the townes of Greece, to accord amongst themselves) Against a people which are in a good unities amongst themselves, tyrants can doe nothing, but if there bee discord amongst them, an overture is straight made, for him to doe what hee will: I freely then confesse (and if I would deny it, experience proves it) that in this point *Machiavell* is a true doctor, who well understands the science of tyranny, and no man can set down more proper precepts, for so wicked a thing, than such as this Maxime containeth; namely, to sleigh all lovers of the Commonwealth, and amongst other subjects to maintaine partialities. Surely if any thing serve to maintaine a tyranny, these seeme most proper and covenable: for they are made from the same mould that tyranny it selfe is, and drawne from one same spring, of most execrable wickednesse and impietie.

Tyrants are  
impious.

But yet I will hold, that neither these tyrannical precepts, nor any others can long maintaine a tyrant, or a tyrannie: For the ordinance of God, being farre stronger than the detestable precepts of *Machiavel*, repugneth them, and never suffereth tyranny to be of any long endurance; as we have before shewed, by the examples of *Nero*, *Caligula*, *Caracalla*, and *Domitian*, as *Sophocles* saith:

Sopho. in  
Aias. Flagel.

No man did ever see,  
A tyrant eence to proove godly.

And because tyrants are alwayes full of impietie, God (with whom they strive) brings his justice upon them, yea commonly hee makes them passe the edge of the sword, or else to die some other strange and violent death: For as *Juvenal* saith:

Corneli. Tacit.  
Annales 5.

A tyrant seldome life doth end,  
But by the sword, which God doth send.

And besides that God brings them to a tragicall and miserable end, even during their lives are they continually tormented in their consciences with feares, distrusts, and furies which so trouble them day and night, that they obtain no rest. To this purpose *Tacitus* rehearseth, That when the emperour *Tiberius* was come to the highest degree of his tyrannie, remaining in a place nigh to Rome, called *Chauri-eres*, he writ a letter to the Senat, which shewed, that he felt himselfe every day more and more tormented and troubled in conscience, because of the cruelties and injustices which he exercised. This is then not without cause (addeth *Tacitus*) that an excellent wise man affirmeth (meaning *Plato*) That if tyrants soules might be seen uncovered, a man should see them torne and wounded with blows of crueltie, riotousnesse

nesse, and wicked counsell, as we see bodies ulcerated with rods and cudgels: What pleasure could *Denis* the tyrant of Sicilie have, who trusted none? Also when one day a certaine philosopher told him, that hee could not bee but happie, who was so rich, so well served at his table, and had so goodly a pallace to dwell in, and so richly furnished: he answered him: Well, I will shew thee how happie I am, and withall he led that philosopher into a chamber gallantly hanged with tapistrie, and caused him to be laid on a guilded rich bed, to repose himselfe; there was also brought him exquisit and delicate viands, and excellent wines: but whilest certaine servants made these provisions for *Monsieur* the philosopher, who was so desirous of a tyrannicall felicitie, another varlet fastened by the hilts to the upper bed seeling a bright shining sharpe sword, and this sword was hung only in a horse haire, the point of it right over the philosophers face, so newly happy, who incontinent as hee saw the sword hang by so small a thread, & so right over his visage, lost all his appetite to eat, drink, or to muse at, or contemplate the excessive riches of the tyrant, but continually cast his sight upon that sword: And in the end he prayed *Denis* to take him from the supposed beatitude, wherein he was layd: saying, That he had rather be a poore philosopher, than in that maner to be happie: Did not I then say well to thee (answered the tyrant) That we tyrants are not so happie as men thinke, for our lives depend alwayes upon a small thread?

cc  
cc  
cc

*Sue. in Nero.*  
cap. 34.

Tyrants tormented of furies.

What repose could *Nero* also have? who confessed, that often the liknesse of his mother (whom hee slew) appeared to him, which tormented and afflicted him; and that furies beat him with rods, and tormented him with burning torches. What delicatenesse or sweetnesse of life could *Caligula* and *Caracalla* have? which caused alwayes to be carried certaine coffers full of all manner of poysons, as wel to poyson others as themselves in cases of necessitie, for feare they should fall alive into the hands of their enemies. *Heliogabalus* also, what comfort had hee in the world? who provided alwayes cords of silke to hang himselfe in, and brave poynards and golden swords, exceeding sharp, in like maner at need to sleigh him. And indeed it is one of the greatest wisdoms that can be in a tyrant, to take a good course for his death, when it is necessarie and expedient for him: for they are often troubled, & do come short therein: as we see of *Nero*, who in his need could find no man that would sleigh him, but he was forced to sleigh himselfe: True it is, that his secretarie held his hand, that with more strength and lesse feare he might dash the dagger into his throat, yet neither his secretarie nor any other person would of themselves attempt it. If this secretarie had beene one of *Machiavels* schollers, it is likely hee would have proved more hardie.

Markes of tyrants.

*Diemi, Halic.*  
lib. 4.

But we have to note, as well upon this Maxime, as upon the former, that as by his precepts here, *Machiavel* tendeth and goeth about to forme a tyrant, that also wee ought to hold for a true tyrant, every prince and ruler, which useth these precepts, and practiseth them: that is, hee which useth the cruelties before commended by *Machiavel*, which maintaineth his subjects in division and partialitie, and which seekes to sleigh all men which love the commonweale, and which desire a good reformation & a good policie in the commonweale: There are also other tokens and markes whereby to know a tyrant, as them which wee have before alledged out of doctor *Barolus*, and them also which historiographers have marked to have been in *Tarquin* the proud: For they say, when he changed his just and royall domination into a tyrannicall government, he became a contemner and a despiser of al his subjects,

jects, as well the meane people, as the nobilitie and Patritians; he brought a cōfusi-  
on and a corruption into justice; he tooke a greater number of waiting servants into  
his guard, than his predecessors had; he tooke away the authoritie from the assem-  
bly of the Senate, which it alwaies before had; moreover, he dispatched criminal &  
civile causes after his fancie, and not according to right; he cruelly punished such as  
complained of that change of estate, as conspirators against him; hee caused many  
great and notable persons to die secretly without any forme of justice; hee imposed  
tributes upon the people against the auncient forme and regalitie, to the impoveri-  
shing and oppression of some more than of others; hee had also spies to discover  
what was said of him, and afterward punished rigorously such as had blamed either  
him or his government: These be the colours wherewith the histories de paint *Tar-  
quin*, when of a king he became a tyrant: and these are ordinarily the colours and li-  
verie of all tyrants banners, whereby they may be knowne. It seemeth that *Tarquin*  
forgot nothing of all that a tyrant could doe, but that he slew not *Brutus*, which was  
a fault in the art of tyranny (as learnedly *Machiavel* noteth it) which fell to be his ru-  
ine: But the cause hereof was, that *Brutus* in the court counterfeited the fool, wher-  
by *Tarquin* had no suspicion of him: For none but wise men and good people are  
suspect and grievous to tyrants, but as for counterfeiting fooles, unthrifts, flatterers,  
bauds, murderers, inventors of impostes, and such like dregs and vermine of the peo-  
ple, they are best welcome into tyrants courts: yet even amongst them are not ty-  
rants alwayes without danger: for amongst such fooles sometimes happeneth a *Bru-  
tus*, who at last will plat out their ends: so that ever their lives hangs by a smal thred,  
as *Denis* the tyrant saith.


But the example of *Hieronimus* (another tyrant of Sicilie) is to this purpose well  
to be noted. This *Hieronimus* was the sonne of a good and wise king, called *Hiero*,  
(whom also they wel called tyrant, because he came not to that estate by a legitimat  
title, although he exercised it sincerely and in good justice) who when he died, left  
this *Hieronimus* his sonne very young and under age: For the government therfore  
of him and of his affaires, hee gave him fiftene tutors, and amongst them *Adrono-  
dorus* and *Zoilus*, his sonne in law, and one *Thraso*, which hee charged to maintaine  
the countrey of Sicilie in peace, as he himselte had done by the space of fittie yeres  
of his raigne: but especially that they should maintaine the treatie and confederati-  
on, which he had all the length of his time, duly observed with the Romanes. The  
said tutors promised to performe his request, and to change nothing in the estate,  
but altogether to follow his footsteps. Straight after *Hiero* was dead, *Adronodorus*  
being angrie because of so many tutors, caused the king (who was then but 15 yeres  
old) to be proclaimed of sufficient age to be dismissed of tutors, and so dispatched  
himselfe as well as others, of that dutifull care they ought to have had of their king  
and countrey: After, he got to himselfe alone the government of the kingdom, and  
to make himselfe to be feared under the kings authoritie, hee tooke to him a great  
number of waiters for his guard, and to weare purple garments and a diadem upon  
his head, and to goe in a coach drawne with white horses, altogether after the ma-  
ner of *Denis* the tyrant, and contrarie to the use of *Hieronimus*: yet was not this the  
worst; for besides all this, *Adronodorus* caused the yong king his brother in law,  
to bee instructed in pride, and arrogancie, to contemne every man, to give audi-  
ence to no man, to bee quarellous, and to take advantage at words; of hard accesse,  
given to all new fashions of effeminacie and riotousnesse, and to bee unmeasurable  
cruell



cruell,& thirstie after blood. After *Andronodorus* had thus framed to his mind this yong king, a conspiration was made against him (unto which *Andronodorus* was consenting) to dispatch and sleigh him, but it was discovered, but yet executed, which was strange: For one *Theodorus* was accused, and confessed himself to be one of the conspiracie: but being tortured and racked to confesse his complices and parteners in that conspiracie, knowing he must needs dye, and by that meanes desiring to bee revenged of that yong tyrant, he accused the most faithfull and trustiest servants of the king: This yong tyrant rash and inconsiderat, straight put to death his friends and principall servants by the counsell of *Andronodorus*, who desired nothing more, because they hindered his desseignes: This execution performed, incontinent this yong tyrant was massacred and slain upon a straight way by the conspirators themselves, which before had made the conjuration, the execution wherof was the more easie, by the discoverie thereof, because (as is said) the tyrants most faithfull friends and servants were slaine. Soone after the tyrants death, *Andronodorus* obtained the fortresse of Siracuse, a towne of Sicilie: but the tumults and stirres which he rayfed in the countrey (as he thought for his owne profit) fell out so contrarie to his expectation, that finally he, his wife, and all their race, and the race of *Hieronimus* were exterminated, as well such as were innocent, as they that were culpable. And so doeth it ordinarily happen to all yong princes, which by corruption are degenerated into tyrants: So fals it out also to all them, which are corrupters of princes, to draw them into habits of all wickednesse.

Lastly, here would not be omitted altogether this wickednesse of *Machiavel*, who confounding good and evill together, yeeldeth the title of Vertuous unto a tyrant: Is not this as much as to call darkenesse, ful lightsome and bright, vice, good and honourable, and ignorance, learned? But it pleaseth this wicked man thus to say, to plucke out of the hearts of men, all hatred, horroure, and indignation, which they might have against tyranny, and to cause princes to esteeme tyranny, good, honorable, and desirable.

A con-  
spira-  
tion dis-  
covered, yet  
executed.



### 16. *Maxime.*

*A Prince may as well be hated for his vertue, as for his vice.*

**T**He emperor *Persinax* (saith *Machiavel*) was elected emperor against the wils of his men of warre, which before had customably lived licentiously in all vices and dissolutenesse under the emperor *Commodus*, his predecessor: insomuch as *Persinax* a wise & vertuous prince, was hated of his men of warre, because they feared he

Cap. 19. of a  
Prince.

he would reforme them and bring them into their old militarie discipline. The like happened to the emperour *Alexander*, a prince endowed with many goodly vertues. Hereupon ye may note (saith he) that malice and evill will is acquired and got, as wel amongst men by their vertues, as by their vices: And therefore if a prince will conserve himselfe in his estate, he must accommodate and apply himselfe to the homors of such as can hurt him, he must also imitate and follow their vices and corruptions: For in such cases, good workes and vertues are pernicious and contrarie unto them.



O the end that a prince, if he have any love & inclination to vertue may utterly dispoile himselfe of all, and make no account of it, but as a thing not only unprofitable, but damageable also, *Machiavell* here proposeth this Maxime: as though he would say, that betwixt vertue and vice there is no difference; and that it makes no matter which of them a prince do follow, provided, that hee follow that which will be most profitable to maintain him: And because vice seems to be most fit to maintaine a tyrannie, his counsell is, that a prince should follow it: And if any will reply hereunto, that vice will make a man bee hated and evill beloved of all the world, yea, and of his owne subiects, he answereth, that so will vertue doe also, & alledgeth the examples of two emperours, *Perrinax*, and *Alexander Severus*, which (saith he) were hated of their souldiers for their vertues. I pray you is there any devill in hell that could sow and maintaine a more wicked doctrine than this? If wee take away the difference of vice and vertue, and that we make them but one, wherein differ we from brute beasts: Surely herein only, that we shall bee more full of vices and wickednesse than they are, because the spirit of man is more ready to invent all sorts of vices and deceits, than the nature of beasts: But the common sence, reason and judgement of all men, and the daily experience which wee perceive with our eyes, do manifestly shew us, that as well in this Maxime as in others *Machiavell* is a most impudent lier: For not onely all good and vertuous princes have alwaies beene well beloved and liked, but also the vicious and wicked princes have alwaies beene and are evill beloved and hated of all the world, if it bee not long of their flatterers, which make a shew they love them, whilst they have meanes to draw any profit from them. But because I have somewhat at large handled this point by examples, in another place, where I spoke of the friendship of flatterers, I need not a gaine here to repeat it.

Good princes loved, & evill princes hated.

Yet I must needs say & confesse, touching men endowed with excellent vertues, that sometimes it falls unto them, as it doth to men which be bleare and weake eyed, touching the light of the Sunne: for like as they cannot beare nor endure the light and brightnesse of the Sunne beames: so men of small vertue cannot abide and endure men of great and excellent vertue: As many times it fell out amongst the Athenian people, which could not suffer men in whom appeared vertues more great and imminent, in comparison of the common vertue of other men: insomuch, as they had a law in their Commonwealth, whereby from tenne yeare to tenne yere they banished ever, some of the most excellent persons of their cite, and they called that

that law, the law of Ostracisme : and their reason was, because people of high vertue were something suspected, that they would seize upon all the domination of the commonwealth, if they should be alwayes suffered to encrease: And it may be this reason was not altogether impertinent in the popular estate of the commonwealth of Athens, where there was some likelihood, that a great man endowed with great vertues, might by little & litle steale away the peoples hearts and favour, and afterward to take to himselfe the sole domination and authoritie of the commonweale : and notwithstanding they had this law at Athens, which they often practised against the greatest and most vertuous persons, as against *Pericles*, *Themistocles*, *Alcibiades*, and other such like great and good men : yet this was not because they hated their great vertues, but contrarie they greatly admired them, yet were they suspected unto them, and could not endure them by comparison, no more than men that are bleare eyed can abide the Sunne. And men must not thinke, that when they banished men by their Ostracisme, that therein they imputed vnto them any villanie or dishonour, but rather this kind of banishment was honourable, & they which were banished, were esteemed men of great & excellēt vertue: True it is, they could have been content to have escaped that honour, as also many persons of base vertue, which would have been glad to have beene so banished by an Ostracisme, as it happened to one *Hiperbolus*, a man of small vertue, whom yet the Athenians so honoured, to banish him by an Ostracisme, but they never shewed the like favor to any other of his qualitie : Neither was this, because *Hiperbolus* had committed any fault, which merited that they should so banish him; but because it so fel out at the end of ten yeares (at which time they must needs put in practise that law) the Athenians having then necessarie use for their good and greatest men, knew not upon whome better to practise it than upon this bad companion, who with his audaciousnesse and popular sermons, had gathered together great riches: *Hiperbolus* then (having no long time made himselfe knowne to the Athenian people by his orations) received this honour and recompence, to bee banished by the Ostracisme, the greatest honour that ever he had in his life. At Rome likewise all the world had in great honour and admiration the great honestie, plainenesse, and severitie to maintaine laws of *Cato* the lesse, yet the people never employed him in any great charges or estates, but rather bestowed their likings upon men endowed with meaner vertues : & the Romans could not persuade themselves, that it was expedient for them to elect into the Consulship, or into any other supreme magistracies, any man of excellent vertue, such as *Cato* was, yet could they not but admire and highly praise him. *Titus Livius* also witnesseth, That the great vertues of *Furius Camillus*, *Paulus Emilius*, and of *Scipio* the African, were much admired of that people, yea, praised and exalted even to heaven: but yet were they suspected, & for such accused and rejected: Their accusers could say no other thing against them, but that they were too much honored and esteemed, because of the great victories and magnificall triumphs which they had had. *Perilius*, the accuser of that great *Scipio*, said, That it was a great shame, that every mā esteemed that the citie of Rome (governesse of the whole world) was as it were hid under the shadow of *Scipio*, as though he alone should and ought to have all the honour and credit of the whole commonwealth, and to hold it covered under his shadow: *Scipio* replied nothing to this accusation; neither knew he indeed what to replie, unlesse he had said, that there was no reason the vertue should hurt him: but knowing wel that his citizens could not abide him, he banished himselfe

Plutarch in  
the life of  
*Cato de' sen*

*Titus Livius*  
lib. 1. Dec. 1.  
lib. 8. Dec. 4.  
& lib. 5. Dec.



selfe from Rome, and withdrew himselfe to Litternum, into a rurall house which he had there, where he finished his dayes: Briefly then it may be said, that men are sometimes made suspected (but especially to the common sort of either base or no vertue) because of their great and imminent vertues, but yet neither hated nor despised.

Excellent  
vertues  
ought not  
to be sus-  
pected of a  
prince,


But in a prince this ought to have no place; for the more vertuous that men bee, the more they ought to love and honour them, and to serve themselves with them: for in so doing, the vertues of such good and vertuous servants are imputed unto the prince himselfe, as we have before shewed; neither can a prince ever draw any great services from men of small vertue: for good services are the effects of vertue: And as no man out of a bush or bramble, can get good peares or other pleasant fruits, because such kind of plants have not that kind of vertue in them to produce such kind of fruits; in like sort, a prince cannot looke for gallant and good services from vicious men of base vertue: A prince also can have no just occasion to hold for suspected, men of great vertue, for many reasons: first, because such persons have in greater recommendation the integritie of their fame and honour, than men have which are of meane fortune, or (as they say) of a base hand, and therefore wil not easily attempt any filthy or wicked thing, which may turne to their dishonor. Secondly, because seeing themselves beloved, honoured, and recompenced for their good services by their prince, their love and desire well to serve him, will more and more encrease, and so prove a meanes directly contrarie to all evill enterprises. Thirdly, because men of excellent vertue are alwaies of generous & great courages & minds: but it is a thing altogether repugnant to all generositie, to commit wicked enterprises against a good prince: yea, and a worke of faint hearted villaines. Finally, in the time wherein we are (principalities and kingdomes being bestowed either by hereditarie succession, or by the election of certaine nobles, and not by an election tumultuarie and violent of corrupted persons) they should be very madde, to aspire to his place, or to enterprise any evill against him, to deprive themselves of that good they already enjoy, without all likelyhood to attaine unto better: And if with all this a vertuous man have any feare of God, he will enterprise no evill against his prince, even for this only cause, that God willeth & commandeth, that we obey our prince, and that we honour him above all things in the world: so that hee which obeyeth him, obeyeth God; and who despiseth him, despiseth God also: And hereunto, more than to any other reason, ought all such as account themselves Christians, to have especial regard, to deliver faithful and voluntarie obedience (seeing God commands it) to their lawfull prince.

Capital in  
Pertinax, He-  
rod. lib. 6.

And as for that which *Machiavell* saith, That the emperour *Pertinax* was hated of his men of warre, for his vertue, is very false: for although in all other things hee was a notable good & vertuous prince, yet was he much and sore spotted with that filthy vice of covetousnesse and illiberalitie (which hereafter *Machiavel* teacheth to be a notable vertue of a prince) insomuch, as beeing come to that high degree of a Romane emperour, yet commonly dealt he in the traffique of marchandize, for the inordinate desire of gaine: and as soone as he was created emperour, yea, and even by his people of warre, yet was hee so farre from being bountifull in recompencing them, that he cut off from his souldiers, certaine pensions which the emperor *Trajan* his predecessor had given them for their nourishment & maintenance: This covetousnesse was the cause he was despised of them and slaine. And as for *Alexander Severus*,

*Severus*,

*Severus*, it was also the covetousnesse of *Mamma* his mother, which was the cause that the people of warre hated them, yea, and slew them both together, as *Herodian* witnesseth, who lived at that time. And therefore the example of *Pertinax* and of *Alexander*, are by *Machiavel* to no purpose alledged, to shew that princes are hated for their vertues: yet although it were true, that such souldiers as slew *Pertinax*, were people hating vertue, as also they which slew *Alexander Severus* (which had gathered all corruption of vices under his predecessor *Heliogabalus*) it followeth not, that of such examples we must make a rule and Maxime: For theeves and murderers do hate justice & magistracie, yet followeth it not, that a prince is not alwaies more loved than hated, by doing good justice. Briefly, such examples are exceptions and defailances of the rule, which notwithstanding do not cease to remaine alwaies true and certaine, no more nor no lesse, as philosophers say, that that rule is certaine and true, That the Summer is hotter than Winter, although there be some daies in Winter more hot, than there be other some daies in Summer.



## 17. Maxime.

*A Prince ought alwayes to nourish some enemy against himselfe, so this end, that when hee hath oppressed him, he may be accounted the more mightie and terrible.*

**P**rinces (saith our Florentine) make themselves great, when they overcome weightie and difficult things, which hinder their deaignes: Therefore a good and wise prince with a certaine ingenious care, will nourish some enemy against himselfe, to the end, that happening to oppresse him, his riches and greatnesse may the better encrease: For such an enemy shall serve him as a sufficient matter to encrease his greatnesse, and as a ladder to ascend the higher.

Cap. 19. of a Prince.



Ehold a Maxime of the same note as the former, hereunto tending, That a prince do alwayes seeke meanes to make himselfe to be feared, rather than loved: But a prince which observeth the doctrine of *Machiavel*, needes take no great care to seeke meanes to nourish an enemy against himselfe, for there will bee ynow, and more than one would, both within and without his countrey, yea,

Tyrants want not enemies.

Cornel. Tacit.  
Annal. 15.

in his owne house : But to say that he can oppresse them all, to make himselfe feared and redoubted, that is no assured thing : but rather contrarie, he may assure himself, that in the end, either one or other will oppresse and ruinate himselfe. When *Milius* had discovered to *Nero* a great conjuration practised against him, he performed that which *Machiavell* prescribeth: for by oppressing and causing to die, all the conjurators and enemies, and all their friends and allies, hee made himselfe so feared and redoubted, that there was not in Rome, great or little, but he trembled for feare, only to heare the name of *Nero* : Such great men, whole friends and parents were put to death, came and fell downe on their knees before him, and thanked him for the good and honour he had done them, to have purged and cleansed their parentage and alliance from so wicked men as those he had slaine : Others in signe of joy for the death of their friends and parents, caused their houses to bee hung with lawrell, and made sacrifices to the gods, to give them thanks for so great a good as was happened unto them : They celebrated also great feasts of joy as they had been marriages : The Senat also for their part (beeing also in a great terrour) ordained, there should be processions and publike sacrifices, to yeeld thanks to the gods, that this conjuration was discovered; yea, they caused to be builded and consecrated a chapel to the Sunne, in the house where the conjuration was made, because it shined to the discoverie therof: They builded also a temple to the goddesse *Health*. *Nero* thinking that all these joies were true and unfained (yet were they but simulations) exercised still more and more his butcherie, and in the end made himselfe so assured (by reason he was feared and redoubted of all the world) that he was of opinion, that he had obtained the upper hand of all his enemies : but it was cleane contrarie: For by this strange slaughter with so many other wickednesses, whereof hee was full, hee brought himselfe into a deadly hatred of all the world : infomuch, as the provinces of the empire revolted from his obedience one after another, and in the end he was abandoned of every man, unlesse it were of some foure or five of his meanest servants, which kept him company in his flight, until he had slaine himselfe, as is said in another place : therefore *Nero* needed to take no thought how to nourish enemies against himselfe, as *Machiavel* teacheth in this Maxime; for he never wanted a great number, as all tyrants have ordinarily.

De Com lib. 2  
cap. 107, 108  
109, 110, 111

God hath  
giue to eve-  
ry seignory  
his opposit.

And how should not tyrants have good store of enemies, seeing even good and wise princes, doe not want them? To this purpose master *Philip de Comines* makes a verie good discourse, saying, That it pleased God to give all princes, kingdomes, and commonweales, an opposit and contrarie unto them, that both the one and the other might the rather be held in their duties; as England hath Fraunce; Scotland hath England; Portugal hath Castile; Grenado hath Portugal; the princes and commonweales of Italie, are contrarie one to another; and so it is of all countries and seignories of the earth: For, if there bee any prince or commonweale, which wants his opposit to hold him in feare, straight one shall see him fall to a tyrannie and luxuriousnesse: Therefore God by his wise providence, hath given to every seignorie and to everie prince his opposit, that one by the feare of an other, might be stirred up to a modest and temperate carriage. And there is indeed nothing (sayeth hee) that better holdeth a prince in his ductie, nor which causeth him to walke more upright, than the feare of his opposit and contrarie: For the feare of God, nor the love of his neighbour, nor reason (whereof commonly hee hath no care) nor justice (for there is none above himselfe) nor any other like thing



thing can hold him in his dutie, but onely the feare of his contrarie. After that *Comines* had dispatched this question, hee entred into another, which dependeth hereof: What is the cause (saith he) that commonly princes and great lords have not the feare of God, nor love to their neighbours? He answereth, the want of Faith: for if a prince beleeveth verily the paines of hell, to be such as indeed they are, hee would doe no wrong to no man, nor retaine anothers goods unjustly: For, if they beleeveth assuredly (as it is true and certaine) that they are damned in hell, and are never like to enter into paradise, which retaine other mens goods, without making satisfaction, or that doe any wrong to any, without amends unto him: It is not likely there would bee found a prince or princeesse in the world, or any other person, which would withhold anothers goods (were it of his subjects, vassales, or neighbour) in good earnest, or would put any to death wrongfully; no, not to hold them in prison, nor take from one to give to another, nor procure any dishonest thing against any person: If then they had a firme faith, and beleeveth the paines of hell to bee horrible and great, without other end or remission for the damned, knowing againe the shortnesse of this life, they would not doe that they do: And for example (sayeth hee) when a king or a prince is a prisoner, and that he feareth to die in prison, is there any thing so deere in the world, which he would not give to come out? Certainly, hee would give both his owne and his subjects goods together: As wee have seene king *John* of France, being taken prisoner by the prince of Wales, at the battaile of Poitiers, who paid 3000000. of franks for his ransom, and acquitted to the English all Aquitaine, or at least as much as they then held, and many other cities, townes, and places, all which came to the third part of the kingdome, which was thereby brought into great povertie, that no coine was there current but it was made of leather, with a little naile of silver in the midst of it: And all this gave king *John*, and *Charles* the sage his sonne, for the said kings deliverance out of prison: And if they would have given nothing, yet the English would not have put him to death, but at the worst have kept him in prison: And yet if they had caused him to die, the paine that he had suffered, had not beene comparable to the thousand part of the least paine in hell: Why then did king *John* give all that hath beene said, and so overthrew his children, and the subjects of his kingdome? because hee beleeveth that which hee saw and knew well, that otherwise hee could not bee delivered. But you shall not finde a prince (or else verie few) that if hee had a towne of his neighbours, would yeeld it for the feare of God, or the paines of hell. It is then the want of faith, because princes beleeveth not that God wil punish the wrongs they doe to another, and that they doe not also beleeveth, that the paines of hell are horrible and eternall, as they are. Yet is this certaine, that God will punish them, as well as other men, though not in this world, yet assuredly in the other: Yea will some say, but who will informe against them, or dare stand before God, for that purpose? I answer, that the complaints, teares, and clamours of the people, will bee informers, and shall complaine before God against princes; the dolorous and sorrowfull lamentations of orphans and widowes, whose fathers and husbands they have caused to die, shall stand as complaints before God; and generally all they, which they have afflicted and persecuted in their persons, or in their goods, shall present themselves before our Lord the true judge, with pitious teares and dolours, and shall serve for witnesses and accusors: and God who is a just judge, shall punish such princes, as doe not feare him, and it may bee will not attend to punish them in the

Princes  
have not  
the feare of  
God, nor  
charitie, for  
want of  
Faith.

Signes of a  
princes ruin

other world but in this world : But let them know, that when it pleaseth God to punish princes, as they are greater than simple people, so he will bring them to a greater fall : and a true token, that God beginneth to ruinate a prince, is when hee to diminisheth his fences, that he makes him flie the counsel of the wise, and elevateth into credit with him, new people, violent, unreasonable, and foolish, slothfull, and flatterers, which do and speake all things to please them: for when we see this happen to a prince, we may well say, that God prepareth his ruine.

Behold in summe, in his proper teames, the opinion of that wise knight *Messire Philip de Comines*, of the cause why God raiseth enemies unto princes; which opinion truly is verie christian, and proceeding from a man of wise judgement, & well experimented in affaires of State, wherein the said *Comines* was exercised, by the space of thirtie yeares, in the time of king *Lewis* the 11. and *Charles* the 8. his sounne, in embassages and other great and honorable charges : He was no such petie burnepaper as *Machiavell*, who dealt in nothing, but in registring and writing of the small broiles and troubles, of one house of the towne of Florence, & coming out of no better schoole, dare deale to give lessons and documents to princes & mightie kings, to teach them how they should govern, or rather how they should become tyrants: But contrary, he that will read the hystorie of *Comines*, shall find many good precepts, which that good knight hath marked by experience in his time, which indeed are good and proper, as well to informe and instruct a good prince, as they of *Machiavell* are to informe a most wicked tyrant.

Vpon this speach above alledged of *Comines*, that God diminisheth the fences of such princes as he will ruinate, I will adde for a confirmation, the saying of an antient wise man, alledged by the poet *Sophocles*:

*Sophoc. in  
Antig.*

*Agreeing well to veritie.  
The saying of the wise man is:  
That which most evill you do trie,  
Most good it seemes to you twis.  
Thus when we stirre up God to ire,  
Hee plagues us much for our desire.*



### 18. Maxime.

*A prince ought not to feare to be periured, so deceive, and dissemble: for the deceiver alwaies finds some which are fit to be deceived.*

Discourse  
lib. 1. cap. 13.  
& cap. 18. of  
the prince.

**T**He prince (saith master *Nicholas*) which vvill become great, and make great conquests, it is necessarie that hee learne well the

the occupation and art of deceiving, as *John Galeace* did, vvhio by that art tooke the dutchie of Millan, from *Messire Bernard* his uncle: The Romans also under the name of allies and confederates, so deceived the Latine people and many others, that they reduced them into a servitude and subiection, yet they never espied it, untill the end. True it is, in this art of tromperie and deceit, men must needs use great fainednesse, dissimulations, and periuries; and the prince vvhich shall be hereunto (as it vvere) made by nature and art, shall alwayes obtaine prosperous successe in his affaires: For men are commonly so simple, and do so soone bend to present necessities, that the deceiver alwayes finds some, which will suffer themselves to be deceived: Hereupon vve may alledge infinit examples of peace, truce, & promises which have bin brokē by princes, yet have had good event: And hereof we may alledge one example of fresh memorie, of Pope *Alexander* the sixt, who never did other thing, but made an art of abusing men, neither ever applied his mind to other studie, neither ever was there found man, that would confirme his promises with more horrible othes, nor that lesse kept and observed them: Yet his tromperies and perjuries succeeded all well unto him, for hee knew well enough therein, how all sorts of men must be handled.

**I**N this Maxime is an amplification of that which hath beene before set downe by *Machiavel*, when hee said, That a prince ought to know how to play the fox; for now explicating what it is to play the fox, he saith, it is to know how to deceive, to dissemble, and to be perjured; and that a prince ought to be adorned with these goodly vertues of tromperie, dissimulation and perjurie: But as for tromperie, which men call subtiltie, we have of it above sufficiently spoken: And as for perfidie and perjurie, we shall afterward speake in another Maxime, and therefore hereupon we will make no long discourse, because wee will not often repeat one same thing: And withall that there is no man in the world, of so small a judgement, who doeth not well see that this Maxime containeth a detestable doctrine, altogether unworthy not only of a prince but of every man, of what condition soever hee be: And I doe not beleve that the Bohemians, who goe from countrey to countrey telling good fortunes, jugglers, or rather runnagate rogues, which make an occupation of deceits and abusing of the world, will not condemne this Maxime, as wicked and abominable, if they be made judges.

And as for that which *Machiavel* saith, That the deceiver will alwayes find some that will suffer themselves to be deceived, I confesse there will be ever found some ideot fooles and fots, that he may deceive, yea that sometimes he may deceive sharp witted and wise men: yet notwithstanding, it is as certain, that there is not so great a deceiver, but he is sometimes deceived: For as soone as a deceiver is discovered to be



The deceiver is often deceived.

be one, every man takes heed to negotiate and traffique with him, or if they bee forced to have to do with him, for fear to be deceived, they wil do their best to deceive him : And herein the most part of the world make no conscience, but thinke it not only lawfull, but praise-worthy to deceive a deceiver : infomuch, as he which hath once a name to be a coufener and deceiver, all men wil dispence with themselves to deceive him if they can : and by that meanes the deceiver having cause to take heed of many sundry persons, it is impossible but he should be often deceived, and be often caught in his owne nets. Therefore *Machiavel* his reason, That the deceiver shal alwayes find them which will be deceived, doth not so well conclude, as it seemeth : For if the deceiver find alwayes some to deceive, hee shall also find some which will deceive him : and it may be sometimes, for one that he deceiveth, hee may find sixe which will deceive him : because none can bee so perfect in the art of trompery (which art *Machiavel* so much recommendeth to a prince) but also he shal alwayes find others, which know more than himsele in some points, and many together do know more than one alone, in all points of that art, one in one point, and another in another : So that in the end he himsele shall see alwaies (according to the common proverbe) the deceiver shall be deceived.

As it happened even to Pope *Alexander* the sixt, whose example *Machiavell* here alledgeth, for the end of all his tromperies and perjuries, was to make his bastard *Cesar Borgia*, lord and king of all Italie, and after, of all Christendome if hee could : But the issue of his desseignes and purposes was a tragicall act, as wee have before discoursed in another place. Moreover, the cause why that many times this Pope deceived Christian princes, and even the king of Fraunce, *Lewis* the twelfth, was : For that in that time men so greatly feared the Popes bulls and interdictions, and that they beleevd him to be a true lieutenant of God, on earth, so that they durst not discredit any thing he did, but rather beleevd all his wordes as oracles : but at this day children would mocke at his actions, and few men will bee bayted with his allurements.

The Romans allies and subjects were not slaves.

But for whereas *Machiavel* saith, That the auntient Romanes under the deceit of those names, Allies and confederates, brought into their subiection & servitude the Latin people their neighbours, is a plaine and pure lie : For they subjugated al men by warre, at divers times as we read in hystories. True it is, that after once they vanquished and brought them under, they then made treaties of peace and confederations, which were not greatly to the advantage of such as were evercome, as in reason they might : For if by the right of nations, such as are vanquished by warres, may be bondslaves of the vanquishers : by a stronger reason may the vanquishers reserve to themselves some preheminance, over the vanquished : But the preheminences which commonly the Romanes reserved to themselves, in all their treaties, were that the allies and confederats, should not make warre upon any without their consent, and that they should contribute unto their souldiers in their warres : Moreover they left to all people their franchises, liberties, goods, religion, magistrates, and all other things, without altering any thing, and without imposing upon them tributes of money or such like. This cannot be called a servitude, as *Machiavell* calls it ; or if it bee a servitude, there are no people in Christendome, whether they be subjects of princes, or common wealthes, which are not in a double, and quadruple servitude.

And whereas *Machiavell* saith, That a prince ought to know the art of trompery, and

deceit, some will aske (to take heed of it) which are the precepts of the art : Whereunto I answer for *Machiavel*, that no man can give precepts, practicall, or singular, which may be applied to every businesse, to avoid deceit and fraud : But the generall precepts of art (which the philosophers call Axiomes in philosophie) are these; Boldly to forswear themselves, Subtily to dissemble, to insinuate into mens minds and to prove them, To breake faith and promise, and such like as heretofore we have handled, and shall do hereafter : But here wee must note one thing, which is, That one well experienced in the art of tromperie, will not alwayes practise that principle, To breake faith, for if he ordinarily do it, hee shall offend against another principle, which commands. To dissemble subtilly : For by every where and ever breakeing of faith, he shall discover himselfe to be a manifest deceiver, whereas hee ought to dissemble, and to make an outward countenance not to be so, but rather to bee a good and an honest man : And therefore to observe all the principles of that art together, without breaking one in observing another, hee shall in small matters keepe his faith, to breake it in great things, and in matters of consequence. Hereof *Fabius Maximus* admonisheth *Scipio* to take heed : Thou desirest *Scipio* (saith hee) to make warre upon the Carthaginians in Affricke, under an hope thou hast to have the favour of king *Siphax*, and of the Numidians, which have promised thee aid and succors : But take good advice, how thou trustest in the barbarous nations, which commonly make no account to breake their faith & to deceive : True it is, in small matters they will keepe their faith with thee, well to assure thee in their promise and loialtie, that they may afterward breake it, to their great profit and advantage, as soone as they see they have means and occasion in their hands, altogether to ruinate thee. This was the admonition, which that wise *Fabius*, gave to *Scipio*, then a young captain. What then should a man do, to guard himselfe from such deceitfull faith of deceivers, which appears and shewes it selfe in little things, and is defective in great matters? A man must do that which *Scipio* answered to *Fabius* : I know well (lord *Fabius* saith he) how a man must leane upon the evill assured faith of *Syphax*, and the Numidians. I thinke so much to leane, and rest my selfe upon them, as may serve my turne, so that yet alwayes I hold my selfe upon my guards, to warrant my selfe from all perfidie and treacherie.

Moreover, there is yet another remedie against such deceivers and dissemblers, which promise much, and in their hearts have no other intention, than in nothing to keepe their promises: that is to shun and flie from them, as from hell, and from more than capitall enemies, as *Homer* teacheth us :

*He that one thing in heart, another in mouth doth beare:  
Fly him an enemye shine, and as hell fire him feare.*

*Tit. Livius  
lib. 8. Dec. 3.*

*Homer. Iliad  
lib. 9.*

19. *Maxime.*

*A Prince ought to know how to winde and to turne mens minds, that they may deceive and circumvent them.*

Discourse  
lib. 1. cap. 42.  
& cap. 18 of  
the prince.



Our time there have princes beene seene (saith our Florentine) which having knowledge how to cavalier the spirits of men, that is, which had the cunning subtiltie to handle and proove mens minds, have surmounted and gone beyond such men as stood upon their simple loyaltie: And this is done, when a prince marketh the vertue or vice of him, whom he meanes to undermine and deceive, by giving him a bait fittest to deceive and intrap him. As did *Appius Claudius*, one of the ten soveraigne potentates, that were created at Rome: For hee meaning to lay hold for ever, of the soveraigne domination of the Romans, enterprised to draw to his league and devotion, all the principall men hee could gaine: and knowing that *Quintius Fabius* (who before had alwayes beene so good a man as could possible be) had a spirit, enclined to ambition and honour, he gained him, and drew him to the net, by promises of great estates and honours, insomuch as hee brought him to become as wicked as himselfe, knowing also many yong Romane gentlemen (which otherwise were well borne and well instructed) to be desirous of wealth and riches to fulfill their lusts, and giving them great gifts, and promising them much more, if they alwayes followed him at the tayle, wheresoever he went, as his guard and vassales of his tyranny: Even so a prince, who will thus handle and tossé mens minds, shall easily with deceit catch whom he wil, and alwaies obtaine the upper hand on them.



H poore Frenchmen (too simple) you see the nets and snares which so often catcheth you, you speake freely, you brag and vaunt, you discover your hearts, and will, unto the Machiavelists, which can cavalier your spirits, and discover the bottome of your harts, and after bring you into their nets at their pleasure: But they are not such, they are slow and prolonging, secret, close, and they suffer not a word to fall from their mouthes, without premeditation in what sense you may take them




them, and so do make them serve to the end they meane; which is ordinarily contrary to that which you think: They can also say, These Frenchmen are light & vnconstant, they cannot keepe their secrets, they abound in words, are undiscreet, they speake many together, they have no retentive in their mouthes, but discover their thoughts to every man: And in truth wee must needs confesse, that France hath no neighbour nation, whose spirits are so easie to cavalier, as the spirits and minds of Frenchmen: And certainly, this Maxime is one of the greatest secrets of the Machiavelists Cabale, wherewith they aid themselves most, to execute that in France which they do: And if Frenchmen could breake their practise, it should be easie to overthrow all their desseignes and purposes, wherby, by little and little, they ruinate all them that they feare & are suspected of them, to draw them afterward into a slavish and Turkish servitude, and to place amongst them Italian colonies.

But this Maxime is practised many waies, as well by marking the vices as the vertues of men: For if he see a mans mind addicted to ambition, he needs but an office with a promise of a greater, and then may they doe all they will: So that having thus cavaliered and captivated his mind, he brings him into his net, to make him serve his turne in all maner of wickednesse, that he will command him to do: For as *Salust* saith, Ambition, because it hath some resemblance of vertue, is often cause of great evils, yea, the ruine of great cities and commonweales: And indeed we see both by old & moderne examples, that this detestable ambition hath often drawne men to bandie and arme themselves, to the ruine & destruction of their owne countrey, most wickedly forgetting the dutie they owe to the conservation thereof, by divine, naturall, & humane right, to enjoy only the smoke of honor, which often bringeth the ruine of their goods, losse of their lives, and destruction of their soules. Such may we call all them that make war upon their owne nation, to deprive them of the enjoying of their goods, lives, conscience, & religion, & al other things which are theirs, & which they cannot take from them but by injustice and iniquitie: But behold they are blinded with ambition, and are their slaves which have brought them into their snares, which could so well cavalier their spirits, and even by that vice, which they have noted in them. In like maner, if these Machiavelists do marke the mind of a man to be given to lubricitie and *Venus* delights, then will they prepare for him, delicate and bravely adorned courtizans, which will soone take him in his owne lust, as it were with the glew or fish-hooke of his owne vice. If they discover him to be covetous, they will bestow some gift upon him, as some benefice or other thing, and will promise him an hundred times as much: but withall, behold the man cavaliered and entrapped. Likewise, if they note a man vertuous, that he is loial and constant in his word, they will seeke to draw out of him some word & promise, and thereupon lay an ambush for him: If they see him of a mind enclined to the commonwealth, they will get him some charge, that thereby he may bee some way entrapped: Briefly, in thus cavaliering mens minds, and by discovering their vertues, vices, courages, affections and passions, they frame craftie engines fit to make men fall into their devotion, or els altogether to take them out of the way, or to make them serve their desseignes and purposes. Lastly, the meanes to shun their frauds and subtilties, are not difficult to wise men: for such cavaliering marchants are sufficiently knowne at this day: And therefore to cause them to fall into their owne snares & ambushes, men must antecavalier them, that is, men must worke against them.

*Salust in  
Catholice.*

Ambition  
cause of  
great evils.



## 20. Maxime.

*A Prince, who (as it were constrained) useth Clemencie and Lenitie, advanceth his owne destruction.*

Discourse  
lib. 1. cap. 32.

**I**N an hundred times (saith *Machiavell*) it will scant happen once, that the good and comfort which a prince doeth to his subjects, when he seeth himselfe as it were forced to do it by feare of rebellion, or otherwise, is gratefully received of them: For commonly the people, for benefits so granted by their prince, are not thankfull, but rather thinke themselves beholden to such as draw their prince unto the bestowing of such benefits upon necessitie and constraint: And this is often the cause that the people seeketh occasions & meanes to draw the prince into that necessitie. And therefore a prince ought never to attend that extreame necessitie, to shew himselfe kind and liberall; for there is like to be so little helpe therein, as it will rather advance his ruine.

The rigour  
of a prince  
is the cause  
of denial of  
obedience.

**I**T should be best and more expedient, for a prince to prevent all his subjects, with good and courteous dealings, than to attend till he see himselfe constrained to diminish his rigour, & (as the common proverbe saith) to bend or breake. Notwithstanding the counsell here given by *Machiavel*, is altogether wicked, and cannot but bring into ruine a prince and his estate: for in summe, his counsell is, To hold hard against his subjects, nothing to abate his rigour, nor to use any kindnesse or gracioufnesse, then and when he sees himselfe, to doe it, constrained and pressed thereunto. If a prince then will stand firme alwaies rigorously to handle his subjects, and to oppresse them, without abating any thing thereof, although he heare of their grievances and complaints, and that hee see them prepared to rebellion, and to denie their obedience; what other thing can there follow, but the entire ruine of him and his estate? For wherein consisteth the estate of a prince, but that his subjects agree together for to yeeld him obedience: If then by his obstinate rigour and evill dealing, hee so do, as he brings his subjects into that necessitie to denie him obedience, will not that bee the ruine of him and his estate? There is no man of good judgement, but he knows this: Therefore said the poet *Sophocles*:

*Even*

*Even as hard Steele in fire we see  
In pieces breakes most easie:  
So minds too hard and fierce which bee,  
Most easie with fallow ground doe lie.*

Wherefore this precept whereby *Machiavell* would make a prince stiffe and inflexible against his subjects, can bring to him but his owne ruine: as it happened to *Robosom* the king, who when his people humbly desired an ease and mitigation of their tributes, he obstinately and proudly denied them: For this king following such counsell as *Machiavell* giveth here, made answer to his subjects, that so much there wanted, that he had any intent to abate any thing of his former dealing with them, that contrarie hee determined to augment rather his rigour towards them: And for this cause did the greatest part of his kingdome cut themselves from his rule and obedience.

And to say, that the people are unthankfull to their prince for benefits accorded as it were by constraint, this is false, and experience shewes us the contrarie: For the people is not so speculative, that they will cause to seeke out and examine the impulsive cause, which moved the prince to commit or ordain any thing, but holds themselves contented with the good and profit which redounds to them by that ordinance, and the enjoying of the good they receive, bringeth unto them such a pleasure and contentment, as it moves them to thanke their prince for that good, and to praise and blesse him, yea, to pray unto God for his conservation and prosperitie. In all the peace that was made in Fraunce since the civile warres, there hath alwayes been scene an experience thereof: For a man may well say, that the king accorded peace to the Protestants as it were by constraint, which indeede is contained in the edict of peace: for the king himselfe so declared it in other edicts which hee made when the warre was renewed; as he declared by an edict in the year 1568, wherein hee saith, That hee had alwayes had in his heart to abolish the religion of the said Protestants, and the cause of his before suffering it, had been as by constraint, and to accommodate himselfe to the time. The Courtiers also have alwayes called it the Suffered Religion, and the Catholicke Romane, the authorised Religion: Although then that those goodly edicts of peace were accorded by the king against his heart, yet ceased not the people to be thankful unto the king, yea, to praise and exalt him as a lover of the good, and repose of his poore people, and to blesse and praise God for him both publickely and privatly. But put the case, that were true which *Machiavell* saith, That the subjects of a prince cannot be thankfull for a benefit accorded by constraint, it followeth not therefore, that such a benefit and a better handling must needs be unprofitable and without fruit: For certaine it is, that alwaies this will make cease the complaints of the people, and cause them to desist from all rebellions and whatsoever enterprises are intended & machinated against him. *Tisno Livius* sheweth us by many examples, this to have many times happened at Rome, where the commons entered into seditions and rebellions against the *Patricij*, and such as were great men in authoritie, but they were appeased incontinent as soone as the great men gaunted that which they desired: And yet wee find not, that the great Patricians and nobles of Rome did almost at any time accord unto the commons, but as constrained and against their wills: There was amongst them men of as

Constrained grants  
are not  
without  
profit.




good wit and judgement, as *Machiavell*, (such as *Cortolanus*, *Appius*, *Cato*, *Fabius*, and other like) which cried, that they must not accord to common people (under the pretext of their seditions and rebellions) what they demand, because it is an evill example, and as it were to give occasion to the people ever to rebell, and be seditious, causing their faults to turne to their profit: but notwithstanding all these reasons, the most part of their wise Senators found it more expedient, to bow and give place to the tumultuous people, than to resist them. There hath beene many times seene in Fraunce, rebellions and stirres of the people for new imposts, which straight were stayed, by taking them away: And indeed natural reason sheweth well, that it ought so to be: For in all things, of what sort soever they bee, as soone as the cause is taken away, men also take away the effect thereof: Moreover, I will not denie but this is of very evill consequence, that a profit should come of a rebellion and sedition: but upon this point it is worth noting, that seldome or never people arise without some great, just, and urgent occasion: & therefore if the prince have not done his dutie to cut off that occasion before, but that thereby there arise rebellion & sedition, he may not find it strange nor evill, to remedie it, rather late than never, and so to purge his negligence. A prince in stead to harden his heart against his subjects (as *Machiavell* teacheth) shall doe better, not to bee so obstinate, but to plie and bow his courage, when the good of the commonweale and his owne requieth it: following the admonition which that wise knight *Phenix* gave to the prince *Achilles*, his disciple.

*Hom. Iliad. 9*

*Appease thy selfe Achilles strong, thy hardned heart abate,  
A mortall man is not becomes implacable so bee:  
Though power most, and honour eke one gods attend and wait,  
So prayers of us mortall men, yet yeeld they, we doe see.*

Foolish distinctions of the Machiavelists.

Good princes have ever so used, and neuer were hindred by *Machiavels* subtile distinctions: That he which oweth obedience, ought to humble himselfe first, and that the prince ought to accord nothing to his subjects, but of his owne proper motion, least he be seene to receive a law of them, unto whom he should give lawes, and that he ought not to capitulate with them: and that it should be a very dishonourable thing for a prince to be seene doing any thing by constraint and against his will, with many other such speculative, frivolous, and foolish reasons. For wee see by the hystoriographers that wise princes never regarded such childish reasons, but bowed and mitigated themselves, as they did see the safetie of their subjects, and the conservation of their owne estates required: And they never esteemed an healthfull and good counsell, dishonourable, neither such meanes & conditions to be wicked or disadvantageous, when thereby they might conserve the love and obedience of their people.

21. *Maxime.*

*A wise prince ought not to keepe his Faith, when the observation thereof is hurtfull unto him, and that the occasions for which hee gave it, bee taken away.*

**A** Prudent and an advised lord (saith *Messier Nicholas*) neither can nor ought straightly to keepe his Faith, when such observation is preiudiciall unto him, and that the occasions and necessities, which caused him to make his promise, are already past and extinguished. If all the men of the world were good, this precept were to be blamed: but seeing the ordinarie wickednes of men, which themselves keepe no Faith; neither is the Prince also bound to observe it towards them. Neither is it to be feared, that a prince cannot alwaies find sufficient reasons to cover and colour that violation and breaking of his Faith: Likewise, it must be considered, that all forced promises may bee broken (especially when they concerne the Commonwealth) as soone as the force is passed. Hereof do we reade many examples, and this is every day scene and practised in our time, That not onely forced promises are not kept amongst princes after that the force is out, but also all other promises are no more observed, after that such occasions faile, which were the cause of making such promises.

Cap. 18. Of  
the prince.  
& discourse  
lib. 3. cap. 43.

**A**lthough the other Maximes of *Machiavell* may bee called wicked and detestable in the highest degree, yet doth this Maxime carrie a way the prize above all others which concerne duties amongst men: For whosoever wil take away Faith and loyaltie from amongst men (as *Machiavell* would doe) hee withall takes away all contracts, commerce, distributive, and politike justice, and all societie and frequentation one with another; none of which can stand, but by the observation of Faith. But if it were so, that for want of observation of Faith one towards another, men durst not sell, buy, exchange, lend, or make other contracts, and that men durst not make any commerces of marchandize one with another, nor observe any publike policie; wherein should we differ from brute beasts? In nothing, but that we should be worse than

The life &  
humane so-  
cietie can-  
not stand  
without  
Faith.

than they: for then every one must dwell by himselfe; there should need no townes nor boroughes to dwell together, but men might bee vagrant and seperated one from another, taking by force the goods one from another: insomuch, as a man might say, that to take away Faith from amongst men (as *Machiavell* dooth) is to bring them into a brutish estate, wherein they cannot live, nor subsist, nor enjoy the necessarie commodities which one receives of another, and by consequent it is to induce and to bring a ruine and an universall deluge to all mankind. Yet if any *Machiavelist* will replice, that the intent of their master, is not to take away all Faith from amongst men, but onely to breake Faith, when there is profit in doing it: I answer him, that in effect that is all one, and that these two things are almost equipollent, to take Faith altogether away, and to breake it ever when there is appearance of profit, For he that buyeth, and promiseth to pay, may say after he hath received the marchandize, that by this doctrine he is dispensed withall to pay nothing, because it is for his profit to have both silver and the marchandize: He also unto whom a man lendeth any thing, may say he hath a dispensation from *Machiavell*, not to yeeld againe that which was borrowed, because it is for his profit to keepe it: And so in all contracts and commerces, men may cover the breach of Faith with the vaile of utilitie and profit, and by that meanes banish and chase away all Faith from men. Behold the effect and consequence of this detestable and wicked doctrine of *Machiavell*.

Which to confute, might well suffice the apparent evidence of evil, and the absurditie which followeth thereupon: whereof the most rusticall ideots of the world may judge: Sufficient also were one place of holy Scripture, whereby God commandeth us to hold our Faith and promise, yea, to our damage: But I will (as I have said before) combat against this prophane *Machiavell*, by paynim and prophane authors, and shew him, that he hath but slenderly read his *Titus Livius*, upon whom he hath written his discourses full of ignorance and wickednesse. *Sextius* and *Licinus* (Tribunes of the Romane people) to obtaine the favour and grace of meane people endebted, would needs that a law should passe by authority, wherby al debtors might preaccount in payment of their debts to their creditors, all the interest money which they had before paid them, and that the rich men which possessed more than five hundred acres of land, should be constrained to release the land they had more, to be diuided amongst the poore. *Appius Claudius Crassus*, Patrician, opposed himselfe against this law, and shewed, that it was pernicious and damageable: Because (saith he) by such a law, publike Faith, which is the bond of all humane societie, is broken: for the goods and possessions which the rich men hold, they have obtained them or their auncestors by contracts of buying, selling, exchanging, and other like, wherein there alwaies passed Faith and othes: & that therefore they which will take from the rich, that which they have gotten unto them by a good and lawfull title, confirmed by that bond of Faith and oath, it were the meanes to abolish, & to take away al Faith from amongst men, without which no humane society can stand: and likewise to make creditors leese their debts, by imputing unto them interests long time before paid in satisfaction of the debt; that should be also to breake Faith and promise of obligations, and to make an overture to all deceit and distrust, in such sort as the contract of lone and such like should bee abolished. By those remonstrances, founded upon good and solid reasons, *Appius Claudius* hindered that law from passing, or being authorised: there was then such account made of Faith, which



which they preferred before al difficulties and particular necessities: And afterward, many times that law of taking away from rich men that which they possessed more than five hundred acres, was refreshed & brought into question by other Tribunes, to have it to passe, but it never came to effect; yet there arose of it infinite seditions, murders, pilleries, and other innumerable evils: A thing which well sheweth, that the violation of publicke Faith draweth alwayes with it, a great Hiade of evils and calamities.

Titus Livius  
lib. 3. Dec. 3.

The Romanes seeing themselves one day want money for the maintenance of their armies, and payment of souldiers; the Senat consulted what provision to make for this want: none of them thought it good to impose a taillage or tribute upon the people, which would prove very greivous in many sorts: at last they all agreed, that souldiers must needs be paid: For (said they) if the commonwealth stand not by Faith, it cannot stand by riches: It were therefore better to spend the good of the commonwealth in loyall paying souldiers wages, and so acquite themselves of their Faith towards them, than to spare the commonwealth by the failing of Faith and word. All the Senate being of this advice, expedient then it was as they thought to find money: and therefore a charge was given to the Prætor *Fulvius*, in an oration to the people, to shew them all their publicke necessities, and to exhort such as were growne rich by farming grounds belonging to the commonwealth, to lay out some silver for the maintenance of the armie in Spaine: *Fulvius* so well perswaded, that the farmers accorded to lay downe a certaine summe of money, as much as was demanded, upon conditions, to enjoy their farmes for three yeares, and that the commonwealth would take upon them the perils of the sea, which might come unto them in their commerces, by shipwracks and hostile incurfions: For they were certaine, that such money as they lent to the commonwealth, was as assured unto them, as in their hands, upon the publicke Faith: and if the Romanes had not had that good reputation, they should not so soon have found money for their need: But they that have that vertue, Well to observe their word, shall never want with whom to contract.

King *Perseus* of Macedonie determining to make warre upon the Romanes, sent embassadours to the Achæans, a people of Greece, and allies of the Romanes, to draw them on his side, & onely required of them a Diet, where they were assembled to heare the said embassadours: But *Calicratis* (a notable man amongst the Achæans) was of advice, That they should give no eare unto that king *Perseus*, nor to his embassadours, because the Achæans had already confirmed an alliance by Faith and oath with the Romans, & that upon that faith was founded all the assurance of their estate; and that Faith had that propertie, that it will not be violated nor suspected in any sort whatsoever: And therefore it was a breach of Faith, only to afford audience to that king, whome they saw plainly prepared to make warre upon the Romanes: This reason founded upon the authoritie of publicke States, was the cause that nothing was accorded to *Perseus*. And likewise heereunto accordeth the saying of the emperour *Antonine*: That the most lamentable thing in this world, is, when Faith is broken and violated by friends, and without the forme, no vertue can bee assured.

Faith will  
neither be  
violated  
nor sus-  
pected.

Dion in Mar-  
cell.

Titus Livius  
lib. 2.

To this purpose, that Faith cannot bee suspected, that is notable, which *Fabius Maximus*, Dictator, did. *Anniball* being in battaile array nigh Rome, conceived this subtil device, to ruinate and utterly to destroy all the houses in the fields, both for

pleasure

pleasure and for other necessary uses, but onely the houses, and commodities appertaining to *Fabius*: And this hee did to bring a suspition upon *Fabius*, that hee had made some secret compact with *Annibal* against his Faith and duetic. *Fabius* knowing wel, that it was not sufficient perfectly to observe his Faith, but that also he must be exempt from all suspition, sent straight his sonne to Rome, to sell and rid him of all he had without the towne, which he did: and so assured his publick Faith, by his particular damage, taking from the people all sinister opinion they might take of him. And assuredly, there is nothing in the world more pleasant, than when Faith is sincerely kept, even in adversitie, and when we have most to doe: Therefore the Romanes esteemed such, their good and loyall allies, as kept their Faith loyally, during the time they had warres in hand: as did *Prolemeus*, king of *Aegypt*, when the Romanes had to doe with *Annibal* and the Carthaginians: for he was alwayes firme in the confederation and alliance which he had made with them; inso much, as their warre being finished with *Annibal*, they sent embassadors to *Prolemie*, to thank him, for that in their so doubtfull and hazardous affaires, his Faith had not altered, and to pray him to continue.

*Titus Livius*  
lib. 3. & 7.  
Dec. 4.

*Attalus*, king of *Pergamus* in *Asia*, came to the degree of royaltie by his vertue: for hee was neither sonne nor successor of a king, neither had hee the heroicall vertues of *Hercules*, of *Alexander*, or *Cesar* to conquer a kingdome: yea, breefely he had nothing in him (saith *Titus Livius*) that could either aid or bring hope unto him at any time to be a king, but onely riches, which he bestowed and used so well, that by the meanes of them, and by his fidelitie towards the *Pergames*, hee became king of *Pergamus*, after he had once vanquished the *Gaules* of *Asia*: As soone as he was come to this degree, he allied himselfe by confederations with the *Romans*, and alwaies kept his Faith perfect and entier: inso much, as wel by the integritie and constantnesse of his Faith, as by good justice, hee reigned foure and fortie yeares, and left his kingdome stable and firme to *Euменes* his sonne, whose domination the Romanes greatly augmented, because hee continued in his fathers loyaltie, who at his death charged him, to repute that fidelitie to be the best heritage hee left him.

Fidelitie a  
good inheritance.

*Titus Livius*  
lib. 1. Dec. 1.  
lib. 4. Dec. 3.

There was nothing in the world which the old *Romans* had in greater reverence and observation than their publike Faith: Therefore had they a temple of Faith, where men swore and solemnly promised al their treaties of peace, truces, confederations, alliances, & other such like, and those who first did violate it were esteemed dedicated to the gods of *Hell*: and with a like sinceritie did they also observe their Faiths in particular contracts: so that every one thought they could not better assure a debt, than in lending to the Commonwealth: yea, when by reason of great wars their treasuries were emptie of money, such as had the custodie of pupils and widdowes portions, and other like, would bring al to the treasurers of the commonwealth: For every man (saith *Titus Livius*) thought he could not better place his silver, nor better assure it, than under the publike Faith.

When *Scipio* the *African* entred into *Sicilie*, with his armie, to passe into *Africa*, because he entred into it as a friend, he would suffer no man to take any thing from the *Sicilians*: But (saith *Titus Livius*) thinking that the first thing hee should doe, was to maintaine & defend the publike Faith, he by a proclamation commanded every man in his campe to yeeld, and to give the *Sicilians* all their owne whatsoever: He also deputed judges to heare and determine all complaints, touching such

such causes: This so pleased the Sicilians, that from thence forward, they shewed themselves very affectionate to aide the Romanes, in their Affrike warre.

Whilst *Anniball* was in Italie, *Valerius Levinus* being Consull, there was a loane of money made of the Romane people: Afterward it came to passe that *Scipio* having passed into Affrica with his Armie, the Carthaginians sent unto *Anniball* to come and defend Carthage, and the countries of Affrica, insomuch as he was constrained against his will to returne: As soone as he was voided Italie, although the Romanes had not ended their warre, neither were out of great affaires, yet *Levinus* certified the Senate, that during the time of his consullship, there was a great summe of money borrowed of the people, that it was time to pay it, and that he in particular was bound in this case to acquite the publike Faith: therefore hee desired that that borrowed money might dee restored: The Senate liked well of his speech, and it was decreed that the said money should be paid at three payments, the first incontinent, the other within two yeeres, and the last within two yeeres after that: When it came to the third payment, there was no money in their treasury to pay it, because of the great affaires, that the Commonwealth had in their warres: Vpon this necessitie, the Senate resolved, that whatsoever came of it, they must acquite their publike Faith, and therefore they gave to particular persons the lands and possessions belonging to the Commonwealth, in payment, for every mans debts, retaining onely upon every acre three halfe pence rent, to shew, that that land had been the commonwealthes, with this covenant, that such debtors should have their payment in money, as soone as the commonwealth had silver, if they had rather have money than land.

This Romane vertue, straightly to observe Faith, was not onely resplendishant in the bodie of the commonwealth, but also amongst particular persons, which never had regard to any thing in the world so much, as in the keeping of their Faith. When *Scipio* was in Affrica, warring upon the Carthaginians, he accorded a truce with them, if they would for that purpose send ambassadours to Rome, which they did: Whilst the said ambassadors made their voiage to Rome, *Asdruball* a Carthaginian captaine, breaking the truce, distressed and tooke 230 Romane ships, upon the Sea: Whereof *Scipio* being advertised, sent to Carthage ambassadors, to shew the Senate that breach of the peace, so unfit for the people that demanded peace: But these Romane ambassadors were so evill entertained at Carthage, that the common people had like to have stoned them, so that they were forced to go back again. Not long after, the ambassadors which the Carthaginians had sent to Rome, returned, and passed through the campe of *Scipio*: What did *Scipio*? he sent for them, and shewed them how their people had violated the publike Faith, by breaking the truce and offending the right of nations, by the violent repulsing of his ambassadors which hee sent; Yet, said he, I will do nothing against the custome of the Romans, in the holy observation of the publike Faith, neither any thing uncomly to my selfe: and after this speach, hee sent them away, not doing to them any harme. Hereby men may know, that at that time, the scoffe and jest so much used of the Canonists, was not in use: *Frangenti fidem, fides frangatur eidem*: Faith must be broken to him that breaketh Faith, *Caesar* also had this propertie, that he would never imitate the treacherie and disloyaltie of his enemies, nor breake his Faith unto them, although they broke theirs. And indeede (as that wise captaine *Quintus Cincinnatus* said) naturall reason, sheweth us, that we must not sinne, for others example, nor breake a law,

*Titus Livius*  
lib. 10, Dec. 3.



*Titus Livius*  
lib. 3. cap. 8.

a law, because others have already broken it, nor commit that fault which we reprehend and condemn in others.

These ancient Romanes were so scrupulous and exact observers of their Faith, that not onely they esteemed, that a man did violate it, when hee did any thing against it, but also whensoever he suffered any thing to be done by others, which seemed to bee to the detriment of that Faith. As when *Anniball* besieged and ruined the town of *Saguntum* in Spaine, which was an allie of the Romanes; because they could not give succours to the *Saguntines*, before the taking of the towne, they thinking that heerein their Faith was something engaged, never ceased till they had rebuilded and repeopled it: And therefore warred they in Spaine, by the space of foureteeen yeeres, at unspeakable charge, and vanquished the *Turditanes*, which brought *Anniball* against the *Saguntines*, and made them tributaries to the *Saguntines*, and drive the *Carthaginians* wholly out of Spaine, and redeemed all the *Saguntine* slaves, which *Anniball* had sold, after the taking of the towne; and recalled from all parts, such as were escaped, to repeople the towne: So well affectionated were these old Romanes, to leave nothing behinde, whereby they might make knowne that a publike Faith, was the thing of the world, which they had in most singular recommendation.

*Salust. de*  
*bello lugur.*

*Jugurtha* king of *Numidia* in *Affrica*, slew wickedly his two bretheren, the natural and legitimate children of good king *Micipsa*, how left his kingdome, as well to the said children, as to the said *Jugurtha*, his adoptive sonne, borne of his brother: The Romanes which greatly loved that good king *Micipsa*, were much grieved, that this adoptive had dealt so wickedly with them, unto whom the kingdome better belonged than to him (yet hee had both spoiled, and withall bereaved them of their lives:) Notwithstanding, hee desiring to goe to *Rome*, they gave him a safe conduct to goe and returne, because hee made the Senate believe that hee would justifie himselfe: When hee came at *Rome*, hee sought (for his justification) to obtaine friends by great presents; but hee could no way cause his fact to bee approved; yet hee returned into his kingdome in all assurance: for although hee merited well, by reason and justice to have bene staied, seeing the execrable act which hee had committed, and that it appertained to the Romanes, to do justice thereof, because they had the protection of the children of *Micipsa*, yet notwithstanding saith *Salust*, the publike Faith got the victorie.

*Dion. in Ner.*  
74.

After that the emperor *Nerva*, was chosen emperor, hee entred into the Senate, when it was assembled and after hee made them understand how kindlie and temperately, hee meant to behave himselfe in the government of the empire, hee added for a conclusion an oath and promise, That never by his ordinance and command, hee would put to death any Senator: A thing which greatly pleased all the companie, and especiallie because that cruell emperor *Domitian* his predecessor, whom hee succeeded, had caused a great number to die, yea for frivolous and trifling causes: What followed? It happened that certaine Senators conspired against that good emperor, and that the conspiracy was discovered: but that good prince seeing that the conspirators were Senators, and that hee had given to them all, his Faith and oath, that hee would cause none of them to dye, loved better to observe his Faith and oath, than to punish with death those Senators, which had well merited it: What will our *Machiavelists* say here, which most cruelly put to death & massacre against publike Faith, even such as no way have deserved any punishment.

But

Belley lib. 1.  
Of his me-  
mories.

But it is time to leave those ancient Romane examples (for wee should never have done to rehearse them all) now let us come to domestically examples. In the yeere 1508, king *Lewis* the twelfth (who then held the dutchie of Millan) made a league at Cambray, with the emperour *Maximilian*, and Pope *Julius* the eleventh, to expulse at their common charge and expences, the Venetians, out of the firme land, as usurpers of that they held, upon the empire, upon the Church, and upon the dutchie of Millan: And it was accorded, that in the yeere following, at a convenient and good time, every one of the said three princes should appeare upon the place with his army, and every man should have that yeelded unto him, that was his own, after they had conquered the said countries, which the Venetians held: The king according to this accord, came himselfe in person, with his army, and many great princes and French lords, but the emperour and the pope failed: Yet the king seeing himselfe strong enough alone, gave battaile to the Venetians, and got the victorie, insomuch as their chieftaines were taken, and 2000. slaine, and almost all the townes, which the Venetians had on firme land, yeelded to him: What then did this good king? although the other two held not their Faiths unto him, and that having then the dutchie of Millan, he alone might easily have kept, all that hee had conquered, yet notwithstanding hee voluntarilie yeelded to the emperour, Verone, Vicence, Padua, and other places belonging to the empire, and to the Pope, Rimini, Faence, Cervia, Ravenna, and other church townes, hereby this good king, shewing in what great recommendation hee had the observation of his Faith, and to maintaine whole and perfect his promise: For if with excuses, hee would have dealt deceitfully, to have broken his Faith (as *Machiavell* saith hee ought to have done) had hee not a faire pretext, to say that others had not held promise with him, might he not have then said, that hee was not bound to reconquer theirs at his owne charges, by the tract of their league? Might he not well have beaten the Pope with his owne Cannons, alledging as before, *Frangenti fidem, fides frangatur eidem*: But hee was a plaine man, without guile, and sincere, hee sought no evasions or refuges, but an upright observer of his Faith and promise, yet *Machiavell* reprehends him, because he used not deceits and tromperies, as the Popes *Alexander* and *Julius* did.

The memorie is yet fresh, of the great warres which the emperour *Charles* the fifth, and *Francis* the first, king of France had together: as also how they objected one to another, the observation of Faith in their publike escripts and writings, yet whatsoever imputations were laid by one to another, experience manifested the truth in the yeere 1539, when the emperour under the word of the king passed through France, to goe from Spaine into Flanders, where the people of *Gant* were risen up against him, for in that passage, the emperour shewed well that hee beleevd, the king was a prince, who would keep his Faith unviolated, when he trusted his owne person under it, notwithstanding all the warres, enmites, hostilities, and other differences which had so often happened betwixt them two, and were not yet extinguished: And certaine it is, that if the emperour (who was a wise prince) had had the least doubt in the world of the kings Faith and loyaltie, hee would never have put himselfe in his hands, and especially for so small an occasion, as in hast to goe build a citadell, in the towne of *Gant*; insomuch as his fact contradicteth his mouth and word: For before he had many times given an intimation to the king, not to hold and observe sincerely his Faith, but as by his own fact, he shewed that he beleevd the contrary of that hee had said, so found he by experience that the king

was

Belley lib. 8.  
Of his me-  
mories.

was a Prince, who had in greater estimation his Faith and promise, than any thing in the world: for he not onely gave to the emperour an assured free passage through his kingdome, but also did it with all the honour and good entertainment, that was possible: The emperour to obtaine this passage, had promised and liberally offered, to invest the king or some one of his children, to the dutchie of Millan, as appertaining unto him by good title: So that if the king would have observed the precepts of *Machiavell*, to have broken his Faith, hee had had a good pretext and colour to have arested in France, the emperour, untill hee had effected his promise in making the king a full possessor of Millan: But that wise and generous king who knew, that publike Faith ought uprightly to bee observed, without any addition of gloses, or restrictions ( heerein using the wise counsell, of his constable *Montmorency*, who was no Machiavelist ) thought it good, purely and sincerely, on his side, first to observe his Faith: And although on his side the emperour accomplished not his, but after he was passed into Flaunders, fed the king with words of hope without effect, yet it is so that never man of a noble heart and good judgement will condemne that which the king did herein: For what profit soever the violation of his Faith had brought unto him, yet the fruit and pleasure of that profit could not have endured long: for the emperour would have left nothing unattempted, to have brought againe that which by such craft was so extorted from him, and with him, into this quarrell would have brought the whole empire: The king also had so still incurred the blame and diffamation of a Faith-breaker before all the world, in place whereof, hee left his adversary that reputation, and obtained for ever to himselfe the title and honour of a loyall king, for keeping his Faith sincerely, without any thing disguising or offending it.

No man  
trusteth  
perfidious  
persons.  
*Titus Livius*  
*lib. 9. Dec. 4.*

But now let us discover the evils which proceede from breach of Faith, and disloyaltie. First, the violators reape this punishment, that men do no more trust them. The Samnits having many times broken their Faith, and the treaties of peace and alliance, which they had with the Romanes, sent one day embassadors to Rome to renew their peace and alliance: After these embassadors were heard in the Senate, they received this answer: Masters embassadors, if the Samnites which have sent you, had alwaies well kept their Faith, we could willingly have hearkened unto you, to confirme and renew our alliances, but because we have often perceived, that even then, when you demand peace, you prepare your selves for war, reason willeth, that wee should no more rest upon words, but rather to respect the effect and the thing: Wee therefore make you know, that shortly we will send an armie into your countrey, to prove whether you love warre better than peace. After this answer, the said embassadors got them into their countrey, and soone after, the Romanes sent the then Consull, with an armie: who found there all things peaceable, and received an amiable entertainment, with a full furnishment of all victuals necessarie, insomuch as the Romanes, knowing that the Samnites desired to live in peace, and that their hearts agreed with their words, renewed unto them the ancient treatie of confederation.

*Titus Livius*  
*lib. 5. & 10.*  
*Dec. 3.*

When *Anniball* was at the point to bee vanquished by *Scipio* in Affrica, and that hee knew, that the Carthaginians imputed unto him their ruine, seeing things made not well for him at Carthage, hee withdrew himselfe to the great king *Antiochus* of Syria, to invite him to make warre upon the Romanes: He found this king alreadie willing to doe it, because he thought the Romans grew too great, and approached



proched too nigh his limits : *Anniball* seeing this king *Antiochus* ( who was a great dominator ) prest and ready to warre upon the Romans, thought he had well found a master, under whom to employ himselfe, to make some shew of his valour, in his trade of war, & that yet hee should worke much trouble to the Romanes, his sworne enemies : But hee was greatly deceived of his hope: for that king, would never give him any charge in his army, how brave and valiant a captaine so ever hee was, but alwaies held him for suspected, for no other cause, but that *Anniball* had alwaies practised that doctrine of *Machiavell*, to keepe no Faith but for his profit and advantage : And but for the Punike treacherie, which was well knowne in *Anniball*, there is a great appearance, that hee had beene employed by the king *Antiochus*, in some great and honourable charge, since hee knew better how to warre upon the Romanes, than any of all *Antiochus* his captaines: And *Antiochus* needed not doubt, that *Anniball* would not willingly fight out to outrance against the Romanes, whereof he was a mortall and irreconcilable enemy: But he doubted that *Anniball* obtaining the love of the people of warre (which willingly love old captaines) might attempt some enterprise against himselfe, to take his kingdome from him, or to play him some other Punick trick of his cunning: Briefely that Faith and disloyaltie of *Anniball*, was so suspected of *Antiochus*, that not onely hee would give him no charge in his armie, but even hee would never beleve his counsell, although *Anniball* gave him the best counsels of the world, for the conduction of his warre: Which is a point very notable to bee marked, that a man should so much distrust a perfidious person, as hee should thinke. he would ever use perfidie and disloyaltie, even then when hee useth the office of a faithfull counsellor and good friend, But it came to passe, that this king *Antiochus*, having beene vanquished by the Romanes, *Anniball* was constrained to seeke out another master, and fled towards to the king *Prusias* of Bithinia, who received him into his safeguard: But then hee met with as perfidious a person as himselfe, who determined soone after to deliver him to *Quintius*, captaine of the Romane armie, which was in those quarters Which *Anniball* perceiving, and seeing all passages shut up, from saving himselfe, hee tooke poyson, which hee had alwaies carried about him, to serve in a necessitie, not trusting any man (as it is the nature of perfidious persons, to esteeme everie man like themselves, and not to trust in any) and after making great imprecations and execrations against *Prusias*, for not observing his Faith, but to goe about to betray him, hee drunke that poyson, and so miserably died: Whereupon it is a thing worthie to bee noted, that perfidious persons and faithbreakers doe ordinarily finde their like, which bring them into that necessitie to detest and execrate even perfidie it selfe, whereof before they made a vertue: A true sentence which they pronounce against themselves, and whereby they condemne themselves, leaving an example and judgement after them to detest perfidie, as a contagious pestilence, to such as use it.

The emperor *Bassianus Caracalla*, shewed many examples of his perfidies, but amongst all, hee committed three most notable, which so descryed him as none would ever more trust him: The first was that which hee used against *Aurelius* king of the Ofsenianes, who under the Faith and safe conduct of *Caracalla*, comming to see him, he brake his Faith, and caused him to bee taken and put him in prison, and seised his goods and his countrie: In this fact hee might covey himselfe with that doctrine of *Machiavell*, and say hee did well, because it was for his profit: But the

Perfidious  
men are  
constrained  
to con-  
demne per-  
fidie.

*Dion in Ca-  
racalla. Hero.  
lib. 4.*

the part he plaied with the king of Armenia, succeeded not alike unto him; which king he sent for to come unto him, being then nigh his country, making him to understand, that hee would agree him, with his children, with which then the king had some dissention: For as soone as hee came to him, he caused him to be taken prisoner, and to bee bound, and to bee cast into a straight prison, as hee had done with *Augurus*: But the Armenians having discovered this perfidie and disloyaltie, rose up in armes, and would not submit themselves under the obedience of that perfidious *Caracalla*. Hee also played another part of treacherie, under the pretext and shew of marriage, with the king of the Parthians, *Artabanus*: For hee writ letters unto him whereby hee signified unto him, that the empire of the Romanes, and that of the Parthians, were the two greatest empires of the world; and that hee beeing the sonne of a Romane emperor, could not find a partie more sociable unto him for a wife, than the daughter of *Artabanus*, king of the Parthians: hee therefore praised him, to give her to him in marriage, to the end to allie and joine together the greatest empires of the earth, as thereby also to impose an end to their warres: This king at the first denyed him his daughter, saying, that such a marriage was very unfit because of the diversitie of their tongues, manners, and habits; as also for that the Romanes never heretofore allied or married with the Parthians: But upon this refuse, *Caracalla* insisted and pressed him more strongly than before, and sent to *Artabanus* great gifts, so that in the end hee gave to him his daughter: Whereupon *Caracalla* assuring himselfe, that hee should finde noe hostility in the Parthian countie, entred bouldly farre into the countie with his armie, making men understand, wheresoever hee passed, that hee went but for to see and make love to the kings daughter: On the other side, *Artabanus* prepared himselfe and his retinue, in as good order as was possible, without any armie, to goe meet his new sonne in law: What did this perfidious *Caracalla*? As soone as the two parties were joined, and that king *Artabanus* came nigh him to salute and embrace him, hee commanded his souldiers earnestly to charge upon the Parthians: Then straight the Romans embraced and entertained the unarmed Parthians, with great blowes of swords and other armes, as enemies, and as if there had been an assigned battaile in so much as there was a great slaughter made of the Parthians; but the king *Artabanus*, with the help of a good horse escaped with great difficultie and danger: So that this simulated and disguised marriage although pleasant to *Caracalla* and his friends, yet were they sorrowfull to many poore Parthians. *Artabanus* beeing saved, determined well to revenge himselfe of that villanie and trecherie: but *Macrinus* releevd him of that paine, who within a little time after, slew that monster *Caracalla*, who was already descryed through all the world because of his perfidie.

Perfidie is  
the cause  
of the ruine  
of the per-  
fidious.

Besides, that perfidie and violation of Faith, is the cause, that none will believe nor trust them which once have used it, yet proceeds there another upon it: which is, That breach of Faith, is ordinarily cause of the totall destruction & ruine of the perfidious and disloyall person, The example above alleaged of *Anniball*, may well serve to prove it: for his trecherie was first a cause that none would trust him: secondly, it was the cause that another perfidious person seeing him without friends or meanes, enterprised to play another part of perfidie, which forced him to poyson himselfe. We have also in another place before, recited the example of *Virius*, and other Capuans, to the number of seven and twentie, which desperately slew themselves, because they had broken their Faith with the Romanes: but amongst other examples,

examples, that of king *Syphax* of Numidia is most illustrious and memorable: This king promised *Scipio*, that he would aid and give him succors against the Carthaginians. The Carthaginians knowing this, found means to lay a bait for this king by a faire Carthaginian damosell, called *Sophonisba*, one of a great house, who by her enticements so drew him into her nets, that shee caused him to breake his faith with *Scipio*, and made an alliance and confederation with the Carthaginians (by the marriage of *Sophonisba*) whereby they accorded, that they would have alike friends and enemies. *Scipio* beeing hercof advertised, was much both astonished and grieved, yet hee thought it good resolution not to attend, whilest the two powers of king *Syphax* and of the Carthaginians were joined together: Hee then so hastened, that hee placed his armie before king *Syphax*, who was going with thirtie thousand for the helpe of the Carthaginians, and overcame all those succours: insomuch, as *Syphax* himselfe was taken prisoner, his horse having been slaine under him, & was brought alive to *Scipio*; who demaunded of him wherefore he had broken his faith with the Romanes, which he had so solemnly sworne betwixt his hands: This poore captive king confessed, that an enraged follie had drawne him unto it by the meanes of the Carthaginians, which gave him that pestilent furie, *Sophonisba*, who by her flatteries and enticements had bereaved him of his understanding. After, this miserable king was in a triumph by *Scipio* led to Rome, & died miserably, & his kingdom brought under the obedience of the Romanes, which gave a good part of it to *Masiniissa*, another king of Numidia, who had ever beene loyall and faithfull unto them in the observation of their faith: So that *Syphax* lost himselfe and his kingdom by his perfidie and breach of faith, and *Masiniissa* acquired great reputation and honour, and greatly amplified and enlarged his kingdome, for rightly observing his sayth and loyaltie.

*Charles* the simple, king of Fraunce, in his time made strong warre upon *Robert* duke of Aquitaine, and vanquished him in a battaile nigh Soissons, where duke *Robert* was slaine. *Heber*, count de Vermandois, brother in law of that *Robert*, was so grieved and displeased at that overthrow, that he enterprised a part of perfidie and villanie, to catch the king his soveraigne lord: therefore with a countenance of amitie, he invited the king to a great feast in the towne of Perone, whither the king came with many other great princes and lords: but the said count caused them all to be taken prisoners, and shut them within the castle of Perone: Afterward hee enlarged all the said princes and lords, upon condition of their promises, never to beare armes against him, but still retained the king prisoner in the said castle, where he died within two yeares after. *Lewis* (the third of that name) his sonne, succeeded him in the crowne; who at his first entrie revenged not the death of his father, upon count *Heber*, fearing some insurrection in his kingdome, because of his great kinred and friends: yet at the last he also made a great and solemne feast, unto which he entreated the great lords and barons of his kingdome, and even count *Heber*, and his friends and kinsfolkes: As they were all assembled at that feast, behold there arrived out of England a currier (a thing fained by king *Lewis*) who (booted and spurred) fell upon his knees before the king, and presented letters unto him on the king of Englands part: The king tooke those letters, and caused them to be read low by his Chancellor, the rather to deceive: As soone as he had read them, the king began to smile and say on high to the companie: Truly men say true, that the English are not wise: My cousin of England sends me word, that in his countrey a rustical & clownish

*Tit. Livius*  
lib. 9. & 10.  
Dec. 3.

Annal. up-  
on the yere  
916.



nish man had summoned his lord (whose subject he is) to a dinner at his house; and as soone as he came there, hee tooke and detained him prisoner, and after strangled him, and villanously caused him to die: Therefore he sends mee word, to have the opinion of the princes, barons, and lords of France, to know what justice should bee done upon that subiect: I must make him an answer, and therefore my masters I pray you tell me your advices. What thinke you (said hee to the count de Blois the most antient) to this matter my good cousin? The count de Blois answered, that his opinion was, That the said rusticall fellow should die ignominiously, and that according to his desert. All the other princes and lords were of the same opinion, yea, even *Heber*, count de Vermandois. Then tooke the king the word, and laid: Count de Vermandois, I judge thee and condemne thee to death by thine owne word: for thou knowest, that in the shew of friendship, and under the shadow of a feast in thy house, thou diddest invite my dead father, and being come, thou retainedst him and brought him most villanously to his death: therefore by thine own confession thou doest merit a most ignominious death. Straight after, the king commaunded that he should be hanged and strangled, which was done: So this perfidious & disloyall *Heber* received the reward of his perfidie and breach of Faith, as hee himselfe judged to have merited.

*Frois. lib. 3.  
cap. 5, 13, 14.*

*Edward* king of England, the second of that name, was much governed by the house of the *Spensers*, which tooke upon them the handling of all the affaires of the kingdome, and despised farre greater lords than themselves: The said king having lost a battaile at *Esturmelin* against the Scots, all England imputed the evill lucke of that losse unto the evill government of the *Spensers*. They beleeving that the great lords of England, which envied their credit, had caused this brute to be sowne, resolved to take vengeance thereof, by a most perfidious and disloyal means: For they persuaded the king to convocate a generall assembly of States, to advise and provide (as they gave to understand) for the affaires of the kingdom: The princes and lords of the kingdome not doubting any thing, assembled at the kings commaund: But incontinent as they were assembled, king *Edward* (whom the *Spensers* had persuaded, that his princes and lords meant to get his kingdom from him) commaunded them to be taken, & arrested prisoners: which was done; & without any knowledge of cause, he cut off the heads from two and twentie of the greatest lords and princes of the kingdome: and amongst them there was beheaded *Thomas* duke of Lancaster, the kings uncle, who was a good and a sage prince, and who after was canonized and sancted. This perfidy ioyned with crueltie (for commonly the one goeth with the other) was the cause that the said king was deprived by all the States of England, of his roialtie, as unworthy to carrie the crowne, and was confined to prison, where he finished his dayes: And the *Spensers*, authors of such disloyaltie, were executed and rigorously punished, according to their merits: For after they had been drawn on hurdles through the streets, all over the citie of *Hertford*; their privie parts were first cut away & cast into the fire; then were their hearts taken out of their bellies, & also cast into the fire; after their heads were cut off and carried to London; and the bodies of every of them were quartered, and every quarter caried into other severall townes, to be set on the tops of their great gates, in detestation of their great perfidie and disloyaltie, which they used towards the said lords.

*De Comines,  
lib. 2 cap. 78.  
and Annal.  
1475.*

It was also a great perfidie in *Charles* the last duke of Bourgoigne, in that hee gave safe conduct to the Count of *S. Pol* constable of France, to come to him with

good

good assurance, and then tooke him prisoner, and delivered him to king *Lewis* the seventh, who making his proces at Paris, his head was cut off in the place *de Greve*. True it is, that the said count had committed great faults, as well against the king, as against the duke: hee had also alwayes studied to nourish warre betwixt the said two princes; yet notwithstanding it was a verie dishonorable and infamous thing, for the duke to take him prisoner, after hee had given him his faith and assurance, by the safe conduct which he graunted him: For if hee had not beene, hee had (according to his determination) with his silver, fled into *Almaigne*, & from thence in time he might have made his peace, and againe have come into the kings favour: But he was deceived as before: & the said perfidie was so much the more infamous and dishonest, because it was perpetrated by this duke of *Bourgoine*, for the covetousnesse to gaine the townes of *S. Quinten*, *Han* and *Bohain*, which belonged to the said count, which the king gave to the said duke, to the end, he would deliver and betray him. But behold the just judgement of God, who permitted, that this duke of *Bourgoine* was in the end beaten with the same rods wherewith hee had beaten the count of *S. Pol*: for being twice overthrowne at *Granson* and *Morat*, by the *Suiffers*, the siege of *Nus* succeeding evill unto him, and also having lost the duchie of *Lorraine* (which before he had unjustly occupied upon the duke of *Lorraine*, who conquered it) all these traverses and troubles engendred such griefe, sadness, and confusion in his spirit, and great indisposition in his person, that hee was never after whole, either in bodie or mind: His wits thus comming into decay, there came into his braine a distrust of his owne subjects, and therefore thought good to serve himselfe with strangers, and to chuse a loyall and faithfull nation, he addrest himselfe to count *de Campobache*, an Italian, and gave him charge to bring with him many Italians to his service, as he did. This was the last act of the Tragedie of his life: For this count *de Campobache* ceased not till hee had betrayed him unto the duke of *Lorraine* before *Nancy*, which the said duke of *Bourgoine* held besieged, and there was slaine in an assault, which the duke of *Lorraine* gave him, to constrain him to raise the siege. And so in like sort, as by perfidie and violating of his faith, hee had caused the constable of *S. Pol* to leese both life and goods: so by the treason and perfidie of *Campobache*, he both lost his life, and his house was ruined and rent in peeces, which was the greatest house in *Christendome*, next unto that of *Fraunce*.

He should never have done, that would set downe all the calamities & mischiefs proceeding of perfidie and breach of publicke Faith. It caused the ruine of *Carthage* the great in *Affrica*, which for a long time was one of the greatest and most flourishing commonweales that ever was in the world. It was the only ruin of *Corinth*, of *Thebes*, of *Calchis*, which were three of the greatest, fairest, and richest cities of *Greece*. It was the cause of *Ierusalem*s destruction, and of all the countrey of *Iudea*: yea, breefely, there never happened any great subversion and desolation in the world, were it of cities, commonweales, kingdomes, empires, great captaines, great monarchs, or of strong and flourishing nations, but it came upon perfidie and the breach of Faith. True it is, that it draweth at the taile with her, crueltie, avarice, and other like companions: but yet perfidie is the mistresse and governess of all: She breaketh peace, she reneweth civile and strange warres, she troubleth people and nations which are quiet, she destroyeth and impoverisheth them, she overthroweth right and equitie, she prophaneeth and defileth holy and sacred things, she banisheth

Perfidie an  
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Subtil palli-  
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not profita-  
ble.  
*Titus Livius*  
*lib. 4. Dec. 3.*

and chafeth away all pietie, justice, and the feare of God; she bringeth in Atheisme and contempt of all religion; she defaceth all amitie and naturall affection towards parents, our countrey, and nation; she confoundeth all politicke order; she abrogateth good lawes and customes: Finally, what mischiefs hath there ever beene in the world, which that hideous monster (Perfidie) hath not engendred: Assuredly, it is an *Aleſto*, an infernall furie, excited and called lately from hell, to the vexation and utter overthrow of this poore world.

And as for that which *Machiavel* sayeth, That a man may find reasons and covertures to cloake and colour the breach of Faith, this hath no place amongst good men which respect their honour, which also repute palliations but tromperies and frauds, and do make mens perfidies but the worse and more damnable. The Carthaginians after the first Punick warre, made a treatie of peace with *Caius Lucſatius*, lieutenant generall of the Romane armie, upon which treatie, *Lucſatius* made this reservation, *Under the good pleasure of the Senate and Romane people*: This treatie pleased not the Romanes, and therefore as soone as they were advertised thereof, they certified the Carthaginians, that they would not ratifie it. Not long after, *Asdrubal*, lieutenant generall of the Carthaginian armie, made another treatie with the Romanes, wherein they comprehended the Saguntines: This treatie a long time was observed on both sides, yet the Carthaginians never expressly, only secretly, approved and ratified it: At the end of which time, the Carthaginians sent *Annibal* to besiege Saguntum, which they tooke and ruined. The Romans after this, sent embassadors to Carthage, to know wherefore the Carthaginians had done contrarie to the treatie of peace made with *Asdrubal*, wherein expressly the Saguntines were comprehended. The Carthaginians in their Senat would have cloaked and coloured this fact (according to *Machiavels* counsell) with certaine fond subtilties, saying, that they never ratified the treatie made by *Asdrubal*, and that it was as well lawfull for them to disavow that which *Asdrubal* had done therein, as the Romans had abrogated the truce of *Lucſatius*. This colour seemed to have some appearance in it, but being more narrowly entred into, nothing will be discovered, but deceit and fallacie: For there must a greater estimation be made of a ratification by Deed, than by Word, as the assurance of Deeds is farre greater than that of Words: so that the Carthaginians, which by the space of many yeares had approoved effectually the treatie of *Asdrubal*, could by no means afterward reprove it, as also because in that truce there was no reservation contained, as there was in the treaty of *Lucſatius*: The Romane embassadors then espying the palliation and quarelling deceit of the Carthaginians, vouchsafed not otherwise to reply, but to present to their choise, either peace or warre: The Carthaginians left that choise to the Romans, which chused warre; by which the Carthaginians lost themselves and their countrey. And this came of their deceitfulnesse and breach of Faith.

*Titus Livius*  
*lib. 4. Dec. 4.*

Not unworthy the rehearfall, are the subtill distinctions of king *Antiochus* his embassadour unto *Titus Quinctius*, lieutenant generall of the Romane armie, then resident in Greece, to defend the Greeke townes in their liberties against that barbarous king. This king perceiving his affaires, could not well succeed against the powers of the Romans, which by the Grecians themselves were drawn into Greece, purposed to seeke peace without any further hazard: *Quinctius* made *Menippus* and *Hegesfanax*, the kings embassadors, to understand, that the only meane of peace was, that their king should avoid Europe, and leave Greece at libertie: Hereunto *Menip-*  
*pus*



pus replied by goodly distinctions well trussed together, whereby hee shewed, that there are three kinds of confederations and treaties of peace: one, with such as are vanquished by warre, unto whom the vanquishers may give law: the second kind, when two enemies, equall in forces, do make peace without battaile; in which kind, as they are like in force, so ought the compacts and conditions of peace to bee alike and egal: and the third is, when they which never were enemies before, are reduced to amitie & confederation, in which kind, neither of them ought to give law to the other: adding to this distinction, that the king their master was of this third kind, and that therefore they were abashed, that *Quintius* would give him a law, saying, That hee must needs avoid Europe. *Quintius*, who was nothing expert in making distinctions, unlesse it were with the sword, although otherwise of good naturall sence: Well (saide he) you have made me a distinction, and I will make you another: There are two kinds of warres; the one may be made in Asia, the other may be made in Europe: Touching the last kind, the Romans have just cause to enterprise wars against your master for the guard of the townes of Greece, least they should fall into the hands of *Antiochus*, according as they have preserved them from the hands of *Philip* king of Macedonie: and as for the first kind, the Romans are content not to deale at all: and if king *Antiochus* your master will make warre in Asia, let him do it, we will not hinder him. The said embassadors (which accounted to have brought much to passe by their subtrill distinction) were much astonished when they heard this contradistinction of *Quintius*: for they could not reply one word: And in the end there was no remedie but *Antiochus* must passe (by the distinction of *Quintius*) to avoid Europe. Hereby is scene, that such subtilties and palliations in treaties of peace and observation of Faith, are but ridiculous things: For the affaires of the world ought to be governed by a common sence and solid judgement, and not by subtilties of distinctions, which should be sent to Sophisters and Logicians to maintaine their arguments in schooles.

The Grecians have alwaies beene great masters in subtilties (as their writings shew) yea, too much: for often it hath happened, that determining to governe the affaires of their commonweales, rather by subtrill reasons, than by arguments founded upon good judgement, they have overthrowne themselves into utter ruines & confusions. Hereof there is a very memorable example in the Peloponnesiack warre described by *Thucydides*, which endured eight and twentie yeares, and wel nigh ruined all Greece from top to toe, as wee say: for it was founded upon a subtiltie of small importance. This was the matter: Two of the greatest commonweales of all Greece were the commonweales of the Athenians & of the Lacedemonians, for all the rest were small in comparison of them, and were in a conjunction by an association either with the one or the other, except some few, as that of the Corcyrians, which neither associated with the Athenians, nor with the Lacedemonians. These two great commonweales had a treatie of confederacie together, wherein amongst other articles there was one which said, That if any of the cities of Greece, which were not then leagued with either the one or the other of the commonweales, would associate themselves either to one or the other, they lawfully might. But so it happened, that the Corcyrians had warre against the Corinthians, which were associated with the Lacedemonians: insomuch, as the Corcyrians feeling themselves weak, practised to enter into league and societie with the Athenians, shewing them, that they might receive them into their societie: The Corinthians on the contrarie de-

monstrated to the Athenians, That if they received the Corcyrians into their societie, to aid them in this warre against them, it were to doe against the said article, the which was to be understood in the wholesomest and best sence, and not to the detriment and ruine of the confederates : and that such as would so interpret it, That it were lawfull for the Athenians to receive the Corcyrians into their societie, for them to warre upon the Lacedemonians, Corinthians, and other confederates, comprehended in the said treatie, should be an interpretation to an evill sence, too easily making an overture to breake the said treatie of peace, after the appetite of a third, which was no confederate : And that therefore the said article must of necessity be understood, in such manner, as the reception of new associates might bee without the damage and prejudice of such as were comprehended in that confederation. The Corcyrians replied, That although in the said article bee not expressed, that it should be lawfull to receive associates, to make warre against confederates or others : yet must it be so understood, especially, when new associates make war for a good right and just quarrell, as ours is (said they) against the Corinthians : & that the treatie could not be violated, neither is the interpretation contrarie to equitie, whensoever men will maintaine right and reason. The Athenians made no account of the interpretation of the said treatie which the Corinthians set before them, although it was conformable and agreeing to the sence and equitie of that confederation, but rather held it better to stick unto the Corcyrians : On the other side, the Lacedemonians banded themselves for the Corinthians, their associates, as reason required, and by that meanes those two great commonweales were brought to the skirmish of warre one against another, by meanes of the Corcyrians and Corinthians, which set them together by the eares. After the Athenians and Lacedemonians entred warres together, they drew after them all the rest of Greece, or the most part into the same skirmish, some of the one part, some of the other : but this Peloponnesiack warre was great, cruell, long, and such as had almost utterly overthrowne the estate of Greece upside downe : and all this came upon the captious interpretation (contrarie to all equitie and reason) which the Corcyrians made of the foresaid article of the treatie of confederation.

Plutarch, in  
Pomp.

In like manner was the subtill disputation of such as caused *Pompeius*, that famous captaine to die. After *Pompeius* had lost the battaile of Pharsalia against *Caesar*, hee embarked on the sea with his wife & certain of his friends, hovering about *Aegypt*, hoping there to be welcome, and entertained by the young king *Ptolomeus*, in consideration of the pleasures which hee had sometimes done to his father. At his approaching the land of *Aegypt*, he sent a messenger in a boat to that young king, who was in the towne of Pelusium, to know if he would receive him in assurance : but in deed the kings affaires were then managed by three base persons, which understood nothing lesse, than well to governe affaires of State, whereof the first was a meane chamberlaine of his, and the other two, *Theodorus* the Rhetorician his schoolemaster, and *Achillas* his domestickall servant : These three venerable persons fel to counsell, to deliberate what answer the king their master should make to *Pompeius* : At the beginning they differed in opinion, one saying, that it were good to receive him and the other, not : But in the end all three accorded in the worst opinion they could have taken, which was, to receive *Pompeius*, and to slay him : Which opinion, this goodly Rhetorician *Theodorus* perswaded to the other two by his subtille reasons. If we receive *Pompeius* (saith he) certaine it is, we shall have *Caesar* for an enemy, and

*Pompeius*

*Pompeius* for a master: If we receive him not, they will be both our enemies; *Pompeius* for rejecting him, and *Caesar*, because we have not staied him: But if we receive him, and put him to death, *Caesar* will thanke us, and *Pompeius* cannot revenge himselfe upon us, nor endamage us: for a dead man is no warrior: Vpon these goodly reasons of that subtil rhetorician, the conclusion was taken by these three bad people, to put to death this great person *Pompeius*, who had had so many triumphs and victories in his life, & who had seen to wait on him sometimes five or six great kings at once, to entreat him as an arbitror of their contentions and differences. If these bad Counsellors had considered the greatnesse of *Pompeius*, who had so many parents and friends, vertuous and great lords, as also the magnanimitie of *Caesar*, which would vanquish by true force, and not by perfidies and treasons, they would never have staied upon the cold and foolish subtilties of this gentle Rhetorician, & they would not have concluded the death of so great a man: But yet they concluded it, and executed their conclusion, causing *Pompeius* to die, as soon as he had taken port in *Aegypt*: But it was not long ere they receiued the reward of their perfidie, founded upon that subtiltie: for *Caesar* soone after arrived in *Aegypt*, unto whom *Poshinus* and *Achillas* presented the head of *Pompeius*, thinking greatly to pleasure him: *Caesar* turned his face backward, because he would not see him, and begun to weep, and withall commanded to put *Poshinus* and *Achillas* to death, which had profered him that present, which was presently done: And that subtile reason of *Theodorus*, who perswaded them, that *Caesar* would thank them for their murder, was not found true. *Theodorus* seeing this execution, and finding himselfe very culpable, fled, & yet lived certaine yeares, miserably wandring and begging here and there, fearing (being known) to be massacred of the world, which everie where had him in execration: But in the end, after the death of *Caesar*, *Brutus* by chance light upon him, and caused him to die miserably, after he had made him endure infinit torments. Behold the end of those three Counsellors of that yong king *Ptolomeus*, who also by their evill conduction made but a poore end: for he was flaine in a battaile nigh Nile, and none could ever find his bodie. Would to God such as resemble at this day these three Counsellors, might receive semblable guerdon and reward as they did, to learne them to conclude the committing of massacres, and the use of perfidies and treasons, which will not faile them in the end: for God is just.

But the skoffe which *Theodorus* alledged in the fore-mentioned counsell, That a dead man makes no warre, is at this day ordinarily in the mouths of our Italianized courtiers, & thereupon they ground their counsels, to sleie and massacre all such as they hate: We must (say they) sleie this and that man, it is good to dispatch them, for a dead man makes no war: But if a man reply upon them, that a dead man yet may be cause of warre, although he can make no warre: what would they answer? Dare they denie so apparant a thing, as we see with our eyes, and whereof hystories furnish us with infinit examples. *Lewis* duke of Orleance, king *Charles* the sixt his brother, after the duke *John* of Bourgoigne had caused him to be flaine, made no warre indeed, but yet was the cause of a civile warre in France, which endured more than sixtie yeares. *Pompeius* after he was flaine, made no more warre, but his death was the cause of a great and long civile warre, in the Romane empire. The violating & death of a *Levites* wife, was it not the cause of a warre, wherein there died more than sixtie thousand men. They which were slain at Vassi, Anno 1562. drew not they on a civile warre, which endured too long? They also which were slain in Anno 1572. in the



Spar. in Geta

the moneth of August by the great townes of France, but especially Paris; were not they cause of great warres? It is therefore a foule and an inconsiderate saying, to alledge, that a dead man makes no warre, thereupon to found their massacres and slaughters, without considering the consequence thereof. Hereupon is verie memorable, the speech that *Geta* the yong prince made to the emperour *Severus* his father. *Severus* having vanquished *Albinus* and *Niger* his competitors to the empire, begun to make a great slaughter of the greatest lords and gentlemen of Rome, which had taken part with *Albinus* or *Niger*, because they were of a more noble house than *Severus*: As then, day by day he was committing his slaughter, hee one day said unto *Basianus* & *Geta* his children (as men spoke of that fact) I shall by this meanes ease you of all your enemies: Hereupon *Geta* his sonne demanded of him: My lord and father, them which you meane to put to death, are they a great number? Yea (answered *Severus*) and told him the number: All they (replied hee) have they neither parents, allies, nor friends? Yea, they have many (said *Severus*;) You then (said *Geta*) will leave us more enemies than you take from us. This wise speech of this yong prince, touched so well the heart of *Severus* (although hee was cruell) that he would needs cease from his slaughter, but that *Plautianus* and other courtiers, which attended the enriching of themselves by confiscations, incited him to continue. Let murderers then hold themselves assured, that for one they have slain, they stirre up ten enemies: And yet is not this all: for all the rest of their lives they have sonles and consciences tormented, with the remembrance of such as they have most wickedly murdered: and the shadows and remembrances of them shal alwayes be before their eyes, as a feare and terror unto them. O how the shadow of that great Admirall shall strangely torment these great enterprisers of massacres! It will never leave them at rest, but shall be a burning flame, which shall agast and fearefully accompanie them even to their sepulchres. Let them then hearken unto the menace and threatning he makes in his tombe against them:

Virg. Æne.  
lib. 4.

*Although the soule from bodie mine cold death hath ravished,  
Yet absens I will follow thee, yea, with a flame full blacke  
My shadow alwayes shall appeare about thee as one dead,  
Which shall revenge on thee my blood, thou, who no ill dost lacke.*

I thought good by the way to touch, what warre the dead makes, or what cause of war they are, to refute that saying of the Machiavelians, That a dead man makes no warre. Let us now come where we left, Of subtilties, which we say ought not to be practised in the government of the affaires of State, and that thereby none may cover any perfidie.

When *Anniball* had gotten the battaile of Cannas, against the Romanes, hee tooke a great number of prisoners, and because he more loved money, for their ransom, than to hold them, hee sent a certaine number of them to Rome, to practise and worke their redemption, but hee made them sweare and promise, that they would returne to him, and so did let them goe upon their faith: But one advised himselfe of a subtile device when hee came at Rome, to returne no more, yet none should say hee broke his faith: For having passed a good peece of his way towards Rome, he suddenly returned backe againe to *Anniball*, fayning hee had forgotten something; after againe followed his companions, and so they all came to Rome:

But

But their affairs comming to be debated in the Senat, none would yeeld to redeem the prisoners; inſomuch as they all which came to Rome for that purpoſe, returned very ſad to *Annibals* campe, except he which returned by the way, who with theſe came not to the campe, but remained in his houſe, thinking he was well diſcharged of his faith and othe: But when the Senat heard tell of the fallacious and deceitfull returne of the ſaid ſouldier, ſo unworthy and unſeemly for a Romane, they commanded him to be drawne out of his houſe, and by force to bee led vnto *Anniball*. Hereby you may ſee then, that no wiſe people of good judgement (ſuch as were the antient Romanes) can approve ſuch ſubtile palliations and covertures of an infractions and breach of Faith, ſuch as *Machiavel* perſuadeth to a prince.

A like deceit was in the king of France, *Philip* the ſixt of that name: for having made an othe (as almoſt all his anceſtors, kings of Fraunce had done) never to run over or attempt to beſiege, or take any thing belonging to the empire; yet deſiring the caſtle of Tin; the Biſhops nigh to Cambray (which troubled him much) cauſed his ſonne the duke of Normandie, as the chiefe generall of the armie, to beſiege it, and himſelfe went thither alſo, as a ſimple ſouldier, without any command at all: By which ſubtiltie the king *Philip* cold not ſave his oth; for he that doth any thing by a mediator, is as much as if he had done it himſelfe, neither did the deceit ſucceed wel unto him: for both the duke of Normandie was conſtrained to raiſe his ſiege, from before the caſtle, and not long after the king loſt the battaile at Crefſy.

The emperour *Valentinian*, in his time was cruell in his actions and dealings, and had many officers like himſelfe: Amongſt other ſuch, there was a criminall judge called *Maximus*, who as he examined certaine criminall perſons, promiſed them if they would confeſſe the truth, they ſhould ſuffer no puniſhment, either of ſword or fire: Theſe poore accuſed perſons (as often men doe) confeſſed things they had never perpetrated, truſting upon his faith and promiſe: But this wicked judge cauſed them to be beatē down and ſlain with leaden hammers, thinking by this cavillation to ſave his oth: God would, that for a recompence he ſhould after bee hanged and ſtrangled, under the emperour *Gratianus*, a gentle and kind prince: For it often happeneth, that ſuch cruell judges, which have beſtowed great paines to make their diligence allowed of the cruell princes, have beene after paid their wages and received their due recompence, of ſome good prince ſucceeding.

*Nabis* was a tyrant, who without right or title got ſoveraigne poſſeſſion of the commonwealth of the Lacedæmonians, and there committed many cruelties and indignities: The *Ætolians* (a furious and cruell kind of people) eſteemed that it would be a great glorie and honour unto them, if they could ſlay this tyrant any way, and that al Greece, eſpecially the Lacedæmonians, would thank them: So they enterpriſed to joyne themſelves unto him, under a pretext and ſhew of faith and ſocietie the better to overthrow him. *Alexamenes* was deputed captaine and conductor of the *Ætolian* forces, to effect that enterpriſe, who did ſo much, as hee entered into league and confederation with *Nabis*, who at that time greatly feared the Romanes: This league being paſt, *Alexamenes* perſuaded *Nabis*, that both together they muſt often exerciſe their ſouldiers, by bringing them into the fields to waſſle, leape, ſkirmiſh, and praſtiſe other militarie exerciſes, to ſhun idleneſſe, and to make them good ſouldiers: *Nabis* beleevved him, inſomuch as one day beeing in the field together, *Alexamenes* came behind him, and threw him cleane over his horſe with a blow he gave him, and then preſently cauſed him to be ſlaine and maſſacred.

This

*Froislib. 1.  
cap. 10.*

*Amm. Mar.  
rel. lib. 28.*

*Titus Livius  
lib. 5. Dec. 4.*

This being done, *Alexamenes* and his people returned towards the town of *Sparta*, from whence they departed, thinking to seize upon the castle, to guard themselves, from all assaults of the tyrants friends, but they could not obtaine it: For the *Lacedæmonians* so disdained and grieved at that most perfidious & villanous part of the *Ætolians* against their king *Nabû* (although they desired no more than his death) that they furiously rushed upon the *Ætoliaps*, which were dispersed through the towne (and looked not for their paines to be so recompenced) that they slew them almost all, and amongst them *Alexamenes* himselfe: such as escaped the sword were taken prisoners and sold.

2. Sam. 2.  
3. 30.  
1. Kings 2.

For the last example of this matter, I will set downe that of *Ioab*, *David*s nephew and constable, unto whom hee did good and great services: Yet *David* commanded *Salomon* his sonne, that he should put to death *Ioab* his cosin germane (as hee did) because of his perfidie: for he had slaine *Abner* and *Amasa* (two other great captaines) traiterously under the colour of amitie. *Ioab* seemed to have great causes to iustifie his fact: For *Abner* had slaine *Asahel*, *Ioab*s brother, and therefore *Ioab* could not but receive just sorrow and feeling thereof: Moreover *Abner* had followed the contrarie part to *David*, standing for the house of *Saul*: *Amasa* was a rebel & a seditious person against *David*, and had followed *Abshalons* part; so it was evident, if *Ioab* had had our Machiavelists judges of his fact, they would not onely have adjudged him innocent, but for a remuneration they would have made him some amends, with the goods of *Abner* and *Amasa*: but the judgement of *David*, which he made at his death, against his sisters sonne, who had done him infinit good and great services, shewed well how execrable and detestable *Ioab*s perfidie was to him: And hereby princes have to learne, to imitate this holy and wise king, by whose mouth God teacheth them, that they ought to observe their faith and promise, yea to their damage; a doctrine fully contrarie to the doctrine of this filthy and wicked *Machiavell*.


To conclude, Perfidie is so detestable a thing, both to God and the world, that God never leaveth perfidious and faith-breaking persons unpunished. Oftentimes hee waits not to punish them in the other world, but plagues them in this yea often strangely and rigorously, by exterminating (as it were) in a moment all their race, wives, and children, as the Poet *Homer* (although a Panim) hath wisely taught us, saying:

*Homer. Ill. 4.*

*Though straight the God of heaven lay not his punishment divine,  
At all times on the perfidious for his great perjurie:  
Yet neither he himselfe, nor child can scape his ire in fine,  
No nor his wife, but all destroyed by hand of his shall bee.*

*Faith,*



22. *Maxime.*

*Faith, Clemencie, and Liberalitie, are vertues very damageable to a prince, but it is good, that of them, he have onely some similitude and likenesse.*

**T**Here is no necessity (saith our Florentine) that a prince should be garnished with all these vertues, but it is requisite that hee haue an appearance of them: For I dare well say this, that having and observing them in all places, they will fall out marvellous damageable unto him: And contrarie, the maske and semblance of them is very profitable: and indeed wee see, each day by experience, that a prince is often constrained to goe from his Faith, and from all charitie, humanitie, and religion, to conserve and defend his owne, which verily he shall incontinent lose, if exactly he will obserue all points, which make men to be esteemed vertuous.

Cap. 18. of  
the Prince.

**M***Achiavel* sets here downe three vertues, Faith, Clemencie, and Liberalitie, which hee reprooveth in a prince as damageable and pernicious, effectually to use them: But whosoever can recover the masks and similitudes of them, as they are naturally portraied, he shall do well to adorne and decke himselfe with them, as whoores and courtizans doe, which apparell themselves like women of honour, to make men beleefe that they are honest and good women: But I will not stand here upon invectives, to confute, or cause men to detest such a filthy doctrine: For what man is so brutall or ignorant, that seeth not with his eye, how *Machiavell* delights to mocke and play with the most excellent vertues amongst men: As for the Faith which is & ought to be amongst men (for *Machiavel* speaks not of the Faith which is towards God) we have discoursed upon it, in the former Maxime: And as for Liberalitie, we shall speake upon it in another place: Here wee wil speake of Clemencie, and examine *Machiavels* doctrine, whether this doctrine can bee damageable to a prince or no.

To shew that Clemencie cannot bee damageable, but profitable to him, unto whom God imparteth that grace, to bee indued therewith, an argument drawn from the contrarie concludes well and evidently for this purpose: For if crueltie (which is directly contrarie to Clemencie) bee pernicious and damageable to him, that

Clemencie  
profitable  
& honora-  
ble to such  
as are cle-  
ment;

that is infected therewith, as we have above shewed; it followeth, that clemencie, and gentleness is both profitable and honourable to him that is indued and adorned therewith: And indeed it is a vertue, both agreeable and amiable with everie man, which bringeth to whatsoever person it dwelleth in, favour, grace, amitie, honour, and good will of everie man to do him pleasure: All which are affections that can never be idle, nor without some operation of their natural effects, as the fire cannot bee without his heating, nor light without shining: so that, a man debonaire and gentle (I speake of all men in general, but especially of a prince) the chief means to obtaine the favour, grace, amitie, and reverence of the people, hee cannot avoid when he will, but feele great utilities, agreeable contentments, pleasures, benefits, great assurance farre from all feare, and most exceeding great repose and tranquillitie in his soule and conscience: But in order to deduce the good effects & utilities, which proceed from clemencie, I do advertise the reader, that I speake of that vertue in his most ample signification, according wherunto it comprehendeth, not onely mercie and kindness towards offenders, but also bountie, goodness of nature, mansuetude of manners, popularitie and facilitie to accommodate himselfe to the peoples humors, and (to all such as a man hath to command) also humanitie & officious affabilitie towards all men. For briefly, all these aforesaid vertues, are like the honie and sweetness of a well complectioned and settled soule, which sweetness may wel be called in one word, Clemencie, although according to his divers effects and respects, men give it divers names.

This natural kindness and bountie of the soule then (which men call Clemency) being in a prince, the first produceth this effect, that shee wil soften and mitigate the punishments of offenders, yea sometimes will forgive and altogether acquit them, according as the circumstances of the fact, and of the persons doe require: For a prince ought wel to consider, When, How, To whom, & Wherefore, he pardoneth a fault, because it is not clemencie but crueltie (as the king *S. Lewis* said) when a prince may do justice, and doth it not: But forasmuch as equitie is the soule of justice, which oftentimes is repugnant and contrarie to the rigour of lawes and ordinances, therefore a prince must needs employ his clemencie, to bring equitie in use, by dispensing with the punishment of offenders, which should suffer by the rigour of lawes: But if there be no equitie nor vailable reason to perswade a prince to dispense with the law, then is he bound to do justice, otherwise he merits to be reputed, not clement, but cruell and culpable of the crime, which he would not vouchsafe to punish: And in this point verie necessarie it is, that a prince bee wise and vigilant to guard himselfe, that he be not surprised nor deceived, and that he use not crueltie in stead of clemencie, by the ordinarie opportunitie of such as sue for pardons. And not to fall into this inconvenience, whensoever the fact is of evill example, and that the commonwealth hath interest therein, the prince ought not to use remission and grace, without knowledge of the cause, and without good counsell.

The emperor *Marcus Antonine* governed himselfe verie wisely in his use of clemencie, to such as committed crimes: for as to them which had not perpetrated great and erroneous faults, and had not taken a custome therein, hee mitigated and lenified such punishments, as were ordained by lawes, by some other lighter punishment: So in weightie crimes of evill consequence, he was inexorable, & for the had no favour, much lesse pardon: And in regard of offences committed against himselfe particularly, hee was as prompt and voluntarie to pardon, as was possible, and

*Capit. & Dio.  
in Marco.  
Vulc. Gallie  
canus in A-  
vidio Cassio.*

and so it appeared in the case of *Avidius Cassius*: For *Cassius* being in Efelavonia with a Romane army, hearing of a false report, that this good emperor was dead; & beleiving this fame to be true, he enterprised to make himselfe emperor, and for such made himselfe to bee knowne and saluted of his armie: After, having certaine notice that he was in good health, he was much abashed and withall troubled; that so rashly he had enterprised upon his masters estate: yet notwithstanding hee desisted not from holding & carrying himselfe as an emperor, fearing that some would sleie him so soone as he forooke his forces, having so farre embarked and engaged himselfe therein: yet could he not shun that which he so much feared, for he was slaine by certaine of his captaines, which thought thereby greatly to please *Marcus Antonius*, and carried to him his head: *Antonine* seeing the head of *Cassius*, was exceeding grieved and sorrowfull thereat, and said to them which brought it, That they should not have slaine him, since hee had not so commaunded, for so had they taken from him the use of mercie: Hee rather desired they had brought him alive, that hee might have reproched the benefits received at his hands, and with reason have shewed him how little cause he had to conspire against him, so also might hee have shewed himself a better friend unto *Cassius*, than *Cassius* had done to him. Yea but Sir (replied one of the captaines) What if by sparing the life of *Cassius*, hee had gotten the victorie of you? We doe not feare that, answered the emperor: for wee have riot so honoured the gods, nor lived in such sort, as *Cassius* could have vanquished us. No good princes, or very few, were at any time vanquished or slaine, or despoiled of their estate, but only such as well merited it, as *Nero*, *Caligula*, *Otho*, *Yrellius*, and other like, which were cruell and full of vices, and like *Gaba* and *Perrinar*, which were exceedingly given to covetousnesse, than which vice, nothing becomes a prince worse: But *Augustus*, *Traian*, *Adrian*, our father *Antonius Pius*, and such like, as they modestly governed, so deceased they honourably, & without violence. *Cassius* was a good and valiant captaine, whose fault we desired to have pardoned, because it rather proceeded of temeritie than of evill will against us, being persuaded when he made his enterprise, that we had bin dead: and although he could never have excused himselfe, but that he had greatly injured our children, which by right and reason ought to succeed us in our estate, yet would not we have had him to die for that: for if our children merited to succeed us in the empire, *Cassius* could not have overthrowne their estate: but if contrarie, *Cassius* had better deserved thā they to governe the commonwealth, and had been better beloved, it had also been reasonable and just he had been emperor. By this aunswere of that good emperor, a man may see how facile and easie he was to pardon offences against him, which is a very covenable vertue in a prince: for a prince can hardly rigorously punish faults committed against himselfe, but he shall be taxed and blamed for rigour and cruelty, although the fault merit greivous punishment, as the same emperor witnesseth by his missive rescribed unto the Senate, which made too rigorous a pursute against the complices of *Cassius*: And because the said letters containe notable sentences worthy of such a prince, I will here translate them. I pray (saith hee) and require you (Masters) that in regard of the Cassian conspiracy, you will depose and lay aside your censure, and conserve my pietie and clemencie, yea, your own, & let none die, that be culpable: let no Senator be punished, nor noble bloud be shed: let such as are banished, be called againe, and let their confiscated goods be yeilded unto them againe, and would to God that I could revoke and cal again to life such as are dead:



For there was never found, that a prince committed a good vengeance of his owne  
 griefe, but it was alwayes thought too rigorous and sharpe, though never so just: I  
 would have you then to pardon *Cassius* his children, his sonne in law, and his wife:  
 How should I not say pardon, since they have done nothing, let them live in al assu-  
 rance, and so know that they live under the empire of *Marcus*: Let them enioy their  
 fathers pattrimonic, his gold, his silver, and other their goods, that they may bee rich,  
 assured, free, and let them be examples of our pietie and clemencie, also of yours, in  
 the mouth of all the world. Neither (ô ye Conscript Fathers) is it any great clemen-  
 cie to pardon the children & wives of such as are banished and condemned, since I  
 demand and pray for pardon, even of the culpable themselves, whether they be Se-  
 nators or knights, that you may deliver them from death, from confiscations, from  
 infamie, from feare, from envie, & from all injuries, and that you will do this, whilest  
 we raigne, that they which were slaine in the tumult for enterprising against us, bee  
 not defamed. After this missive was read in the Senate house, all the Senators with  
 an honorable acclamation begun to crie, The gods conserve *Antonine* the clement,  
*Antonine* most pitifull, *Antonine* most mercifull: The gods perpetuate thy empire  
 into thy race: We wish all good to thy Wisedome, to thy Clemencie, to thy Do-  
 cttrine, to thy Nobility, and to thy Innocencie. This acclamation declareth wel how  
 amiable & acceptable Clemencie makes a prince: for there is nothing in the world  
 that better gains the hearts of men, nor that brings to a prince more reverence and  
 love, than this gentlenesse and lenitie of heart: And indeed this good emperour by  
 his Clemencie got thus much, that after his death, all Rome made a certaine ac-  
 count, that he was ascended into heaven, as to the place of his original: Because (said  
 they) it was impossible, that so good a soul, endowed with so excellent verrues, shold  
 come from any other place than from heaven, either returne againe to any other  
 place. The very name of *Antonine* was also so revered and loved of all the world  
 from father to sonne in many yeares and generations after him, that many empe-  
 rours his successours, caused themselves to be called *Antonines*, that the rather they  
 might be beloved of the people, though that name belonged not unto them, nor  
 were of the race or familie of *Marcus Antonine*: as did *Diadumenus* the emperour  
*Macrinus* his sonne and his companion in the empire, and as also did *Bassianus* and  
*Geta*, *Severus* his children, and *Heliogabalus*, they were all surnamed *Antonines*. But  
 as this name appertained not unto them, so held they nothing of the vertues of that  
 good emperour, with whose name they decked themselves. Yet many reprehended  
 in *Marcus Antonine* this his great Clemencie, whereby he so easily pardoned such  
 as had conspired against him, saying, That he provided evill for the safetrie of himself  
 and his children, to suffer conspirators to live: This was but a meanes to embolden  
 wicked people to enterprise conspiracies: and amongst others, the emperesse *Fausline*  
 his wife, found it evill and of bad consequence, that he punished not rigorously the  
 partakers of *Cassius*, whereupon he writ a very memorable letter to this effect. Very  
 religiously doest thou (ô *Fausline*, my deare cōpanion) to have care of the assurance  
 of us and our children: but whereas thou admonishest me to punish the complices  
 of *Avidius Cassius*, I doe advertise thee, that I had rather pardon them: for nothing  
 more recommendeth a Romane emperour amongst all nations, than Clemencie.  
 That was it which placed *Julius Caesar* in the number of the gods; which hath con-  
 secrated *Augustus*; which gave that most honourable title of *Pius*, that is, gentle  
 and godly, to thy father: Finally, *Cassius* himselfe had not beene slaine, if my advice  
 had

had bene demanded in the sleying of him. I pray thee therefore any doore compen-  
 sation be not afraid, but hold thy selfe assured under the protection of the gods, who  
 no doubt will guard us, because pietie and clemencie are so pleasant and agreeable  
 unto them.

For a resolution then, certaine it is, that nothing can so become, or is so worthy of  
 a prince to practise, as Clemencie, by pardoning such as offend him, and even them  
 which have committed some fault, that may be excused by some equitable reason,  
 and by mitigating the punishments of the law to such, as upon custome commit no  
 excess, and which otherwise are vertuous and valorous people, and their offence  
 not exceeding great and hainous: for if otherwise a prince use his Clemency, with-  
 out having these considerations before his eyes, his fact will rather hold of crueltie  
 and injustice, than of clemencie: but for a man to practise it with a counterpoise and  
 equall ballance of equitie, justice can be nothing interloosed, but rather shall bee re-  
 duced and applied to his true rule.

But assuredly, as a princes Clemencie bringeth to his subjects the fruit of a good  
 equitie, so doth it also acquire unto himselfe this inestimable good, to be beloved of  
 every one, as was *Marcus Antonine* the emperour. The like happened to *Vespasian* the  
 emperour, who was greatly beloved for his great Clemencie and gentlenesse: for  
 he was so gentle, kind, and clement, that he easily forgot offences committed against  
 him, yea, he would do good to his enemies: As when he married and endowed ve-  
 ry richly and honourably the daughter of *Vitellius*, his enemy, which warred upon  
 him: Moreover, he would never suffer, that any were punished, who did not well  
 deserve it. Likewise his sonne *Titus* was so good and clement, that he was never bla-  
 med for bearing evill will to any man, & often he had this word in his mouth: *That*  
*he had rather perish himselfe, than lose any:* He was of the people surnamed, *The delight*  
*of mankind*, for his kindnesse and Clemencie. In like sort *Traian*, *Adrian*, *Pius*, *Tacitus*,  
 and many other Romane emperours were so beloved and revered of their sub-  
 jects for their naturall humanitie and Clemencie, that they are placed after their  
 deathes in the roll of their gods.

Moreover, whensoever a prince shall bee soft and clement, there is no doubt but  
 his subjects will imitate him therein: for it is the peoples nature to conforme them-  
 selves unto their princes manners, as the proverbe saith:

*The example of the princes life in all things commonly  
 The subject seekes to imitate with all his possibilitie.*

But whensoever subjects doe imitate that most excellent vertue of Debonairetie  
 and Clemencie, certaine also it is, that the whole bodie of the commonwealth is  
 much better composed, more quiet, and better governed: For when men are given  
 to that vertue, they will withall addiect themselves to Justice, Temperance, Charitie,  
 Pietie, and all other vertues, which doe ordinarily accompanie Clemencie, from  
 whence cannot but arise the estate of a most perfect common-wealth. Therefore  
 we read, That in the time of the afore said emperour *Marcus Antonine*, the world  
 was commonly well reformed in good manners: for every man studied to imitate  
 him in his vertues, and especially in his moderation and gentlenesse: in so much, (such  
*Capitulus*) as he made many good men of such as were very bad before, and such  
 as were good, he made them better. This is also the cause why debonaire and good

*Suet. Vesp.  
 Vesp. cap. 14  
 et. 15. in Vita  
 cap. 1. et 2.*

Clemencie  
 cause of  
 goodworks

*Capit. in  
 Marcel.*

princes are alwaies so praised and esteemed, not onely by men of their time, but also by all Hystoriographers, & all posteritie, because they are ordinarily cause of many goods to all their subjects: as by contrarie, cruel princes are alwaies defamed during their lives, and after their deaths, because of great mischiefs, whereof they are cause, authors and executors. This is well painted out by *Homer*, when he saith:

*Ody. lib. 19.*

*A wicked man, full of fierce crueltie,  
Behind his backe of all accurst shall be;  
Both during life, and after death also,  
Defame on him in every place shall go:  
But contrarie, the good and sincere man  
Will grave in mind his praise all that he can.  
How all men in each place set forth his praise  
To borders even of nations strange alwaies.*

A princes  
Clemencie  
is not the  
cause of  
evill.

But I doe well know, that hereupon the Machiavelists will say and replie, That if a prince will be so facile, to pardon and to practise Clemencie, he will thereby incite men to take experience of that his vertue, and by consequent provoke them to commit evill and excessse, under the hope of impunitie: Hereunto I answer in a tripartite sort: First I say, That if a prince use Clemencie, without derogating from his justice (as above we have said he ought to do) there will follow no impunitie of a punishable crime; nor by consequent any provocation to commit any excessse punishable: for justice shall alwayes have her course, although by Clemencie it may be moderated. Secondly, suppose that the Clemencie of a prince might bee a meanes or occasion unto men, to take more license to do evill, yet could not this take place but in persons of evill nature: for men of good natures and disposition will rather be incited by a princes clemencie to be good like him, by following his vertues, than to be wicked and ungodly thereby: The prince also which shall bee endowed with Clemencie, will love and follow other vertues, & hate vices, and by consequent will honour and advance vertuous people, and hate and recoil from him such as are vicious: This will cause the wicked, which are enclined to vices, to guard themselves from committing punishable faults: for although they promise to themselves an easinesse, to entreat pardon for their faults by the princes Clemencie, yet can they not promise to themselves to be beloved and entertained of him, but rather evill liked & unadvanced. Thirdly, although Clemencie cannot but draw with it some iniquitie and injustice (as verily a prince cannot so evenly poise and weigh his affaires in the practise of Clemencie, but there will be alwayes found within them some injustice) yet that evill which followeth Clemencie, is not so great, that we ought therefore altogether to take away Clemencie from a prince, from whence proceeds infinit goods, profitable and commodious, as wel to the prince himselfe, and his estate, as to his subjects and the whole commonwealth as may easily bee collected out of that which hath beene already said, and shall be spoken hereafter.

*Titus Livius  
lib. 1. Dec. 4.*

The auntient Romanes doe confesse, that their facilitie to pardon, hath many times brought warres upon them, as also revoltments of their allies and confederats. But what then? Left they therefore alwayes to shew themselves prompt and voluntarie to use Clemencie towards such as offended them? may rather it was the vertue, whereof they made greatest estimation, and which they most practised, knowing well



well, that Clemencie was the true foundation of the greatnesse and estate of the commonwealth. And this is it which the embassadour of the Romanes spake in an assembly of the *Ætolians* (a people of Greece) which were solicited rather to alie themselves with king *Philip* of Macedonie against the Romanes, thani with them to renew their alliance. Our auncestors (saith he) have often experimented, and wee also have seene, that because ever we have beene easie to pardon, wee have occasioned many to experiment our Clemencie, yet were we never so discouraged, as we would not at all times use equalitie to such as have broken their faiths unto us, and such as holily observed them, as also reason wils, that such as are loyal and faithful be better beloved, favoured and respected than others: Have we not warred upon the *Sannites* by the space of seventie yeres? and during this time, how many times have they broken their Faiths? how many times have they risen up against us? yet have we alwayes received them for our allies, after, by marriages have wee come to an affinity with them, and finally, we have received them for concitizens into the towne of Rome. The *Capuans* revolted from us, to alie themselves with *Anniball*; but after we had besieged them, there were more in the towne which slew themselves, pressed with an evil conscience, than we caused to die, after we had taken the towne by force, and left them their towne whole and their goods. Having also vanquished *Anniball*, and the *Carthaginians*, which had done us so many mischiefs, and so often broken their faiths, yet left we them in peace and libertie. Briefly O *Ætolians* (saith he) you should know and beleeve, that the *Romane* people will alwaies have Clemencie, in most singular recommendation, and you shall doe farre more for your selves, to replant your selves into our amitie and alliance, unlesse you love better to perish with *Philip*, than to vanquish and prosper with the Romanes. Vnto this remonstrance of the *Romane* embassadors, the *Ætolian* States would deliver no answer, but amongst themselves resolved secretly, neither to bee on the one side, nor the other, and that at the end of the war, they would joine themselves to the strongest, which in the end was their bane; yet found they refuge in the *Romanes* Clemencie: And verily Clemencie is such a vertue, as a prince may never dispoile himselfe of, although sometime it seeme he get harme thereby: For Clemencie is not cause of any evill, but onely the malice of men doth abuse it; yet it doeth not therefore follow, that it is to be rejected, because a man may abuse it, no more than to cast away all wine, as a pernicious thing, because therewith many are drunke: But let us now come to the other effects of Clemencie.

Besides the effects whereof we have above discoursed, which are to temper the rigor of justice, to make the prince beloved, revered, and praised of all the world, and to fill his subjects with good manners, there are yet three other effects worthie of note in a princes Clemencie, that thereby hee may bee better obeyed, more assured in his estate, and may augment his domination: And to touch those three points in order one after another, I will presuppose for the first point, That a prince makes himself easily & well obeyed, when the wils of his subjects are of themselves well disposed to yeeld obedience: But it is certaine, when a prince is debonaire and clement, that his subjects will be alwaies wel disposed to obey him, for two reasons: The one because he shalbe beloved, & the amity which his subjects beare him, shall incite and stirre them more willingly to obey him; The other reason, because being soft and gentle, his commands also are sweet and gracious, founded upon reason and equitie, and this will cause them easily to yeeld obedience, because there is nothing

that more enduceth a subject to render his prince obedience, and to obey his command, than when themselves do see & judge, that the commandment is both reasonable and equal, for equitie is the sinew of the commandment and of the law, which makes it forcible and brings it into action, and without this equitie, the law cannot endure, nor long be observed.

*Titus Livius*  
*lib. 5. Dec. 5*

How to  
make good  
lawes.

Therefore the lawes and ordinances which the Romanes gave to the Macedonians, after they had brought Macedonie under their obedience, endured very long before they were in any thing changed or corrected: For they were so upright and convenient for that nation, as the usage it selfe (saith *Titus Livius*, which is the true corrector of laws) found nothing to reprehend or correct, by the experience of many yeares. Verie memorable also is the manner of the Romanes use to make lawes, and especially those which they gave to the Macedonians: For they were not contented to handle and deale with them in their Senate, to cut and stretch them after their fancies (as some doe at this day, which make lawes in their chambers with such as themselves) but elected ten delegates or deputies, wise and honorable men, which went all over Macedonie, to inquire and bee informed of the manners and conditions of the countrey people, and of their antient customes and liberties, and to have their peoples advice of such lawes as were fittest for them: By this meanes they made very covenable lawes for the nation of the Macedonians, which they found good, holy and equall, and they willingly obeyed and observed them, with good harts, without any constraint. And assuredly this is the best meane when men make new lawes and ordinances, that is to have the advice of such as are to have & obey them, to know of them the discommodities that by them may fall out, which they must needs know better than any other: And for this reason the antient kings of France, made their lawes and ordinances, by the advice of the States generall, or at the least by the assembly of a great number of barons, prelates, and wise people of each great towne, of the kingdom, which assembly they called the kings great Counsell: And the Romane emperours, made their lawes by their Senates advice, as we have in another place said. And indeed it is a rash presumption of one man alone, or a few men, to think they can make lawes of themselves and covenable ordinances, for a people and a nation, without having the advice of them of that nation, yea of many & of divers countries: The antient Romans were of a better judgement, than such presumptuous persons, and they never received law, till it was well tossed and handled, and till everie one were heard speak, that would either perswade or dissuade the law, which was to be enacted: Therefore (saith *Titus Livius*) it came often to passe, that the Tribunes (whose office it was to cause the law to be received or rejected by the people) desisted from the receipt of a law, beeing moved so to doe by the reasons and remonstrations of such as dissuaded it: and oftentimes also opposing themselves against the reception of a law, they departed from their opposition, being moved therunto by the reasons of such as perswaded. And truly if the laws and ordinances, which are made for the government of a kingdom or other principallitie, were so well examined before they were concluded, and that every man were heard, in a generall assembly of States, to perswade or dissuade them, so many absurd, and weake lawes, would not be made as are, neither by consequent would they be so evill observed as they are: For they should be made equall & commodious for such as should obey them, and so would each man obey them with good will, because as is said, Equitie is that which holdeth law in action and observation.

Moreo-

Moreover none need to doubt, but when he that hath authoritie to commaund, is beloved, that by that meanes he shall not bee better obeyed. *Lucullus* was a valiant and wise captaine, who executed great matters against *Ambrius* & *Tigranes*, two of the greatest kings of Levant, and of all Asia, but in the end not being able to obtaine the love of his souldiers, hee was in hazard by their disobedience to have overthrowne all the glorie and honour, which he had acquired: This disobedience of his armie, was the cause that the Romanes called him from Levant, before hee had altogether ended the subjugating of those two kings, and sent in his place *Pompeius*, who did nothing els but (as I may say) gathered the fruit that *Lucullus* had sowne, & carried away the honour and triumph of his paines and travels: For the necessitie was such, that *Pompeius* must necessarily be sent in *Lucullus* his place, for that *Lucullus* was nothing obeyed of his people of warre, because they loved him not, hee was so sterne and uncourteous: and as soone as they had obtained *Pompeius* for their captaine general, they greatly obeyed him, because he was unto them gentle, clement, and affable, inso much as he did with them, what he would, and by their forces and valours, hee brought all the East under the Romanes obedience: This then was a great evill hap for *Lucullus* (who otherwise was endowed with excellent vertues, that he could not use softnesse, clemencie, and kindnesse towards his souldiers, and have gotten love, & to have contained them in his obedience, but so to lose the fruit of his travels and victories, not wholly finishing that whercof he had taken charge.

But yet greater evill lucke happened unto *Appius Claudius*, who was so exceeding rigorous and imperious, that he caused his souldiers, rather to hate than love him: He being Consull and captaine generall of the Roman army, against the Volscques, practised in the campe towards the souldiers, the same rigour and severitie, which he did against the common people at Rome, and cared not to bee beloved, but onely sought to make himselfe to be feared: This was the cause that his people of warre would not obey him, but as constrained, they executed their charge cowardly and negligently: When he comanded to march quickly and swiftly, his souldiers would goe slowly and softly; when hee came towards them to command them any thing, they would not vouchsafe to regard him, but fixed their eyes on the ground, and as he passed by, cursed him: He once went about to assemble them all in one place, to have perswaded them to have performed their duties in a battaile, but in place being assembled, they scattered themselves hither and thither: When he saw this manifest disobedience, in lieu to correct his rigour (which was cause thereof) hee augmented and redoubled it, by causing them to be whipped with rods, & by putting to death the captaines, which dispersed themselves, when they should have ioyned together, and at last he fell to decime and to tythe all the rest of his armie by lot, putting to death one of each ten through his armie: Yet for all this hee did nothing of account or to his honour: Returning after to Rome, he was accused of the Tribunes of his great severitie and inclemencie, and by not getting the love of his souldiers, he effected nothing but his dishonor and shame: But fearing to bee condemned, he procured his owne death in his house: and this evill hap accompanied with great opprobrie & ignominie, had not happened unto him, if he had ben of a gentle and good nature, to have obtained love.

The Bountie, Clemencie, and Gentlenesse of a prince, manifest themselves by many meanes towards his subjects, as by good tractations and comforts, farre from oppres-

*Dionis  
Pompeio,  
Plutarch, in  
Lucul.*

*Titus Livius  
lib. 2. Dec. 1.*



De Comines  
lib. 1. cap.  
109. 110.

Comines.

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A clement  
prince assur-  
ed in his  
State.

oppression, by maintaining their liberties and franchises, by making edicts & equall ordinances, and in observing, and causing good justice to be observed: But the pleasantest meane which most contenteth the subjects, is, when the prince doeth them this honour, to communicate himselfe to them, deales in publick affairs with them, and demands their advises, aids, and meanes: for subjects seeing themselves on the one side so much honoured of their prince, as to bee called into the participation of his counsell, and seeing and understanding on the other side the urgencie of the publicke affaires, and just reasons wherefore the prince demaundeth such a thing or such a thing, it is certain, that they will obey much more voluntarily, than when they know nothing of his affaires, and when they know not wherefore, nor wherein, mony should be employed that is demanded. This was seene and practised at the beginning in a parliament held at Tours of the generall States during the raigne of king Charles the eight, Anno 1483. as M. Philip de Comines witnesseth: for the poore people of Fraunce were before vexed and eaten up by the space of 20. yeres and more with great tallages and imposts, and great civile warres, which never comes without a great ruine: yet notwithstanding, seeing themselves so much honoured by their prince, as by him to be convocated together with the States to understand publick affaires, and therein to give their aid and advice, not onely the States accorded to their king, the impost which he demanded, but also humbly besought his maiestie, that it would please him to assemble them againe within two yeres after, and that if his said Maiestie had not money ynough to dispatch his affaires, they would at his pleasure furnish him: and that if he had any warre, or that any would offend him, they would employ their persons and goods for his service, and never would deny him any thing whereof he had need. Behold then how this soft and sweet manner of a princes actions, to conferre of his affaires with his subiects, makes him so obeyed, as by this meanes hee may sooner obtaine a great thing, than by rigour a small thing. And to this purpose he asks certaine questions with a good grace: Might it not bee accounted a farre more just thing, both before God and the world, by such force as this, to levie money, than upon a disordinate will? For a prince cannot otherwise levie it but by tyrannie: would priviledges, to take it at their pleasure, bee alledged against so good subiects, which so liberally give that which is demanded? was such an assembly daungerous and treasonable? according as some men of base condition and baser vertue say, alledging that to congregate the States, is, to diminish the kings authoritie, and to commit treason: but rather those commit treason towards God, the king, & the commonweale, which hold estates and offices, which they never merited: neither serve they to any other thing, but to whisper and rattle in princes eares, things of small account: and they feare nothing more than great assemblies, that so they may not appeare and be knowne as they are. These words of Comines are very notable to be applied to our time.

Let us now come to the other effect of the Clemencie of a prince, which concerneth the assurance of his estate. Hereupon I thinke every man wil confesse unto me, that there is nothing that better assureth a prince in his estate, than when hee hath no enemies: But a debonaire and gentle prince shal never lightly procure enemies but rather daily friends: because that vertue of Clemencie is of it selfe so amiable and attractive, that they are alwayes loved, which are endowed therewith: And if sometimes enemies arise against a good and gentle prince (as the envie and desire to have and to make themselves greater, causeth ambitious and covetous men some-  
times

times to enterprife upon such clement princes) yet very hardly shall such enemies shake their estates, or prevaile against them, and especially if that prince with his Clemencie, have about him a good Counsell: For his vertue will procure him many friends of his neighbours, and make his subjects voluntarie and obeisant; inso-much, as it shall be verie easie for him to resist the enterprises of such as wil invade & set upon him. Wee read, that the emperour *Alexander Severus* was verie modest, soft, clement, and affable towards all his subjects, wherewith *Mamma* his mother was not content: So that one day she said unto him, that he had made his authority not regarded, but contemptible by his Clemencie: Yea, but (answered he) I have made my estate so much the longer and more assured: And in truth he had in likelihood lived longer time: but she so ruled him, that he got the evill wil of his subjects, and so did his sonne by the extreame avarice and arrogancie that was in her, which caused the death of them both. The same notable speech of *Alexander* is attributed to *Theopompus* king of Sparta, who knowing, that the puissance of a king is good & excellent, when kings use it well: but because there were farre more kings which abuse their powers, than that use them wel, he provided for himselfe & his successors certaine Censors and correctors, to reprehend them of their faults, which were called *Ephori*: Certaine then said unto *Theopompus*, that by this establishment of *Ephori*, he had lessened and enfeeblished his power: Nay then (said he) I have fortified it, & made it perdurable, meaning to say (as true it is) that there is nothing which better fortifieth, nor which makes more firme and stable a princes estate, than when he governes himselfe with such a sweet moderation, that even he submits himselfe to the observation of lawes and censures. The emperour *Severus* otherwife endowed with many great vertues, had not this good, to be debonaire and clement, but rather was rigorous and cruell: yet he knew well, and himselfe confessed, that Clemencie is a vertue most worthy of a prince, and hee much desired to bee so esteemed, although his actions were contrarie. I know well, that here the Machiavelists may reply upon me, that he faigned and only made a shew, to esteeme of Clemencie, upon a certain kind of playing the Fox, and dissimulation, which *Machiavel* holdeth to bee convenient for a prince: Hereunto I make a double answer: And first I say, suppose in this place *Severus* meant to play the Fox, yet when he so much praiseth Clemencie, and so faine would seeme clement, he thereby seems to approve that vertue, as both lowable and good. Secondly I say, that it is credible, that *Severus*, although hee was exceeding sanguinarie and cruell during his raigne, yet in the end he found, that it had been better for him, if he had beene *Clement*: for with his owne eyes he saw *Plautianus* his greatest and especiallest friend, and *Basianus* his eldest son (whom with himselfe he associated in the empire) both of them (though not together) conspire to sleigh him; inso-much, as he durst not punish them, because they had learned of him to be sanguinarie and cruell: and at the end of his dayes, the last words hee spake, were, That he left the empire firme and assured to his *Antonines* (meaning *Basianus* and *Geta*, which he named *Antonines*, that they might be beloved) provided, that they proved good princes: but if they were wicked & cruel, then he left them weak and evill assured: And indeed these last words were as a prophecie to his children: For *Basianus* his eldest son (who succeeded him in the empire) was as cruel as hee, and begun to exercise his crueltye, in slaying with his owne hand *Geta* his brother and after continued it upon his friends and other notable people a great number, which he brought to their deaths: and therefore was not his foot long in the empire

*Lampria  
Alex. Sever.*

*Plutarch in  
Apo.*

*Sparto & Di-  
on in Corol.*

pire, but (according as his father prophesied of his death) hee was soone despoyled thereof, and of his life withall : for he was slaine by *Marrinus* his lieutenant, and lived but nine and twentie yeares, whereof he reigned sixe. The emperor *Domitian* also was a verie cruel prince, yet he greatly praised Clemencie in a prince, and ordinarily, when he reasoned upon any affaire in the Senat, he often enterlaced amongst his speeches some commendations of his owne Clemencie, although he was most cruell and wicked. And breefely, we may say and conclude, that this vertue of Clemencie is so excellent and lowable of it selfe, that even the wicked, which reject it, are notwithstanding constrained to have it in estimation, and to confesse it is a vertue worthie of a prince.

*Dion. Halic.  
lib. 7.*

From the beginning that Rome was reduced into the forme of a commonweale and delivered from the tyranny of the *Tarquines*, the people were sent to the warre without wages, & whilest they were at the warre for the commonweal, the interests and usuries which they ought to the rich (for alwayes the poore are debtors to the rich) left not to encrease and multiplie; insomuch, as when the souldiers returned from the war (some being maimed and wounded) in stead to have rest in their houses, they had the usurers on their backs, which demanded the usuries run on, during the time of the warre : Hereupon arose there in the towne a great sedition, for the poore amongst the people could not suffer this rude handling, that they thus should be tormented with seifures and pawning of their goods, & with imprisonments of their persons, for the interests growing during the warre, and being in the commonwealths service. This cause finally comming in deliberation in the Senate house, *Valerius Publicola* (who was one of them which helped away the tyrant from Rome) spake thus : This the usurers rigorous dealing, is but a new tyrannie : and it is but a small thing for us to have expelled from Rome the tyrannie of the *Tarquins*, if now we will establish another : & that it was too unreasonable, that souldiers should pay interests running on, whilest they served the commonwealth, since also they served without wages. Therefore he exhorted the Senate to releev the people of those interests for their content, and that afterward they might with so much the better will serve the commonweale at a need : For els (saith he) certaine it is, if there be a continuance of this rigorous dealing, it will bring the people into a great disobedience, & a sedition into the commonwealth, the estate wherof by this means may be shrewdly shaken and hazarded : But if the people be kindly and graciously used in acquitting them of the said interests, by this meanes you shall make most assured the estate of the citie. The Senate followed this advice of *Publicola*, knowing well, that the firmitie and assurednesse of the publicke State is founded upon Clemencie and Gentlenesse.

*Titus Livius  
lib. 2. Dec. 3*

*Annibal* making warre in Italie, meaning to go to Capua, commanded one of the prisoners hee held, to guide him to a place called Casin, which was in the way to Capua : This prisoner supposing *Annibal* had bidden him guide him to Casilin (and that because *Annibal* spoke not well the Latine language) hee conducted his armie on that side to Casilin, farre from the way to Capua : *Annibal* perceiving he was evill guided, caused to whip and hang the prisoner which had done this, before he would heare any excuse. This rigorous execution and other cruelties that he used, never caused such as were allied with the Romans to breake from them, although on every side they saw themselves in great peril, because (saith *Titus Livius*) they knew that they were commanded by a just and a moderate government, and by



by good people that hated crueltie, therefore refused they not to obey (which is the true bond of Faith) the best, most prudent and humane.

*Antiochus* king of Syria, and a great dominator in Levant, having enterprised a warre against the Romanes, they sent against him *Lucius Scipio*, for captaine generall of their armie, although otherwise he was no great warriour: But the cause why the Romanes delivered so great and honourable a charge unto him, was, because the great *Scipio* the Affrican his brother, had declared, that if *Lucius* his brother were chosen generall captaine to goe against *Antiochus*, he should bee there as his lieutenant: As then they both were in Greece with the Romane armie, making war upon that king, it so happened, that the onely sonne of *Scipio* the Affrican was taken prisoner by *Antiochus* souldiers: *Antiochus* having this young lord in his hands entertained and used him very honourably, knowing that that great *Scipio* was of such Clemencie, that he would never forget, that the pleasure and that the amitie of so great a personage might stand him in good stead in some great necessities, as losse of a battaile, or of a captivitie, or such like. Not long after *Scipio* fell sicke, whereof *Antiochus* hearing, he sent him his sonne without ransome, fearing *Scipio* would die with grief and melancholie, by whose death he doubted to leese a good refuge: For that king (saith *Titus Livius*) trusted more in the Clemencie and authoritie of *Scipio* alone, for the uncertaine and doubtfull haps of warre, than in his armie of 60000. footmen, and 12000. horsemen. Is not here, thinke you, an admirable effect of Clemencie, that an enemy doth better assure his estate upon his enemies Clemencie than upon his owne forces?

But what need we any more to amplifie by examples or authorities this poynt? doth not ordinarie experience shew, and ever hath done, that all good and clement princes have alwayes bene verie assured in their estates: as *Augustus*, *Vespasian*, *Traian*, *Adrian*, the *Antonines*, and many other Romane emperours, and the most part of our kings of Fraunce, which were clement and debonaire, do fully proove this which I say: for they raigned very peaceably; died of natural deaths; and after their deaths, were greatly lamented of the people. Here I may not forget a notable sentence of the emperour *Antonius Pius*, which hee received from *Scipio* the Affrican, which was this, That hee loved better to preserve one of his subjects, than to sleie a thousand of his enemies. Assuredly, a sentence of a good and clement prince, who delighted not in shedding of blood, as our Machiavelists doe at this day, which are so covetous of such blood, as they account their enemies, that whensoever any of mark falls into their hands, they wil not give him for an hundred pounds: They may wel say contrarie to *Scipio* and the emperor *Pius*, that they had rather sleie an enemy than save an hundred friends. Are not these people worthy to command? Neither make they any account more of their princes subjects, than of slaves, which men may beat, scourge, or sleie at their pleasure, as beasts: as indeed there hath been lately a burne-paper fellow, a writer for wages, one of these Machiavelists, who durst publish by writing, that the authoritie of a prince over his subjects, is like that which a lord hath over his villaine and slave, having power over death and life, to sleie and massacre them at their pleasure without forme of justice, and so to despoile them of their goods. And how comes this? Thinke this sot, that the office of a king is like to the office of a gally captaine, to hold his subjects in chaines, and everie day to whip them with scourges? Surely, they which hold that opinion, do merit to be so handled, yea, that some good gally captaine would twice or thrice a day practise that goodly

*Titus Livius*  
lib. 7. Dec. 3.

*Capit. in Pio.*  
*Suet. in August.* cap. 35.

goodly doctrine upon their shoulders: but how much more notable and humane, is the doctrine we learne of the life of *Augustus Caesar*? who so much feared, that men had such an opinion of him, that he would not take away, but onely diminish the libertie of the people, that he could never abide and suffer to be called *Dominus*, that is to say, Lord, but abhorred it as an injurious name, & full of opprobry, because it hath some relation to *Servus*, which is to say, servant, or slave: hee being farre from the affectation of such great and magnificall names, as many great men have since well liked of, without shewing the effect of them.

A prince by  
Clemencie  
encreaseth  
his domi-  
nation.  
*Dion. Halic.*  
*lib. 2.*  
*Plutarch. in*  
*Caesar. &*  
*Alexand.*

The third point now remaineth, which is to shew, That the Clemencie of a prince is cause of the encrease of his domination. Hereupon wee reade a memorable hystorie of *Romulus*, who was so clement, soft, and gentle towards his people, which he vanquished and subjugated, that not onely many particulars, but the whole multitude of people submitted themselves voluntarily and unconstrainedly under his obedience. The same vertue was also cause, that *Julius Caesar* vanquished the Gaulois: for he was so soft and gracious unto them, & so easie to pardon, and used them every way so well, far from all oppression, that many of that nation voluntarily joynd themselves unto him, and by them he vanquished the others. When *Alexander* the Great made great conquests in Asia, most commonly the citizens of all great cities met him, to present unto him the keyes of the towne: for hee dealt with them in such Clemencie and kindnesse, without in any thing altering their estates, that they liked better to be his, than their owne.

*Titus Livius*  
*lib. 3. Dec. 3.*

*Anniball* having taken the towne of Saguntum in Spaine, was so feared and redoubted, that the most part of Spaine submitted themselves under his obedience, and abandoned the Roman societie, because they had not aided Saguntum against *Annibal*: The Romanes (to repaire their fault whereat they tooke much gteefe) sent great forces into Spaine under the conduction of *Publius Scipio*, father of the African, and of *Cneius* his uncle: *Annibal* to containe in obedience the Spaniards, tooke in hostage their children, their brethren, or parents of all the nobilitie of the countrey, and the notablest citizens of the good townes, and set them under guard at Saguntum, under the charge of some smal number of souldiers. God would, that those hostages should find meanes to escape from their prison, yet it was their haps to fall into the hands of the *Scipioes*. The *Scipioes* having possession of them, in place to revenge themselves upon them (as they feared) for the fault they & their parents had made by their revoltment from the Romanes, they welcomed & dealt with them very graciously, and sent them all to their parents and houses. This Clemencie and kindnesse of the *Scipioes* was cause, that soone after all Spaine forfook the obedience of *Anniball* and the Carthaginians, and fell under the government of the Romanes, which they would never have done, if these hostages had beene dealt with after the counsels and precepts of *Machiavel*.

*Titus Livius*  
*lib. 3. Dec. 3.*

Yet the example of Clemencie in *Scipio* the Affrican, is more notable than this of his father and uncle. After the deaths of his said father and uncle, this young lord full of al generositie and hardinesse, came to besiege new Carthage in Spain (which the Carthaginians of Affricke had founded there) and did so much, as hee got it by assault: Besides, the great riches which he found within the towne, he found there also within that towne a good number of Spanish hostages, which the Carthaginians held there for the better assurance of other townes of Spaine, which they had regained upon the Romanes after the death & overthrow of the *Scipioes* and their host.

*Scipio*

*Scipio* as soone as the towne was taken, caused all the hostages to be brought before him, and wished them to take good courage, and that they should feare nothing, for they were falne into the power of the Romane people, which loved better to bind men unto them by good deeds than by feare, and to joyne all strange nations unto them, rather by a societie, than by a sad servitude. After hee had thus encouraged them, hee dispatched messengers through all Sapine, to the end every man might come thither to seeke his hostages, and in the meane while gave expresse charge to *Flaminius* his treasurer to handle them well and honourably: Amongst other hostages, there was a young ladie of a great house, which was brought to *Scipio*, which was of so great beautie, that as she passed by, she drew each mans regard upon her: This ladie was fianced unto one *Allucius*, prince of the Cekiberians. *Scipio* taking knowledge of her parents, and to whom she was fianced: also that *Allucius* extreamly loved her, he sent for them al: Her parents came with a great quantitie of gold and silver for her ranfome: *Allucius* came also: They all beeing present before *Scipio*, hee said to that young prince *Allucius*: My deare friend, understanding, that ardently you love this yong ladie (as her beautie well meriteth it) I thought it good to keepe her for you, as I would my affianced should be kept for me, if the affaires of the commonweale permitted me to thinke upon the action of legitimate love: in favor then of your affections, I have preserved your loves inviolated: in recompence whereof I only desire & pray you, that from henceforth you will be friends unto the Roman people: and if you will credit me as a good man, that is desirous to follow the traces of my father & uncle, which you knew: Know you, that in our town there be many like to us, and that there is no people in the world, which you ought lesset to desire for enemies, nor more for a friend. After *Scipio* had thus graciously entertained this young prince, he was so filled with shame and joy, that presently he prayed the gods that they would acquite to *Scipio*, that great benefit, for hee could never doe it. The said ladies parents stepped forward, & presented unto him a great quantitie of gold and silver for their daughters ransom, which although *Scipio* refused, yet they pressed it so sore upon him, that he accorded to take it, and bad them lay it before him; which they doing, *Scipio* called *Allucius*, & said unto him: Good friend, besides the dowrie which your father in law wil giue you my desire is, that you wil take this silver at my hands, as an encrease of her dowrie. *Allucius* very joyfull of so great a benefit, thanking him greatly, returned with his lover in great contentment unto his countrey: where as soone as he came, he sowed the fame of those things through all Spaine, saying, That there was come into that countrey a young lord, like the gods, which vanquisheth all men, by armes, by clemencie, and magnificence: Within a smal time after he came to the service of *Scipio* with 2400 horse. Not long after came also to *Scipio* the parents of the other hostages which he had taken in new Carthage, all which he yeilded unto them, conditionally to be the Romans friends. Hee gave also to a great lord called *Mandonius*, his wife, who was sister of another great lord, named *Indibilis*, which were exceeding joyous thereof, and promised *Scipio* all fidelitie: Amongst those prifoners also, there was found a young prince, called *Masiva* the nephew of *Masiniissa* king of Numidia, which he sent to his uncle, after he had honourably apparelled, mounted and accompanied him. This was the cause that *Masiniissa* stucke so firmly to the Romane partie, wherein he constantly persevered all his life, and greatly aided *Scipio*, to the overthrow of the Carthaginians: And as for the Spaniards (whose hostages *Scipio* had sent home without ranfome) they per-



formed many great favours to him in all his Spanish wars : Briefely , this great Clemencie, kindnesse, and gentlenesse of *Scipio*, were the cause that all his high & mighty enterprises were ever facile & easie unto him: But herein appeared in him a double Clemencie, namely, that the two lords above-named, *Mandonius* and *Indibilis* revolted, and so caused al their countrey to revolt also, upon a false fame that run of *Scipioes* death : But after finding the report false, they resolved yet once againe to proove his Clemencie as an assured refuge, and so went & fell on their knees before him desiring pardon, & confessing their faults. *Scipio* after he had rebuked them, said unto them in this sort: My friends, by your merits you shal die, but you shall live by the benefit of the Romane people : And although the custome be, to take all armes from rebels, yet I will not take them from you, but if you fall any more into such a fault, I shall have reason with armes to take armes from armed people, but not from disarmed: Therefore seeing you have many times experimented the Romans Clemencie, take heed also you prove not their vengeance and wrath. By this example then of *Scipio* it appeares, that a prince ought alwaies to be enclined to Clemencie, wherby he may obtain friends, augment his dominations, shun Gods indignation, the envie of men, and to do to another that which he would should be done to himselfe. This is it which *Romulus* said to the Antenates and Cæninians, which he had vanquished & subjugated: Although (said he) you have merited to suffer al extreame things, for that you rather loved warre against us, than our amitie: yet many reasons moove us to use our victorie moderately, in respect of the indignation of the gods, unto whom pride is odious, the feare of the envie & evil wil of men, and because we beleewe, that Mercie and Clemencie is a great reliefe and remedie for the miseries and calamities of mortal men, which we would gladly entreat of others, in our own distresses and calamities: We therefore pardon you this fault, and leave you in the same enjoiance of your goods, as you were before.

Dion. Halk.  
lib. 2.

Titus Livius  
lib. 2. Dec. 2.

The Romane Senat had alwayes Clemencie in great recommendation, yea, even towards them which had often rebelled. The Ligurians (which now we call Genevois) rose up against the Romanes many times insomuch, as they sent against them *Marcus Popilius*, Consull, with a puissant armie. *Popilius* having subjugated and vanquished them, hee tooke their armes from them, dismantelled and destroyed their townes, and sould the goods and persons of such as were taken in warre. The Senate thought this very hard, to sell so many men, which implored the Romanes mercie, and tooke it to be an evill example, to cause their enemies from thence forward in desperat sort to have recourse to armes, as an extreame necessitie, rather than to their Clemencie: So it was ordained, that they should be redeemed which were sould, and their goods also that could bee recovered; that the Ligurians should also have their armes: and withall, *Popilius* was countermanded to returne, and give over the government to another of Liguria.

Titus Livius  
lib. 5. Dec. 1.

*Camillus*, general captaine of the Romane armie, besieged the towne of Falisques, the Romanes enimies: The schoolemaster of Falisques enterprised a great wickednesse and villanie: for making a countenance to lead (for sport & pastime) the youth of the towne, which were committed unto him to be instructed, he straight brought all that youth to *Camillus* his camp, hoping he would give him some good recompence, speaking in this manner: Lord *Camillus*, I yeeld into your hands the town of Falisques, for I here bring you their deare & louing children, which to recover, they will easily yeeld themselves to you. To whom *Camillus* answered: Wicked wretch, thou

thou addrestest not thy selfe to thy like : We have by compacts no societie with the Falisques, but by nature we have : we are not ignorant of the right of warre and of peace, which we wil couragiously observe : we make not war upon yong children : for even when we take townes, we pardon them, so doe we also to them which bear armes against us : Thou wouldest vanquish the Falisques by deceit and villanie, but I wil vanquish them by vertue & armes, as I overcame the Veians. After this, *Camillus* commaunded to bind the schoolemasters hands behind him, and to give all the schollers rodde in their hands, which whipped him naked into the towne. As thus in this sort the children brought their master to the towne, all the people ran to see the spectacle, which so changed their courages, before full of wroth & hatred against the Romanes, that straight they sent delegates to *Camillus*, to desire peace, admiring the Roman clemencie and justice. *Camillus* knowing, that he alone could not enterprise to conclude a peace, sent the said delegates towards the Senate of Rome, wher arriving, they made this speech to the Senat: Having (my masters) been vanquished by an agreeable victory both to gods and men, we yeeld our selves to you knowing, that our estate shal be better under your domination, than in our owne liberties and customes : The issue of this warre will serve hereafter for a double example to all mankind : for it seemes you doe better love loyaltie in warre than present victorie : And we beeing provoked by your kindnesse and loyaltie, do gladly and willingly yeeld you the victorie : We offer our selves your subjects, and we shall never repent our selves of your domination, nor you of your loyaltie. The peace and alliance accorded to the Falisques, *Camillus* entred Rome in triumph, and was more esteemed to bee a victor by Clemencie, than if it had been by Armes.

He that would here collect so many examples as histories doe furnish us concerning this matter, should never have done, but I satisfie my selfe with the most memorable amongst them : for in a notorious and evident thing, there is no need to insist more amply.



## 23. Maxime.

*A Prince ought to have a turning and winding wis, with art and practise made fit, to bee cruell and unfaishfull, that hee may shew himselfe such an one when there is need.*

**I**T is good (saith our Florentine) that a prince should appear to be loyall, piteous, liberall, yea, and effectually to bee so; whensoever hee seeth it is profitable unto him : But yet a princes spirits must be so flexible, so ductible and easie to bee led, so handsomely and naturally fitted, and with custome used, as hee can do

C c ij

Cap. 18. Of  
a Prince.

the

the contrarie at all times at a need : For most commonly necessitie requires, that a prince should shew himselfe disloyall , cruell, fierce, and niggardly.



He Philosophers call habitude that promptnesse & aptnesse which men acquire by frequent exercise of the actions of every art . As a Taylor by customeable exercise of cutting and shaping, obtaines an habit and dexteritie, to know well how to make garments. An Archer in a crosbow or gunne, by the often exercise of shooting, obtaineth that habitude, to draw well, and to shoot nigh the white: and so it is in all other actions and sciences, every man may get an habitude by frequent exercise. *Machiavels* mind then is , That it is not sufficient for a prince sometimes to be cruel, perfidious, fierce, covetous, and illiberall, but by frequent exercise of crueltie, perfidie, and covetousnesse, he must obtaine an habitude, promptly, dexteriously, and handsomely at his pleasure to practise these goodly vertues at a need. For if by frequent exercise hee could not obtaine this habit, it might so fall out, that in his necessity he should be found to seek in the practise of them in that sort which should be requisite and necessarie: even as an Archer or Gunner cannot know how handsomely to handle his Bow and Gunne to come nigh the marke, who not past once or twice before hath handled them : Because (as *Aristotle* saith) one sole action makes not an habitude, no more than one alone Swallow brings a certaine assurance of the Springs coming : But I pray you, is not this a triumphant doctrine for a prince to be taught? nay, rather to teach some devill of hell: for since the nature of divels cannot tend but to evil, a man may say, that it should be very covenable that they had (as I beleve they have) *Machiavell*, to teach them the precepts of the art of wickenesse: As this Maxime must needs be one of them, whereby hee wills, that these vicious qualities of crueltie, perfidie and niggardlinesse should be in a prince, as in an habit and perfection : But I will not stand to confute here this Maxime: for before, we have sufficiently spoken of crueltie and perfidie, and at large demonstrated, how unworthy they are for a prince: And as for Covetousnesse, we shal have occasion to speak of it in another Maxime: yet I would desire al persons which have in them any pietie and love of vertue, to learne to detest so abominable a doctrine, as this which *Machiavell* here teacheth : for there was never Arabian, Scythian, or Turke, which ever taught a more strange & barbarous doctrine, as to persuade men to make habitudes of vices? Let us also learne to discern spirits before we beleve them . If *Machiavell* had been knowne to be such a man as I hope he shall bee deciphered by this discourse, it is likely hee should not have done so much harme as hee hath done. And finally, let us thanke our good God, which hath not permitted, that our spirits should be infected with such a corruption, as to approve or follow such abhorrent doctrine from pietie and reason, and such monstrous & savage opinions: For as *Thucydides* calleth them, servants and slaves of absurd opinions, such as follow euill counsell sooner than good, as the Athenians often did: So do I beleve them to be double, yea, centuple slaves and miserable, which suffer their spirits to be persuaded and deluded with the doctrine and impietie of *Machiavell*.





## 24. Maxime.

*A Prince desirous to breake a peace, promised and sworne with his neighbour, ought to mooue warre against his friend.*



He prince (saith *Machiavell*) having made certaine capitulations with his neighbour, which long time have beene established and well observed, so that hee feareth directly to breake them, lest hee fall to open warre with his said neighbour, hee must stirre him by taking armes against his friend, knowing that the other will feele himselfe touched, when the assault is delivered to his friend and confederate, and wil sustaine and revenge him, and so shall it seeme that hee himselfe, is the first provoker of warre and breaker of peace.

*Discourse,  
lib. 2, cap. 9.*



*Achiavell*, because hee hath aboue taught, that a prince may alwaies finde colours ynough to palliate and cover the infraction of faith, now hee gives a rule, saying; That to palliate a rupture of peace or confederation, with a prince his neighbour, hee must assaile his confederates friend: Wee have before amply dispute against these subtile palliations, and have shewed by many examples, that the issue hath alwaies proved evill to them that use them: And surely such cautells and subtilties, are not onely most unworthie of a generous prince, but also of all other men, and by lawes hee is no lesse punishable, that hath done wrong to a man, by cautell and subtiltie, than if he had done it by force.

The ancient Romanes, by the forme and course they had to make confederations and peace with the people their neighbors, shewed wel how far they were from this doctrine of *Machiavell*: For the *Pater Patrius* (who was the stipulator or master of the ceremonies or arbitrer of peace) after all articles accorded, of the one part, and of the other, and oathes taken, pronounced a great height these words; The first of the two people which breaketh the peace, bee it by deliberate counsell, or by subtile deceit, graunt ô *Jupiter*, that the same day, hee may bee bruised and beaten, as now with this flint stone, I bruise this pig: and therewithall after this speech, hee with a stone beates downe a porke pig. Briefely they no lesse detested the rupture of a peace, made by a subtiltie, than if it had beene made by an open warre: They also held it for a thing certaine, that alwaies the evill fortunes of a renewed warre, fell upon them which had broken the peace: but because we have above discoursed upon this matter, we will passe on to the next Maxime.

*Titus Livius  
lib. 1, Dec. 2.*



## 25. Maxime.

*A Prince ought to have his minde disposed to turne after every winde, and variation of Fortune, that hee may know to make use of a Vice, when neede is.*

Cap. 18. & 25.  
Of a prince.



Good thing is not alwaies profitable, nor in season, and oftentimes a prince who would practise it, shall thereby draw on his owne destruction: For sometimes it falls out, that necessarily hee must use that which is evill, and vice: Therefore a wise prince, ought to take great heede to the time, and to the windlike variation of Fortune; and ought to have knowledge, to serve himselfe with a vice, for his profit and advantage, when time requireth it: Otherwise if hee alwaies follow vertue, and that which is good, there are seasons so contrarie to it, by the chance of Fortune, that incontinent, hee will fall into ruine.



Ecause a Prince that hath beene nourished in vertue, as hee reades *Machiavell*, might make some difficultie to beleieve him, and to esteeme that it should evill become him, altogether to despoile himselfe of vertue, to put on vice: For this cause, *Machiavell* (desirous to resolve this doubt) sheweth here that it is not uncomely for a prince, to change from vertue into vice: And to encourage him to make this change, he saith, That sometimes, such a time and season may happen, that it is necessarie for a prince, to know how to use a vice, to serve fortunes turne, which commonly oppugneth vertue: Yet there is no man, of so small judgement, that sees not with his eies, that this doctrine containeth two points, altogether wicked. One to say it is necessarie to a prince for the conservation of his estate, to use vice: The other to approve and allow lightnesse and inconstancie of manners, by changing good into evill. As for the first point, wee have heretofore amply handled it, where we have shewed, That good princes, which were given to vertue, have alwaies prospered in their estates: but contrary, the wicked, which exceeded in vices, have alwaies had hard fortunes and evill haps in their kingdoms, and have come to unluckie ends: As for the other point inconstancie, we must here touch, in few words.

Constancie  
is a compa-  
nion of all  
other ver-  
tues.

I will then presuppose, that Constancie is a qualitie, which ordinarlie accompanieth all other vertues: yea it is as it were of their substance and nature: There-  
fore

fore is Iustice defined, A constant will to yeeld to every man, that which belongeth unto him : and Temperance may bee also defined , A constant moderation to use well all things : and Prudence, A constant provision in all affaires, and so of all other vertues . Hereupon I make this illation , Since constancie is of the nature and substance of all vertues , and as it were mixed amongst them , that thereof it followeth, That hee which is inconstant, can have no vertue in him, for vertue goes not without constancie : *Machiavell* also ( as beastly as hee is ) so understood this : for by degrees going about to leade a prince, and all them, which follow his doctrine, to a soueraigne wickednesse ( as philosophers leade men to a soveraigne good ) he hath considered, that he must make for his foundation, Inconstancie : For an inconstant man disposed to turne with all windes, can never bee but full of all sorts of vices, and voide of all vertue : Because in vertue there can fall out no change nor variation , since all verues doe accord and agree amongst themselves : But amongst vices, there may be changes, inconstancies, & variations, because often they are contrary, and doe hold the places of extreames : As for example, Avarice and Prodigalitie are contrary vices, as also are Temeritie and Cowardise , Ignorance and malicious subtiltie, Crueltie & Dissolute lenitie, Ambition, and the Despight of Honour, and so of other vices : Inconstancie then may well perch amongst vices, flitting and moving from one to another ; but amongst vertues , she can finde no place, because as I have said, they all naturally so hold on Constancie , that without it they cannot bee vertues. *Machiavell* then was not any thing deceived, when thinking to leade a prince, unto a soveraintie of wickednesse, he furnisheth him with inconstancie and mutabilitie as the windes : for as soone as the prince shall cloth himselfe with *Protheus* garments , and that hee hath no hold nor certitude of his word , nor in his actions, men may well say, that hee is abandoned of phisitions , and his maladie is incurable, and that in all vices, hee hath taken the nature of the Camcelion . At the hands of such a prince which is inconstant, variable in his word, mutable in actions and commands, there is nothing to be hoped for, but evill, disorder, and confusion.

How much more notable and worthie to bee engraved in princes hearts , is that sentence of *Scipio* the Affrican : *That they are vanquishers , which being vanquished, doe give place unto Fortune* : But the better to understand this , I will set downe the occasion of this notable speech. After by an evill hap of warre , *Scipio* his father and uncle were overthrowne, with the most part of their armie in Spaine, the day being come, whereupon they elected their magistrates at Rome, none durst hazard himselfe, to demand the government of Spaine , for evill luck which happened to the two brothers *Scipioes* : Hereat the Romane people , beeing very sad and sorow full, cast their eies upon the great men of the citie, to see if any of their hearts would arise, to demand the government of Spaine : and because none did it , they esteemed the affaires of the common wealth, to bee in a deplored and desperate estate : The above said yong lord *Scipio* ( who after was called the Affrican , of the age onely of two and twentie yeeres ) arose and demanded of the Roman people, the said government of Spaine ; shewing by a grave oration, full of magnanimitie, and assured constancie, That his carriage should be good, and that they needed not feare, that in regard of his yong age, there should be found in him any temeritie, for he would doe nothing but by good counsell : And although the name of the *Scipioes* might seeme unluckie, in regard that his father & uncle, had ben vanquished & slaine in Spaine, that notwithstanding hee doubted not, but to turne the chance of Fortune : Briefely by

*Titus Livius*  
lib. 6, Dec. 3.



by a great and favorable consent of all the people, hee was chosen governour of Spaine, and generall captaine of the Romane armie: As soone as hee was in this estate well assured of his vertues, hee began to speake to every one, with such a majestie and constancie, as all men became fully resolved that hee would well acquite himselfe of this charge, to the honour and benefit of the commonweale: After being in Spaine, he convoked the old bands, which remained after the defeating of his father and unckle, and used unto them good words and reasons, giving them thanks for the fidelitie, they had borne to his deceased father & unckle, and that ioyfullie they had received him, for their captaine generall, although hee was yong of age, for the good hope they had of him, which was of the race of their dead captaines, and that he would so wel performe his duetie, that they should truely know, that he was of the race of their dead captaines: The publike Fortune (saide he) of the Romane commonweale and your vertue, must needes keepe us from all despaire of our affaires: For this good lucke, hath ever been fatally given us being vanquished in our great warres, yet ever notwithstanding to remaine victors, by resisting by constancie and vertue, all malignitie of Fortune.

Titus Livius  
lib. 7. Dec. 4.

Constancie  
stirreth not  
for prosperitie  
or adversitie.

The same *Scipio* another time (but long after) speaking to *Zeusis* and *Antipater*, embassadors of the king *Antiochus*, which demanded peace of him, after he had beene vanquished, used these words full of gravitie and wisdom: The peace (saith he) which you demand now that you are vanquished, we agree unto you, with like conditions as you offered before our victory: For in al fortune, good or evil, we have alwaies the same courages; neither can prosperitie exalt us, nor adversitie humble us too much: And if you your selves were not good witnesses therof, I would aledge no other testimonie, than that of *Anniball*, who is in your army: Therefore make knowne unto the king your master, that we accord unto him, the same peace which we offered him before our victorie. Here may you see, how constant the Romanes were in vertue, without any change either of prosperitie, or adversitie. Here is no Machiavelizing, wee must not goe to the schoole of *Scipio*, nor of the ancient Romanes, nor of any other valiant Princes, to learne *Machiavels* doctrine, to have an unconstant and mutable courage, to change and to turne as the winde: This must bee learned in the schoole of a sort of Italian Machiavelists, resembling harlots which love every man, yet love no person, and which with doubtfull and unstayed mindes, run here and there, like Tops.

Constancie  
of a Prince,  
wherein it  
ought to be  
employed.

Wee commonly say, That the king is the lively law of his subjects, and that the prince ought to serve for a rule to his people: but is it not a ridiculous thing, to say, That the law ought to bee a thing unconstant and mutable with every winde? Nay contrarie, the law ought to bee firme, constant, permanent, inviolable, and inviolably observed, else it is no law: And therefore amongst all mortall men, the prince is hee, which ought to bee most constant and firme, to shew, that hee is the true and lively law of his people and subjects unto whom his carriage and actions, ought to serve for a rule. A Prince then must bee of one word, and to take heede, that hee be not mutable nor double of his promises, and that he alwaies have a magnanimous and generous courage, tending to vertue, and the publike good of his kingdome, & principallity, and that no trouble nor adversitie, may abate that generositie and constancie of courage; nor any prosperitie, make him swell with pride, wherby to draw him from vertue: In a constant course, he must shew himselfe grave and clement, and these two should be in him with a temperature: such gravitie is requisit for the majestie

jestie of his calling, with such clemencie and affabilitie, as his subjects desire in him: In all his actions hee must alwaies shew himselfe to bee one man, loving and amia- bly entertaining men of vertue and of service, and alwaies as constantly rejecting vicious people, flatterers, lyers, and other like, from which hee can never draw out good services: Finally, hee ought to be constant in retaining his good friends and servants, and not to take a sinister opinion of them, without great and apparent cau- ses, and in all things to governe himselfe constantly, by good counsell, and to bee master of himselfe, that is to say, of his affections and opinions, for to direct them alwaies to good and sage counsell, such as were those great Romane monarches, *Augustus Caesar*, *Vespasian*, *Traian*, *Adrian*, the *Antonines*, *Alexander Severus*, *Constantine the Great*, *Theodosius*, and other like: Such before them, were the great *Darius*, king of the Persians and Medes, conquerour of the monarchie of Affrica, the great king *Cirus*, and *Alexander the Great*: such also were the ancient kings of France; the great *Clovis*, the generous *Charlemaigne*, the good *S. Lewis*, *Philp August* the conquerour, *Charles le Sage*, *Charles the seventh*, the victorious *Lewis* the twelfth, father of the people, *Francis* the great, restorer of letters, *Henry* the se- cond, *le Debonaire*, and many others: These bee they that a prince must propose to imitate, not such of no account as deserve not a place amongst princes, such as *Agathocles* a potters sonne, and usurper of the Sicilian tyrannie; or *Oliver de Ferme*, a barbarous and most cruell souldiour, who massacred his owne parents & friends, to usurpe the tyrannie of the place of his nativitie; or that *Caesar Borgia* the Popes bastard, full of all disloyaltie, crueltie, inconstancie, and other vices, and farre from all Royall vertues, which *Machiavell* proposeth for patternes to bee imitated of princes. Reasonlesse creatures themselves, doe they not shew that a prince ought to bee constant, to maintaine his subjects in peace and tranquillitie, without stirs or motions? The king of honie Bees, is hee not alwaies resident and abiding in his hive with constancie, to keepe his little subj:cts in tranquillitie? And whensoever a- amongst these small creatures, there are found some unconstant and straying kings, which cannot abide in their hives, and within the circuit and limits of their power, do we not see that they bring al their little people out of order: For straight as their king begins to stirre and goe out, his subjects remoove withal, so that oftentimes by the removing of the king, hee himselfe is lost, with all the troupe of his little sub- jects, by precipitation & headlong casting himselfe, by his inconstancie, into marri- shes & pooles, where, both himselfe and his are lost: Let princes then, and all other men learne of these pettie creatures, how necessary Constancie is unto them, and that they beeing unconstant and variable (as *Machiavell* teacheth them) they can not faile but destroy and ruinate themselves and others.

Hereupon is very woorthie to be noted, that which *Euripides* saith, That a good and vertuous man never changeth his manners, for the change of either aire or countrie, or either for prosperitie or adversitie: his verses englished are these.

An evill ground under an heaven serene,  
good store of Corne oft times doth bring wee see:  
Good ground also, with a sharpe aire I weene,  
bad store of fruit praducess unto thee:  
Yet by she heavens a good man or an ill,  
his nature change will not for any hap:

*Eurip. in He-  
cuba.*

For

*For alwaies wicked, wicked provereth still,  
and good men, good will proove, for evill clap  
In good mens hearts theres no adversitie,  
in life of his can breede diversitie.*

And assuredly this faction of the Machiavelists, with each wind to change manners, cannot bee found any way good, by good and vertuous men, who have their hearts in a good place, no more than they can approve the riming verses, which the Machiavelists have alwaies in their mouths.

*Cum fueris Roma, Romano vivito more,  
Cum fueris alibi, vivito sicut ibi.*


That is to say,

*When thou art Rome, a Romane life then must thou lead,  
when other where, doe as they doe, in the other stead.*

For these manners are proper to the Chamælion, which takes all colours of the place where hee is, and of the Polypus, which alwaies seemes to bee of the colour of the earth, whereupon it shineth: But this is not convenient nor comely for a good man who ought alwaies to bee constant in vertue, without changing or varying, no not though the heavens should fall upon him: But because the Poet *Horace*, very elegantly describeth what kind of person a constant man ought to bee, I will set it downe, as an end of this Maxime.

*Hor. lib. 3.  
Carm. Ode. 3.*

*So constant is a good man alwaies in his life,  
that hee stirres not for all the peoples rage and strife:  
The tyrants fierce cannot move him, nor boistrous winde  
which all the sea doth turne, nor thunder claps I finde:  
His constant vertue cannot alter any way,  
No though the heavens should fall upon his head, I say  
No feare could touch his hautie heart by night or day.*



## 26. Maxime.

*Illiberality is commendable in a prince, and the reputation of a mechanic or handicrafts man, is a dishonour without evill will.*

*Cap. 8. & 16.  
Of a prince:*

**I**F the prince (saith hee) will bee liberall, incontinent hee impoverisheth himselfe, and being poore shall bee despised of every man



man : And if hee will repaire and help his poverty, by pilling his subjects, hee shall make himselfe hated of them, and shall be reputed and handled as a tyrant : But contrarie being covetous, he shall be judged puissant, and having wherewith to furnish any affaire, when it happeneth, hee shall bee honoured and esteemed : And if the reputation of a mechanicke or illiberall person, be dispersed of him, this cannot bee hurtfull unto him, seeing by force hee seekes nothing at his subjects hands : Yet a prince may well bee prodigall of anothers good, as of booties acquired by war, as *Cyrus*, *Alexander* and *Cæsar*, but of his own hee ought to bee an houlder, and illiberall : For there is nothing that more consumeth it selfe, than largnesse and freenesse of giving, which by the practising thereof, leese the meanes to be practised. In our time, wee have seene no great matters effected, but by such men as had the reputation to bee covetous, all others have come to nothing. *Pope Julius* was liberall, till hee obtained the Popedome, but as soone as hee had gotten it, hee forooke that trade, to the end to make warre upon the king of France, *Lewis* the twelfth, as hee did. The king of Spaine likewise, hee understood, that king *Ferdinand* (grandfather of the emperour *Charles* the fifth) had not so happely atchived so many great enterprises, if hee had affected to bee esteemed liberall.

**I**N my opinion, this Maxime should not please courtiers, either Machiavellists or others, which ever like best, that a prince bee not onely liberall, but rather profuse and prodigall, so farre are they from opinion that hee should bee covetous : But certainly as illiberallitie and covetousnesse is damnable, and no way befitting a Prince, so also is profusion and prodigalitie : But most praiseable it is, that he should a course betweene both, and that hee bee liberall, acknowledging the services which is done him, and to use bountifullnesse toward good and vertuous people, and for the advancement of the Commonwealth : For that is true liberalitie, when men employ to good uses the goods & gifts dispended, and not when they employ them to evil uses : But to shew how liberalitie ought to be exercised in a prince, wee will first speake of liberalitie and prodigalitie, his two extreames.

As for Covetousnes, which *Machiavell* holds to bee covenable for a prince, certaine it is, that there is nothing in the world which makes him more contemptible and despighted than it doth : for of it selfe it is odious in all men (because it is filthie and mechanickall) but especially in Princes, which as they are constituted in a more ample and opulent fortune, than other men are, ought also to shew themselves more liberall, and further removed from Illiberallitie and Covetousnes. The emperour *Galba*, otherwise a good and sage prince, but suffering himselfe to bee governed by some about him, which were rapinous and covetous, hee himselfe also being too hard to his souldiers, thus destroyed and defiled all his vertues : But that

Covetousnesse cause  
of a Princes  
ruine.

*Tacit. lib. 17.  
Annales.  
Dis. in Gal-  
ba.*

Dion & Cap.  
in Pertia.

Pomp. &  
Latus in  
Mauricio  
& Phocas.

Titus Livius  
lib. 4. Dec. 5.

Ioseph. An-  
tiq. lib. 14.  
cap. 8. & 13.  
Plutarch in  
Crasso.

that more is, this his covetousnesse and the rapines of his officers, cost him his life, brought him into contempt, and after, to bee slaine of his souldiers. The emperor *Pertinax* was good and one of the most wise and moderatest princes, that ever was, and who a man might say, to bee as it were irreprehensible, and a very father of the people (he alwaies so studied every way to comfort his subjects) but he was so spotted and defiled with that vice of covetousnesse, that he thereby became hated and condemned of his men of war, so that they slew him. The emperor *Mauricius* was a very niggard, yea so great was his covetousnesse, that he delighted in nothing, but heaping up of treasures, and would spend nothing: wherby every man tooke occasion to blame and despise him: The great store of treasure which he had, made *Phocas* his lieutenant (who otherwise was a man of no account & a coward, but as covetous as his master) to sleigh him, and obtain the empire: But yet *Phocas* being come to the empire, continued in his covetousnesse more than ever was found in *Mauricius* his predecessor, and respected nothing but heaping up of treasures, by rapines and extorcions, without any care of government of his empire: This miserable covetousnesse & carefulnesse of this traitor *Phocas*, was the cause of his owne ruine, & the entier dissipation of the Roman empire: For during his government there were cut off from the Roman empire, Germanie, Gaul, Spain, the most part of Italie, & Slavonia, and Mesia, the most part of Affrick, Armenia, Arabia, Macedonia, Thracia, Assiria, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and many other countries; wherof some cut them selves from the empire, and other were occupied by the king of Persia, and other potentates; which was an exceeding great evill hap, and very memorable, that thus the Romane empire should fall in pieces, by meanes of this emperours covetousnesse.

This happened not alone to *Phocas*, to have lost his domination, by the meanes of his covetousnesse; for the like fell to king *Perseus* of Macedonie: This king having enterprised warre upon the Romans gathered together great store of treasures, but when it came to bee distributed, to have souldiers, hee shewed himselfe so holding and covetous as was possible: For having caused to come from the Gaulois, very great succours into his countrie, by the covenant of a certaine summe of mony, which he promised them, yet refused to deliver them silver when they came, excusing himselfe amongst his people, that it was a dangerous thing, to receive so great a number of strangers in his countrie, for fewer would serve him: Briefely saith *Titus Livius*, he did but find meanes to bring all those treasures into the Romanes hands, for their bootie: for the Gaulois seeing themselves thus mocked by the king, returned, spoiling all his countrey as they passed: and after, the Romanes vanquished *Perseus* and got all his treasures, which hee lost with his crowne, and his life, and this fell unto him, by his covetousnesse.

*Marcus Crassus* a Romane citizen (being worth 3500000 crownes of annuall revenue) was yet so covetous, that seeing *Lucullus*, had enriched himselfe by the Levant warre, never ceased till he had obtained charge and commission to make warre upon the Parthians: And that which incited him most to purchase that charge, was, that hee had heard say, that *Pompeius* (who had made warre there not long before) had had goodly meanes to heap up great treasures, if hee had listed, as hee might have pilld the temple of Ierusalem, where the treasures of sacred vessels, and of the widdowes and orphans, mounted to the summe of two thousand Talents, or five Millions of crownes: So *Crassus* resolved to rob that temple, to redouble his riches, and therein not to bee so scrupulous, as *Pompey* had been: And so indeed *Crassus*

passing

passing by Hierusalem against the Parthians, pill'd the temple, and to himselfe appropriated all that treasure, which partly was the goods and substance of poore widows and orphans: *Craſſus* going on, came into Armenia, and from thence came to the Parthians, where he gave battaile to king *Herodes*, or rather to *Suren*a his lieutenant: but *Craſſus* losing the battaile (where his onely sonne was slaine) escaped on foot, thinking to save himselfe, which he could not do, but in the end was overtaken and slaine, and his head carried to *Herodes*, who with it served himselfe in a play of a Tragoedie, which was plaied before him, where they talked of a hunter which had slaine a great savage beast. Here may you see the tragicall end of this insatiable covetous wretch *Craſſus*, who was justly and soone punished, for his great and horrible sacriledge which he had committed in the holy temple of Hierusalem.

By these examples then it is evidently seene, That Covetousnesse is customably the cause of the ruine of such princes and great lords as are infected therewith: so farre is it off, that it is profitable, as *Machiavel* saith: Yet true it is, that there have been some (but very few) which being covetous, notwithstanding have not beene ruinated by that vice, as the emperour *Vespasian*: but the reason wherefore the covetousnesse of *Vespasian* was not cause of his destruction, is for that hee exercised it not else but upon his rapinious magistrates, and because he employed on good uses, and for the utilitie of the publike good, such money as his avarice heaped up, yea, hee even practised great liberalities towards good people, and ruinated cities to rebuild them: Surely, if those reasons be well considered, they will serve *Vespasian* for a lowable excuse, if it so be that a vice can be any thing excused: For first there was no great harm that he should draw water from such sponges (as such magistrates were) which had sucked and drunke up the substance of the people, and to cause them to regorge and cast up the booties whereof they were full: And (in mine opinion) there were no harme if they did the like at this day; for what harme is there to take from a theefe? The other excuse is yet more considerable, that *Vespasian* employed not upon his owne pleasures and delights, the silver which his covetousnesse had collected, but bestowed it on good uses for the good of the commonwealth. And certainly, there is nothing that more troubles subjects, which pay tributes, than when they see, that the prince spendeth evil, the silver which is levied upon them, which would alwaies more liberally furnish him with a crowne, than they would do with a peny, if they saw their money wel bestowed. Our king *Lewis* was herein something like *Vespasian*: for he levied much money upon his subjects, yea, triple so much as his predecessors had done: but he spent it not in his pleasures and delights, nor other dissolutenesse, nor in practise of liberalitie upon unworthy people, but upon good things, about the affaires of the kingdome: as to buy peace with his neighbours, and to corrupt strangers, which might serve therein or in other affaires: Moreover, he did not as the emperour *Mauricius*, or as king *Perseus*, which heaped up great treasures, and then durst not touch it: for (as *Comines* saith) he tooke all, and spent all.

Princes then which levie money upon their people, are something excusable, when they employ them upon good uses; & especially, when they have that discretion to pill the pillors, and to ransacke theeves and eaters of the poore people, and spare other good subjects, which are not of that sort: But such as make great levies upon the people, and doe bestow them evill, they cannot bee any thing excused in their covetousnesse and prodigalitie. The emperour *Caius Caligula* succeeding *Tiberius*, found an inestimable treasure, even 67. millions, and 50000. crownes.

Dd

To

*Dion. in Vespasian, cap. 16. 17.*

Profusion  
cause of ru-  
ine in a  
prince.  
*Suet. in Caligula, cap. 37. 38. 40. 41.*



To calculate this unmeasurable summe after the proportion of 1240000. crownes, which made 32. Mule loads (as *du Bellay* saith) which were sent to Fontaraby in the yeare 1529. for king *Francis* the firsts ransome, it should be found, that the 67. millions of *Caligula*, should make about 1800. Mullet loads, which is an huge and a most admirable treasure: yet did this monster spend all this, in lesse than a yeare: But was this possible, will you say, that so great heapes should be laid out in so little space? Yea I say: for this brainlesse foole caused houles to bee builded upon the sea, yea, and that should be onely, where men said it was deepest: So that there to make good foundations, he was forced to cast in great heapes of stones, as great as high mountaines, and so much more, as any thing was impossible, so much rather loved hee to do it. Moreover, he delighted to bring downe mountaines and rockes, to equall them with flats and plaines: so in plaines to erect mountaines: & this also must needs be done, even the very day that he commaunded it, upon paine of life: He would also cause bathes to be made in waters of very pretious sent, he would make prodigall bankets, wherein he would serve excellent pearles and other pretious stones, which he would cause to be liquified and dissolved, as they might be drunk: Again, he caused ships to be made of Liburnian Cædais, whose sternes were all covered with pearles, and within them were builded bathes, galleries, halls, and orchards, & there sitting amongst dauncers and players of instruments, he caused himselfe to be carried in those ships about the coasts of Campania. By these unmeasurable and monstrous expences, he saw the end of that great treasure (left by *Tiberius*) in lesse than a yeare: Hereof came it, that wanting silver, he converted himselfe to rapines, and to lay great and new imposts upon his subiects, yea, tributes upon victuals, upon processes, upon labourers salaries, upon harlots gaines, upon players gaines, and upon many such like things: and so having againe gathered huge heapes of crownes, upon a covetous pride, to touch and handle money, hee delighted to walke bare-foot and to tumble upon it. By this meanes (and with crueltie and other vices) hee was hated of all the world, and incontinent slaine: And in truth he was inexcusable, for inventing new and great imposts upon his people, seeing hee so evill employed the money.

*Sueto. in Nē.  
10. cap. 27. & 30.  
32. Dion. in  
Nerone.*

The emperour *Nero* likewise laid great imposts and levies of money upon his subiects, and quashed and made void the testaments of such as would not make him their heire, as an ingrate person to his prince; he by force took treasures out of temples, and committed infinit other extortions. But how expended he all this monney? In making sumptuous bankets, as *Caligula* did; in giving unmeasurable gifts to flatterers and bad people, and upon other strange dissoluteness. He alwayes apparelled himselfe with exceeding rich & precious habits, yet he never put on garment twice, he played away great summes of mony at once: he fished alwaies with golden nets, the cords wherof were knit with purple and scarlet; he never went abroad with lesse than a thousand coaches or litters drawne with Mules whose shoes were all of silver, all the Mulleters also were gallantly and costly apparelled: *Sabina Poppea*, his wife, caused the coaches wherein she rid, to be drawne with cords, and al other furniture for her mules, of gold: Whensoever she went abroad, there waited on her 500. she Asses, which gave milke, and that milke was drawn out every day to make bathes for her to bathe in: Breefely, *Nero* made so great and riotous expences, that no silver could suffice him; insomuch, as spoiling his provinces of their goods and riches by rapines and imposts, and withall practising great cruelties (for rapine and crueltie are

are alwaies companions) he brought upon himselfe the hatred of all the world, and came to a miserable end, as we have above said.

The like happened to the emperour *Vitellius*, who in a yere spent in bankets without all measure, nine millions of crownes. *Dion* sayeth, That in a vessell served at his table, he had so many tongues, braines, and livers of certaine strange and exquisite fishes and birds, as cost ten thousand crownes. *Suetonius* saith, That his brother bestowed a supper upon him, whereat was served two thousand exquisite fishes, and seven thousand exquisite and pretious birds, besides all other services. These so exorbitant & unreasonable expences, drew him into covetousnesse, rapine, and crueltye, which was the cause that he was massacred and slaine, and raigned but a yere and ten dayes.

*Dion. in Vitell. Suet. cap. 13.*

Here might I adde to these, the examples of *Domitian*, *Commodus*, *Bassianus*, and many other Romane emperours, which held of the two extremities of Liberalitie, namely, Covetousnesse and Prodigalitie, using Covetousnesse and rapine, to heape up silver, and Profusion to spend them; all which had the like end, as *Nero*, *Caligula*, and *Vitellius* had: But hereby is sufficiently shewed in those examples, the contrary of the Maxime, which *Machiavel* saith is true, and that a prince which is covetous & hard, cannot prosper, but especially, when he naughtily bestoweth the treasures & money which he heapeth up. Now there remaineth to shew, That Liberalitie is profitable and necessarie for a prince, when he applieth it to good uses.

When *Alexander* the Great departed from Macedonie to goe to the conquest of Asia, hee caused all the captaines of his armie to appeare before him: At their comming, he distributed unto them almost all the renew of his kingdome, inso-much, as he left to himselfe almost nothing: Amongst them, one of the said captaines, called *Perdiccas*, said unto him: What then will you (Sir) keepe for your selfe? Even Hope, answered *Alexander*: We then shall have our part thereof (replied *Perdiccas*) since we go with you. Thus *Perdiccas* and certaine other also, refused the gifts which their king offered them, and were as thankfull, as if they had accepted them: So that they accompanied him in his voyage of Asia, full of good will, to serve him, as they did: For he was so well served of these valiant Macedonians, his subiects, that with them he conquered almost all Asia: so the liberalitie of *Alexander* was very profitable unto him.

*Plutarch. in Alexand.*

The antient Romanes had this custom, ordinarily to encrease the seignories and dominations of the kings their allies, as they did to *Massinissa*, king of Numidia, unto whom they gave a great part of the kingdome of *Syphax* his neighbour, and some part of the countrey of the Carthaginians, after they had vanquished *Syphax* & the Carthaginians: as also they did to *Eumenes*, king of Pergamus, in Asia, unto whom they gave all they conquered upon king *Antiochus* from beyond the mount Taurus, which came to more than foure times so much as all *Eumenes* his kingdome. They also practised great liberalities towards *Ptolomeus*, king of Cyprus; towards *Attalus*, another king of Pergamus; towards *Hiero* king of Scicilie, and many others. And what profit got they by all this: even this, that in the end all the countries and kingdoms fell into the Romans hands, either by succession and testamentarie ordinances of those kings, or by the wil of the people, or otherwise. And this reputation of Liberalitie, which the Romans acquired, was the cause, that the kings and potentates of the world affected and so greatly desired their amitie and alliance. *Silla*, *Marius* his lieutenant, making warre upon king *Jugurtha*, perswaded *Boëthus*, king of

*Titus Livius lib. 44. Plutarch. in Caton.*

*Sallust. in Jugurth. lib.*

Mauricians, to take part with the Romanes against *Iugurtha*, because (saith hee) the Romanes are never wearie with vanquishing by beneficence, but do alwaies enrich their friends and allies.

The king *Cosis* of Thrace having promised the Romanes, that hee would proove their good and faithfull friend, and to that effect having delivered them hostages, notwithstanding they aided king *Perseus* of Macedonie against the Romanes, when after by warre king *Perseus* was vanquished, wherein *Bitis* the said king *Cosis* his son was taken prisoner, this king would have ransomed his sonne, and withall made certaine frivolous excuses: The Senare made him this worthy answer, That the Romanes knew verie certainly, that he had preferred the good grace and favour of *Perseus* before their amitie, but that therefore they would not cease to give him his sonne and his hostages, because the benefits of the Romane people are free: inso-much, as they better love to leave the price and the recompence within the hearts of such as received their said benefits, than to bee readie to receive prompt and quicke satisfaction.

*Disin. Au-  
guſt.*

*Augustus Caesar* seeing himselfe have many enemies, which he had gotten by civile warres, he knew not whether he should put them al to death, or what he should doe: For he on the one side considered, that if hee caused all to die, then the world would thinke that either he was entring into the butcherie of a civile warre, or els to usurpe a tyrannie: and on the other side he feared, that some mischief would happen unto him, if he suffered them to live. The abovesaid *Livia* his wife (which was a good and sage ladie) shewed him, that he ought to gaine his enemies, which he feared, by liberalitie and beneficence. Hee followed this counsell, and begun with one *Cornelius* the nephew of *Pompeius*, whom hee advanced into the office of Consull, and in like sort to others, which he tooke to be his enemies, he practised beneficence and bountifullnesse, in such sort, as he gained all their hearts. Because the remonstrance which *Livia* made to *Augustus*, is verie memorable, I will here summarily recite it: I am very sorrowful (my most deare lord and spouse) to see you thus grieved and tormented in your spirit, so that your sleepe is taken from you: I am not ignorant, that you have great occasions, because of many enemies, which you will have still, feeling in themselves the deaths of their friends and parents, which you have caused to die during those civil wars: & withal, that a prince cannot so wel governe, but there will be alwaies malecontents & complainers. There is this moreover, that this change of estate which you have brought into the commonweale, by reducing it into a monarchie, makes, that a man cannot well assure himselfe of such as they esteeme to be their friends: yet I beseech you (my good lord) to excuse me, if I a simple woman take that hardinesse to tel you my advice upon this matter: which is, that I thinke there is nothing impossible to repress by soft and gentle meanes: for the natures of such as are enclined to do evil, are sooner subdued & corrected by using clemencie and beneficence towards them, than severitie: For princes which are courteous and mercifull, make themselves not onely agreeable and honourable to them upon whom they bestow mercie, but also towards al others: And by contrary such as are inexorable, and will abate nothing of their rigour, are hated and blamed not only of them, towards whom he shewes himselfe such, but of al others also. See you not (my good lord) that either never or very selde physicians come to cut the sick members of the bodie, but onely seeke to heale them by soft & gentle remedies: in like sort are maladies of the spirit to be healed: And the gentle medica-

ments



ments of the spirit may these well be called, Affabilitie & Soft words of princes towards every one, his Clemencie and placabilitie, his Mercie and debonairetie, not towards wicked and bad persons, which make an occupatiō to do evill, but towards such as have offended by youth, imprudencie, ignorance, by chance, by constraint, or which have some just excuse. It is also a verie requisit thing in a prince, not onely to do no wrong to any person, but also to be reputed such a man as will never doe wrong to any man; because that is the meane to have the amitie & benevolence of men, which a prince can never obtaine, unlesse he do persuade them, that he will do well to the good, and that he will do wrong to none: For feare may well bee acquired with force, but amitie cannot be obtained but by persuation: so that if it please you (my lord) to use benefits and liberalitie towards such as you esteeme your enemies, and towards such as feare you will do them wrong, you shal easily gaine them and others from henceforth for your friends. This remonstrance of *Livia* was the cause that *Augustus* let loose and set at libertie all them which were accused to have enterprised any thing against him, satisfying himself with the admonishments hee gave them, and besides gave great goods and benefits unto some of them, so that as well those as others of his enemies became his friends and good subiects. Behold here what good came to *Augustus* by his beneficence and liberalitie.

The emperor *Marcus Antonine* feared nothing more than the reputation of an hard and covetous man, and alwayes wished and desired, that such a spot of infamie might never be imposed upon him: And indeed, all his carriage and actions were such, that none could impute unto him any spot of covetousnesse, but al Liberalitie worthy of a good prince: for first he established publicke professors of all sciences in the towne of Athens, unto which he gave great wages, which proved a most profitable act to the commonweale, worthie of such a prince: and this was partly the cause, that in his time there was so great store of learned people in al manner of sciences: inso much, as the time of his kingdom was and hath bin since called the golden world. In our time, king *Francis* the first of happie memorie, did imitate the example of this great and wise emperor, establishing publick lectures at great wages in the Vniversitie of Paris, a thing whereof his memorie hath bene and shall be more celebrated through the world, than for so many great warres as he valiantly sustained and demeaned, during his raigne. Secondly, the emperor *Antonine* forgave the people al the fiscal debts and arrerages which they ought him, by scedules, obligations, or otherwise for fiftie yeares before, which was an huge and unspeakable liberalitie: But he did this to take away all meanes & matter, from all officers & fiscall procurators, of molesting & troubling his subjects afterward with researches and calling on of old debts. Thirdly, he never laid impost or extraordinarie exaction upon his people, but handled them in all kindnesse and generositie: He never made profuse and superfluous expences, but held an estate both at home and in the court, sober and full of frugalitie: And finally, to shew how he delighted in liberalitie, hee caused a temple to be builded to *Beneficence*.

Behold here a true patterne, after which princes should conforme themselves to know how to practise that goodly vertue, liberalitie: And very notable is that point, that that good emperor *Antonine* held the estate of his house ruled by frugalitie and sobrietie, and farre from the straunge profusions of those monsters, *Caligula*, *Nero*, and *Vitellius*: for he considered, that it were much better to employ for the publicke wealth of his empire, the revenues and money thereof, than in riotousnes

Dion, in Tra-  
iano, Empr.  
in Alex. Spar-  
to Andria,

and vanities; and that such unmeasurable profusion constraineth a prince to fall to rapines, & to deale evill with their subiects, because (as the common proverb saith) Vnmeasurable largesse hath no bottome. Therefore did that great emperour *Traian* also hold his estate soberly governed, and hee maintained no unprofitable persons in his service. No more did the emperour *Severus*, who would not suffer in any offices any persons to be placed, which were not necessarie: They had also good salaries and rewards of him, yea, he would often rebuke them, for not demanding gifts of him: and wherefore (saith he) wilt thou, that I should be thy debter, seeing thou askest me nothing. *Adrian* also had this propertie, that hee gave great gifts unto his good friends and servants, and made them rich, before they demanded any thing: And above all, he was liberall towards professors of letters, and learned men, which he enriched: but he much hated such as by evill meanes became rich, and generally all good emperours were adorned with the vertues of liberalitie and munificence, which they practised with such moderation & prudence, that they were never spotted, neither with *Machiavels* Covetousnesse, nor his Prodigalitie: And therefore they flourished and prospered during their raignes, and left after them a perpetuall memorie to posteritie of their vertues and praises.

Our kings of France, as *Clouis*, *Charlemaigne*, *Lewis* the piteous his sonne, *Robert*, *Henry* the first, *Lewis le Gros*, *Lewis* the eight, *S. Lewis*, and many others, were verie liberall, but they exercised their liberalitie and principalitie upon the Church and Church men, which they but too much enriched. Yet we read, that *Charlemaigne* was also very liberall towards learned men, and that he spent much in founding & maintaining the Vniversitie of Paris. And a man may generally marke in our kings of Fraunce, a Christian liberalitie, which they have alwayes had, that is, That they have been great Almoniers, exercising their liberalitie upon poore people, which is an exercise of vertue, exceeding worthy of a Christian prince, which he should never forget.

By this abovesaid, I hope the Maxime of *Machiavel* is sufficiently confuted, and that it evidently appeareth by our examples and reasons, That Covetousnesse is damageable and dishonourable to a prince, as also is his contrarie profusion, and that Liberalitie is profitable and honourable unto him: And as for the reasons which *Machiavel* alledged, they are foolish and false, as his Maxime: For to say, That a rich prince shalbe esteemed puissant, because he hath great treasures, that reason doeth evill conclude. King *Perses* of Macedonie (of whom we have spoken) had great treasures, yet left he not to be esteemed a king pusilanimous and of small valour, & such was his reputation in his owne countrey, & amongst his owne subiects. *Craffus* also was knowne to be more rich than *Pompeius*, but he was not esteemed so valiant nor so good a man, neither in his life had he the tenth part of *Pompeies* honours. *Mauricius* and *Phocas* Romane emperours, by their covetousnesse heaped up great treasures; but were they therefore esteemed puissant and valiant? nay contrarie they were esteemed cowards, and in the catalogue of such emperours as held the most abiect and infamous places.

But I pray you let us come to the reason. When a prince hath the fame to bee a great treasurer, doth he not give his neighbours occasion to seeke meanes to enterprise upon him to obtain those treasures? Wherefore is it, that the Venetians (which if they list, might be the greatest treasurers of the world) have made a law amongst them, to have no treasure in their commonwealth, other than of armes? It is because they

The power  
of a prince  
lieth not in  
treasures,

De Comdi. 2  
cap. 11.

they know well (as they be wise) that if they heape up treasures in money, they shall but prepare a bait to draw their neighbours on to make warre upon them: but wars come too soone, and under the pretext of more occasions than we would, therefore we need no baits to draw it upon us. It is not then best for a prince to bee reputed a man full of treasures and silver, as *Machiavell* thinketh: for money of it selfe cannot but serve us for a bait to attract and draw upon us them which are hungrie and desirous of it. And although commonly, money is thought to be the finewe of war, yet are they not so necessarily required, that without money warre cannot be made. I will not here alledge the poore Hugonet souldiers, which most commonly warred without wages: but I will only alledge the militarie estate which was in the Roman empire in the emperour *Valensinians* time, and since: For in that time the militarie art was so policied, that every souldier tooke for a moneth so much bread, so much wine, so much larde, and so much of other necessarie things: His habits also were new from tearme to tearme, and all other things necessarie, so that he touched either none or very little money, yet had he all that he wanted. And indeed, money serves but for commutation: for men cannot eat it, nor apparell themselves with it, nor if he be sicke, can it heale him: Wherefore then serves it? For a prompt, quicke, and easie commutation: For if you have money, you straight have whatsoever you need: If then by other meanes and policie order be taken, that a souldier have all he needs (as was done in *Valensinians* time, and others) it will be found, that money makes not a prince puissant. Moreover, I do confesse, that it is certaine, that in the militarie policie which we have at this day, which is, that a souldier shall receive in money all he needeth, that money is very necessarie, and that without it a man can doe no great thing, and that they are as finewes, or as the maintenance of the finewes of war, but yet by good husbandrie a prince may have sufficient of it, and without Covetousnesse.

As for that which *Machiavell* makes no account of, that a prince be reputed to be a Mechanique, I leave it to them to thinke which have, I will not say, the heart of a prince, but onely of a simple gentleman, that hath honour but in a little recommendation, if they would not bee grieved to bee reputed a Mechanique person. I know well, that the nobilitie of Italie, which more commonly trade and deale with marchandize, than with armes, care not for that name of a Mechanique, so they may get money: But the gentlemen of Fraunce, of *Almaigne*, of England, and of other countries of Christendome, are not of the humor of that mechanique nobility, neither would they for any thing in the world be so reputed, as *Machiavell* would persuade them.

And as for the examples which *Machiavel* alledgeth of Pope *Iulius* and of *Ferdinand* king of Spaine, which (he said) were covetous, yet effected great matters: I answer him in one word, That it prooveth nothing of that he sayth: for Pope *Iulius* made no great prowesses nor conquests, as every man knoweth: and king *Ferdinand* in the exploits and enterprises of warres was not covetous, for any thing we read in hystories: And if that were true which *Machiavel* saith of those two, I will oppose alwayes against those two obscure examples, them above alledged, which are farre more illustrious and notable, and by the which I have shewed, that Coverousnesse hath alwayes been pernicious to princes, and Liberalitie without profusion, profitable and honourable.

For a resolution then of this matter, I say, That the vice of Ingratitude accompa-

nith



*Salustius in bel-  
lo Jugurth.*

nieth ordinarily covetousnesse, and that none can be covetous and illiberall, unlesse he will prove ingrate to his friends and good servants, which is one of the greatest vices, wherewith a prince can be noted: For it is impossible that his affaires can bee well governed, without good and loyall ministers and servants, such as he can never have, being ingrate: Therefore a prince ought well to ingrave perpetually in his memorie, the sentence of king *Bochus*, who said, It was lesse dishonorable for a prince to be vanquished by armes, than by munificence: And therefore that good emperor *Titus*, whensoever he passed any day, without exercising some liberalitie and beneficence, said to his friends: O my friends I have lost this day, meaning that that was the chiefe marke, at which a prince should shoot, to wit, Beneficence, and that otherwise he employes his time evill.



### 27. Maxime.

*A Prince which will make a straight profession of a good man, cannot long endure in this world, in the company of so many other that are so bad.*

*Cap. 15. of a  
prince.*

**A**ny (saith *Machiavel*) have written bookes, to instruct a prince, & to bring him to a perfectiō in al vertues, as *Xenophon* did in the institutiō of *Cyrus*: There are also many philosophers & others, which by their writings have formed Ideas & figures of monarchies & cōmonweals, wherof there were never seen the like in the world, because there is great difference betwixt the maner, that the world liveth in, and that it ought to live: He then that will amuse and stick upon the formes of philosophers, monarchs, & commonweals, by despising that which is done, & praying that which ought to be done, he shall sooner learne his owne ruine, than his conservatiō. Leaving then behind, al that can be imagined of a princes perfection, and staying our selves upon that vvhich is true, and subiect to be practised: By experience I say (sayeth master *Nicholas*) that the prince vvhich vwill maintaine himselfe, ought to learne how he may sometimes not bee good, and so ought to practise it, according to the exigence of his affaires: For if alwayes hee will hold a straight profession of a good man, he cannot long endure in the company of so many others, which are of no value.

This



His Maxime meriteth no other confutation, than that which resul-  
teth from the points before handled, for we have at large demon-  
strated, that the truth is cleane contrarie, to that which *Machiavel*  
saith here, and that princes which have beene good men, have al-  
waies raigned long & peaceably, and have been firme and assured  
in their estates : and the wicked contrarie, have not raigned long,

but have violently beene deposed from their estates : And as for the Ideas & forms  
of perfect monarchs and commonweals, whereof some philosophers have written,  
they handled not that subiect, saying there were any such, but to propose a patterne  
of imitation for monarches, and government of commonweales : For when a man  
will propose a patterne to imitate, he must forme it the most perfect, and make it the  
best he can ; and after, every man, which giveth himselfe to imitate it, must come as  
nigh it as he can, some more nigh, others lesse : But a prince which proposeth to  
himselfe *Machiavels* patternes, such as *Cesar Borgia*, *Oliver de Ferme*, *Agashocles*, how  
can he do any good thing, or approach to any good, seeing the patternes hold no-  
thing thereof ? Patternes then which men propose to imitate, must bee the best set  
downe that they can bee, that if in our imitation wee hap to erre, from a perfect  
image of Vertue, yet wee may so so and in some sort expresse it in our manners :  
But what meanes *Machiavel*, when he sayeth, That men must leave behind, that  
which authors have written, of a princes perfection, to draw us unto that, which is  
now adayes practised : What is this ? but in a word to tell us wee must leave the  
good precepts of vertue, to abide and stay our selves upon vices, and a tyrannie :  
For they which have written of a princes perfection, have set down nothing which  
may not well be practised, and if a prince cannot fully doe and practise all the pre-  
cepts which are written, he may at the least practise part of them, one more, another  
lesse : But we must not say, that if a prince cannot be perfect, that therefore hee must  
altogether forsake, and cast off all vertue and goodnesse, and take up a tyrannie and  
vice : For as *Horace* saith :

*He that in highest place cannot abide,  
Let not the meanest place him be denied.*

So that it seemes *Machiavell* knowes not what hee would say, when hee holds,  
That wee must not stay upon that which authors have written of a princes perfe-  
ction, but upon that which is practised, and in use : For if hee meane, that vice alone  
is in use, he then giveth wicked counsell and advice, and if he will confesse, that good  
and vertue is in use and practise, then will it follow, that wee must not reiect that,  
which is written of a princes perfection, although a man cannot come to the per-  
fectnesse thereof, for alwaies it is good and praiseable, to come as nigh thereunto as  
we can.

And touching that which *Machiavell* saith, That a prince who is a good man, can  
not long endure amongst so many others, that value nothing : I see well that hee  
meanes hereby to perswade a prince to apply himselfe to the wicked, and to doe as  
they doe, and to bee wicked with them which value nothing : But if *Machiavel* had  
well considered, That goodnesse and vertue, are alwaies in price and estimation, yea  
even with men of no value, which are constrained to praise that, which they hate :

And

Patternes  
to imitate  
must be  
perfect.

And if he were resolved (as it is certaine) that subiects doe commonly apply themselves willingly to imitate their prince, (*Dion* witnesseth that in the time of the emperor *Antonine* the philosopher, many studied philosophie to like him) hee would never have given this precept to a prince, to accommodate himselfe to the vices which are in fashion and use: but contrarie, hee would have taught him to follow goodnesse and vertue, to draw his subiects thereunto, and to receive honor & good reputation in the world: But in truth we need not mervaille, if *Machiavell* hold opinions so farre discrepant from the way of vertue, for that is not the path, whereby he pretends to guide and conduct a prince; but his way, is that which leadeth to all wickednesse and impietie, as we have in many places demonstrated.

The antient Romanes one day, found certaine verses of their prophetesse *Sibilla*, where it was said, That the Romans should alwaies chase out of Italy everie strange enemy, if the mother of the gods were brought to Rome: The Romanes (which were very superstitious in a vaine religion) sent straight embassadors to Delphos, towards the Oracle of *Apollo*, to know where they might find the mother of the gods: The oracle sent them to king *Attalus* of Pergamus: *Attalus* led them into Phrigia, and shewed them an old Image of stone, which in those quarters they had alwaies called the mother of the gods: The said embassadors, caused that image straight to be embarked, and brought to Rome, whereof the Senate being advertited, it fell in deliberation amongst them, who he should be, that at the gates should go to receive the mother of the gods: and it was concluded, that that must bee the best and most vertuous man in the citie: When then it came in question, who was the best in all the towne; every man (saith *Titus Livius*) desired the lot might fall upon him, and there was not any, but he loved better, to be elected the best man of the citie, than to be chosen either Consul or Dictator, or into any other great estate: The elect on fell upon *Scipio Nasica* (cousin germane of the Affrican) who was a young man, but a verie good man, and the sonne of a good father; who went to receive that old goddesse of stone, mother of the gods: But I do demand of you, if those good Romans had been instructed in the doctrine of *Machiavell*, and had learned of this Maxime, that it is not good to make a straight profession of a good man; would they so much have wished, that this election had fallen upon them, and preferred this title of a good man, before so high dignities of a Consul or Dictator? certainly no: but they which hold contrarie the doctrine of *Machiavell* make more estimation of goodnes and vertue, than of the greatest riches and dignities.

And indeed, there is nothing more certaine, but that it is the goodliest and most honourable title, that a man can possibly have, To be a good man: And let it not displease great lords, which are imbarcked in the highest titles of honours of Constables, Marshals, Admirals, Chancelors, Presidents, Knights of the order, Governors, and Lieutenants of the king, and other like great States: for all those titles, without the title of a good man, value nothing, & indeed are but smokes to stifle them which have them: But I confesse, that if they have the title of a good man, with these titles, then are they worthy of double honour, and to bee beloved and respected of all the world.

The title of  
a good man  
more affect-  
ed of the  
Romanes,  
than to be  
Consul or  
Dictator.



28. *Maxime.*

*Men cannot be altogether good, nor altogether wicked, neither can they perfectly use cruelty and violence.*



*John Pagolo* (saith *Machiavelli*) usurped *Peruse* (which was Church land) by murdering his cosins and nephewes to come to the seignourie: This was a man accomplished in all vices, without conscience, and kept his owne sister: Pope *Iulius* the eleventh, in *Anno 1505*. going about to reunite to the church, such lands as were dismembred from it, by the usurpation of many particular lords, tooke his journey to *Peruse*, without any armes, accompanied of many Cardinals, with but a simple guard; yet this traine was garnished with baggage and moovables of value inestimable: *Pagolo* who knew well, that he came thither to dispossesse him of his seignorie, yet had not the courage to sleigh both him and his Cardinals, although he might easily have done it, and have enriched himselfe with the bootie, but suffered himselfe to be taken, and carried away by the Pope his enemy: This was not any remorse of conscience, that made *Pagolo* commit this fault, but it was because he knew not in a need to be altogether wicked: Hereupon I conclude, That men leave to leese great fortunes and occasions, which happen unto them, because they knew not how (in a need) to be altogether vvicked.



His *Maxime* is a true end and scope, whereunto *Machiavel* would lead a prince, and all such as follow his doctrine, namely to be altogether wicked, in all perfection of wickednesse. The degrees to come to this so high and soveraigne wickednesse, have (for the most part) beene already declared: For *Machiavell* hath shewed, That cruelty, perfidie, impietie, subtiltie or deceit, covetousnesse, and other like (which are the degrees whereby men mount the top of all wickednesse) are very fit and meet for a prince, and that hee ought to bee decored and adorned with them: But now complaines he, that men (although they be otherwise full of vices) yet they cannot use them so dexteriously and handsomely, as that they may mount to the highest, greatest and soveraignest wickednesse: and that it is a great fault, and brings unto them great damages in their affaires. I pray you can there be found amongst the *Scythians*, *Arabians*, or any other barbarous nation, which

*Machiavel*  
teacheth a  
soveraigne  
wickednesse

which live without law or policie, a more detestable and infamous doctrine, than here is taught in *Machiavels* schoole? May not any man see that hee buildeth by his precepts, a true tyrannie? yea that he useth the like method to teach his soveraigne wickednesse, that philosophers do to teach the soveraigne good: For as *Aristotle*, *Plato*, *Cicero*, and others which dealt in writing of the soveraigne good, first shewed the vertues and good manners, whereby they must ascend thereunto, as by degrees: so this stinking doctor *Machiavell*, useth the same maner, teaching a prince all kinds of evill and wickednesse, which may lead to the highest degree and top of all vices, and of all evill.

But I will not long stay in refuting this Maxime, for I thinke I have before so well beaten downe those degrees, whereby he would have princes ascend to that height of all wickednesse, that he that followeth the way which we have shewed, shall not need to feare mounting thither, but rather not doubt the contrarie: Wee have also made appeare by reasons and notable examples, That they which give themselves to the vices of perfidie, impietie, crueltie, and other vices, which *Machiavel* teacheth, come ordinarily to evill ends: so far is it off to be damageable, That a man cannot be perfectly wicked, as most impudently he affirmeth. And as for the example of *Pagolo*, which he alledgeth, it is a strange thing, how this gallant should not attaine to the full top of all wickednesse, since they of his nation have commonly their spirits so prompt, and quicke to all evill and corruption: But it is credible, he was some luskish and faint hearted fellow, which wanting no good will to slay the Pope, onely wanted courage to enterprise and performe it: But some may say, that *Pagolo* feared to do well, if he had slaine the Pope *Julius*, and therefore he would not doe it, because he would not do good, but only apply himselfe to evill and vice, as *Machiavell* teacheth: And indeed if he had slaine this Pope, hee had done great good to all Christendome of that time, for he lighted and stirred up warres amongst Christian princes, and delighted in nothing so much, as to sow trouble every where, yea hee vaunted, that he would do more with *S. Pauls* sword, than all his predecessors had done with *S. Peters* keyes. *Pagolo* then (who had sworn to the doctrine of *Machiavel*, as is to be presumed) would not be the cause of so great good, as by slaying that monster, to do so much good to Christendome: But *Machiavel* found he did evill, that hee slew not the Pope, and speaks therof, as a man passionate: for there was never man, a greater enemy to the Pope, than *Machiavell*. I therefore do greatly mervaille how Papists can esteeme of *Machiavel*: But indeed they which esteeme so much of him, are not papists, though they say they are; but are a people, which in their hearts, make no care either of God, or of the divell, nor of the Pope, nor of the Popedom, no nor of any religion; but are very Atheists, full of impietie, like their master: yet indeed they go well to Masse, and there is good policie in it; for therein they make to appeare, that they have so well profited in their *Machiaveline* philosophie, that they are come to the perfection, that their master taught them in this Maxime.

29. *Maxime.*

*He that hath alwayes carried the countenance of a good man, and would become wicked to obtaine his desire, ought to colour his change with some apparent reason.*

**W**hen a man desires to change from one qualitie to an other (saith our Florentine) as when hee will become wicked for some cause, having alwaies before carried the countenance of a good man, he must do it discreetly, & before seeke occasions (by providing himself in the meane while new friends) to leane upon in the place of the antient, which abandon him: And herein a great fault was committed by *Appius Claudius*, who was one of the ten soveraign potentates of Rome, for he having alwaies shewed himself a lover of the people, humane, kind, communicative, of easie access, a good justicier, going after about to usurpe the soveraign domination of Rome, hee too sodainly changed his qualities, into other cleane contrarie, turning his roabe, as it had beene from white to blacke, which was the cause that the world incontinent discovered his hypocrisie and pourpensed malice, and poynted at him with their fingers: So could he not attaine his designs and purposes, which he might have had, if fairely by little and little he had changed, alwayes seeking some apparent occasions to become cruel, fierce, rigorous, unsociable, and to have provided himselfe friends of like qualities, to maintaine him, as is sayd.

Discourse  
lib. 1. cap. 42.



His Maxime is like that of Renardizing and foxlike deceit, whereof we have before spoken: For this is a precept, how of a good man to become wicked, & yet the world should not perceive it: And (saith *Machiavel*) hee must not be so grosse as at the first arrival, to change from good to evil, as from white to black, because this change may be perceived of the world; but hee must proceed unto it, by a cautell and subtiltie, seeking palliations and colours to hide his change, and to give apparent reason thereof: As if a man will become cruel, he must cover his cruelties, with some appearance of Iustice: if he will become rapinous and a catchpoll, hee must cover his rapines, with some appearance of necessitie and publike



like utilitie : Thus doth he change himselfe by little and little, & so from good shall he become wicked, and none perceiue it : And it is good to be noted, the comparison which *Machiavell* makes of the chaunge and varietie of manners, by the chaunge of colours : For as blacke never takes white well, his contrarie, unlesse first white bee rainted with some other colour, as blew or red : So the chaunge (sayeth *Machiavell*) from good to wicked, is never made unto any good purpose, without some pretext and shew, which gives to a man an appearance betwixt good and euill.

Here is a singular precept in the art of wickednesse, To become wicked & yet the world shall not perceiue it : for if the world know it, then it is an ignorance of the art which wils a knowledge, well to dissemble, and that a man should bee apt and fit to know handsomely, to taine and deale, with his visage and countenance, to deceive men : By joyning then together these two precepts, To bee a dissembler, and to bee wicked, to doe euill, it will follow, that this Maxime is very proper for this art : for it teacheth how to do to become wicked, and not to discover himselfe to be so, but alwayes to observe the pretext of dissimulation.

You see then (and he that sees not is very blind of sence and understanding) that this abhominable Florentine perseuereth stil to teach a prince the art of wickednes : But for so much as before we have disputed against all the kinds thereof, as likewise against hypocrisie and dissimulation, I will speake no more hereof. And as for the example of *Appius Claudius*, one of the ten potentates of Rome, which *Machiavell* alledgeth, serves nothing for his purpose : For *Appius* exercising an office which endured but a yeare, carried himselfe well for that first yeare, which was the cause that he and his companions were continued in their estate another yere : but with great difficultie obtained they that continuation ; for it was as it were a breach of their law to continue an office to any person more than a yeare : *Appius* seeing, that it should be impossible to obtaine of the Romane people, a continuation for a third yeare, thought it good now to make himselfe feared, by seeking to obtaine his estate by force : and like ynough he had gotten againe his office, had there not happened a warre against the Romanes, which came nigh unto them : and therefore *Appius* and his companions, could do no lesse (if it were but to defend themselves) than leuie an armie : but none would obey them, because the time of their offices was expired, and that they acknowledged them no more for lawful magistrates : so that for want of obedience they were constrained to forsake their offices, & to submit themselves to the peoples mercie, who set in prison *Appius Claudius*, and *Spurius Oppius*, where they died, and banished the other eight, and confiscated their goods. The cause then why *Appius* could not obtaine the tyrannie which hee had enterprised, was not, for that he changed too sodainly from good to wicked, but because the time of his office being expired, he could not be obeyed : and herein, al the dissimulations and foxlike dealings of *Machiavell*, could have done him no good : for as soon as any mans office was expired at Rome, he that held it, must come out, were hee good or wicked, because such was the law.

Moreover, this Maxime here, is not onely wicked, but also hard to practise : For verie difficult it is, that a man should change from a good man to a wicked, and not bee perceived, though in his actions he use many palliations and dissimulations : For amongst people there are alwaies some one which is not a beast, but (as the proverbe is) can know flies in the milke, and which straight can discover the dissimulations

ons of those Machiavelizing Foxes, and can crye, the Fox, that men may take heed of him.



## 30. Maxime.

*A prince in the time of peace, maintaining discords and partialities amongst his subiects, may the more easily use them as his pleasure.*

**U**R auncestors of Florence (saith Machiavell) especially such as were esteemed the wisest, have alwayes held this Maxime, That *Pistoye* must be held in obedience by the meanes of Partialities: And for that cause they nourished in certaine towns belonging unto them, discords, the more easily to governe them. The Venetians also, mooved with the like opinion, maintained in the townes of their government, the factions of the Guelfes and Gibelines, that their subiects minds beeing occupied with such studies, might have no leisure to thinke upon rebellion: yet a prince, vvhich (as they say) hath any blood in his nailes, vvill not nourish such Partialities in time of vvarre: For so may they bring him much hurt. But in time of peace hee may by such meanes handle his subiects much more easily.

Cap. 30. of a prince.

**W**hensoever the commonwealth is governed by a good prince, who useth good counsell in the conduction of his affaires; and gets the love of his subjects, it is certaine, that both in time of peace and warre he shall be obeyed alwaies: For the most part of the people wil obey him voluntarily and without constraint, some for love; others for feare of his justice, which he shall have wel established in his domination. And therefore this Maxime cannot be but damageable & pernicious to a good prince, which being practised, alienateth him from the love of his subjects: for if he nourish partialities amongst his subjects, he cannot possibly carrie himselfe so egally towards both parties, but in the both will be jealousie and suspition: in so much, as each partie will esteeme the other to be more favoured of the prince than they, whereupon he wil hate his prince, and by that meanes it may come to passe, that the prince shal be hated of both parties, & so both the one and the other shall machinate his ruine, which hee can hardly shun, having all their evill wils. And suppose he had but the evill wil of the one partie, yet could he not be assured, seeing men are naturally enclined to a desire to ruinate and destroy that which they hate, and that not only many, but even one alone particular,

Partialities pernicious to a prince.

Ee ij.

may

Partialitie  
the founda-  
tion of ty-  
rannie.

may well find & encounter means to bring to passe his purpose, and to execute an enterprize, as before we have demonstrated by many examples: Therefore this Maxime cannot but be verie pernicious and verie perillous for a prince, who wil use it: But it may be a tyrant may make use of it, to hinder a concord of the people, which may prove ruinous and perillous unto him: for when a people accordeth, a tyrants nailes have no great power upon them, neither can easily introduce or practise tyrannicall actions upon a people which is in good concord; because he refuseth the yoke, and denieth obedience unto wicked ordinances and new burthens, & without obedience nothing by him is brought to effect. Therefore they which meane to introduce a tyrannie into a countrey, do first cast this foundation of Partialitie, as the certaineft meane to establish & build a tyranny: and although no tyrannie bee ever firme or assured, & that we seldome or never see, tyrants live long, because all tyrannie comprehendeth violence, & that by nature violent things cannot endure; as also that God sets in foot and exerciseth his justice upon them, yet for all that, is there not a better nor more expedient meane to establish a tyrannie, than to place & plant a Partialitie amongst the people: And this is the mark and end whereat *Machiavel* shooteth to establish a tyrannie, as we have before shewed in many places.

It may be *Machiavel* learned this Maxime of *Claudius Appius*, who was a man of courage, and verie tyrannicall towards the Romane people: and if all other Senators had been of his humor, assuredly the Senate had usurped a tyrannie in the citie, and changed the Aristocraticall estate into an Oligarchie: but most commonly, he remained alone in his opinion: But we must understand, that at Rome there was ten Tribunes of the people (which were magistrates established to conserve the liberties and franchises of the meane people, against the tyrannicall enterprizes of the great men of the citie) which had power to oppose themselves against all novelties, as new lawes, new burthens and imposts; and after a firme opposition, none might passe any further: They also had power to propose and pursue the reception of new lawes, as they knew it was requisit and profitable for all the people; whereby it often came to passe, that the Tribunes sought to make passe and to receive lawes, to the great dislike of the Patricians and Senators, and to the utilitie of the mean people. The above said *Claudius Appius* alwaies gave the Senate advice, to sow a Partialitie amongst the said ten Tribunes, and by the practise of that same amongst them, they might oppose themselves against laws, which others would have to passe: For (said he) by this meanes the Tribunes power shall ruinate it selfe, without that wee shall seeme any way to meddle therein, and without that the people shall know, that any of our action is in it. This counsell of *Appius* was many times followed, but in the end they found it did them no good: For after the Tribunes were partialized one against another, and that therby nothing could passe nor be concluded by way of deliberation and accustomed suffrages, then fell they to armes and seditions: So that in the end the people were constrained by force to plucke from the Patricians, that which they would not permit to be handled and disputed, by the accustomed way of good deliberation and conclusion by pluralitie of voices. Thus oftentimes the Patricians were constrained (to appease the people) to grant them things which by reason they might have perswaded them to leave: for it is the nature of men to desire alwayes that which is denied them, as the Poet *Horace* saith verie well, expressing that which happeneth ordinarily in the world.

*Titus Livius*  
*Dec.*  
*Dion. Halic.*  
*lib. 9.*



*That which denied is most commonly,  
Desired is of us most ardently.*

Moreover, it often came to passe, that the Patricians desired to make passe to the people (by meanes of the Tribunes) some law, which seemed unto them profitable for the commonwealth, but they could not come to their pretences, because they had fashioned the Tribunes to a contradiction one of another: And of those Tribunarie partialities arose at Rome, great insurrections of the people, and great murders and effusion of blood, as there did when the two brethren *Gracchi* were slain: And therefore that goodly counsell of *Appian* (whereupon *Machiavel* hath made his *Maxim*) was cause of great evils and calamities, as surely it is easie to judge, That all partialities and divisions are cause of ruine & desolation amongst a people: whereof we are also advertised by him who is truth it selfe, our Lord Iesus Christ, who saith, That every kingdome divided in it selfe, shall be desolate. And if there bee any *Machiavelist* so grosse headed, as he cannot comprehend this in his spirit, yet may he see this by experience in France, if he be not altogether blind: & if he be French, he cannot but palpably touch it in the losse of his goods, and in the death of his parents and friends, unlesse he be a lazer, or without sence: For all the late ruines of Fraunce, from whence have they proceeded, but from the partialities of Papists and Huguenots, which strangers sowed and maintained thereof. It is folly to say, that the diversitie of Religion was cause thereof: For if men had handled all controversies of Religion, by preachings, disputes, and conferences, as at the beginning they did, they had never fallen into partialitie: but since men came to armes & massacres, and that by constraint they will force men to beleve, partialities sprung up, which was the onely marke whereat all strangers shot, that thereby they might plant in France the government of *Machiavel*.

The Chalcedonians were well advised, not to beleve the counsell of the *Ætolians*, which resembled this doctrine of *Machiavel*, and the counsell of *Appian*: for when the warre was open betwixt the Romanes and the king *Antiochus*, the Chalcedonians, allies and friends of the Romanes, caused to bee assembled the States of their countries, to resolve upon that which *Antiochus* made them understand, That his onely coming into Greece, was to deliver the country from the subiection and servitude of the Romanes, and therefore required them to allie and conioine themselves with him. The *Ætolians* (which were very unconstant & mutable people with each wind, as are the *Machiavelists*) chanced to be in that assembly, & perswaded the Chalcedonians, that it was certaine, that the king *Antiochus* had passed from Asia into Europe, to deliver Greece from the Romanes servitude, and that they thought it best, that all the cities of Greece ought to allie and contract amitie with both the two parties, the *Antioches* and the Romanes: For (said they) if we allie our selves with both parties, whē the one would offend us, the other wil revenge us. The Chalcedonians not finding good this counsell of the *Ætolians*, knowing well, that as none can serve two contrary masters, so neither can they allie themselves with two nations enemies, and that they which will entertaine two contrarie parties, shall often fall into the mal grace of both: And therefore *Mixtion*, one of the principals amongst the Chalcedonians, made to the *Ætolians* a very wise and notable answer: Wee see not (masters *Ætolians*, say they) that the Romanes have seized upon any

towne in Greece, neither that therein they have placed any Roman garrison, nor that any paie them tribute, neither know we any, unto whom they have given any law or any thing changed their estate: And therefore we do not acknowledge our selves entangled in any servitude, but that we alwaies are in the same liberty which we have alwaies been: Being therefore free, we stand in no need of a deliverer, and the coming of the king *Antiochus* into Greece, cannot but hurt us, who can performe no greater good unto us, than to withdraw himselfe farre from our country: And as for us, we are resolved to receive none within our townes, but by the authoritie of the Romans, our allies. The Chalcedonians then governed themselves after this answer, and it happened well unto them. But the *Ætolians* were almost all ruined and lost by practising their foolish opinion, to entertaine both the Romanes and *Antiochians*, together: for so were they of necessitie forced to seeke practises, alwayes to maintaine warre betwixt the king and the Romanes commonweale, to the end, that the two powers might alwayes stand on foot, without abilitie one to overthrow another, because otherwise could they not attain to their desleigne & purpose, which was to keepe themselves in friendship with both parties: yet thus seeking and practising to sustaine them both, and maintaining them enemies, they made themselves hated of both: So that after the retreat of *Antiochus* into his countrey, these miserable *Ætolians* fell into a desperate case, like to have torne one another in peeces, burdening & accusing mutually one another to be the inventors of that wicked counsell: yet in the end, by the Romanes clemencie and bountie, which pardoned them, they had a certaine subsistence, though in a meane sort.

*Titus Livius*  
lib. 4. Dec. 1.

In the towne of *Ardea*, a neighbour of the Romanes, there was a like partialitie, as there is at this day at *Genes*: for now at *Genes* the people is banded against the nobles, and they will by no meanes receive any for duke of *Genes* of the nobilitie: inso much, as all dukes of *Genes* must needs be villaines and base men of race, and it may be there will be found in France of the like race as at *Genes*: The like partialitie (I say) being in the towne of *Ardea*, betwixt the nobility & the people, it happened that two yong batchelers, one of the people, and another of the nobilitie, fell at debate one against another, about the obtaining in mariage a yong maid of excellent beautie, but of a base and carterly race: Great bandying there fell out about this mariage, they of the nobilitie all casting their heads, and employing their abilities for their gentleman, who loved and desired that maid; and they obtained so much, as they got the maids mother on their side, who affected, that her daughter might be placed in a noble house: But contrarie the people which were for the other yong man of their owne race and qualitie, did so much for him, as they gained the maids tutors, which thought, that it was more reasonable, that their pupill should espouse an husband of her own qualitie, than to mount into a higher degree: for that equalitie ought (as much as might be) to be observed in marriage: Vpon altercation of this mariage, the parties were drawne unto justice, & the maid was adjudged to the gentleman, after the advice of the mother: yet although by law the gentleman got the cause, by force he could not: for the tutors with strong hand forced the maid from her mother: The gentleman unto whom she was adjudged, being almost enraged at this rape and injurie that was done him, gathered together a great companie of other gentlemen, his parents and friends, and gave charge upon those which had taken away his betrothed wife: Breefely, there was a great stirre and noise through the towne, and a great number slaine on both sides; and at last the gentlemen remained

mained masters of the towne,& the people were driven away: The people straying about the fields,ruinated the houses and possessions of the nobles : The abovesaid nobles sent to Rome,embassadors for succors: The people likewise sent to the Volques (people of Tuscanie)for their aid : By this meanes the Romanes and the Volques fell to warre one against another: But the Romanes carrying away the victory, beheaded the principall authors of the insurrection,which happened for this marriage in the towne of Ardea,and confiscated all their goods, which was adjudged to the communaltie of the Ardeats.Here you see how the partialitie which was in the towne of Ardea,was cause of that great calamitie and combustion : and therefore wel to be noted,are these words of *Titus Livius*: The Ardeates(saith he)were continually in an intestine war,the cause and commencement whereof proceeded of the contention of partialities,which alwaies have and will bee ruinous and damagable to people farre more than externe warres,than famine,than pestilence, or than all other evils,which the gods do send upon cities, which they will altogether destroy. These words are full contrarie to the Machiaveline doctrine, as indeed they are the words of another maner of author than *Machiavel*, at whom I doe much marvell, that he dare attempt to write discourses upon *Titus Livius*,since any may see, he understands him not , and his doctrine is also cleane contrarie to that of *Titus Livius*. Vnto the said sentence of *Titus Livius*, I wil add that which he reciteth from *Quintus Capitolinus*,who admonishing the souldiers of his armie : Our enemies(saith he) come not to assaile us upon any trust they have in our cowardize or their own vertue , for many times alreadie they have assailed both the one and the other; but it is for the confidence they have in our partialities and contentions which now are betwixt the Patricians and the people : for our partialities are the venome which empoisoneth and corrupteth this citie,because we are too imperious, and you too unmeasurably desirous of libertie.

The partialities of the Carthaginians, were they not cause of their utter ruine? There were two factions at Carthage, the Barchinian (whereof was *Annibals* house) and the *Hannonene* contrarie. As soone as *Amilcar* the father of *Anniball* was dead, the Carthaginians elected for captain general of their armie, *Asdrubal* their citizen, one of the Barchinian faction, which they sent to make war in Spaine with a great armie. This *Asdrubal* had learned his art of warre under *Amilcar*, which was the cause why he sought to have *Annibal* nigh him (who at that time was very yong) to administer unto him the same benefit which he had received at his fathers hands, & therefore writ to the Senate of Carthage. The Senate brought this to deliberation, and *Hanno* his advice being demanded, he reasoned in this sort: Masters (said he) me thinks the demand of *Asdrubal* is verie equall, yet I am not of opinion, his request should be graunted him: For it is equall in that hee desireth to restore a like benefit to the son, as he hath received of the father: yet may we not herein accommodate our selves to his will, & give him our youth to nourish after his fancie. I am then of advice, that this young *Anniball* be nourished and educated in this citie, under the obedience of lawes and magistrates, and that hee bee learned to live after justice, and in egalitie with others, least this little fire do one day raise up a far greater. The wisest and best advised of the Senate were of this opinion, but the pluralitie (which was of the Barchinian faction) was to send yong *Annibal* into Spain to the warre, who as soone as he came there was much beloved of the souldiers, as well because he resembled his father *Amilcar*, as for his militarie vertues. Not many yeres after,

Times Living  
Lib. 1. Dec. 3

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after, he was chosen capitaine generall of the Carthaginian armie: But as soone as he was settled in that estate, he accomplished the prophesie of *Hanno*, for hee lighted the great fire of the Punicke warres against the Romanes, whereby in the end the Carthaginians were utterly ruined: Altho proceeded but from the partiality which was at Carthage: for as soone as the Hannonians reasoned one way, the Barchinians must needs reason to the contrarie, and they studied for nothing, but that by the pluralitie of their voices, their opinion might obtaine the upper hand, without any care or consideration, what opinion was the best: And thus ordinarily happeneth it, where there is any partialitie: For then men give themselves more to contradiction, than to iudge after an wholesome sentence, and without passion of that which is profitable and expedient.

The partialities of the houses of Orleance and Burgoigne (in our grandfathers memorie) were they not cause of infinit miseries and calamities, wherewith France was afflicted by the space of more than threescore yeres, and of the entire ruine of the Bourgonian house? *Lewis* duke of Orleance, the alone brother of king *Charles* the sixth, tooke for his device (*Misto*) Duke *John de* Burgoigne tooke for his (*Accipio*) challenging as it were thereby an egalitie with the only brother of the king, under colour, that he was richer than he: This commencement of contrarie devices, which they caused to paint in their banners of their launces, and on their servants liverie coats, erected a great partialitie; insomuch, as the duke of Burgoigne enterprised to cause the duke of Orleance to be slaine (as he did.) The children of the duke of Orleance (because justice was not executed on their fathers massacre) levied arms: Duke *John* also by armes resisted them, insomuch, as all the realme was partialized about the quarrell of these two great houses: After, duke *John* was slayne at Mounterean-fante-Yonne, in a strange manner: whereupon his sonne *Philip*, willing to revenge himselfe, sent for the Englishmen, which he caused to passe through France, and occupied at least the third part of the kingdom of Fraunce. This duke *Philip* made peace with the king, but he had a son (*Charles* his successor) who would never put trust in the king of France, fearing himselfe, because of the warres which his father and grandfather had raised in the kingdome, but would needs grapple with king *Lewis* the eleventh. This king (who was too good for him) raised him up so many enemies on all sides, that the house of that duke came to ruine. Behold the fruits of partialities, which *Machiavell* recommendeth so much to a prince. And hereupon should well be noted, the saying of master *Philip de Comines*: That divisions and partialities are verie easie to sow, and are a sure token of ruine and destruction in a countrey, when they take root therein, as hath happened to many monarchies and commonweals.

*De Comines* to prove his alledged saying, setteth down other examples, The partialitie of the houses of Lancaster & Yorke in England, whereby the house of Lancaster was altogether ruined and brought downe, & the one house delivered to the other, seven or eight battailes betwixt three and fourscore prince of the roiall blood of England, and an infinit number of people. This here is no small thing, but it is rather an example, which should make us abhorre all partialities. Hee further sayeth, That by the means of the said partialitie betwixt those two houses, many great princes and lords were banished and chased from England, and amongst others, that he saw a duke of the house of Lancaster, the chiefe of the league of that house, and brother in law of king *Edward* the fourth, who saved himselfe in Burgoigne, yet in

so poore estate, that he went bare-foot and without hose after the traine of duke Charles of Bourgoigne, demanding his almes from house to house. He after reciteth the tragicall acts of the duke of Warwicke; of the kings, Edward and Henry; of the prince of Wales; of the dukes of Glocester and Somerser, which are strange hystories, that cannot be heard or read without great horror, and cannot but make men detest all Partialities and divisions.

In the time that Anniball made warre upon the Romanes, there were created Consuls together at Rome Marcus Livius and Claudius Nero, which bore great enmitie one towards another, and of long time: The Senate fearing that these enmities betwixt those two Consuls, should cause some Partialities in the administration of their estate, which might turne to the damage of the publike good, admonished them both to be reconciled together. Marcus Livius made answer, That it was not needfull, and that their enmities and partialities, should cause them with envie, to seeke one to doe better than another: but the Senate was not of that advice: For they remembred, that in the time of the Proconsulship of Quintus Pennus, Caius Furinus, Marcus Posthumus, and Cornelius Cossus, the Romane armie had beene vanquished and chased by the Veians, because of the partialities of the cheefetaines, which could not accord in their counsels and designs, but tended alwayes to contrarie ends. The like also happened in the Proconsulship of Publius Virginius, and Marcus Sergius: But the most memorable and latest example, which the Senate had before their eyes, was the losse of the battaile at Cannes, where the Romans lost fiftie thousand men, which losse happened by the discord and partialitie of two cheefetaines, Paulus Emilius, and Terentius Varro. These examples mooved the Senate to exhort these two Consuls, Livius and Nero, to a reconciliation, not beleeving that their partialities could serve them for any thing, but evill to conduct the affaires of the commonweale; insomuch, as being constrained by the Senates authoritie, they accorded and reconciled themselves together, and very wel acquitted themselves in their charge, and overthrew together a succour of fiftie thousand men, which Asdrubal conducted and brought over into Italie, to Anniball his brother: In this defeat also, Asdrubal himselfe was slaine, and his head secretly carried and cast into Annibals campe, who yet knew no newes of that journey: When Anniball saw the head of his brother, he then deplored his fortune, and despaired of his affaires, knowing that the Roman vertue would never bow nor stoop for either misfortune or calamitie.

The reconciliation then and concord of Marcus Livius, and Claudius Nero, were cause of a great good and utilitie to the commonwealth; and remounted the affaires thereof into a great hope, and abated the pride that Anniball had taken of the battaile at Cannes; as also by the contrarie, the Partialitie of Paulus Emilius (who was a wise captaine) and of Terentius Varro (who was verie rash and heady) was the cause that the Romane Commonwealth was almost utterly overthrowne, and that Anniball was mounted into so great pride and hope, to bee master thereof.

Concord then, & not partialitie, is profitable and healthful to a commonwealth: and to this purpose is verie memorable, the oration of Fabius Maximus, to the Romane people. Fabius being elected Consull (which was the greatest magistracie in the Romane commonweale) five times, and twice having had for his companion Publius Decius; the people at this time would needs take for his companion, Lucius

Volum-

Titus Livius  
lib. 1. & 7.  
Dec. 3. & 11.  
4. & 5. Dec. 1

Concord  
very profit-  
table to the  
common-  
weale.

Titus Livius  
lib. 10. Dec. 3

Voluntarius: But the abovesaid *Fabius* arose upon his feet, and turning himselfe towards the people, said: My masters, I have already had in two Consulships, for companion *Publius Decius*, and we have carried our selves together, in a verie good concord, therefore I pray you to give me him, yet this time also, in favour of my age, which hardly can now accustome it selfe with any other companion: You know that there is nothing more firme, for the tuition of the commonweale, than magistrates which accord well: for everie man will communicate his counsell more privately with him he knoweth, and who is of manners and conditions accordant with his owne, than with another. At this request of *Fabius* the people accorded unto him, *Decius* for his companion, yea, and that with such joy and comfort, as each man thought that from so good concord of two Consuls, there could not proceed any thing, but good and profit to the commonwealth.

*Titus Livius*  
lib. 5. Dec. 1

The Romanes one day, having no silver in their publike treasure, to make warre which they then had on their armes, the Senate gave charge to certaine Senators, to remonstrate to the people, that each man should make them readie to doe their best, for the defence of the commonwealth, and that none ought to abandon the defence of their country, for want of sol'd and payment of wages: This was so well done, as first the knights offered for nothing to serve the commonweale: Incontinent after this offer made, there runne to the pallace great troupes of people, to cause themselves to be enrowled to march in warre without wages: The abovesaid Senat caused and ordained, that the colonels of souldiers, as well foot as horsemen, should assemble their regiments, and by orations give them great thanks, in the name of the Senate, and of the commonwealth, for this their good will, freely to serve the commonweale: which commission they all executed, highly praying the generositie of the Roman souldiers: Hereby all the world was taken with so great joy for this great concord and unanimite of great and small, to couserve the commonweale, that every one wept for joy, and cried on high, That assuredly the citie of Rome was most happie, invincible, & eternall, by this concord: That the knights were most brave men, worthy of prayles: That the people were good and lowable, and that the debonairetie and kindnesse of the Senate had beene vanquished by the prompt and voluntarie obedience of the people. Here you may see what opinion the Roman people had of concord, so farre were they off to thinke that partialities were good.

But when wee say, That concord is good, necessarie and profitable for the conservation of the publike good: I say not, that herein is meant, that all persons which deale in the commonwealth, ought of necessity, to bee of one humor, of one voice and complexion: For rather contrarie, they must needs bee gentle and sharp, affable and fierce, severe and pitifull, such as *Appius*, and *Publicola*, *Caroes* and *Casars*: For as in the Lute, if the strings were all of one sound, the harmonic were worth nothing, but being of divers sounds, tending to one melodie, it prooves a pleasant and agreeable harmonic: so in a commonweale, or in a princes Counsell, if all were of one humour and inclination, their advices and government could not be good, but being of divers natures (yet tending to one end, which is the common good) their opinions shall alwaies be better debated, by divers and contrarie reasons, and by conclusions, better taken and better digested. This it is which *Tullius Hostilius* king of the Romans, said to *Sufferius* dictator of the Albonois: The partialities (saith he) which thou reprochest unto us, are profitable, and not damageable to the commonwealth,

*Dion. Halic.*  
lib. 3.



monwealth, as thou saist: For we contend together, who shall most profit it, great, or yong, old, or new citizens: And because to maintaine a publike estate, two things are necessarie, Force in warre, and Prudence in counsell, we wil contend and debate upon them both, who shall do best, and who shall shew himselfe most vertuous in warre, and most prudent in counsell: This Partialitie then which is in counsel, when all men tend to the publike good, are well according discordances, which in the end make a verie sweet harmonie.

I conclude then this matter, with the saying of *Comines*, That if a prince which is in peace, maintaine partialities amongst his subiects, they wil bring him into warre, and if he be once in warre, they will bring him unto ruine and confusion: I conclude then, That a prince above all things, ought to take heed, that hee nourish no Partialities, unlesse it be (saith he) amongst women: For a prince may take pleasure in maintaining a partialitie amongst the ladies and gentlewomen of his court, & so may alwayes have some pleasant newes to laugh at, and take his pastime: But yet I could like better, that amongst the ladies of a princes court, there should bee such a partialitie, as there was in times past, amongst the Romane Ladies: The Patrician ladies had a chappell, dedicated to the Patrician Pudicitie or chastitie, unto which place they often went, to make their devotions, in a great troupe: These ladies being one day in their chappell, there arrived *Verginia*, who was a Patrician, but shee was married to *Lucius Volumnius*, who was of the third estate, although also a great lord: These Patrician ladies would by no meanes suffer *Verginia* to enter into their chappell, because she was not married to a Patrician, but thrust her backe: *Verginia* said, she was by race a Patrician, and that she was a chaste wife, without reproach, and married to a lord, who had received great honor and estates, in the commonwealth, and was now in a high degree thereof, although by race he were but of the third estate: Notwithstanding whatsoever she could say, these Patrician ladies would not suffer her to enter into their chappell: *Verginia* seeing this (to shew that shee was a chaste ladie) caused an altar to be erected to Pudicitie, and dedicating it in the presence of a great troupe of other Patrician ladies: I dedicate (saith shee) this altar to the Patrician Chastitie, and do admonish you all, that the same contention, which is amongst our husbands, who shall be most valiant & vertuous, may also be amongst us, who shall be most chaste, and that you may so doe, and behave your selves, as this altar may be more holily and chaste reverenced, than this chappell here. Behold here a contention worthy of vertuous and sage ladies: But at this day, ladies contend, who shall best dance, paint, and decke themselves, and do such like things as do not lead them into the chappell of the Romane Patricians, nor to the altar of *Verginia* her Chastitie, but rather doe lead them cleane contrarie,

Partialitie  
amongst  
women.

*Titus Livius*  
lib. 10. Dec. 2

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*Seditions*

31. *Maxime.*

*Seditions and civile dissensions are profitable and blamelesse.*



Say against the advise of many (sayth master *Nicholas*) that dissensions and civile seditions, are good and profitable, and that they were the cause that Rome is mounted into the loftie degree of empire, wherein it hath beene: I know well that some hold, that it was rather her valiancie in armes, and her good fortune, which so high hath lifted her up: But they which hold this, do not consider, that deeds of arms cannot be conducted without good order and good policie, and that it is policie, which commonly leadeth to good fortune: But certayne it is that seditions have beene cause of good order, and of the good policie, which was establisht at Rome: And in summe, all the goodly acts and examples of the antient Romanes, have proceeded from this fountayne of seditions: For good examples proceed from good nurture and education; good nurture proceeds from good lawes and policies; and the mother of good lawes, are seditions, and civile dissensions, which inconsideratly most men condemne.



It were to bee desired, that *Machiavell* and his nation, which esteeme seditions and civile dissensions so profitable, had reserved them for themselves, with all the utilitie and profit that is in them, and not have participated them with their neighbours. As for France, they might wel have spared the seditions and partialities, which the Italian Machiavelists have sown on this side the mounts, which caused so much bloodshed, so many houses destroyed, and so many miseries and calamities, as every man fees, sees, and deplores. Would to God then all civile dissensions, had remained amongst the Florentines, and other Italians, who do love & find them good, so that the Frenchmen had beene without them; then would not France be so rent and toine in peeces, as it is, and it should not bee enfeebled more than halfe in his forces; the people should not bee so poore as we see them, nor so naked of his substance, and all good meanes: For civile dissensions have brought to the realme, such a ransacke and discomfiture of goods, and have so abandoned and overthrowne all free commerce and good husbandrie (which are the two meanes to store and fill a countrey with

with abundance of goods) that at this day, there are scarce no good houses, but they which were wont to bee, are ruinated and altogether impoverished and made barren: And truly it is as in a forrest, when a man sees all the goodly oaks hewen downe, and that there remaineth no more there, but thornes, shrubs, and bushes; For even as such a forrest, which either hath none, or few trees in it, meriteth rather the name of a bush, than of a forrest; so the kingdome or commonweale, whose good and ancient houses are impoverished, deserveth rather to be named by the name of a desert, than of a kingdome or commonweale.

Moreover, the reason which *Machiavell* alledgeth, whereby hee would proove Seditions to be good, is very grosse and foolish: for follow with this, Because Seditions are sometime not the cause but the occasion, that there are made some good lawes and rules, That they are therefore good: This reason is like the argument of a certaine philosopher, whom *Aulus Gellius* mocketh, who would maintain, that the fever quartaine is a good thing, because it makes men sober and temperate, and to guard themselves from eating and drinking too much. Such philosophers as delight to broach such absurd opinions, deserve to bee left without answer, with their Seditions and fever quartaines, to draw out such profit from them, as they say doe proceede out of them: Doth not the common proverbe say, That from evill manners, doe proceede good lawes? and doth it therefore follow, that evill manners are goods? that is, doth it follow, that white is blacke, or blacke white? The grossest headed fellowes know wel, that law makers, never set downe lawes, but onely to reforme vices, and abuses, which are in a people: so that indeede, no lawes would have been made, if the people walked uprightly, and committed no abuses, nor had any vices: For lawes are not set downe, but for transgressors, and to bound intemperate persons within limits, and bounds: Hereof followeth it, that abuses, vices, straying, and lusts are occasions of good lawes, and prudent princes and law makers are the efficient causes of them; but it doth not therefore follow, that vices, abuses, and straying lusts, are good things.

Moreover, it is not alwaies true, that which *Machiavell* saith, That Seditions are causes, or occasions of having good lawes and rules: The Seditions which were raised up at Rome, by *Tiberius Gracchus*, and *Caius* his brother, Tribunes of the people, which were so great & sanguinary, were not cause of any good laws: They were the cause, that they both were massacred, as they merited, but they were neither cause nor occasion of any good law or rule: and how should they be cause thereof, seeing they tended to authorise and make passe wicked lawes, and to despoile true masters and proprietors of their goods? For *Tiberius Gracchus*, pursued by his Seditious faction that a law (called *Agraria*) might bee received and authorised, whereby it was not lawfull for a Romane citizen, to possesse above ten acres land, which was as much to say, as to take away the more from them, which had more: And because *Marcus Octavius* his companion, in the Tribunate, opposed himselfe to hinder the passage of this law, as both wicked and unjust; *Gracchus* would needs have had him dispatched of his estate, and sought to make a Triumvirate of himselfe, of his brother, and of his father in law, to divide amongst the people, rich mens goods: This was the cause that the great lords of the citie, by the advice and counsell of *Scipio Nasica* (who was accounted the best man thereof) slew him in the Capitoll, and caused his body to bee cast into Tiber: His brother *Caius Gracchus* being Tribune of the people, a certaine space after, sought againe to bring up that law *Agraria*, and

Seditious  
cause of ra-  
vishment,  
of goods, &  
of cessation  
of com-  
merce, and  
agriculture.



would needs devise one out of his owne braine; whereby it was ordained, that in all judgements and conclusions of affaires, there should be 600 knights, and 300 Senators, all having voices; & this did he to have the pluralitie of voices, at his command, knowing that the knights, would alwaies easily encline to his pursues, and so could hee not faile to obtaine what hee would, if at all deliberations, there were twice as many knights as Senators. But this was a wicked law tending to overthrow and weaken the authoritie of Senarors, and therefore they hindered it: For *Lucius O-pimius* Confull (by the decree of the Senate) caused the people to arme themselves, and to goe assaile *Caius Gracchus*, with the seditious of his troupe: and in the conflict *Gracchus* was slaine, with *Flacchus* his fellow in the Triumvirate. Finally, the seditions of these two brethren *Gracchi*, tended but to bring forward wicked lawes, and hereof came no good, but they were cause of infinit murders, and of great effusion of blood.

*Dionin Aug-  
gusto.*

The seditions also, which were raised up at Rome, by the Triumvirate of *Octavius*, *Antonius*, and *Lepidus*, what good, brought they to the commonwealth? They were cause of infinit mischiefs, of so great and long civile warre, of the death of an infinit number of persons, of the ruine, impoverishment and pillage of the provinces of the empire, and finally of the change of the estate of the commonwealth, into a monarchie: And although that the subjects of the Romane empire, did not then feele any harme by that change, because they light on a good prince, *Augustus*; yet after they felt it under five or six emperours, all which successively followed *Augustus*, that is to say *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, *Glandius*, *Nero*, *Otha* and *Visellius*, all which were bad emperours, and governed very tyrannicallie.

*Herod. lib. 3.*

*Herodianus* writeth, That the Greekes were first subjugated, and brought under subjection by the Macedonians, and after, by the Romanes, because of their accustomed seditions, whereby they bannished or caused to die ordinarily, the most valiant and generous persons that they had in their commonwealth: And yet after they were brought under the Romans yoke, they could not hould themselves from beeing seditious, yea even when there were many competitors to the empire: for ever they banded for some one, which was after cause oftentimes of the racing, ruinating and destroying of their best townes, as happened in the time of *Severus*, to such as partialized for *Niger*.

Before the Romanes had subjugated the Gaulois, Gaule was divided into pettie commonweales (as *Julius Caesar* saith in the commentaries) which notwithstanding were leagued together, and held a Diet, once a yee at Dreux to parlie and confer of the whole countries affaires: But at last there fell a partialitie amongst them, insomuch, as there became great warre betwixt the Sequanois and the Autunois: The Sequanois drew to their succours the Alemaines, under the conduction of *Ariovistus*; and the Autunois the Romanes, under the conduction of *Caesar*: *Caesar* ariving in Gaule, to succour the Autunois, did so well, as hee planted greater division and sedition through all Gaule, and by that meanes subjected it to the Romane empire. And it was a province, which the Romanes esteemed most opulent and rich of all them under the empire: so made they their account, to draw ordinarily out of it, greatest store of silver: And indeede, after Gaule was made subject unto the Romanes it was alwaies much vexed with imposts, and tributes, and with the extorcions & pillages of governours, which (to cover their robberies with some colour) said, it was needefull to hould the Gaulois poore, least they rebelled a-

gainst

gainst

gainst the Romanes, against whom they had aunciently made warre, and obtained upon them many victories.

The tenne Potentates which were created at Rome in the place of Consul, would needs usurp a tyrannie, and continue in their estate beyond the time established by lawes: But what meanes used they? even sedition: For so long as they could maintaine sedition betwixt the people, and the Patricians, their tyrannie was in some assurance, but as soone as great and small of the citie, were at an accord, the ten Potentates, were withall straight ruined and overthrowne. But this example, is very fit to confirme the Maxime of *Machiavell*, according to the end whereunto it tendeth, which is, to establish a tyrannie: for seditions and civile dissensions, may something serve a tyrants turne to maintaine him in his tyrannie, but because heretofore wee have sufficiently parlied of tyrannicall actions, and alledged many examples, which in their places may be found, wee passe on.

*Dionis. Hallic.  
lib. 11.*



### 32. Maxime.

*The meanes to keepe subjects in peace and union, and to bound them from Rebellion, is to keepe them alwaies poore.*



He townes (saith *Machiavell*) which are placed in leane and barren soiles, are customably united and peaceable, because the inhabitants there, being ever occupied in ploughing, and labouring the earth, have no other meanes nor lesure to thinke upon seditions and rebelli-

ons: And contrary, towns situated in fat & rich countreies, are easily enclined to stirres and disobediences: For truly, strifes & debates, which arise every day amongst men, proceede onely of riches, and abundance of goods, & rich people will not suffer themselves to be handled as we commonly see. Therefore did the Romanes maintaine in poore estate, their Colonies, and assigned them small possessions, least they should rise up against them; yea even within their owne towne, a long time reigned, a very great Povertrie, notwithstanding which, the citizens left not to bee vertuous people, and imploied in great publike charges, as were *Quintus Cincinatus*, *Marcus Regulus*, *Paulus Emilius*, and many others which were very poore, yet executed great things. And surely we have

*Discourse  
lib. 1. cap. 22.  
lib. 2. cap. 7.  
lib. 3. cap. 16.  
and 25.*

ever seene that povertie, hath produced better fruits than riches, and that a people being rich and fat, have alwaies been more prompt to rebellion, and disobedience: Therefore it is an healthfull and good remedy, to hould subjects poore, to the end that by their riches they neither may corrupt themselves nor others.



Ere may a man see the very counsell, which *Guiemand* gave to *Giles*, governour for the Romane emperour in the towne of Soissons, and the neighbour countries. *Chilperick* the fourth of that name, king of France, had for one of his most especiall friends and counsellors, this *Guiemand*, who was a valiant and sage French baron. This king sometimes led a slippery and disordinate life, so that to furnish his pleasure and unmeasurable expences, hee was constrained to impose upon the people great imposts, and to commit great exactions. The French, which at that time were of an austere courage (saith the hy storie) begun to hate him and beare him evill will, and to resolve amongst them selves to seize his person, and to appoint a tutor for him, and so to take from him all his young and bad counsellors about him: which he perceiving, demaunded *Guiemand* his advice, what he should doe: *Guiemand* counselled him to flie, and to give place to the French ire, which in his absence hee would appease, and as soone as they were quieted, he would recall him: He also parted a gold ring in two, and gave one moitie to the king, saying: Sir when I send you this other halfe, which I keepe, it shall be unto you a certain token, that you may boldly come againe, and without feare *Chilperick* then retired towards the king of Thuringe, and in his absence the French elected for their cheefetaine, the said *Giles*, governour of a great part of Gaule, which the Romane emperor then held: This *Giles* called *Guiemand* to be about him, as one of his Counsell, because he was reputed a wiseman: *Guiemand* dissembled the best he could by the space of nine yeares, all which time he was about this *Giles*, yet never forgetting the amitie and fidelitie which hee bore to his king: But amongst other things which hee counselled this governour, this was one, that hee gave him to understand, that the Frenchmens nature, is to be rudely handled in great subjection, and to take great heed they doe not enrich themselves; for they are farre better poore than rich, and when they are rich, and at their ease, then doe they incontinent rebell against their prince. Breefely, by this goodly counsell (whereof he desired such issue as after happened) hee put in that Romane governours head to lay great imposts and exactions upon the French people, and withall to practise cruelties. This was the cause that the Frenchmen (by the advice and secret handling of *Guiemand* himselfe) called againe their king *Chilperick*, unto whom *Guiemand* sent the halfe ring which he had. The king returning, the French gentlemen met him even at Bar, where they dealt with him most honorably: The king also forgave them all new tributes and imposts, and from thence forward governed himselfe wisely, and of a *Sardanapalus*, which he had been before his flight, he became after his returne a noble and valiant prince, and chased the Romanes from a good part of Gaule which they held, and greatly enlarged the limits of the realme of Fraunce. Therefore is it evidently seene, that the Maxime of *Machiavell*, or the counsell which *Guiemand* gave to *Giles* (which is one same doctrine) is not very good, and that the issue thereof cannot be but evill.

And



And to argue this point by reason, I thinke every man will confesse unto me, that it is more expedient for a prince to bee king and lord of a rich and plentifull countrey, than of a barren and poore countrey: for a withered and poore country cannot nourish any great people: Moreover, a poore and barren countrey cannot produce and bring forth things necessarie to the tuition thereof, as abundance of corn, wine, fodder, money, and other things. Finally, to make a kingdome strong and puissant, (as well to maintaine it, as to augment it) there is a necessitie, that it bee copious and rich of all things. And although *Machiavel* in a certaine place where he speaketh of warre, maintaineth, that the common saying is false, *That money are the sinewes of warre*, this hindreth not, but that which we say may be true: For suppose it bee true (as *Machiavell* by his foolish subtiltie maintaines,) that it is the good soldiours which are the sinewes of the warre, and not money; yet these sinewes cannot stirre, nor be brought to any great actions, without clapping upon the cataplasme of money: So that if money be not the sinewes of warre (after the foolish subtiltie of *Machiavell*) because they have not of themselves either motion or operation: yet at the least are they the meanes which causeth the sinewes to moove, & without which souldiours, can do nothing, or at least, without paiement, in equipollent kinds to mony, as victuals, apparell, and armour. And if it be objected unto me, that there are some poore nations, which notwithstanding are puissant & warlike, as were the Macedonians in the time of *Alexander* the Great, and these were poore in regard of the Greekes, Persians, and Medes; and as at this day are the Tartarians and Scythians; and as the Suiffes were within this hundred yeares: Hereunto I do many wayes answer: That first I will not denie, that the nations or poore countries cannot bee but naturally good warriors (as commonly all Northernly nations are, of which number, are the Macedonians, Scythians, and Tartarians; yea, the Suiffes also & the *Almaignes* hold now of the North) But this their martiall vertue proceeds not from their povertie: For in *Affricke*, *America*, and in many other places of *Asia*, and in many Islands there are many poore nations, yet nothing warlike: But if poore nations, which are naturally warlike, become rich in their countrey, they will not therefore leese their warlike vertue: As the Suiffes at this day are very opulent and rich, yet are they nothing lesse valiant in war than they were in the time of the battaile of *Morât* (about a hundred yeares since) which they got against the duke of *Bourgoigne*: in which time they were so poore, that many of them could not discern vessels of silver from peuter, as *M. de Comines* saith. The Macedonians also, became very rich, after that under the conduct of *Alexander*, they had conquered *Asia*; yet remained they alwayes generous and valiant. The Romans also in time of the foundation of *Rome*, were very poore, but within a small time they became very rich, yet therefore lost not their valour and generositie. It is not then the povertie of the country which makes a warlike people, but rather the nature and inclination of the heaven, which likewise is much aided, when the countrey may become rich.

If there be opposed unto me also, That we see many princes and privat persons, which doe evill abuse their riches, as *Caligula* did 67 millions of gold, which *Tiberius* left him; and as *Cæsar* did the great treasures which hee heaped up in *Gaul*, and as many others did: Hereunto I doe two wayes answer: First, I say, it followeth not that riches and treasures are evill, because some abuse them, no more than wine is to be condemned, because many are drunke therewith. And although there bee some princes & other persons which have abused their riches, there are also many which

The force of a prince consisteth in the riches of his countrey.

Riches is more requisite for a generall, than particulars.

use them well. I moreover say, that the consequence is not good in this case, from the particular to the generall: For I confesse well, that it should be better and more profitable for the commonwealth, that in a countrey there were many houses meanly rich, than some little number excessively rich, because of itself that excessse proves verie pernicious to him that enjoyeth it, who is thereby sometimes incited to stray out of the limits of lawes and temperance. But suppose it true, that great riches is most commonly damageable to particulars; it therefore followeth not that they are not, nor may be in a countrey in generall: but the more rich a countrey is, so much more is it strong and puissant, if so be that it be so well governed, as the particulars abuse not their riches: which they will not doe (especially being under the yoke of good Lawes and good Magistrates) if every man have not too great abundance thereof, but in a mediocritie according to their qualities and degrees: for such a meane seemes very requisit and profitable, because they are meanes & aids to come unto vertue, and to be exercised therein: but the excessse is often pernicious, as it was in many particular Romanes in *Cæsars* time, which were so exceeding opulent and rich, that their excessive riches drew them out of the limits of vertue, to give themselves unto all luxurie, and to enterprise novelties and changes.

A Prince  
ought not  
to thesaurize.

But when I say, that unmeasurable riches are pernicious most often to particular persons, I meane also of the person of a soveraigne Prince: For it is neither good nor profitable, that a prince doe treasure up nor make heapes of riches: for it serves but for a bait, to draw unto him enemics, or to engender quarrels and divisions after him, & we often see, that Princes great treasures are causes of more evill than good. That infinit treasure of threescore and seven Millions of gold, which *Tiberius* left after him, for what good purpose served it? It served to commit a thousand villanies and unprofitable expences, full of corruptions, which *Caligula* would never have made, if he had not found that treasure. And the treasure which *Charles le Sage*, king of Fraunce, left behind him, wherefore served it, but to sowe enmitie and division amongst brethren? for *Lewis* duke of Anjou got it, for which the dukes of Berry and Bourgoigne bore him evill will, and on their sides also (to get treasures) they caused great exactions to be laid upon the people. And what good did this treasure to the duke of Anjou? but tended to the destruction of him and his treasure, in the conquest of the Realmes of Naples and Sicilie. The great treasures of king *Cyrus* of Lidia, incited him to warre against king *Cyrus* of Persia and Media, to his owne destruction. The treasures of *Perseus*, king of Macedonie, made him put so great confidence in his forces, that he would needs have warre with the Romanes, and so lost all, together with himselfe. Breefely, it is neither good nor profitable for a prince to heap up, nor to have great treasures and riches enclosed in one place. And what then? must a soveraigne prince be poore? No: But contrarie, he had need be rich and very opulent: for otherwise he shall be feeble and weake, and cannot make head against his enemies: but his riches and treasures must be in the purses and houses of his subjects; that is to say, a Prince must so deale, that his subjects by good handling and maintenance of good peace, may abound and be rich, that their townes may be maintained in their liberties and franchises, and in free commerce, and that the labourer and all others may be comforted and preserved from extraordinarie and excessive imposts, and from exactions and pillings of Magistrates, and of a companie of ruffians and violent persons, which under colour, that they hold the place of an Archer in the kings militarie ordinances, or some horseman, therefore will they eat and

The surest  
treasure of  
a Prince, is  
in the sub-  
jects purses.

and ruinate the poore labourer and others, under colour of a commission to receive tenthes, and of others under pretext to receive some taile or money royall, and of others under diverse other pretexts: For to say true, the petty and inferiour people is as much or more foiled and spoiled by magistrates, and such as usurpe the office of magistrates, as by the imposts of money which are destined for the prince. If a prince then shoot at this marke, that through all his countrey and lands of his obedience, the subjects be rich and abundant, and that there be the greatest number that can be of good and rich houses, then shall there be so many treasures for him, and he shall never want in his need: For the nobleman shall serve in good order, yea at his owne expences if need be in affaires of warre; the merchant and laborer shall furnish him with silver and souldiors; the Cleargie wil willingly contribute their tenthes: breefely, the prince shall find ordinarily good and assured recourse in his subjects purses, which will be the best treasures he can have: for in place to give great wages to other treasurers (which can often subtilly steale from their prince, without being perceived) these treasurers will take no wages of their prince, nor steale from him, neither will his treasure perish in their hands. And truly, the true and assured riches of a prince, which he cannot leese, and which cannot faile him, is the riches of his subjects: for other of the princes treasurers may be undone by the povertie of collectors of the princes debts, or by some other chance of warre or shipwracke; but the treasure that is in all the peoples hands, is not subject to hazards: And therefore the prince cannot better treasure up wealth and enrich himselfe, than by growing rich by good dealing with his subjects. The Venetians (which are wise Politikes) use this: For it is a capitall crime in their Commonwealth, to speake of gathering money for a publike treasure: But their particulars are so rich, that the publike cannot be poore.

By the abovesaid reasons it seemeth unto me, that the Maxime of *Machiavell* is sufficiently confuted; and that it is scene, that a Prince for the good of his estate, ought to maintaine his Subjects rich and not poore: For to say that poore subjects will be more tractable and obedient, and will more easily thrust their heads under the yoke, and will better beare burdens when they are laid upon them, it is rather contrarie. This was the opinion of the emperour *Galba*, who said (when one told him, that *Vitellius* enterprised upon the empire) that there were no people lesse to be feared, than such as are every day in thought to live, and therefore he being such an one, was not to be feared. But *Galba* knew well in the end, to the losse of his life, that his saying was not true, and that a person in necessitie will seek all meanes, good and bad, right and wrong, to obtaine his purpose. The same cause of Povertie made also *Orto* to enterprise to aspire to the empire: For he himselfe said, that he had rather die in warre, in hazarding himselfe to come to an empire, than to die in prison for his debts. Therefore said *Iulius Caesar* to such as were poore & great spenders, or which were loaden with crimes, that they stood in need of a civile warre; meaning that the best meane to put away their poverrie, was to see pilleries and thefts permitted (as they are in civile warres) to gather silver and other goods good cheape, with little labour. And to this purpose is very notable the sentence of *Salust*: Alwaies (saith he) men of one citie, which have no goods, doe envie good people; doe make most account of such as are naught; doe hate the present government, and desire a new; and disdaining their owne affaires, doe studie for a change, because povertie cannot incurre any hazard of losse.

Povertie  
makes men  
enterprise  
novelties.

*Sueton. Caesar*  
*Dis. cap. 71*

If it



Dion. Halic.  
lib. 5. 6. 7.

Annal. 3.

Dion. in Au-  
gust.

Means how  
a Prince  
may enrich  
his subjects.

If it were needfull to confirme this by examples, to shew, That poverty hath many times been cause of great insurrections & civile warres: We reade that at Rome there were many stirrs and seditions against usurers, which ate up, and impoverish'd the people, and caused great faintnesse. The like often happened in France: for in the time of king *Philip Augustus* the conquerour, in the time of *S. Lewis*, in the time of king *John*, and many other times the Jewes and Italians, which held bankes, and practised usuries in France, whereby they ruined the people, were chaled and banished out of the kingdome. The factions of Mailotins, and of such as carried coules, and hoods of divers colours, and other like popular inventions, tending to seditions and civile wars, were not founded upon any other foundation than that: For poore people of base estate, are alwaies the authors & executioners of such factions & seditions. In the time also that France was under the obedience of the Romane empire, we reade that the Gaulois rose up often, when they sought to impoverish them by undue exactions: As in the time of *Augustus*, there was in Gaule one *Licinius*, a receiver of imposts, who practised great and undue exactions, upon the people, unknowne to *Augustus*; and because at that time, part of Gaulois payed tributes, each chiefe of every house a certaine summe by month; this master deceiver made a weeke but sixe daies, and a moneth, but of twentie foure daies; so that in the yeere, were foureteene moneths, and so two fell to his profit: *Augustus* being aduertised herof, was much grieved, yet did no justice thereon. Not long after, *Augustus* sent for governour into Gaul, *Quintilius Varus*, who was a great lord, & before had had the government of Siria, where he had filled his hands: Ariving in Gaul, hee sought to doe there as he had done in Siria, and began to commit great exactions upon the people, and to deale with them, after the Sirian manner (that is) like slaves: The Gaulois seeing this, made a countenance, voluntarily to accompanie *Varus* and his armie, against the high Almaines, upon which hee made warre; but after they had couducted him and his army into a straight, whence hee could not save himselfe, they set upon him, & defeated & cut his army in pieces. *Varus* and the other great lords of his company, slew themselves in dispaire: And hereupon the Gaulois rebelled against the Romane emperours many times; as under *Nero*, under *Galien*, & under many others, and at the last freed and cut off themselves altogether from the obedience of the empire: Whereupon I conclude, That to goe about to hould the people poore (as *Machiavell* counselleth) there can arise nothing but insurrections, seditions, and confusions in the commonwealth.

But the meanes that a prince ought to hould, to enrich his subjects without weakning his owne power, is first to take away all abuses, which are committed upon the people in the collection of ordinarie tributes: For a prince most righteously may levie ancient & accustomed tributes, to sustaine publike charges, otherwise his estate would dissolve: And he ought not to follow the example of *Nero* who once would needes abolish all tributes and imposts; and because the Senate shewed him that hee ought not to doe it, he imposed other new, without number. For a good & wise prince will doe neither the one nor the other, but without inventing any new tributes, will maintaine himselfe in the exaction only of the ancient, which he will cause to be received, the most graciouslie, and without stirre of the people that can be; which to doe, it seemes to bee requisite, that such taxes & imposts, be ducly laid without favour, or respect of persons: which in times of old, was a reformation that the king *Tullus Hostilius* made in his time at Rome, whereupon he was much praised

fed, and his poore people comforted: Men must also imitate the ancient Romanes, which excepted no person, from patrimoniall tributes, which are such reall burdens as are payed in regard of grounds, whereunto they belong: For there was neither Senator nor bishop, but he paid as well as they of the third estate: There must also bee a provision made, that the receivers and treasurers (which are they which doe most hurt to the people) may no more pill and spoile the world: There must also an hand bee houlden, that so excessive usuries be no more practised, under the name of pensions and interests; and that it bee permitted to deliver silver, to a certaine moderate profit, which upon great paines it may not be lawfull to exceede: for to forbid at once all profit, is to give unto men occasions to seeke out palliation in contracts, by sales of pensions; by letting to hire fruits; by selling to sell againe; fained remunerations, & such like colours: There must a provision be made, that strangers, bankers, nor others, may no more make themselves bankrupts: And here would bee brought in use, a law, made in the time of the emperour *Tiberius*, whereby it was ordained, that no man might hould a banque, vpon a great paine, which had not two third parts of his goods in ground of inheritance: moreover there must bee repressed the superfluities of apparell, of banquets, and other like, wherby men doe so impoverish them selves; this shall bee a cause that povertie or to have little, shall bee the more tollerable: For as *Caro* the elder said, in an orration for the law *Oppia* (against the great estates and luxuries of women:) It is a great evil, and dangerous shame, the shame of povertie & parcimonie, but when the law forbiddeth superfluities & excesses of apparell, and other vaine expences, it covereth that shame with an honourable mantle of living after lawes, seeing that it is a most praiseable thing, and the contrary punishable and vituperable: And assuredly saith he, it ordinarily commeth to passe, that when wee are ashamed of that, whereof wee should not, wee will not be ashamed of that, whereof wee ought to have shame. Finally a prince must bee a good justicer, ever respective that the meaner & poorer sort, be not oppressed by the greatest neither by such men as are violent or evill livers: All those things shall bee no charge to the prince, to bring to passe: yet by these meanes, hee may greatly enrich his subjects, which then will never spare any thing they have, at their princes demand. The people of the earldome of Foix, are of their owne natures rude and stubborne enough, yet we reade, That in the time of *Gaston*, contie of Foix (who was in the time of king *Charles* the sixt) his subjects paid him so great tallies and imposts, as hee held a kings estate, though hee were but a Counte: Yea they paid him them, very liberally, without constraint, and bore unto him, great amitie and benevolence: and whereupon came this? but because he maintained them in peace, when all his neighbors about him, were in great warre, and that hee maintained to good justice amongst them, as none but hee alone pilld and vexed them. And certaine it is, that if men must needes bee robbed and spoiled, they had rather to be so dealt with, by one man alone, than of many; and that subjects will beare it better at their Princes hands, than of particulars; but especially, when extreame and hard tallies and imposts are laid upon subjects, if they bee descried to be employed for the publike good, and that it bee something softned and sweetned by a good peace and justice: And therefore *de Comines* together praifeth and reprehendeth king *Lewis* the eleventh his master, saying, That hee pillet and oppresseth his subjects, but yet hee would never suffer any other to doe them any evill, or any way to rob or spoyle them.

*Titus Livius*  
lib. 6, Dec. 3.  
lib. 3, Dec. 2.

*Sutton, in*  
*Tib. cap. 48.*

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But to many it may seeme, that that we have abovesaid, tendeth too much unto the dispraise of Povertie, which notwithstanding seemes to bee praised and recommended by our Christian religion: But hereunto I answer, That Povertie of it selfe, is neither praisable nor vituperable, but men must judge of them according to circumstances. For if it bee suffered with an holy patience, by a Christian man, who takes in good part, and contenteth himselfe with the vocation, whereunto God hath called him, and with the meanes which he hath given him: and if it bee accompanied with a simple and gentle spirit, assuredly such a Povertie may bee placed in the ranke of the greatest vertues: For it is no small vertue to bee able well and constantly to beare Povertie, without straying out of the path, but rather a very difficill and rare thing: Therefore the Panims themselves, praised and admired *Aristides*, *Phocion*, *Lisander*, *Valerius Publicola*, *Fabricius*, *Curius*, *Quintus Cincinnatus*, *Menencus*, *Agrippa*, *Paulus Emilius*, and many other great persons, which have carried themselves like good and vertuous people, though they were very poore, because they suffered Povertie, with a great & constant courage, and without straying any thing from vertue. Yet so much there wanteth, that Christian doctrine approveth this Povertie of begging, that contrary it forbiddeth plainely, that none be suffered to beg: And likewise the word of God witnesseth unto us, That good men will not willingly suffer their children to beg their bread, for alwaies God assisteth, and giveth them meanes: Therefore Monkes called Mendicants, have gone too far, in praising, extolling, and exalting Povertie, not taking it as it must be understood by the word of God: And so it is like they will soone repent, that from the beginning they have made so deepe a profession of Povertie, against which they have many times since pleaded, kicked, and spurned, yet could never bee rid, nor dispatched of it, but alwaies have beene compelled by Popes and Parliaments, alwaies to hould and observe it as a thing wherein lay and lyeth all the perfection of the orders: But because this account and narration is pleasant to tryed and wearied readers, I will a little discourse upon the warres of these Mendicant friers.

How the  
Mendi-  
cants plea-  
ded against  
povertie &  
lost the  
cause.

You must then know, that these Mendicants, at their first entrie into the world (to renoune their names) proposed to themselves, straightly to follow the estate of perfection, that by their owne merits they might enter into Paradize, and cause others to enter into favour of them, and with their authoritie: This estate of perfection, they constituted in three points, Chastitie, Obedience, and Povertie: Of the two first points, wee will not speake here, but onely of the last point, which is Povertie: Of this Povertie also they have made their kinds, High, Meane, and Base: High Povertie (which the Franciscan Friers attribute unto themselves) is that which hath nothing in this world, neither in proper nor in common any way, that is, neither fields nor house, nor possession, nor rents, nor pension, nor beasts, nor moveables, nor apparrell, nor bookes, nor rights, nor actions, nor fruits, nor any other thing in the world. Behold here indeed a soveraigne, pure, and exceeding neere Povertie, wherein there neither wanteth any thing, neither is there any thing to be reprooved, since it hath nothing at all. The second kind (which for the Dominicans and Iacobins) is a Meane Povertie, which hath nothing particular or proper, but only some things in common, as bookes, apparrell, and daily victuals. The third and last kind (which the Carmelites & Augustines have retained for themselves) is Base Povertie, which may have proper, common, and in particular, whatsoever is justly necessarie to life, as apparrell, bookes, certaine pensions, and some lands, for helpe of their kitchin, and necessi-



necessitie of their living. And it is good, to note in those good brethren the Carmelites and Augustines, how humble they shew themselves, to bee contented with so base a kind of Povertie, without any desire to mount higher, as acknowledging themselves, unworthie and incapable, for to ascend into so high and superlative a degree.

These Mendicants then (being obliged and restrained unto Poverty, by a solemn vow which they make at their profession, in their orders) they are so annexed, united, and incorporated in it, & with it, that never after they could be never so little separated or dismembred, what diligence or labour soever they need to do it; hereof they have found themselves much troubled and sorrowfull: For howsoever gallant and goodly the Theorique of Povertie is: yet in practise they have found it a little too difficile and hard. And indeede, if you consider more nigh, the Theorique thereof (especially of that high and sovereign Povertie) I know not whether you can finde any thing in the world more excellent or more admirable: For they which make profession thereof (in my opinion) come something nigh an Angell-like nature, because the Angels have no need of the use of the earthly & corruptible goods of this miserable world, but onely take care of divine and spirituall things. More also, they which make profession of this high Povertie, have this advauntage over the rich men, which possesse the goods of this vale of miserie, that they are not wrapped in so many mischiefes and travailes, which accompanie those goods, but are frank and free, taking no care nor thought for ploughing, manuring, sowing, reaping, grape-gathering, lopping of trees, grafting, eradicating, cutting, planting, building, selling, buying, or doing any other like things, which concerne the affaires of the world: From all these things they are free and exempted, having nothing which hindereth them to be in a continuall contemplation and meditation of divine things, to come in time unto a great and deepe wisdom, yea, to approach to the Angelicall nature of the Cherubins and Seraphins, which have no other occupation, than to contemplate and exalt the Divinitie. But also if on the other side you consider the great difficulties in this so strict and straight use of Povertie, you shall find it verily a sad and unpleasant thing: For it is an approved Maxime, as well of the Mendicants, as of all other monkes, yea, of all men in generall, *That every man must live*: But a man cannot well live, with contemplations and meditations, for the bellie is not satisfied with such viands, but it must needs have bread and victuals, which grow and proceed from the earth and possessions of this world: Whereof it followeth, That they must needs have possessions to obtaine victuals, or at least they must buy and obtaine of them unto whom possessions doe belong.

But the profession of Povertie (especially of that high one) repugneth and contrarieth all this: For thereby it is not lawfull to have any possessions, nor to acquire corne, wine, or other victuals, for as much as by the acquisition thereof (whether it be by sale, donation, exchange, or other like) the acquirer and obtainer thereof makes himselfe a proprietor and master of the thing which hee obtaineth; which is not lawfull to doe for such as make profession of high Povertie, which can no way bee proprietors of any thing, be it moovable or unmoovable, victuals, apparrell, or any other thing whatsoever, as is said. Therefore you see, that the practise of Povertie is something greivous & troublesome, & not so pleasant as the Theorique: For as for the Theorique, you cannot find a thing more pleasant nor facile, nor which lesse bindeth a man in worldly affairs, nor which meriteth more to be praised and esteemed

in all good companies, and especially in great feasts and bankets, after the old proverbe, which saith:

*Hee that implete is of vlands,  
Fasting, so others recommands.*

But upon these difficulties touching the practise of Povertie, the Mendicants have made many great questions and scruples of conscience, which many Popes have sought to resolve, yet could never satisfie nor content those brethren. Amongst others, the Friars Minors were greatly troubled in their spirits upon this: that by their rule (which the blessed S. Francis left them) it is said by an expresse article, That the brethren of that order can have nothing proper in any manner, neither may they have any meanes to live, but to beg hard and without shame: For there are amongst them which think, that this may be understood of simple proprietie, and not of usufructe or use thereof: So that retaining the usurpation only of possessions and other things graunted unto them, rejecting the proprietie of them, they thinke not to violate any part of their rule. But they that give this interpretation of the rule, dare not justifie their interpretation thereof, lest they contradict the testament and last will of blessed S. Francis, their founder; whereby hee had ordained and expressely forbidden, That none should glorie upon his rule; and that none should say, that it ought to be understood thus or thus; and that none should obtaine Apostolicall letters from the Pope, either to adde thereunto or declare: insomuch, as on the one side, not daring to adventure to give declarations and new sence to the rule, & on the other side, being held so short thereby, that they dare, neither have nor acquire any thing, their consciences are mervellously troubled and tormented; and especially, since some of their adversaries call them theeves, and proving it by this argument. Whosoever possesseth or eateth another mans goods, whereas hee hath nothing, nor can have any thing of his owne, hee is a theefe: But the Mendicants, and especially the Friars Minors doe possesse habites, bookes, moovables, chambers, bribes, asses, and other moovable goods, and do eat bread and pittance, in all which goods they can have no right of proprietie, nor other: *Ergo* then, &c. Vnto which argument assuredly they cannot answer: For if they replie, that in these goods by them possessed, they have the use simply without any proprietie, besides, that they have given an interpretation to the said rule, against the testamentarie prohibition of their glorious founder; a man may reply upon them, that if they wil say they have a right of use in the said goods, it will then follow, that that right should bee to them in proprietie, and that therefore having the proprietie of that right, they should alwayes find themselves breakers and gainlayers of their rule, which prohibiteth, to have any thing proper, whether possessions, rights, or other goods. Hereat let every man thinke, if it must not needs be very greevous to those good Friars Minors, that men should thus argue against them by subtile arguments, to proove them theeves, as living on other mens goods, and of that which was not theirs, like birds of prey: And so much the more this pincheth them, because they see, that high Povertie, (whereby they pretend to mount to the degree of perfection) is the cause whereupon this blame and diffame cometh. But they dare not well complaine nor speake a word but onely tollerate all things in all patience and humilitie, not without great scruple of conscience, which many amongst them make, which soeuer they thinke in  
their

their spirits, that that which they eat, is not their owne; neither the apparell that they weare; and that they have not, nor can have in them any propertie, any right, any usufructe, nor any simple usage: yet could they not so repress this their grief of mind, but it would by many tokens breake out; yea, and that meate, which with sad minds and striving consciences they had crammed their bellies withall, was againe disgorged & vomited. Finally, after they had remained a long time in that anguish and perplexitie of spirit and of conscience, it happened that they created a Pope at Rome, who in his youth had been a Frier Minor, who was called Pope *Nicholas* the third. The Friers seeing, that such a Pope (who once was one of theirs, and who knew the difficulties which were in the practise of this High Povertie) could not bee but favorable unto them, held a Chapter generall, where they resolved to send certaine delegates and embassadours to this Pope, humbly to beseech him to do them this favour and grace, as to take away and cut off all the said difficulties. These delegates then in the yere 1280. hastened towards the S. Paternitie of this Pope, and shewed him from the Chapter general of their order, the great and indissoluble difficulties wherein they were, for the intelligence of the rule of blessed S. *Francis*, and for the observation of the prohibitions contained in his Testament, and generally for the whole practise of that High Povertie; humbly beseeching his said Paternitie, to provide therfore, as he knew to be requisite: yet they most humbly shewed unto him, by forme of advice (without any mind of presumption, to give any interpretation to the said rule) that it seemed unto them, that the glorious S. *Francis* neither understood nor would, that they should be left naked of all goods: For by the same rule he had commanded them to observe the Gospell, and to follow the traces of Iesus Christ: But Iesus Christ (said they) had a purse and silver in it, as we read in the Gospell, and that therefore they thought it should bee permitted unto them so to have also: Moreover, they sayd, by reiecting the goods and testamentarie legacies, that good Christians would give them, that they so should bee homicides of themselves, and tempters of God, because they deprived themselves of things necessarie for the conservation of their lives: Also, that this great and High Povertie leadeh to the estate of bestialitie: because we can obtaine no knowledge, without having bookes either in proprietie, or in use. Also, suppose they ought to have nothing at all proper in particular, it therefore followeth not, that they ought to have nothing in common: and therefore that his Holinesse might well permit them to have goods under the common name of the Covent. And that the blessed S. *Francis* having commanded them by his word to beg hardly, & without shame, by consequēt hath permitted them to take whatsoever any man giveth them in alms, be it moovable or unmoovable, silver or cloth, to enioy or use as their owne. Moreover, they humbly remonstrated unto him, That often in cases of maladies, and other necessities, they were forced to borrow, which they could not repay, unlesse they had whereof to do it: and that therefore it was necessarie unto them to be permitted to acquire & heap up, to satisfie such as had lent them in their necessitie for their credit sake. Vpon this supplication and remonstrance, Pope *Nicholas* caused to assemble the colledge of Cardinals, which in their Conclave examined well this great cause; and by their advice he ordained and declared, That the Friers Minors could have nothing in proprietie, neither in particular, nor in common, because the true perfection of the order consisteth in this point, to be disappropriated every way of all goods, without having or retaining in them any right: But he reserved unto them the fact (and not the



right) of the usage of goods, which by legacies, or otherwise, might fall and appertain unto them, retaining to himself and to the Roman Church the proprietie of those goods: Conditionally also, that this fact and deed of usage bee not excessive, and that in the said Friers, there alwayes shine a notable and apparent Povertie: And answering to their reasons, hee said, That our Lord Iesus Christ desiring to yeeld to our infirmities, and to condescend to our imperfections, thought it good to have a purse and silver in it, but yet (that notwithstanding) to have a purse and silver, is of it selfe an action of humane infirmite and of imperfection. And as for that they say, that the abdication and refection of all proprietie of goods, may proove an homicide of himselfe and a temptation of God; he answereth no: but that the true way to perfection, is altogether to commit himselfe to the providence of God, without having any care to provide for living; and that the meanes of begging (which by their rule was permitted unto them) could never faile them: and that also neither was it needfull to have store of victuals, that they might the better observe their said rule: but especially in that article, wherby they are enjoined to fast every Friday, the Vigiles, Advent, and Quadregesima, which commeth to half the yere or there abouts: And that as their povertie ought to be straight, so their victuals also ought to bee straight and sober, and that they ought to eat little: for it agreeth best with that so high Poverty. And as for that they say, that it may be lawful for them to have goods in common: he answereth, that is very evident, no, because the rule restraineth them to a refection and abdication of all proprietie: and that which is common to many, may well be said by right to be proper to all in *Genere*, or generall, and to every one in *Specie* or particular. And finally, upon that last point wherein the Friers doe understand, that in cases of necessitie they are forced to borrow, and that therefore they desire permission to acquire, to repay; Pope *Nicholas* answereth them, that they have not well proceeded therein, to contract either borrowing or lending, because in that kind of contract there is a translation of proprietie from him that lendeth, in him which receiveth: And as the Legists say: *Mutuum est cum sit de meo tuum*, that is, A thing is lent, when that which is mine, is made thine. To shun therefore this inconvenience, hee gave them an acute and an ingenious counsell; which was to procure and find meanes, that they which had devotion to give to their Covent, should appoint for them principal praiers in their place, of things which were necessary unto them in their maladies, or otherwise, towards them, which would furnish them therof; or that they should name some one (of whom they might be assured, to him that would give them any legacie) to be executor of his wil, by employing the legacie to satisfie the furnitures made, or to make, for the friers: Vpon condition notwithstanding, that the proprietie and possession of the silver or other thing bequeathed, be in no sort transferred unto the said Friers, but alwayes to remaine with him that bequeathed it. Behold in summe, how Pope *Nicholas* resolved the difficulties of the Mendicants, touching the practise of their poverty: For he permitted unto them the use of goods which fell unto them, and reserved the proprietie of them to the Roman church: and besides permitted them to accept Testamentarie legacies, by persons interposed: wherein he well shewed what a good friend he was of that order, and that he forgot not the place wherein he was nourished in his youth, yet left he a scruple in his bull: wherupon there fel out no lesse contentions than before, because he circumscribed his permission or indulgence, with this condition: *That alwayes there should shine in these Friers, an holy and manifest Povertie*. This was a condition which

which touched them verie nigh, as shall be said hereafter.

Yet the Mendicants seeing themselves to have a permission by this Apostolicall bull of Pope *Nicholas*, to cause legacies and foundations to be given unto them, incontinent they begun to practise themselves diligently to have them. And because they considered, that by sermons they might easily draw the devotion of the people towards them, they rushed upon that practise with al their might; which so wel succeeded unto them, because the bishops and curats of that time (as for the most part they were at that day) were but beasts, & could not preach at all, neither wel nor ill, but the most sufficient onely knew their masse at the most. The sermons then of these Mendicants, being of great estimate and credit with the people, they straight drew unto them store of legacies, pensions, and foundations, they never forgetting, (either at the beginning or end of their sermons) to recommend the works of charitie towards their covents, deciphering their necessities at large, and verie eloquently, assuring the good people, that they might thereby gaine Paradise for them and theirs, by doing good to their said Covents. By this meanes also they drew to them the practise of burials and confessions, insomuch, as everie man and woman went to the Mendicants to be shriven; which failed not, but alwaies enjoyned them for penance, to give something to their Covents, and to cause Masses to be said for them. And whensoever it came to the extreame confession in the article of death, they exhorted the diseased to elect their sepulture in their Covents, and so to give them good legacies and benefits. Briefly, they wrought so well and diligently by practise upon practise, that legacies and benefits even rained on all sides upon them, to the great prejudice of Curats, which lost almost all their auntient and accustomed oblations, and which saw their offertories and suffrages to go to nothing in their open fights, to their great grieve.

This was the cause that about the year 1311. the Curats (being countenanced by bishops) complained much to Pope *Boniface* the eight: saying, that the Mendicants troubled them in their auntient possessorie of Sermons, Confessions, and Sepultures, and that they thought it was most reasonable, that they to whom appertained the charge of soules, should also have the bodies of the dead to burie, & that they should heare them in confession, unto whom they administred the sacraments. Moreover, they shewed, that the Mendicants invented many novelties, as to preach within their Covents, at the same houre that the Curates said their parochiall masses, and that they also preached without their Covents, without either the Bishops licence, or the Curate of the place: And by such practises and novelties, the said Mendicants had taken away from the said Curates the most part of their obventions and revenues, and so brought their estates almost to nothing: therefore most humbly they besought his Paternitie to remedy those abuses, and to maintain them in their auntient possessions. Pope *Boniface* upon this complaint of the Curats (for which all Bishops and Prelates entreated) would give provison, and by his ordinance which he made, with the advice of his brothers Cardinals, he exhorted much the Curats to take patiently, that the Mendicants have right & authoritie to preach, confesse, and burie, shewing them, that it was free to the people, to goe heare a sermon, to confesse themselves, and to chuse their sepulture where they thought good. Moreover, to do them right in this, that the Mendicants frustrated the said Curates of their practickes and obventions, hee ordained, That from thence forward the said Curates (least they carried the name of Curate in vaine and without profit)

G g ij.

should

Cap. 3. De  
Sepulchris in  
strag.

should levie and retract a fourth part, from all legacies, foundations, and other obventions, which the said Mendicants could obtaine, and might any way fall and come unto them by meanes of the said Sermons, Confessions, Sepultures, or otherwise: forbidding the said Mendicants for no cause to preach in their Covents at the houre that parish Masses, or at the houre that Bishops or their Vicars doe preach: And not to preach out of their Covents, without the permission of the Bishop or the Curate of the place: Exhorting moreover the said Curates and Mendicants respectively to live and carrie themselves together from thence forward, in good peace and concord, and by no meanes to suffer, that the spirit of division (the enimie of humane nature) bee so familiarly acquainted with them.

The Pope *Boniface* having made this ordinance and rule betwixt the Curats and Mendicants, soone after they entred further than ever, into contentions & debates: For when Curats went into the Mendicants Covents to aske their fourth part of the practickes and obventions of the said Mendicants, they would straight joine altogether, and make such a shouting, braying, and hissing at the poore Curat, calling him beast, ideot, asse, and saying he could not well read his Masse, nor decline his name: And further, would aske them certaine petie questions out of Grammer, and bid them turne something into Latine, to shame them. And thinkest thou beast (said they) that we have taken paines to prepare meat to put in thy mouth? Belongeth it unto the Assse, to reape that which we sow: Goe, goe beast to thy Breviarie, if thou canst read it, & come not into our Covent, to beg any thing, unlesse thou wilt have our discipline: go and studie thy *Disputatione*, and *Amo. Qua Pars*, and come not hither to trouble and defile the pure fountaine of holy Theologie, wherein thou understandest nothing: some others cried, come, come, unto our Refectorie, and we will lay the Trebelliane fourth part on their shouldeis. These poore Curates then (seeing the said Mendicants approach them, beating one hand against another, letting downe their coules, and lifting up their fists) in a great feare retired out of their Covents. And knowing no way possibly to obtaine their due, which had bin granted them by Pope *Boniface*, they offered their griefes and sorrowfull complaints to Pope *Benedict* the eleventh, in the year 1304. or thereabouts. But the Mendicants were not cowards, to remonstrate also their good right on their side, and amongst other reasons especially shewed, that as by good right none will withdraw a Falcidie or fourth part from devout & godly legats; so none ought to take a fourth trebellian from their practicks and obventions, seeing they were bestowed on them for godly causes also. Pope *Benedict* after good deliberation upon this weightie matter, with the advice of his Cardinals, and of certaine other good old doctors of Law, found, that the Mendicants their reasons were well founded in right, and that there was no apparent reason, wherefore they should pay to the said Curates the fourth part of their practickes and obventions: For although there was some colour in that, that the Curates said, That they ought to have the fourth part of obventions and revenues of Mendicants, because they had the name and title of Curates, even as an heire ought to have the fourth Trebelliane free, because hee hath the name and title of heire: yet in this rule there is a fallacie (said these old doctors) in regard of Legats for godly and devout causes: For Legates are exempt from delivering of fourth parts: such like as those which Mendicants take of godly Christians. And for confirmation of their opinion, they alledged *Godfredus in Summa*, *Azo Hugolinus de*

*Fontana,*

Cap. 1. De  
Privilegiis in  
universis.



*Fonsava, Guilielmus de Cuneo, Rainerus de Foro Livio, Hubertus de Bobio, Petrus de bella Persica, Oldradus de Ponte,* and many other old doctors of Law. They alledged also certaine strong pillars out of *Bartolus* and *Baldus*, upon which they said their opinion was founded. And therefore Pope *Benedict*, mooved with their allegations and with equitie, rased and made of no validitie the ordinance of Pope *Boniface* in that case, taking away and utterly abolishing the said fourth part: yet something to content the Curats, he ordained, that they should have the halfe of the funerals of such as were buried with the Mendicants, that is to say, the half of the spoiled things which served for the conduction of the bodie (as torches and cloth about the coffin) which was no great bootie, in comparison of legacies, obits, foundations of masses, and other obventions, yet there was no helpe, the Curats must needs be contented with this sanction and decree for this time.

Yet hereof engendred a greater quarrell than ever, betwixt the Curates and Mendicants: For the Curates said high and cleare, That Pope *Benedict* had done them wrong, to take from them the said Trebelliane upon practickes and obventions of Mendicants, and that those new come beasts would have all, and would spoyle all Curates of their goods and revenewes: And that under the title & name of Mendicants and contemners of the goods of this world, they manifested themselves to be rapinous hypocrites, which will needs have all, by right or wrong. These Curates so cried and complained, and so well remonstrated their right unto Pope *Clement* the fift of that name, at the Counsell of Vienne, Anno 1311. that the Pope rased the ordinance of Pope *Benedict*, and againe brought into force that of Pope *Boniface*.

Cap. 2. De  
Sepulch. in  
Clem.

Cap. 1. De  
Verb. sig. in  
Clem.

Moreover, in the said Counsell of Vienne there was demonstrated unto the said Pope *Clement*, that the said Mendicants had greatly abused the commission of pope *Nicholas*, who had reserved, That alwayes in the order of the said Mendicants there should shine an holy and apparant Povertie: yet alreadie the said Mendicants had so well practised and profited in their trade, that there was no more amongst them any appearance of Povertie: For each day they instituted heirs, they gave legacies, pensions, and revenues, vines, gardens, and other possessions, also they builded their Covents like royall pallaces: insomuch, as there appeared in them nothing but riches and opulencie, so much there wanted, as in them appeared any ensigne or token of holy Povertie, as should shine in them according to their rule, and the reservation and condition which Pope *Nicholas* set downe in his bull. Pope *Clement* having understood all this by the advice of the said Counsell, declared the said Mendicants (although he himselfe had been one) incapable to be heirs, to receive testamentarie legacies, or to have possessions, rents, or pensions, yea, to have barnes of come, or cellars of wine, unlesse in time of great necessitie, or to have precious Church ornaments or houses sumptuously builded. Briefly, this Pope to their great grieve, brought them againe to their first practise of High Povertie, Meane, and Base, and cut neere their wings, that they might not forsake & abandon it from thence forward: yet he tooke not from them their usage of fact, of some small and few goods, as many as might be necessarie for their simple nourishment, therein comprehending the youth of the order, and without any thing departing from their Povertie: so that alwayes there might remaine something unto them justly, whereof to live.

But Pope *John* the two and twentieth of that name, in Anno 1324. tooke yet from them

them the said usage of fact, and sent them purely and simply to their clap-dish, and begging for their living, saying, That the said usage of fact, reserved to Mendicants, imported and attributed unto them a propertie; because the act of use is proper to them which exercise it; and therefore whosoever hath that act of use, hee by consequent hath something proper, which after hee concludes by his bull, that all that goodlie subtiltie and invention of Pope *Nicholas*, to leave the use of goods to Mendicants, and to reserve the propertie of these goods to the Romane church, was but a simulation and hipocrisie, wherewith the Mendicants secke to cover themselves, and abandon fairely that holy Povertie, wherein they have constituted the estate of perfection, and whereunto hee sent them.

*Monst. lib. 1.  
cap. 56.*

When the Mendicants saw themselves thus disgraced and remitted, as deepe as ever into their Povertie, they were much offended, but then there was no order nor means to remedie it, but for a long time, made the best of it they could. About threescore and sixteene yeares after this ordinance of Pope *John* (that is *Anno* 1490) there was a Pope created, called *Alexander* the fift, a Candiot by nation, who had been a Fryer Minor in his youth, unto whom these Mendicants resorted, and shewed him, that they were the true Curates, and pastors of the people, because they had right and priviledge from the Apostolike seat, to confesse all people, and to burie their bodies, and that those whom they confesse were held and reputed both well and duely confessed, without any need to be againe confessed to Curates, and those which they burie, were knowne and reputed to be well and duely buried: They further said, that they had priviledges to preach to the people, & to say Masses, as good and available (at the least) as them of Curates, yea the people liked them better, and said they were devout, and more frequented them, than such as Curates said: And withall they said, that in their covents, there was great store of Masses, & at all times, to the great profit & commoditie of every man: For they, which for their breakfast in the morning, or when they were to ride forth, had need of a morning Masse, they should finde there some readie said, at three or foure a clocke: They likewise which rise late, as good old and devout women, found Masses at nine, ten, and eleaven a clocke, yea as many as they would, betwixt five a clocke in the morning, untill dinner time: They further remonstrated, to the paternitie of this holy Father, that the said Curates were Asses, and shod beasts, which could not acquire the due of the least sermon, which was made in all the yeare, and which lived not upon their cures and benefices, but suffered them to be served, by as ignorant Vicars as themselves, which cared not for any thing, but to make profit, by farming their said cures, wherby they committed infinit abuses, seeking onely to clip their sheepe, without giving them any spirituall foode: But as for us (said they) we distribute unto them spiritual meat, in all larges and abundance, as well by celebration of Masses, and other divine services, as by multiplication of sermons, within and without our covents: Wherefore it evidently followeth (said they) that we are the true and actual Curates of the people, performing & executing all the acts of legitimate Curates, and that they which say they are Curates, are so but in a shadow and fantasie onely, and that they are unworthie to carry the name and title they have, and thereby to enjoy the fruits, designs, oblations, obventions, and other renewes & practikes, which such Curates possesse: So they concluded in this, that it would please his Paternitie, to create, establish and constitute them, the alone and true Curates, and to put them in recall and actuall possession of the said cures, and of the renewes and dependances of them, with

with inhibitions to such as called themselves Curates, and to all others, not to trouble, molest, nor hinder them in any sort, by themselves or by interposed persons, upon paine to encurre the indignation and malegrace of *S. Peter*, and of *S. Paul*, and of perpetuall damnation, without any hope of grace, pardon or appeal. Vpon this goodlie remonstrance, containing so ponderous and considerable reasons, Pope *Alexander* referred the matter to counsell, and by the advice of his Cardinals, granted to Mendicant Friers, all that they demanded, and caused with great expedition to goe out faire and ample bulls, & well leaded: These good Mendicants friers, as soone as they had got out their bulls, came straight from Rome to Paris, to cause them to be received & registred in the court of Parliament: But before they presented them to the said court, they advised and concluded, that it was most expedient to have the people favorable, and on their sides: Therefore through all a whole Lent, they preached at Paris in all their covents, the contents of their bulls, saying, That they onely were the true Curates, & pastors of soules, by the ordinance & creation of the Pope, Gods lieutenant on earth, of whose power none ought to doubt; and exhorted the people so from henceforth to acknowledge them, to the end to shun the paines set downe in our holy Fathers bulls, against all contradictions thereof: And in their sermons they forgot not to make invectives against a companie of Curates, which knew nothing, but to take the renewes of their cures, without any deserving them, neither spared they also, to taxe & detest their beastlie and too notorious ignorance: But yet were they somthing deceived in their opinion, for at Paris many cures were held, and possessed by doctors, Theologians of Sorbonne: These doctors, then fearing the consequent of these bulls of the Mendicants, & that thereby they might be dispossessed of their cures, incontinent mounted also into pulpits, to counterpreach and blazon the said bulls, & them which had obtained them: Therefore they shewed to the people, That from all times, exceeding all memory of any man living, Curats were in actual and legitimate possession, to take & receive tenthes, oblations, obventions, and other fruits, and renewes, affected and dependants to cures: And the Mendicants, contrary to their proper profession of mendicitie, were in possession, seisin & injoyance of Povertie, meane, and base, respectively without any trouble, hinderance, or contradiction, in the knowledge and view of all the world: And that therefore every one ought to be maintained & guarded in his possession, without any innovation, that is, all Curates of the goods and renewes of their cures, and Mendicants of their Povertie and begging: and for prooffe thereof, they alleaged many good places, saying it was written; That man must give to *Cesar* that which is *Cesars*, & to God, that which is Gods, which is to say, that we must needs yeeld to every man, that which belongeth unto him, to Curates tenths, & oblations, & to Mendicants, their begging and almes: They further said, That it was reasonable, that the name should answere to the thing, and that since that Friers, Jacobines, Carmelites, & Augustines, have chosen that name of Mendicants, that really and in effect, they ought to be beggars, and not Curates; A short time would not serve, to set downe & discover all the reasons and allegations, which the Curates preached and blazed abroad, against the Mendicants, and the Mendicants against Curates: For neither the one nor the other, ever studied better sermons, than they did in this contestation & contention: The Curates defended themselves, by their long possession; and by the ancient and modern cannons, which assigned them their charge of soules, & which compare them to Levites, yea even in taking their tithes: They alleaged also, *Non al-*

*ligabis*



*ligabis &c.* that is, Thou shalt not bind the throat of the Oxe which treadeth out the corne; and *Dignus est operarius &c.* that is, The workman is worthie of his salarye or wages, and many other like places, which they had at their fingers ends: And to confute those Mendicants bulls, they said, they were but new come, wherewith they do trouble the world; & that before they were borne, the people was as well preached unto and instructed, and Masses, confessions, and other divine services as well done and exercised, as since they came into the world; & that they had nothing in them, but bable and certaine subtiltie, wherewith they brought the people asleep, and perswaded them, that they are learned, although they know nothing; and that they are full of hypocrisie and simulation, making an outward profession of Povertie, yet tending in effect to no other end, but to have and heape up goods and renewes. They moreover said, that it was a mortall sinne, to give any thing to these Mendicants (unles some few bribes & almoses) because that they which gave them either silver or possessions, or rents, or revenues, made them to be condemned in hel, by causing them to breake their vow of Povertie, and by making them breake their rules, which they had sworn to observe. And that they which are the cause, that any other doth any evill and sinne, are as culpable, as hee that doth it. The Mendicants to the contrarie, alledged their Apostolicall bulls, and the Popes power, and laid, It was an heresie one of the greatest, & most insupportable that could be in the world, to say, That the said bulls ought to have no places, because that was as much, as to revoke into doubt the high & unmeasurable power of the great vicar of God: & that they which preach against the said Apostolicall bulls, should feelee the smart of it. They also tooke the places of scripture before alledged, *Non alligabis, Es dignus est mercenarius &c.* saying, that they formally made for them; for they were the true oxen which tread out the graine, & the true workemen which travell in divine service: and that they say more masses in a moneth in one of their Covents, than there is said in all the cures of Paris in a yere: and that for one man and one woman, which those Curates confesse, they confesse an hundreth, and for one bodie which the curates burie, they burie an hundred, and therefore, for Curats to alledge these places, they cut but themselves with their own knives: And as for their sermons (said they) these masters Curates will bee so proud, to compare them with ours. Doe not all men see, that commonly they can doe nothing, but at the Offertorie, speake a few words, which they have learned by heart from their master, to get their offerings in? Doe they not likewise see, that every one mocks them, because of their ignorance & evill life, and that commonly there is no good play, that hath not a Curate in it? But as for us, you see how we preach (said they) in pulpits, our sermons are other manner of things, than their proemes, and there is no more comparifon to be made betwixt their speeches and our sermons, than to compare a calfe to an asse: Moreover if wee should come to a disputation, to speake Latin, were these Curates to be compared unto us? the least novices in our covents, shal alwaies say a lesson, more sufficiently than these Curates, if they will but learne it. Finally, all this Lent passed in sermons, and contersermons of the said Mendicants, and Curates, all which of the one part and the other, sought to winne the peoples favour and devotion, to enjoy the fruits & revenues of Cures: After the Lent was passed, they came to justice, for the Mendicants pursued the reception and enrowling of their bulls, entreating the court of Paris, to admit and allow them, whereupon the said Curates of Paris, formed an opposition: As the parties proceeded in their causes, they respectively alledged

alleged, by intendits, replies, duplications, triplications, the reasons and means touched before, and farre more reasons, which touched the quicke: But the evill lucke was for the Mendicants, for upon the point of their good hope, to obtain the cause on their side, Pope *Alexander* died: Then the Curats began to oppole against them, that the said bulls, had no force nor vigor in them, unlesse they were confirmed by Pope *Iohn* the foure & twentieth of that name, successor of the said *Alexander*: The Mendicants (much grieved hereat) sought to obtaine a confirmation, but could not: For the Curats got before them, insomuch as the poore Mendicants seeing themselves out of hope, to obtaine the reception & enrowling of their said bulls, resolved to leave the pursute thereof, and the Iacobines first left the cause, and the others consequently: So that the Curats were maintained diffinitively, in the possession and enjoyance of their cures, and of the renewes depending thereunto: and the Mendicants were maintained in their possession and seisin of their beggerie, with expresse inhibitions (accorded by the consent of the said Curates) not to trouble nor molest them in any sort, and each to beare his part of the law charges.

These Mendicants seeing themselves fixed & fastened to their povertie, more than ever, tooke it with the best patience they could possibly, for so were they forced to do: Yet notwithstanding, some particulars amongst them, which were the most angry, & had most credit, did so much, as they obtained for them, provisions & reservations, from the Pope, of certaine cures and other benefices, with dispensation to hold and possesse them, notwithstanding their vow of Poverty: The abovesaid Curats of France, fearing the consequence, made their complaints to king *Charles* the 6. then reigning: The king by the advice of his Counsell, made an ordinance, in the yeare 1413. wherein he much praised the rules of the Mendicants founders, in that by them it is ordained, that they ought to live in Poverty and Mendicacie, without having any thing in common or in particular, saying that such an ordinance is both salutarie and good: And that Poverty is to annexed to the Monachall profession of Mendicants, that the Pope himselfe cannot separte them: which considered, he forbiddeth expressly, that none shall have regard to the said provisions, obtained by any Mendicants upon cures or other benefices, and if any be in possession, that hee be taken out, and they which are not yet received, that none should receive them in: And commanded all bailifes, stewards, and other officers of the realme, not to suffer so pernicious, yea so superstitious a thing to have place, but rigorously to punish such as stand against this ordinance, notwithstanding all bulls, provisions, and dispensations of the Pope, to the contrarie: So that by this, the kings ordinance, the Mendicants were more strongly tied to the possession and enjoyance of their Poverty and beggerie, as well in generall as particular, this happened at the pursute of the said Curats, their adversaries.

But yet a strange case it is, that the passions and hatred of men, should bee such, as they have no end: The said Mendicants were so farre from contentment at this ordinance, that they bare great malice to all Curates, yea the one beheld the others with an evill eye, and could not hold themselves from reciprocal detractions, and evill speeches, & from blasing one another in pulpits, taxing the abuses and heresies one of another, and describing one anothers marchandise. When Pope *Sixtus* the fourth, came to his papacie, in the yere 1472. the Mendicants became verie proud, because hee was a Fryer minor, and waxed insolent and audacious against Curates, assuring themselves that the Pope would support them in all things: The  
Curates

cap. 2. de  
Treguas &  
pace in extra  
Articles of  
peace be-  
twixt the  
Curats and  
the Mendi-  
cants.


Curates then not being able to suffer the detractions, skoulding and insolences of these Mendicants, complained to the Pope, who could do no lesse than seeke to accord them: For this effect hee deputed foure Cardinals (that is) the Cardinall of Hostia, of Præneste, and of S. Peter ad Vincula, and of S. Sixtus, to heare the differences of the said Curates and Mendicants, and in quietest maner to compound them: The Cardinals heard the parties in their allegations, and did so much with them, as they submitted themselves to their finall judgement: After this, to set a firme and finall peace betwixt the said parties, they pronounced for them an amiable sentence, which was authoris'd by the Pope, in Anno 1478. and containeth the articles following, That Curates from thence forward, should no more say, that the Mendicants were authors of heresies, seeing that the Faith hath beene greatly brought to light by them: And likewise the Mendicants shal preach no more, that parishioners are not bound to heare the parochiall Masse of their Curate on Sundayes, and solemne feasts, seeing that by the Cannons, they are therunto restrained and obliged. Item, that neither the one nor the other, shall any more solicit persons to chuse a sepulchre in their churches, but shall leave it at the free election of everie man. Item, that the said Mendicants, shal preach no more, that the parishioners are not bound to confesse themselves to their owne Curats, at the least at Easter, since that by right they are bound thereunto, and that every good parishioner, ought to make his Easter with his owne Curate, without any thing derogating by that article, from the priviledge which Mendicants have to heare confessions, and to enioine pennance, to confessed and repentants. Item, that the Mendicants, in their actions of preaching, of saying Matins, and ringing their bells, do not enterprise upon the houres that Curates say their service, unlesse it be by the consent of the parties. Item, that the Mendicants shall no more turne away persons and parishioners from their parish Masses, neither shall Curats take away the devotion of parishioners, from the Mendicants, but rather aide and succour them. Behold in summe the articles of this peace, and arbitrarie sentence betwixt the Mendicants and Curats, which the Pope Sixtus greatly approved, and generally exhorted them all to concord and union, in the name and as Vicar of him, who said *Pacem meam do vobis, Pacem meam relinquo vobis*. I give you my peace, I leave you my peace: By which articles of the said arbitriall sentence is scene, how these Curates and Mendicants publickly blamed one another: And all this proceeded not but from the ardent zeale they all had, not to the edification of the people, but to have their offerings and oblations: for since that time, they could so wel manage and deale, with the poore ignorant world, that they made them give the whatsoever they would, especially such as were sick, when they were at confession, and demanded absolution from purgatorie and hell, they would never absolve them, unlesse they gave to their Covents and churches, whatsoever they desired.

This conclusion here is also cleane contrarie to the Maxime of Machiavell, That Povertie cannot be a cause to hold a people in peace and obedience, seeing it was cause of so many discords & dissensions, even amongst them, which made profession therof, and which constituted their perfection therein: By this discourse also we may note the sanctitie of Mendicants (wherewith this poore world hath beene so much ravished) which from the beginning of their birth in this world, have raysed up so many riots and strifes against Curats, & al for the paunch: For they begun and florished, in the time of Pope Gregorie the ninth, Anno 1230. which Pope was then

Platina in  
Gregorio 9.



then much troubled with resolving the hard points about their poverties & amongst other points resolved them, That it ought to be understood, not only in the abdication of all proprietie to particulars, but also to the generall, as Pope *Nicholas* reciteth it in his abovesaid Decretall: For that of Pope *Gregorie* is not found printed in the bodie of the Cannon law, as the others are, whereof before we have made mention. But herein is no great losse, no not though all the Cannon law were lost with it: For although something be good in it, yet the most of it is good for nothing but to maintaine wickednesse, abuses, and Romanish superstitions, that it were expedient to burie that little good in it, so that all the evill might bee choaked with it: For from hence there is come unto the world infinite (both spirituall and corporall) calamities.

33. *Maxime.*

*A Prince which feareth his subiects, ought to build fortresses in his countrey to hold them in obedience.*

**T**He Prince (saith *Machiavell*) who hath more feare of his owne people, than of strangers, must build Fortresses: but he that doubteth strangers more than subiects, needeth not: For the best Fortresse that is, is not to bee evill beloved of subiects, and if a prince be once evill beloved of his people, there is no Fortresse can save him. True it is, that Fortresses may bee profitable to a prince in time of peace, to give more courage to him and to his Governours, established in them, to hold the people in subiection, and to use against them greater audacitie and rigour: But yet this shall be but weake assurance, unlesse the prince have meanes to raise up a good and strong armie, to tame his subiects, if they will needs rebell; For to thinke to tame them by reducing them to povertie, *Spoliatis arma supersunt: Arms remaine yet to the unarmed.* Also to unarme them, *Furor arma ministrat: Furie administresh armes ynough.* Likewise, to slay the chiefe heads of the people, more heads would arise, as of the Hydra. The *Sfoeces* builded the castle at Millaine, which done, they iudged, that by the meanes of that Fortresse they might with assurance handle their subiects at their pleasure, and therefore spared no kind of violence: insomuch as they acquired the

Discourse  
lib. 2. cap. 24  
Cap. 10. of  
the prince.

the hatred and evill will of their subiects, which was the cause that the French, their enemies, carryed away Millaine at the first assault, and the Sforces had no good by their fortresse, but were spoyled of all the dutchie.

*Machiavel* hath handled all the parts of the art of tyrannie.



Although *Machiavel* have not dealt with the art of tyrannie in his writings by a methode, yet hath he not left behind, any part of that art: For first hee hath handled, How a tyrannie ought to be builded, that is, by crueltie, perfidie, craft, periurie, impietie, revenges, contempt of counsel and friends, entertainment of flatterers, tromperie, the hatred of vertue, covetousnesse, inconstancie, and other like vices, whereby hee hath demonstrated, that men must ascend as by degrees to come unto a soveraigne wickednesse. Secondly, he hath shewed how one ought to be maintained and conserved in that high degree of wickednesse and tyrannie, namely, by maintaining amongst subiects partialities and seditions, and in holding them in povertie and necessitie. Now hee yet addeth another meane, namely, to build Fortresses against his subiects, as by making in good townes, citadels, and by building forts upon bridges and common passages, and other like castles and fortresses: and *Machiavel* thinks this meane ought to be practised, and that other aforesaid meanes are not so sufficient, well to establish a tyrannie: For povertie (saith he) is no sufficient meane to containe a people in obedience, for they are never unfurnished of armes: And though they should take them from them, and should sleie their chieftaines, yet that would not suffice, because the anger and furie of the people would furnish them with sufficient armes, and that chieftaines would arise unto them, like *Hydra* her heads.

But I will not stay long in the confutation of this Maxime, but onely I will say this, That experience makes us wise, and that the invention of Citadels (which in our time princes have builded against their subiects) hath bin cause of infinit evils: For all commerce and traffique hath been & is greatly diminished in townes, where they have been builded, and there have been and are committed infinit insolences by souldiers against citizens; and there neither hath come nor will come to princes which have builded them, other good than great expences and evill will of their subiects: For this construction of Citadels is an apparent shew, that the prince trusteth not his subject, but especially, when they are builded any other where, than in the limits and borders of kingdoms and countries against strangers. When the subiects know, that their prince distrusteth them, they also esteeme that he loveth them not. And when the subject is not beloved of his prince, he cannot also love him, and not loving him, hee obeyes him not, but as constrained, and in the end will get his head out of the yoke, as soone as there wil fall out a fit occasion. Here is the profit of Citadels.

The Machiavelists of France, doe not alwayes follow their master.

Yet I will say this by the way, That our Machiavelists of Fraunce, which were authors and enterprisers of the massacres of *S. Bartholmeu*, read not well this place of *Machiavel*, which we come to alledge: For they said, That men must not stay upon fishing for frogs, but men must catch in their nets the great Salmones, & that one Salmones head was more worth than tenne thousand frogs; and that when they had

had slaine the chieftaines of pretended rebels, that they should easily overthrow the rude and rascally multitude, which without heads could enterprife nothing. These venerable enterprisers shuld have considered that which here their Doctor *Machiavel* saith (which also since they have seen by experience) That a people cannot want heads, which will alwayes rise up, yea, even those heads which be slaine. If they had so well noted and practised this place of *Machiavel*, as they do others, so much blood would never have been shed, and their tyrannie it may be had longer endured than it hath done: For the great effusion of blood, which they have made, hath incontinent cried for vengeance to God, who (according to his accustomed justice) hath heard the voice of that blood: and for the crie of the orphan and widow, hath laid the axe to the root of all tyrannie, and alreadie hath cut away many branches thereof, and (if it please him) will not tary long to lay all on the ground, and so establish Fraunce in his auncient government.

As for Fortresses in frontiers of countries they have beene long time practised, and are profitable to guard from incursions and invasions of enemies, & to the end such as dwell upon the borders, may the more peaceably enjoy their goods. Wee read, That the emperour *Alexander Severus* gave his Fortresses upon Frontiers, to good and approoved captaines, with all the lands and revenewes belonging unto them, to enjoy during their lives: to the end (saith *Lampridius*) that they might bee more vigilant and carefull to defend their owne. And afterward, the emperor *Constantine* the Great ordained, That the said Fortresses, with their grounds and revenewes, should passe to the heires of the said captaines, which held them as other maner of goods and heritages. And hereupon (some say) have come such, as the civile law call *Feudi*.

*Lamprid. in  
Alex. Pomp.  
Latus in Con-  
stant. Mayo.*



### 34. Maxime.

*A Prince ought to commit to another those affaires which are subiect to hatred and envie, and reserve to himselfe such as depend upon his grace and favour.*

**A** Prince which will exercise some cruell and rigorous act (saith *M. Nicholas*) hee ought to give the commission thereof unto some other, to the end, he may not acquire evill will and enmitie by it. And yet if he feare, that such a delegation cannot be wholly exempted from blame (to have consented to the execution which was made by his Commissarie) he may cause the Commissarie to bee slaine,

Hh

to

*Cap. 7. & 14  
of a prince.*



to shew that he consented not to his crueltie, as did *Cesar Borgia*, and *Messire Remiro Dorco*.




His Maxime is a dependencie of that goodly doctrine, which *Machiavel* learned of *Cesar Borgia* (which although it was verie cruel) yet meaning to appeare soft and gentle, following therein the Maxime which enjoineth dissimulation, committeth the execution of his crueltie to *Messire Remiro Dorco*, as at large before wee have discoursed that hystorie. And because we have fully shewed, that all dissimulation and feignednesse is unworthy of a prince, wee will stay no longer upon this Maxime: Well will I confesse, that many things there be which seeme to be rigorous in execution (although they be most equall and just) which it is good a prince do commit to others, to give judgement and execution by justice, as the case meriteth: For as the emperor *Marcus Antonine* said, It seemeth to the world, that that which the prince doth, he doth it by his absolute authoritie and power, rather than of his civile and reasonable power. Therefore to shun that blame and suspition, it is good that the prince delegate and set over such matters to judges, which are good men, not suspected nor passionate, not doing as the emperor *Valentinian* did, who would never heare nor receive accusations against judges & magistrats, which he had established, but constrained the recusators or refusers, to end their cause before those judges onely: Whereby he was much blamed, and his honour impeached and disgraced: For truely, the chiefe point which is required to cause good justice to be administred is, That judges be not suspected nor passionat: because the passions of the soule and heart doe obfuscate and trouble the judgement of the understanding and cause them to step aside and stray out of the way. It is also a thing of verie evil example, when a prince with an appetite of revenge, or to please the passions of revengefull great men, doeth elect Iudges and Commissaries that be passionate, and which have their consciences at the command of such as employ them: As was done in the time of king *Lewis Hutin*, in the judgement of *Messire Enguerant de Marigni* great master of Fraunce; and in the time of king *Charles the sixt*, in the judgement of the criminall processe of *Messire Jean de Marets*, the kings Advocate in the parliament of Paris: And a man may put to them the judgements given in our time against *Amie du Bourg*, the kings Counsellor in the said parliament, and against captaine *Briquemand*, and *M. Armand de Cavagnes*, master of the Requests of the kings household, and against the count *de Montgomerie*, and many others:

For the executions to death, which followed, manifested well,

That the judges were passionate men, their consciences being at the command of strangers, which governed them.

Passionate  
Iudges can  
not iudge  
well.

35. *Maxime.*

*To administer good Iustice, a Prince ought to establish a great number of Iudges.*

**H**O have prompt and quicke expedition of good Iustice (saith *Machiavell*) many Iudges must be established, for few can dispatch few causes, and a small number is more easie to gaine and be corrupted, than a great number: And withall, a great number is strong and firme in Iustice against all men.

**E**Xperience hath made us wise in France, that this *Maxime* of *Machiavell* is not true: For since they multiplied the Officers of Iustice in the kingdome, by the encrease of Counsellors in parliaments, by erection of Presidents seats, by creation of new or alternative Officers, we have processees & law causes more multiplied, longer & worse dispatched than before: insomuch as by good right and by good reason the last Estates generall held at Orleance, complained to king *Charles* the ninth, of that multiplication and multitude of Officers, which served not (as it doth not yet) but to multiplie law causes, to ruinate and eat up the people, and yet no better expedition of Iustice than before, but rather worse & notoriously more long & of greater charges to the parties. Vpon which complaint it was holily ordained, That offices of Iustice, which became vacant by death, should bee suppressed, and that none should come in their place, untill these offices were reduced to their auntient number, as it was in the time of king *Lewis* the twelfth. And by the same meanes it was also ordained, That the said offices should be no more sold, but conferred and bestowed by the king (at the nomination of men notable, and of qualitie in every place) to persons having good reputation of honestie, and whose abilitie in knowledge shall be examined extemporally, at the opening of a booke before their reception. But the *Machiavelists* have raised and quashed these two articles; the last, to have silver for the sale of Officers; and the first, to bring foyson and abundance of marchandise: for the greater number there are of Offices, so much the better is the trafficke and commerce, because there are every day more times of respire, whereof to make money. And we must not thinke, that the abundance of Offices hath brought a low price & cheapnesse to their marchandise: For contrarie, it hath made them dearer by a third or halfe within this ten yeares: insomuch as an Office of a Counsellor in a parliament, which was not wont to cost past three or foure thousand Franks, will now cost two or three thousand crownes of the Sunne: And the Offices of Presidents and Procurers Generall (which were not wont to be

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fold)

Discourse  
lib. 1. cap. 7.

Multiplicity  
of Officers,  
cause of the  
corruption  
of justice in  
France.

The *Machiavelists*  
have made  
deare Offi-  
ces in France

fold) are within this little time sold, as all other Offices, at the tax and price of ten, twelve, fourteen, yea, twentie thousand franks, according as they are, and according to the greatnesse of the parliaments: For they are not all at one price. But I pray you upon whom do our Machiavelists of France bestow these Offices? upon beasts or ambitious men; For learned men will not buy them, if they bee not drawne on by ambition; but they had rather be reputed (as *Cato* said, being put by the Prætorship, which he demanded) worthy to be Presidents or counsellors, than to be so in effect, by the price of silver. As for them which are beasts & ignorant, they have some reason to make provision for that marchandise, to get whereof to live, and pay their debts: otherwise should they die for hunger, or els be despised and pointed at with the finger, for that by reason of their ignorance they shall be employed in no affairs of justice, and shall have no practise. And truly, these be they, which within this little time have made this kind of marchandise so deare: For because they are in great number, they run thither fast, with great desire to have: Which is the cause, that the Machiavelists seeing so many marchants to arrive, so exceeding eager to buy, doe hold up without all reason the price of their marchandise, and will by no means depart with it, but to him that offereth most. But I will not here stay to dispute against these buyers and sellers: For I am of opinion, that all their processes shall be made at the first estates that are holden.

By the resolution then of the Estates of Orleans, it is scene, That this Maxime of *Machiavel* was reprovved and condemned, and that it is neither good nor profitable for the commonwealth, that there should be a great number of Officers of justice, but that it were better there were a meane number of them: And this might easily be judged and knowne by natural reason. For the prince which shall establish a great number of Officers to administer justice, either hee must make a multiplicitie of degrees of Officers, or he must establish many in one same degree. If hee make many degrees of Officers, then justice shal be longer, & more prolonged & pernicious: because they which plead, must passe through the hands of many Officers, by many instances from one degree to another. And therefore it is evident, that the multiplicitie of Officers in degree, cannot be but damageable and pernicious. If the prince make a multitude of Officers in one same degree (as was done in Fraunce when Presidiall seats were instituted, when new Councillors of Parliament were added to the old, and when many lieutenants & other Officers were new created) the great number will not cause justice to bee better nor more promptly ministred: but contrarie, shal be the cause of great charge and procrastination: For much time goes away, whilest many Iudges are gathered together to one place, to reason one after another, and after, as saith the Proverbe:

*Affaires so many committed,  
Are alwayes carelesly regarded.*

Moreover, suters alwayes desire with their own mouthes to informe the Iudge of the principall points of their cause, fearing something should bee left out, either by negligence or too much hast. And withall, which is said in a common Proverb, that the lively voice toucheth better than the writing, & better engraveth a thing in the spirits of men. This desire of the parties, to cause the Iudge well to understand their right, is not reprehensible, but just & reasonable, and which ought not to be denied them:



them : yet in the meane time the multiplicitie and great number of Iudges, maketh this point verie difficult and unesie : For men haue not so soone spoken to all, and finding one, he straight finds not another : Moreover, if the matter to iudge, be easie and without difficultie, wherefore serues it to assemble a great sort of Iudges, to decide the cause, since one alone can as well dispatch it, as many? And withall, that one alone can rid more matters in his studie in a day or two, than an assembly can do in a moneth: For a man may labor his cause at all hours, in the morning, all the day, at night by candle light, on holy dayes and working dayes, whereas the bodie of an assembly will not traveile ne sit but certaine houres, and on certaine dayes. If the matter to be iudged be difficult & hard, it may seeme at the first, that many can better iudge of it than one alone : because many eyes see clearer than one eye alone : and withall, there is not so great appearance of corruption in many, as in one alone: But for these difficulties, there are other easier provisions, than by multiplication of Officers : For there needs but good consideration to establish in everie subalterne seat, one Officer alone, which were a good man, of good knowledge, and well stipended : For being a iust man, and well stipended, he will not be easily corrupted, lesse a great deale (it may be) than a great number of such as are at this day : and being learned, and of good knowledge, hee will easily resolve difficulties : withall also in a case of difficultie he may take for an assessor some one of the most sufficient Advocates of his seat, & privatly heare in his study the parties and their Counsell ; & upon their hearing, to resolve of the difficultie in deed and in right, yea, he himself with wise inspection into all things with the helpe of his bookes, may dispatch and rid himselfe out of all difficulties, being learned and of good judgement, as he had need be. Moreover, inferiour Iudges can hardly iudge evil, unlesse they erre either in Fact or Right: from which they shall guard themselves, if supreme Iudges performe well their duties, by not sparing the personall adjournments against such as by grosse ignorance do erre in Right, or which by the negligent inspection into their causes, do erre in Fact. And assuredly, if such Iudges have good Censors, which will marke their faults, and will reprove and correct them, Iustice shall be as well admistrred by one alone in every inferiour seat, as by many. But our soveraigne Iudges are glad of the faults of their inferiours : For their evill judgements bring the greater practise unto them, to fill their purses, to pay for their Offices, to glut their avarice, and to furnish the unmeasurable pompes of themselves and their wives. So that to Iustice, the same happeneth which doth to an humane bodie : For when the head is whole, it will purvey and provide for the necessities and maladies of the members, and seeke out all things fit for that purpose : but when the head is diseased, all the members feele it : So the corruption which is in parliaments, makes, that all justice in inferiour courts, is depraved and corrupted.

I resolve then against the saying of *Machiavel*, That it were better, that there were but one person, in everie estate or degree of inferior justice, than a great multiplicitie of Officers: but my meaning is not, to stretch this unto soveraigne Iustice, but contrarie, I thinke that it is good and necessarie, that judgement bee executed by more than one person; namely, by a meane number of good, and well chosen men : For a judgement given by a notable compaignie, hath more weight and gravitie (as a soveraigne judgement ought to have) than that which comes from one alone : Also because a soveraigne judgement may sometimes take his foundation upon the pure and simple equitie (which sometimes directly repugneth the local

customs, ordinances, and lawes written) it is good and necessarie, that equitie bee judged to be equitie, by the braine and judgement of many: and it is not meet, that one alone should take upon him, that great licence, to depart from authentike and received lawes, to follow his own opinion, which he wil call equitie: For that should bee as it were, to give power to everie particular Iudge, to judge after his fantasie, against received and approved right, and so to suffer to passe under the name of equitie, huge iniquitie. Since then none may easily & without great reason, depart from received and approved lawes, it followeth that none may easily also induce an equitie, against the said lawes, unlesse to induce it, he use great and deliberate consideration and examination, and do well ponder the circumstances & consequences, by a good and experimented judgement, which one alone cannot do, except hee bee of some exceeding invention, knowledge, & experience, & of a good and sound judgement, such a one as can hardly bee found: Therefore it is much better, to commit to many (not to everie one, but unto such as are well chosen) that power to induce equitie against received lawes, than to one alone: Besides this, it appertaineth unto soveraigne Iudges, to examine the new edicts and lawes of princes, to marke and note, if there be any thing hard in them, which it were good to mitigate and lenifie; which they must either themselves do, before they allow or divulge them, or els must they signifie to the prince, a cause why they approve them not. This, one alone can never so wel do, as many (how great and wise soever he be) because the spirit of one man alone, is not capable, to see and comprehend all the particular cases, which may be applied to the matter of an edict, neither in memorie or cogitation can he comprehend, whatsoever absurditie, incommoditie, or iniquitie, can bee in a law. But many, casting & discoursing in their minds everie thing, one foreseeing one thing & another another, by examining & disputing upo the matter, may the better perceive and comprehend the law, and inconveniences thereof. For it is not to be doubted, but that by the dispute of learned and sufficient men (which do examine by a good judgement, reasons contrarie, likely, conjuncts & adjuncts of every thing) may far better, be comprehended the difficulties & incommodities of an edict, than by the reasoning of one alone. The maner which the Romanes aunciently observed, in the making of new lawes, shewes this, for they which proposed and preferred them, were commonly men of good spirit, great judgement, and experience in the affaires of the commonweale; but yet every man (great and small) was heard to contradict that law which was proposed, yea sometimes it was found, and often, that a base person, of smal estimation, which had neither great knowledge nor experience, yet hath noted in that law absurdities and inconveniences, which were causes of rejection, or at the least of moderating and correcting it. Again for that soveraigne Iudges, are as it were censors and correctors of inferior Iudges, it is verie requisite, that they be many in number: because it will seeme hard for a magistrate to be corrected by one alone, unto whom (it may be) he would not give place in any thing, either in good knowledge or experience: Finally, because corruption is more to be feared in soveraigne Iudges, which have none above them to correct their fautes, than in subalterne and inferiours, who themselves may be corrected; therefore it is requisite that soveraigne Iudges be in number, for many are more uneasie to be corrupted, than one alone: I confesse then, in the soveraigne degree of justice of a prince, it is good and expedient, that he have a sufficient number of persons, to exercise it, provided alwayes, the number be not too great, and unbridled, for the qualitie is therein more requisite

requisite than the quantitie. The like is, to be of the kings Counsell, where it is good anequisite, there be many heads, as we have said in another place. For confirmation of my saying, I will alledge no other thing, than the example of our auncestors: For in the time, and before king *Lewis* the twelfth, inferior Officers were not many in the seat and degree of justice, for there was but one in everie seat thereof, to administer it; namely a Provost, or ordinarie Judge, in the first degree; a lieutenant general, or bailife (as they call him) or steward in the second degree; but in soveraigne courts of Parliaments, and the great Counsell, they were many, yet not in so great number, as they be at this day.

But seeing wee are in hand with meanes to establish a good justice, I will touch therein some small points, which I have marked in histories. We must then presuppose, that to cause good justice to be administered, a prince must needs have good lawes, and create good Magistrats and Officers: As for lawes some concerne the decision of matters, and other the formalitie of processe: Touching such as concerne the decision of matters, it seemeth well that there hath been sufficiently provided, by the locall custome of everie country, and by the right or law written: Wel might it be desired, that the doctrines of the doctors of the civile, and cannon law, were well chosen, and the good set apart and authorised: For though in judgements we can hardly lacke them, yet are they so confused, and wrapped with contrarie opinions, that they which hope to find in the doctors gloses and commentaries the solution of some doubtfull question, do often fall into inexplicable laborinthes, and for treasure doe finde coales: Which would not come to passe, if the good doctrines which often come in use, and which are founded upon reason and equitie, were separated and distinguished from the troupe and mixture of those doctors writings. And touching lawes, which concerne the formalitie & conduction of processe and litigations, it seemes to me, there hath been sufficient provision in France, by Royall ordinances: But it seemes not to be sufficient, that a prince make good lawes, well and rightly to conduct and lead, to the end, the processe and contentions of subjects: but it wil be very requisite and necessarie, that hee make lawes to prohibit and hinder, the birth of these processe and contentions; for otherwise good justice and readie expedition of causes, shall indirectly serve for an occasion to increase and multiplie, because men will be made prompt and voluntarie to move actions, when they are assured to have speedie and good justice: So that to shunne this, and to make that the thing which of it selfe is good and holy, bee neither cause nor occasion of evill, it shall bee (as I have said) very requisite to have good lawes, to hinder the birth and originall of contentions, wherein it seemes to mee, that the sayd Royall ordinances are defectuous and maimed: So is there great need of some *Licurgus* or *Solon*, to make those said laws, mens wits are so wild, and their spirits so merveilleously plentifull and fertill, to bring forth contentions and differences, and so easy to dissent one from another: yet notwithstanding I thinke not that it is impossible, something though not altogether, to repress this arising, and fecunditie of law causes, but because it will bee too long now to discourt, wee will reserve it for another time.

But it is nothing to have good lawes, if there bee not withall good magistrates, for their execution: for the magistrate, is the soule of the law, who gives it force, vigour, action, and motion, and without whom the law is but a dead, and unprofitable thing. A good magistrate then is a most excellent thing, yea the most excellent

Good Justice  
consisteth in  
good lawes  
and good  
Magistrates



Caligula  
would  
make his  
horse a con-  
sul of Rome

Epist. 3. lib. 1.

lent in the world, yea he is a verie rare thing, at the least in his time: yet might there be sufficient in a mediocritie, if they were well chosen and sought for. But not the first that payeth most is received, without any care to chuse the fittest: *Dion* writeth, That the emperor *Caligula*, had an horse called *Velocissimus*, which he so much loved, that he made him often to dine and sup at his table, and caused him to be served with barley in a great vessell of gold, and with wine in great caldrons of gold also: Not contented thus, to honour his *Velocissimus*, he determined with himselfe to advance him unto estates and offices, and so the governour of the commonweath, and so resolved to make him Consul of Rome, and had done it (saith *Dion*) if hee had not beene prevented by death. The Machiavelists of this time, which read thin *Dion*, can well say, that this was an act of a fencelesse and mad man, to give such an estate to a beast: Yet do they find it good at this day, to give estates to as fencelesse beasts, & more dangerous than *Velocissimus* was: for (if the worst had salne) if *Velocissimus* had beene created Consull of Rome, hee could have done no other harme to the commonwealth, nor to particulars, unless it had beene a blow with his foot, to such as had saluted him too nigh; but hee would never have made any extorions, pillings, or other abuses, which the beasts of our time commit, which are placed in Offices: And this is it which *Horace* saith, That we mocke him which is evill favouredly powled, and him that weareth a rent shirt under a silke coate, or that hath his gowne on the one side long, and on the other short: but he is not mocked, who wasteth great goods riotously, who overthroweth right, & committeth infinit sins and abuses in his charge; men will peradventure say he doth evill, but not that hee ought to be punished.

How many Offices be there in France, more fit for *Velocissimus*, than for them which hold them? and that which is least perilous, every man doth laugh at, but this which is most dangerous to a commonweale, no man dare so much as say, it ought to be amended, much lesse corrected: For there is a simple beastlinesse and ignorance, and a malicious beastlinesse and ignorance: The simple ignorance is like to that of *Velocissimus*, which can do neither good nor evill: but malicious beastlinesse and ignorance, is a beastly ignorance of all good and right things, but of a great capacitie to hold all vices and wickednesse, such as our Machiavelists: If then a man must needs chuse one of the two, who sees not that it were more expedient to chuse a simple beastlinesse? Can any then deny, but it were better to have for a magistrate *Velocissimus*, than some of our Machiavelists, or our Office-cheators, which come by retaile, unto that which they bought in grosse.

But the prince, who resolves with himselfe, to establish good Magistrates (without which, hee can have no good justice, though his lawes be the best in the world) he must consider and note many things, both in particular persons, and in bodies in generall: for he should take notice what an office it is, for which hee should provide an officer, and accordingly seek a person whose vertue and sufficiencie may be correspondent and equall unto the functions of that estate: For a farre greater sufficiencie is required in a President, than in a Counsellor; and in a Counsellor, than in an inferiour Judge; and in a Judge, than in a Chatellaine or castle guarder: Here it is, where ought to be observed the Geometrical proportion whereof *Aristotle* speaketh, by giving to the most fittest and sufficienciest, the greatest estate, & to them which are meancely fit, meane offices and estates, and the least, to such as are least sufficient: This it is, which *Fabius Maximus* shewed to the Romane people, when they would

Proportion  
geometrical  
to be observed  
in providing  
of Officers.  
*Arist. lib. 1.  
Ethicks.*

would needs create Consuls, two yong lords, that is, *Titus Octacilius* (*Fabius* his nephew) and *Emilius Regillus*, when *Annibal* made warre in Italie: Masters (said he) if we had peace in Italy, or that we had warre here, against a lesser captaine than *Annibal*, so that there were place to amend and correct a fault, when it were made, wee would not hold him well advised, that would hinder your election, and as it were withstand your libertie: But in this warre against *Annibal*, wee have made no fault, but it hath cost us a great and perillous losse, therefore am I of advice that you doe elect Consuls, which match *Annibal*: For as wee would, that our people of warre were stronger than our enemies, so ought wee to wish, that our heads and chieftaines of warre, were equall to them of our enemies: *Octacilius* is my nephew, who espoused my sisters daughter, and hath children by her, so that I have cause to desire his advancement: But the commonwealthes utilitie is more deere unto mee. And withall, that no other hath greater cause than my nephew, not to charge himselfe with a weight, under which hee should fall. The Romane people found his reasons good, therefore revoked their election, and by a new suffrage elected *Fabius* himselfe, and gave him for a companion, *Marcellus*, which assuredly were two great and sage captaines.

This rule to elect magistrates equall to everie charge, above all ought to be well practised in the election of soveraign judges, for after they have judged, if they have committed a fault, it cannot but verie hardly be repaired: so that the reason which *Fabius* alledged, having place in the election of soveraign judges, the provision which followed it, meriteth well to bee drawne into an example and consequence, for the good and utilitie of the princes subjects.

The particular qualities, required in a Magistrate, cannot better nor more briefly be described, than by the counsell, which *Iethro* gave to *Moses*: For hee advised him, to elect people fearing God, true and hating covetousnesse: Surely this counsell is very briefe for words, but in substance it comprehendeth much. For first, the Magistrate which shall feare God, will advise to exercise his Office, in a good conscience and after the commandements of God, and above all things will seeke, that God bee honoured and served, according to his holy wil, and wil punish such as do the contrarie. If the Magistrate feare God, hee will love his neighbour as himselfe, because God so willeth, and by consequent he wil guard himself from doing (in the exercise of his estate) any thing against his neighbor, which he would not should be done against himselfe: Briefly hee will in a booke (as it were) write all his actions, to make his account to that great Lord and master, whose feare hee hath in him. Secondly, if the Magistrate bee veritable, and a lover of truth, it will follow that in the exercise of his Office, as well in civile, as criminall matters, he will alwayes seeke out the truth, and shut his eares to impostures and lies of calumniators and slanderers, which is no small vertue, wherein Iudges often erre. Also, a magistrate that loveth truth, by consequent shall be of sufficiencie, knowledge, and capacitie, to exercise his estate: for Ignorance and Truth are no companions, because Truth is no other thing but light, and Ignorance darkenesse. And for the last point, If the Magistrate hate covetousnesse, he will not onely guard himself from practising it, but also hee will correct it in others: and by cutting off this detestable vice (the root of all evil) he shall keep downe all other vices, which be like rivers proceeding from this cursed and stinking spring. And as wee see, that the covetousnesse of wicked magistrates is cause of the length of law causes, because they have a desire, that the parties which

Particular  
qualities  
required in  
a Magistrate

Exod. cap. 18

pleade

plead before them, should serve their turnes (as they say) as a cow for milke; where-by it followeth, that the poore people are pilled, and eaten even to the bones, by those horse-leaches: Also contrarie, when the Magistrate hateth covetousnesse, hee will dispatch and hasten Iustice to parties, and not hold them long in law, neither pil and spoyle them; a thing bringing great comfort and help to the people: Briefely then, if these three qualities which *Ieshro* requireth in Magistrates and Officers of justice, were well considered by the prince, in such sort, as he would receive none into an Office of justice, who feared not God, loved not veritie, and hated covetousnesse, certainly justice would be better administred, to his great honour, and the utilitie of his subjects.

I will not say, that amongst the Painims, there were Magistrates, which had the true feare of God, for none can have that, without knowing him, & none can truly know him, but by his word, wherof the Paynims were ignorant; yet were there Painims, which had the other two parts which *Ieshro* requireth in a Magistrate. When *Caso* the elder was sent governor & lieutenant general for the Romanes, into the Isle of Sardaigne, hee found that the people of the countrey, had already a custome for many yeres before, to expend and bestow great charges at the receit, and for the honour of all the governors, which were sent from Rome; hee found also through all that countrey, a great company of bankers and usurers, which ruinated and eate out the people by usuries: As soone as hee was arived in his government, hee cassed and cut off this, and would not suffer them at his arrivall, to bee at any charge for his entertainment: He also drave out of the countrey at once, all the said bankers and usurers, without any libertie given them to stay, upon condition to moderate their usuries, which some found hard and evill, thinking that it had beene better, to have given to these bankers and usurers, a meane to their usuries, beyond which they might not passe, than altogether to take from them the meane, to give and take money to profit, a thing seeming prejudiciall to commerce and trafficke: But so much there wanted, that *Caso* stayed not upon these considerations, beleevving that the permission of a certaine, might easily be disguised and perverted, and that men which bee subtil in their trade, might easily in their contracting and accompting, make them lay downe eight for ten, or twelve for fiftene: Briefely, *Caso* governed himselfe so in his estate and government, that the fame of his reputation, was of an holy and innocent person.

Hee was in all matters assuredly a brave man, hee was a good souldiour, a good lawyer, a good orator, cunning both in townes and in rurall affaires, proper in time of peace, and as proper in time of warre, a man of severe innocencie, and who had a tongue that would spare no mans vices, even publicly to accuse them, as indeed in all his life hee never ceased to accuse vicious and evil living people, to make them bee condemned by justice, and especially in his age of nintie yeres, hee accused one *Sergius Galba*. This man stepped one day forward, to demaund the Office of Censor, which was an Office verie meet for him, because hee delighted more to blame and reprehend the vices of men, than praise their vertues: In the pursute of this Office of Censor, hee had many competitors, which also demanded this estate, not so much for the desire they had to have it: for they did well foresee, that if *Caso* were Censor, hee would practise a rigorous Censorship, and that hee would disgrace many officers and Magistrates (as this lay in the Censors power) which were far from good. And this which feared them most, was, that *Caso* himselfe, as he sued for the

Offic

*Titus Livius*  
lib. 3. Dec. 4.

*Titus Livius*  
lib. 9. Dec. 4



Office said openly, that if he were chosen Censor, hee would bring to their trial an heape of vitious corrupted Magistrates, and would reforme offices, by reducing the into the first forme, and disgrading culpable and unworthy officers; and that they which opposed themselves to the pursute hereof, did it for no other cause, but because they feared the touch: Briefly, he did so much, that not onely hee was elected Censor, but also gave him for a companion in his Censorship *Lucius Valerius*, whom he demanded, because he was like humorous as himself. These two being Censors, they failed not to remove many out of their places, for they cassiered many Senators and Magistrates, yea such as were of great houses and nobilitie: They caused their houses to be demolished and overthrowne, which had builded on publike ground: They caused divers ponds & lakes to be paved, which were ful of mudde and durt, & to repurge all the gutters, sinks, & jakes of the citie: They greatly heightened and raised the farmes of the commonwealth lands, which before had beene held at a low price, by persons which by complots and intelligences, had let them out far dearer: Briefly, they administred a very lowable and profitable Censorship, wherupō *Cato* was surnamed *Censorius*. Would to God we had at this day such mē, & that princes would employ them, for the commonwealth stands in great need, so to be purged of so many evils and corruptions, as do infect and ruinate it.

King *Charlemaine* and *S. Lewis* may in this place serve for examples to all kings, and princes: For we read, That these two good kings, true lovers of good Iustice, performing the Office of good Censors, sent often in their time, commissaries and enquestors through all provinces, to be informed against the abuses of Magistrates, and such as they found in fault, and did not well observe all edicts, and ordinances, they were rigorously punished: Infomuch as during their reigns, justice was exceeding well administred, to the great help & comfort of the people. The prince ought also in his election of Magistrats, to advise himselfe well, to chuse officers, which in iudgement will have no respect of persons: For the Magistrat ought to yeeld right egally to the poore as the rich, according to the merit of the cause, and not after the desert of persons. From the beginning of the Roman commonwealth, they had either none (or few) lawes written, to end contentions & differences amongst the, but they were ended, as seemed good to Magistrates, which alwayes gave a colour to their sentences, by certaine decrees and iudgements, which they said had bin before given in like cases: By this palliation and deceit (saying, that they had ben so before iudged) they administred iustice after their own fantasies, yea in such sort as they almost alwayes carried away the gaining of the cause: for Magistrates (which were at their command) supported and favoured them. The meanest sort of people perceiving, that under colour of former iudgements, they were abused, and so that they almost alwayes lost the causes, against the great men of the citie; many beganne to quarrell and complaine: Infomuch as that the Tribunes publicly proposed, that it was necessarie there were ten potentates elected, in the place of two Consuls, to administer the commonwealth, and write laws & ordinances, wherby from thence forward the differences and law controversies might be decided, and not after the fantasies and former iudgements of Iudges & magistrats. The great men after their custome, opposed themselves against this. Hereupon there arose a great stire and sedition, within the town of Rome, which neither the Consuls nor Senat could any way appease: But at the new creation of Consuls, it happened that *Lucius Quintius* (who dwelt in the fields, in a little husbandrie he had) was elected Consul, and sent for

Annales  
upon Anno  
809. and  
2253.

Iudges  
ought to  
have no  
acceptation  
of persons.

Dion. Halic.  
lib. 10.

Good iustice  
cause  
of peace, &  
evill, cause  
of sedition.

for to his village, where they found him at his ploughes taile, ploughing his small possessions: This good person was honourably brought as soveraigne Magistrate into the towne: as soone as he was arrived, hee began to exercise his estate, and to administer justice to everie man, as wel poore as rich, without respect or exception of persons. He in a little time, dispatched all old causes, which had long hanged in suspence, by the meanes of prorogations which rich men made: and behaved himselfe so discret and just in the handling of all causes, as hee was generally esteemed a good and equall judge. Hee abode all day in the pallace, to heare and dispatch causes, and he gave audience to every man very patiently and benignely, and used speedie and good justice, to one and others indifferently, having no regard to persons, but to the merits and to the justice of the cause then in question onely. By this meanes *Quintius* brought to passe, that not onely the great men, were no more suspected judges of the meanest, but also justice was so agreeable and plausible to the people, that the sedition ceased, and all the people were appeased, so that none demanded any more to have new laws, whereby to judge causes, but every man greatly contented himselfe, to have for a law so good and equall a judge, and Magistrate. And surely there is nothing in the world, which sooner ceaseth seditions and stirres, nor that better maintaineth publike peace and tranquillitie, than a good Iustice, administered by good and equall magistrates: But on the contrarie, a wicked Iustice is often cause of uproares, insurrections, and civile waies, as poore Fraunce can say at this day.

*Dion. Halic.  
lib. 10, & 11*

The example of both these cases appeared certaine yeares after *Quintius* was out of his magistracie: for they which succeeded him, had not that grace nor dexteritie, well to administer Iustice: insomuch, as the Tribunes tooke up againe their determination, to create ten Potentates, to write lawes and ordinances, after which men might be judged in all causes: And indeed the Senate (as it were constrained) accorded to this creation, & there were chosen ten Potentates, which with great deliberation composed the laws of the twelve Tables, which were found very good & equall: and not only they proposed and made in publike places the said lawes, and engraved them in Tables of bras, but which more is, they certaintimes administered justice to every man, after these laws, with great uprightnesse and equitie: And amongst other Potentates, there was *Appius Claudius*, who shewed himselfe verie soft and affable to the meanest people, and heard them patiently, & did them verie good and speedy justice, so that the people made no account of the Tribunes, thinking they needed not to runne unto the Tribunes for helpe, since *Appius* alone performed not onely the Office of a good Iudge, but also of a Tribune, to sustaine the good right of the meane people. But this good justice endured but a yeare: for the second yere, the said Potentates being made to continue but for a yeare in their estates, resolved altogether so to remaine, without ever despoyling themselves of that Office: And to gaine people to their faction, they began to doe justice cleane contrarie to that of the first yere, using favour and subornation, alwayes giving sentence to the profit of them that were on their side, to sustaine their tyrannie: By this meanes they drew many persons to bee of their factions, and wrought a great partialitie in the towne of Rome, some holding for the ten Potentates, others against them: But in the end their imperious and tyrannical arrogancie towards one and others, was the cause that the partialized people accorded, and great and little set themselves al on one side against them, wherupon fel their total ruine: insomuch

as the first yeare of their estate, by their good Iustice they brought and maintained a good peace in the citie: but in the second yeare, by their evill & wicked justice they reduced all into troubles and confusions within the citie.

Vnto this example of the tenne Potentates, might we compare the wicked, partiall, and venale Iustice, which hath raigned in France since fiftene yeares (which is and hath beene the principall cause, and as it were the nurse of all troubles and seditions) and that little of good Iustice which wee see to shine (as a lightening, which soone passeth away) after the first troubles in Provence, when the President de Marse, & certain Counsellors were sent thither: For the little good Iustice which they did in that quarter, in so little time as they remained there, was the cause that the people of Provence (which naturally are very hot and furious) carried and guided themselves, in the other following troubles, more modestly than any other of the French Nation.

We have before said, That *Quintius* patiently heard all them which demanded justice of him: which is a point, that all Iustices and Magistrates ought well to observe: For according to the right of Nations and of naturall equitie, none ought to be condemned without being heard. In the time that the *Tarquins* were chased from Rome, they underhand practised many citizens, by promises and otherwise to commit a Treason to the Commonwealth, & to establish *Tarquin* the Proud in his estate. The corrupted citizens procured to them many slaves of the best sort of citizens, by promises of liberty and other good recompences: inasmuch, as all the hired people being in a very great number, concluded upon a secret conspiracy, that the said citizens should one night seize upon the strongest places of the towne, and that the said slaves should sleigh their masters in their beds, as soon as they should heare a noice that should be made through the towne for a watchword: and this being done, some should go and open the gates to the *Tarquins*. There were two brethren, *Marcus* and *Publius Laurentius*, which were of this conjuration: these many times were tormented in their beds in sleepe, by hideous and fearefull dreames, this made them goe to their Divines, to know from whence these dreams proceeded. The Divines told they proceeded from some wicked enterprise which they had in their heads, which they could not well bring about, & it were good they left off, that they might be no more tormented with such dreames. This was the cause, that the two brethren discovered all the conspiracy to *Servius Sulpicius*, one of the Consuls. *Sulpicius* saw an evident and nigh perill to the Commonwealth, if suddainely it were not provided for: yet did he not thinke it good to deale in the punishment of the culpable, before they were well vanquished, and plain matters averred against them (as our Machiavelists of this time doe, which take law against men after they have slaine them) but secretly communicated the fact to the Senat. The Senat referred to him to proceed in that matter, as he thought fittest for the utility and conservation of the Commonwealth. *Sulpicius* considering then, that amongst the conspirators there were many great persons and well allied, and that he might reape great envie and hatred, if hee caused any to die without an open conviction of the fact, hee resolved to bring the cause to a cleare and evident prooffe. He then tooke such order, as the strong places of the citie were guarded by good men on a certaine night assigned, and so sent to *Tullius Longus*, his companion in the Consulship (who then besieged the Town of Fidenes) that he should come to Rome with a good part of his army: and he delt so, as he arrived nigh the gates at the houre of midnight, at the night assigned, and that



there he should stay, till *Sulpitius* sent him word. This done, he gave charge to the two brethren *Laurensines* (which had discovered the enterprise unto him) to advertise their complices, as from the side of the *Tarquins*, to execute their desseigne that night, & that they all should meet in the market place, the better to know what every man should do. This was so done: in so much, as the conjurators being altogether assembled in the publicke Market, the Consull *Longus* was assigned to enter into the Towne with all his forces, & so in the market place were all the conjurators environed and wrapped in by the good order that *Sulpitius* had taken: so that they were all by this meanes convicted of the fact: in so much, as none of their parents or allies could denie the crime. This was the cause that every man said after (when it came to the punishment of the conspirators) that it were a good deed to punish them, and that *Sulpitius* had well performed his duty. Briefely, by this cleare & evident prooffe which *Sulpitius* drew out of this conspiracy, he obtained great honour and praise, whereas he should have heaped upon himselfe great envie & evill will of the allies and parents of such as were culpable, if he had caused them to be executed without great and evident verification of the crime.

*Am. Marcel.*  
lib. 21. A  
judge ought  
to feare to  
offend his  
conscience.

*Helpidius* also, lieutenant of Justice at Rome, in the time of the emperor *Constantinus*, shewed himselfe a good and sincere Iudge: For being commaunded by the emperor to racke and torment a poore accused person, he would never do it, because he found no matter nor sufficient proofes against him to do it: but humbly besought the emperor rather to discharge him of his Office, than constrain him to doe a thing against his conscience.

*Suet. in Tib.*  
Cap. 42. *Am.*  
*Marcel.* lib.  
23. & 27.

The prince then which wil make a good election of magistrats, ought to take care to chuse persons, which like *Cato* will not winke at vices, & which wil patiently heare parties, & judge equally, as did *Quintius*: which will be diligent, wel to draw out the truth of the fact, before he give judgement upon any, as did *Sulpitius*: which may be such persons as feare to offend their consciences, like *Helpidius*. And briefly, that they be fearers of God, lovers of truth, & not covetous, according to *Ieshu* his counsell: Thus doing, he need not feare to have his justice well ruled and holily administred. He must take heed he doe not like the emperor *Tiberius*, who gave his Offices to great drinkers & gourmandizers, taking pleasure to see a man tunne up much wine and viands into his belly: Neither ought he to imitate the example of the Emperor *Julian* the Apostata, who for a Iudge (one time) gave to the Towne of Alexandria in *Aegypt*, a most cruell and turbulent man: And when it was told him, that this Iudge was a man very unworthie of such an Office: I know not (saith he) how unworthie he is: but because the Alexandrians be turbulent and covetous persons, I will give them a like Iudge, which may deale with them after their merits. This was a very inconsiderate part of this emperor, to give a wicked magistrat to a corrupted people for their amendment: for that is, as if one should give unto a diseased person a wicked physician to heale him. There was the like fact committed in our time by the Machiavelists; but no marvaile if Atheists follow the traces of an Apostata, for the one is as good as the other. Neither ought the prince also to do as the emperor *Valentinian*, who constrained the parties to subject themselves to the judgement of suspected Iudges to bee their enemies: For all these said emperours were greatly blamed by authors of their time, and are yet by all hystories, for their so evill choise of unworthie men in Offices, which rather they ought to have recoyled and dejected, as many other emperours did, which for farre lesse causes have cassied and dis-

dispatched them out of their Offices, as some have written, That *Augustus Caesar* cashiered a Magistrate as ignorant and incapable, because hee writ *hei* in place of *ipse*. And *Vespasian* cashiered another, because he perfumed himselfe and smelled of muske, saying, he would have loved him better, if he had smelled of Garlick. And *Domitian* cashiered another, because he delighted in dauncing and puppet playes: for *Domitian* (althogh otherwise very wicked) had this good in him, that he caused well to be chastised, all such as our Machiavellists are at this day. Likewise also *Fabritius Censor* cashiered out of the Senate *Cornelius Rufinus* Senator, because hee had vessels of silver weighing 10. marks, which at this time comes to 40. crowns. But I leave you to think, if they would not then have rigorously punished such as do spoile and eat the people, which sell Iustice, or which commit like abuses (which at this day are manifestly tolerated in France) since they cashiered men out of their Offices for far lighter causes, as to faile in the orthographie of a word, to smell of a perfume, to daunce, to have plate of the value of 10. pounds: for these things seeme not to be great faults, but at this time men do rather make virtues of them.

But it is not ynough, that a prince make good election of his Officers and Magistrates by the consideration of each mans particular virtues, but also, in seates where he must needs establish many Iudges together, he ought to take good advisement well to compose the body of that assembly, by considering the qualities required, to give a good harmonic and temperance to all the bodie. And for this purpose hee ought to compose and temper it of persons of divers estates and divers countries, as for example: A parliament and judgement seat (which ought to bee composed of many) ought not to be made of men, all of the Nobilitie, or of the Clergie, or of the third estate, but some of every estate. Likewise, it ought not to be composed of men all of one towne, but they ought to be taken from divers iurisdiccions or diocesses. And those two points have anciently been observed in France, according to the old ordinances so enjoining. But in the time wherein we live, we may add by the like reason, That in a parliament or the like seat, they ought not all to be Catholicke Romanes, and none of the Reformed Religion. For if the estate of the Clergie for the conservation of her priviledges, hath well obtained, that in all such places there bee magistrats of the Clergie (althogh they be of the same religion in all points with the Catholike Lay-men) why should they denie it to men of the profession of the Gospel? To this purpose we read, That at Rome there was a time wherein there was many more knights in the assembly of Iudges sovereigns of causes, than of Senators: in so much, as by sovereign judgement, *Publius Rutilius* (who was a good and sincere man) was condemned to banishment (because he had repressed the excessive and unreasonablenesse of exactions of Publicans in Asia) being evill beloved of the knights, which were the greater number of the assembly. The Senators disdaining and grieving at this wicked judgement, stirred up *Drusus Tribune* of the people at whose pursute there was a law made, That from thence forward the Senators and knights should be of a like number in the judgements of causes: Which law was found good and profitable to the Commonweale: as by the contrary they found not good that law which before *Calpurnius Gracchus* (who also was a Tribune of the people) would have caused to passe, whereby he sought to move, that in the judgement of causes there might be two knights against one Senator. For he saw there is no equalitie or equity; and therefore by good reason that law was rejected, yea and to the ruine of *Gracchus*, who was slain in the too earlie pursute of this law.

Paral. lib. 2.  
cap. 1410.  
Antiq. lib. 9.  
cap. 2.

Dion. Hal.  
lib. 7.

A Prince  
ought to  
punish evill  
Iudges, and  
to reward  
good men.

Lamprid. in  
Alex.

*Iosaphas* also, king of Iudea, after he had established good magistrates through the Townes of his kingdome, and expressly enjoined them to execute good justice to every man, without having any regard, but to the feare of God, and not to the riches nor the dignity of persons, finally established a seat like a parliament, in the towne of Ierusalem, composed of persons elected from all the lines and families of his kingdome, as Iudges, holding the degree of supreme jurisdiction, unto which, mē might only appeale from the sentences of inferior Iudges. The same temperance kept also the ancient Romanes in all sorts of their magistrats: For they not onely had of their Nobility, but also of their knights, and of the third estate to the contentment of every one: and that magistrats being so tempered, they so might be suspected neither to great nor little. This is it which was said of *Marcus Valerius* (that valiant and wise Senatour and great captaine of warre) perswading the Senate to receive the people to Offices, and into the administration of the Commonweale. Masters (said he) all they which will well establish a publike estate, ought to consider, not only that which is present, but also that which may come: But certainly, if the whole administration of the Commonweale remained alwaies in the hands of such as are rich & puissant, it might so come to passe in succession of time, that some small number of the would usurpe a tyrannous domination over the people: But when some of the people shall bee mixed amongst such as are rich and puissant, they dare enterprise no tyrannie, fearing to be punished by the lawes, whereof the Magistrates of the people may pursue against them the observation. Finally, so much the greater terror and feare wee propose before the eyes of transgressors of lawes, and corrupters of manners, by putting against proud and covetous men, many observers and watchers in their heads, so much the better shall the estate of our Commonwealth bee established and assured.

A Prince having by good election well ordained the magistrats of his justice, he ought after to consider how he may maintaine them in their duty to walke upright, and to keepe themselves from corruption. To doe this, he must observe two things: To cashier them which deale evill in their charge, yea that he punish them according to the greatnes of their faults, and that he recompence and remunerat them which deale well in their charges. Wee have above set downe some examples of certaine emperours, which chastised their vicious magistrats, which examples do merit well to be drawn into a consequence, at the least for great faults of magistrats: But above all, a prince ought alwaies to have before his eyes the example of the king *S. Lewis*, who of his kingdome sent often Commissioners through his provinces to get information of the abuses of magistrats, that he might do justice thereof: For this example meriteth well to be practised in the time wherein we are. Moreover, the emperor *Alexander Severus* practised very well these two points, whereof now I speake; touching the punishing of evill magistrats and remunerating the good. For on the one side he so hated wicked magistrats, which abused their Offices, that one day there coming to his Court one *Arabianus*, who was reported to have committed thefts in the administration of his Office, he begun in a great choller, O gods immortal! *Arabianus* not onely liveth, but dare appeare in the Senate, and before mee. On the other side, *Alexander* would remunerate and bountifully reward such magistrats as were good, and well acquitted themselves in their charges: For (said he) good magistrats which are good men, must bee bought and enriched: but wicked men of no value must bee impoverished and driven away. Wee may also allcadge the example of

the



the most part of our ancient kings of France, which stipended well their Officers of Iustice: For although it seeme, that the wages which they take at this present is little; yet at the time when their wages were first constituted and set down unto them, they were great and sufficient ynough to maintaine them unto whom they were given. And there is no doubt but a man might as well and honourably maintaine himselfe some 60. yeares agoe with 300. pounds a yeare, as now for 1000, for truely, since that time, all things have proved foure times dearer. Whereupon it followeth, since expences are quadruple, and that the wages of magistrats are not raised, that it were requisite they were augmented, the rather to encourage them to do their duties, and to take from them all occasion and excuse of abuses.

Hereupon some have thought, that to shun abuses & corruptions of magistrats, it were good and expedient to make them temporall, as for two or three yeares, or els to make them ambulatorie, by removing of them frō time to time frō one province to another. This opinion hath bin held by a great person of our time, which seemeth to be founded upon many good reasons: For if magistrats were temporall, by consequent they should bee subject to the Syndiks, and to give account of their administration: and if they were ambulatorie, they should not know the persons submitted to their iurisdiction, neither could they contract with them any inward familiaritie and love, which often do cause Iudges to stray out of the right way, and do draw the curtaine from the eyes of Iustice: And both by the laws of the Romans, and the ordinances of king *Lewis*, and many other kings his successors, the magistrats of Provinces could neither be perpetuall, nor might they bee magistrats in the provinces where they were borne. Yet if wee consider, that France is composed of divers provinces, which have every one their courses of law, different, we shall find, that it were impossible to find magistrats fit to administer iustice in every severall province, for want of knowledge of the different stiles, customes, & manners of every severall countrey, which are not wel learned but by use and practise: And also old men and many persons very capable to exercise offices of magistracie, neither can nor will subject themselves to an uncertaine removing frō one province to another: for the affaires of their familie could not well beare it, yet every man must have care of his familie. We see also that men advanced to Offices, although men learned and capable, yet at the first have not had the dexteritie well to apply their knowledge to use, for it is obtained by the handling of matters & experience. Whereupon it followeth, that if magistrats were temporall, they should be at the end of their time even then when they begun to understand how they ought to handle their offices, & by appointing deputies in their places, the like would come to them: and so would it come to passe, that in Offices there would be placed, more oftē new men than well experienced; a thing neither good nor profitable to the Commonweale. And for this cause we read, that the emperor *Antoninus Pius* continued alwaies in his time his magistrats, which in their Offices acquitted themselves well. And in the time of *Severus*, and other emperours after him, it was practised, that to the Office of the *Prætorian* prefecture, they should alwayes provide some one of them which before had served as an Assessor, and knew therefore how he should handle that Office. And certainly, in the Roman time there was this incommoditie in the matter of magistrats, that often they were at the end of their time, before they understood how they should administer; as a captaine *Niger*, lieutenant of the warre for the emperor *Marcius Antonine*, complained to him. But that incommoditie was much more supportable in that time, than

Magistrates  
in France  
ought nei-  
ther to be  
temporall  
nor ambu-  
latorie.

Capit. in Pio.

Span. in 24.  
879.

A prince  
ought him-  
selfe to mi-  
nister justice

Dion. Halic.  
lib. 1. & 5.

Suet. in Caf.  
cap. 43. in  
Aug. 1. 33 in  
Claud. cap. 3  
in Galb. cap.  
7. 8. 9. in  
Domitiano,  
cap. 8.

Dion. in  
Adrian.

at this day it can bee in France : for the Romane magistrates seldome decided private and particular causes : but in France, magistrates must deale in all causes.

After that the prince hath well established his justice as well by publication of good lawes, as by institution of good magistrates, yet is he not discharged : For hee ought himselfe also to deale therein. And this is another point of the Counsel which *Iethro* gave to *Moses* : For after he had counselled him, what magistrates hee should establish under him, he added more, That *Moses* ought to reserve unto himselfe the knowledge and decision of great affaires, which are of consequence. And assuredly this is a point very necessarie, and which a prince ought not to leave behind : for hee is debtor of justice to his subjects, and ought to give them audience in things whereof he is to have necessarie knowledge : for all things are not proper to bee handled before magistrates established by the prince : but there are many things, whereof the knowledge ought to appertaine to the prince alone : as when a meane man wil complaine against some great lord or magistrat, or against Publicans and exactors of the princes money, or when a man labours for a pardon, gift, recompence, and many other like : The prince then ought himselfe, either alone, or in his Counsell to give often audience unto his subjects : For we read, that by the primitive creation of kings and monarchs, the authoritie which was attributed unto them by the people, consisted in three very notable points : whereof the first was, To minister good justice unto their subjects, by causing them to observe the lawes and customes of the country, and to take knowledge themselves of the injuries which are great & of consequence amongst their subjects. The second point was, To convocat an assembly of a Senat, to handle the affaires of the commonwealth. And the third, To be the chieftaine and soveraigne of the warre. And forasmuch as the first dutie of kings consisteth, to doe good justice unto their subjects, the auncient Grecians (even *Homer*) calleth them *δυσμετριους & δυνεικταριους*, that is to say, Distributers of justice. This is it wherefore almost all good princes have had their ordinarie daies of Audience, wherein they took knowledge of the complaints & grievances of their subjects, & administered right & justice unto them, *Julius Caesar* took great paine and travaile to heare causes, and to administer justice, and to cause them to observe lawes which concerned the commonwealth : as especially the law *Sumptuarium*, which would permit no excessse in bankets, nor dissolutenesse in apparrell. *Augustus Caesar* likewise kept an ordinarie Audience, which he continued untill night : yea, being evil at ease, he in a litter would be carried to the pallace, or hold Audience in his house. The emperor *Claudius* also (although he were of an heaveie and dull spirit) yet held hee his Audience, & administered right to parties. So did *Domitian*, who (how wicked soever he was in other deportments) with great industrie & diligence administered good justice unto parties, and often revoked decrees from the Centumvirat seat, which for favor were given, and spared not to punish corrupted Iudges. The emperor *Galba* likewise (although he was of the age of threescore and twelve yeares, when he came to the empire) yet dealt with audience of parties, and administered justice. So did *Traian*, *Adrian*, the *Antonines*, *Severus*, *Alexander* and many other Romane emperours give Audience to their subjects, and administered justice unto them. And very memorable is that which is written of the emperor *Adrian*, namely, That one day as he went into the fields, he was required by a poor woman (who had watched to speak with him) to do her justice upon a certaine complaint she made unto him : The emperor very kindly said unto her, That that was no place where she should require justice, and

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sent her away till another time : The woman replied upon him: Sir (said she) if you will not doe me justice, wherefore deale you to be emperour? *Adrian* was never moved hereat, but staid still, heard her, and did her justice. If we reade the hystories of France, we shall find, that it hath yet bin more ordinary & common with our auncient kings to hold Audiencies (which men called *Lit de Justice*, The Bed of Iustice) than with the Romane emperours. *Charlemaigne* king of France, and emperour, besides that he tooke great care, that stewards, baylives, & their deputies, should walke upright without abusing their Offices, would also, that they should reserve unto him all great causes, or such as were amongst great lords: Then caused he the parties to appeare before him, he heard them patiently, and agreed them amiably, if hee could by any means: and so he gave his sentence, and good & prompt justice. King *Lewis* the first of that name (surnamed *le Debonaire*, because of his good & holy conditions) following the traces of *Charlemaigne* his father, held a publick Audietice in his pallace three times in the weeke, & heard the grievances and complaints of every one, executing to all quicke & right justice. But what good came there hereof? Even this (saith the hystorie) that the publicke good in this good kings time, was so well governed & administred, that there was almost no man found amongst his subjects, which complained, that any man did him wrong or injurie, but all men lived in great peace and prosperity, one not daring to offend another, for the feare they had of the kings good justice, which he would administer himself, and so cause his ministers to do after his example. So much could that royall vertue of Iustice do for the maintenance of peace and prosperitie in a kingdome. King *Philip Augustus* (surnamed the Conqueror, for his great prowesses and conquests) was also a good Iusticer, and willingly heard the complaints of his subjects: inso much, as one day understanding, that *Guy Countie de Auverne* used greatly to pill and violently to spoile his subjects and neighbours, exacting upon them great summes of money against their wils, & without the kings consent their Sovereigne, and having found him culpable hereof, condemned him (by the advice of the Barons of the Realme) to lose his land and seignorie of Auverne, which from that time was united to the crowne. Wee may also place here the good justice of the kings, *Charles le Sage*, *Charles* the seventh, *Charles* the eight, *Lewis* the twelfth, and of many other kings of France, which gave ordinarie audience to the complaints of their subjects, and to do them justice. But it shall suffice to close up all this matter with the example of that good king *S. Lewis*, who amongst other vertues wherewith he was endowed, he was a very good & upright administrer of justice. This good king having a great zeale to establish a good Iustice in his kingdome: first he would and ordained, That the good & ancient lawes and customes of the kingdome should be well and straitly observed, upon the paine he would take of his Baylives, Seneshals, and other magistrates, if they caused them not to be well observed. And to the end the said magistrates might carry themselves well in their offices, he chose other officers, the best that hee could find, of which he secretly enquired of their vertues and vices. And to the end they might administer good and brieve justice to the poore as to the rich, without exception of persons, he forbad them to take presents (unlesse some present of victuall, which may not exceed tenne shillings by the weeke) nor any other benefites for them or their children, neither of them which were in contention, nor of any other person of their bayliwike and territorie, and commaunded they should take nothing within their prefecture or jurisdiction: For this good king considered, that presents,

Annal. upō  
Ann. 809. &  
814. & 1215

Annal. upō  
Ann. 1255.  
& 1269.

Gaguin in  
the life of  
S. Lewis.  
The good  
justice of  
Lewis.



The tenne  
commāde-  
mēt which  
the king S.  
Lewis at his  
decease  
gave to his  
eldest son.

benefits & desire to gain, are the means whereby magistrates may be corrupted, & therefore to shun all corruptiō, he must cut off the means thereunto. Moreover, he very rigorously punished such officers of Iustice as abused their estates, & spared not even great lords themselves, but punished them after their merits: as happened to the lord *de Concy*, who caused to strangle two yong Flamins, when he found the hunting in his woods. For the king caused to bee called before him the said lord, who fearing to bee handled as he had dealt with the Flamins, would have takē the hearing of the cause frō the king, saying, he was to be sent for before the peeres of Frāce. But the king forced him to abide his judgemēt, & indeed had made him die, if great lords (parēts & friēds of the said lord *de Concy*) had not importuned so much the king for his pardō: unto which the king accorded, that he should have his life, but yet he cōdemned him to the war against the Turks & Infidels in the holy lād by the space of 3. yeres (which was a kind of banishment) & besides cōdemned him in a fine & paiment of 10000. Paris pōuds, which were bestowed on the building of an Hostie Dieu at Pōthoife. This king gave not easily any pardō, nor without great deliberatiō: And (for a devise) he had often in his mouth that verse of the Psalme of *David*: *Happy are they which doe Iudgements & Iustice at all times*. He said also, That this was no mercy but cruelty, not to punish malefactors. Moreover, he was a king ful of truth, chaste, charitable, and fearing God; which are vertues exceeding worthy for a good prince, & which cōmōly accompany good justice. But the godly precepts he gave (being in extremitie of his life) to K. *Philip*, the Hardy, his sonne & successor, do well merit to be writtē in letters of gold upon the lintels of dores, and the houses of all kings & Christian princes, to have the alwaies before their eies. My deare son (saith he) since it pleaseth God, our Father & Creator, to withdraw me now from this miserable world, to carry me to a better life than this; I would not depart frō thee my son, without giving you for my last blessing the doctrines & precepts which a good father ought to give to his sonne, hoping you wil engrave in your heart these your fathers last words. I cōmand you the my deare son, That above all things you have alwaies before your eies the fear of God, our good Father: for the feare of God is the beginning, yea the accōplishment of all true wisdom, & if you feare him, he will blesse you. Secondly, I exhort you to take al adversities patiēly, acknowledging, that it is God which visiteth you for your sinnes, & not to wax proud in prosperity, accounting, that it comes to you by Gods grace, not by your merits. Thirdly, I recōmend unto you charity towards the poore: for the good you do unto the shal be yeilded unto you an hundred fold, and Iesus Christ our Savior shall account it done unto him. After, I recommend to you very straitly my deare sonne, that you cause to keep well the good laws & customes of the kingdome, & to administer good justice to your subjects: for happy are they which administer good justice at all times: and to do this, I enjoin you, that you be careful to have good magistrates, & cōmand you them, that they favor not your Procurators against equity, and that you rigorously punish such as abuse their Offices: for when they make faults, they are more punishable than others; because they ought to govern other subjects, & to serve the for an example. Suffer not, that in judgemēt there be exception of persons, & so favour the poore only as the truth of his fact doth appcare, without favoring him as to the judgement of his cause. Moreover, I cōmand you, that you be carefull to have a good Counsel about you of persons which be of staid & good age, which be secreet, peaceable, & not covetous: for if you do this, you shal bee loved and honoured, because the light of the servants makes their masters shine:

shine: Also more, I forbid you to take tallages or tributes upō your subjects, but for urgent necessity, evident utility, and just cause; for otherwise you shall not bee held for a king, but for a tyrant: Further I cōmand you, that you be carefull to maintaine your subjects in good peace & tranquillitie, & observe their franchises & priviledges which before they have enjoyed, & take heede you move no war against any Christian, without exceeding great occasion & reason. *Item*, I exhort you to give the benefices of your kingdome to men of good life, & good conscience, not to luxurious & covetous wretches. My deare son, if you observe these my cōmands, you shal be a good exāple to your subjects, & you shal be the cause that they will addit thēselves to doe well; because the people will alwaies give thēselves to the imitation of their prince: & God by his bōury maintain you firm & assured in your estate & kingdom. Thus finished this good king his last words, full of holy zeale, and correspōdent to his life passed, & yeelded his soule to his creator, which had given it him. His sonne king *Philip* third of that name, called the Hardie, because of his valiancie which hee shewed against the infidels, & against other enemies, as well during the life, as after the death of his father, made good profit of these excellent commands, and maintained the kingdome in good peace, and great prosperity during his raigne.

For an end hereof, I do note in this good king *Lewis*, That it is very true which the Scripture witneseth unto us; That the just shall spring up, and receive of God the blessing of a good & long generation: For there were more than 300. yeres, that the race of this good king held the crowne of France, yea there was no more any other race of the blood royall, but his: For the house of *Valois*, & the house of *Burbon*, have issued frō this good king: God by his mercy grāt grace to princes of this time, which are discended frō so good a root, that they may engrave in their hearts the godly cōmandemēts of this king, whose meaning verily was not only to prescribe to the said king *Philip* his sonne, but generally to all his posteritie.

36. *Maxime.*

*Gentlemen which hold Castles and Iurisdicktions, are very great enemies of Commonweales.*

**T**He Leagues and Cantons of *Almaign* (saith *Machiavell*) live very peaceably, and at their ease, because they observe an equality amongst thēselves, and suffer no gentlemen in their country: & those few they have, they so hate thē, that when by adventure any of thē fall into their hands, they put thē to death, & take none to mercy, saying, they are they which destroy all, and hold schooles of wickednesse: I call (saith he) them gentlemen, which live of their renew, without giving thēselves to any trade: These in a countrie are very dangerous, & above all, high Iusticers which hold Castles & Fortresses, & which have a great number of vassalles & subiects which owe them faith and homage. The kingdome of *Naples*, the land of *Rome*, *Romaigne*, and *Lombardie*, are full of such manner of men, & they are the cause that hitherto no good estate politick can be constituted in those places, for they are formall and capitall enemies of the civile estate of Commonweales.

Discourse  
li. i. Cap.

They



Hey which have frequented the countries of Almain & of Suiffes may well give *Machiavell* the lye, for that he saith in this Maxime : for in those countries may be found many gentlemē great Iusticers, having under them, men, jurisdictions, and castles, which were not onely maintained in their nobility and authority, but also are there greatly respected and employed in publike affaires : And so much there wanteth, that there they hold a schoole of wickednes, that contrary, onely they hold the countries in peace, every one in his own countrey, and do see justice administered to their subjects. I will not deny but there are gentlemen in Almaine, in the country of Suiffes, in France, & other where, which are bad enough, & which are violent and vitious, yet for some few we must not cōdemne all in generall, as *Machiavell* doth here, who saith, they be dāgerous people in a country, & that they are enemies to an estate politicke: I know not if those he named be such (namely the gentlemē of Naples, of Romania, of Lumbardy, & of Rome) and I am content to confesse unto him, because I will not cōtest & strive against him, upō a fact which hath some appearance of truth : But I deny unto him, that on this side the mounts they are such, but cōtrary we see, that it is only the Nobility of France, and other neighbour countries, which authorize & protect justice, & which make it to be obeyed: Yet will I also cōfesse that the gentlemē on this side the mounts, are very dangerous, & great enemies unto such a politicke estate as *Machiavell* hath builded by his writings, that is, a Tyrannicall: For hystories tell us, that our ancestors, especially the barons, lords, & gentlemen, have vigorously alwaies opposed themselves against tyrannies, & would never suffer them long to grow up or take root, which is a naturall thing in the French Nobility, and good, though evill for the Machiavelists strangers which are come into France to practise their tyrannies: for by Gods grace, they shall (with much ado) take any deepe roote there.

### 37. Maxime.

*The Nobilitie of France would overthrow the estates of that kingdom, if their Parliaments did not punish them, and hold them in feare.*

Discourse  
li. 1. Cap. 1.



He kingdome of France (saith *Nicholas*) is a kingdome more living under lawes, than any other, whereof their Parliaments are the guardians & maintainers, especially, that of Paris: and hitherto that kingdome is maintained, because the Parliaments have alwaies been obstinat executors and resisters against the Nobility, without which the kingdome of France had come to ruine.



*Achiavell* had done much better to have meddled only with the estate of Florence: for he shewes well his ignorance, & that he never knew the estate of France, nor how it hath beene governed by our ancestors: For I pray you, where hath hee found this, that the kingdome of France would dissolve and come to ruine, but that the Parliaments are executors against the Nobilitie? Is not this as much to say, as the French Nobilitie will ruinate the kingdome, if it be not bridleed and held short



short, by Parliaments, and that it were better there were none: I doubt not but that *Machiavel* thus thought: For we see it by the practise of the *Machiavelists*, which never shot at other marke, than to ruinate in France all the Nobility, the better to establish their tyranny, at ease without contradiction: And for this effect have they called, violated, & overthrowne all the good lawes of the kingdome, by the means of which it hath alwaies hitherto bin maintained: and *Machiavel* confesseth & saide true, which his disciples having well marked, and desiring to ruinate the said kingdome, have not failed to begin by the lawes thereof, knowing wel that having ruinated her foundations, she will be easily dissolved and overthrowne.

But to confute this Maxime, I will alledge no other thing but that wee see in our French histories, That our kingdome was as much or more flourishing, & better governed before there were any Parliaments in France, than since: For the Parliament of Paris (which is the ancientest) was established & constituted in the time of king *Philip le Bel*, Anno 1294. That of Tholouse, during the raigne of *Charles* the 7, Anno 1444. That of Burdeaux, in the time of the same king, Anno 1451. That of Daulphin, in the time also of the same king (but by the authority of king *Lewis* the 11. his sonne then Daulphin, and then inhabiting in Dauphine) in Anno 1453. The Parliaments of Dijon and of Provence, in the time of the said king *Lewis* the 11. That of Roan, in the time of king *Lewis* the 12. in Anno 1499. And that of Bretaine was erected only in the time of king *Henry* the 2. in Anno 1553: But before there was any newes of all those Parliaments, was not the kingdome large and flourishing, rich in peace, flourishing in war? None can deny this, without giving the lie to all our histories, which doe witness, that in the times of *Clowis*, *Charles Martell*, *Charlemaigne*, *Philip August*, *S. Lewis*, & of many other kings of France, the kingdome greatly flourished in peace and war: Yet was there no newes of all the Parliaments abovenamed. And so much there wanted, that the gentlemē troubled or ruinated the estate of the kingdome, where there was no Parliaments, that by contrary, they were they which exercised in person, the estates of baylives and seneshals, and ministred justice to every man through the provinces, and when they were constrained to go out, they appointed themselves a lieutenant to exercise their offices: And as for appellations from their sentences, they were discussed by a generall meeting of the deputies of provinces, and good townes of the kingdome, which congregated at a place assigned by the king, once a yeare: Which assembly men well called a Parliament in the old French tongue. But those assemblies were not formed offices, neither in any thing are like the Parliaments at this present, but rather are like the assembly of our Estates generall: There did sit the deputies of the Short robe, whereof the most part were gentlemen, which they called Lay men, and the deputies of the Long robe, which wee call clerkes (although since, counsellors clerks are only called Clerkes, & Lay men they which be married) with the Peeres of France, when they would sit with the: Therefore gentlemē were employed to do justice to the people, not only in offices of baylives & seneshals, but also as delegates of townes & provinces to assist in the assembly of Parliamēt, which otherwise men called the court of Peeres. It is therefore seene, that the saying of *Machiavel* is a meere slander, & that the Nobility of France is not such as he makes it (although in all estates there be both good & evill) and that of all times, even before there were any Parliaments, the Nobility were employed to maintain the kingdome in peace and repose by their exercise of the charges and offices of Justice.

And would to God, that yet at this day gentlemen would not give themselves so much

Since what time Parliaments of France were instituted. Before Parliaments the kingdome was no lesse flourishing in peace and good justice than since.

Many of  
this time  
despise let-  
ters and the  
nobilitie  
of vertue.  
*Salust. in  
Catalan.*

much to armes, but that some of them would studie the civile law, that they might exercise offices of Iustice. The ancient Romanes made no lesse account of a civile vertue, whereby a man knew how to maintaine peace and justice in his country, thā of the military vertue, whereby we are defended frō strange oppression. And indeed it is a small thing (as *Salust* saith) to be puissant in armes without, when within we have no counsell. For the Barbarians, as the Scythians and Tartarians, are great warriors against their enemies and neighbors, yet amongst themselves they have no counsell, no good policie, no wel governed justice, no letters, sciences, nor schooles, and in summe they are Barbarians, though they bee warlike. Whereby appeareth, how much it serverth to the publicke estate of a countrey, to have within it a good justice, and a good policy, and fit and capable people well to manage it. But our gentlemen at this day (at the least many) have letters and sciences in too great despight, and doe thinke it doth derogate from their gentrie and nobilitie, if they know any thing, and make a mocke at such as deale with a pen and inckhorne, which is one of the greatest vices which at this day raigneth amongst the Nobilitie. And if they delighted not in ignorance, but would vouchsafe onely to reade hystories, they should find that *Julius Caesar*, *Augustus*, *Tiberius*, *Claudius*, *Adrian*, *Marke Antonine*, *Seruus*, *Maximus*, and many other emperours were very learned in letters and sciences, yea themselves writ bookes. We read also in our hystories, that king *Charlemaigne*, king *Robert*, *Charles la Sage*, and of recent memorie, king *Francis* the first of that name, were princes endowed with good knowledge, for their time: I say for their times: for the times wherein were these antient kings (except the said king *Francis*) were full of barbarousnesse and ignorance, and farre from the learned world of the emperours, which we have before named. I will also note another notable vice, which runnes currant amongst gentlemen at this day, which is, That they make so great account of their Nobilitie of blood, that they esteeme not the Nobilitie of vertue; insomuch as it seemeth to some, that no vices can dishonour or pollute the Nobility and gentry which they bring from their ancestors. But they ought well to consider, that to their race there was a beginning of Nobilitie, which was attributed to the first that was noble, in consideration of some vertue which was in him. If then the Nobilitie and gentrie of race tooke his originall and spring from vertue, it followeth that so soon as it holdeth no more of the said spring, it is no more Nobilitie nor gentrie, no more nor lesse than the water which commeth and springs from a neat and cleere fontaine, when it pollureth and corrupts it selfe in filthie bogges, cures, fennes, and mterie sinkes, shall be called the fountaine water, since it hath corrupted it selfe in filthie mire and clay; but shall be accounted corrupt and stinking water, although it ran from a most pure and cleere spring. We read that the emperor *Marke Antonine*, made so great account of the Nobilitie of vertue (although hee himselfe was most noble, & of an antient race) that in comparison of it, he made no estimate of Nobilitie of race, therefore married he his daughters to persons which were not of great antient Nobilitie, but to such as were wise and vertuous, such as none were found like amongst the most illustrious races of Rome. *Marcus* also was a great lord in the time of *Augustus Caesar*, issued of a royall race, yet he made no account of that Nobilitie of blood, in comparison of that true Nobilitie which is of vertue: Hee loved, honoured, praised, and enriched learned men, yea was verie familiar with them, and had them ordinarily at his table, although otherwife they were of base race: This his love and favour, which he bore to learning, was the cause that his

name

name by them was immortalized, and hereupon such as are liberal, and love learned men, are called *Mecenases*. The Poet *Horace* greatly praiseth him, because he preferred the Nobility of vertue before that of race, when he saith :

*Thou saist true Mecenat, what matters it to thee,  
On what blood he is borne, so shas borne he be free.*

Serm. lib. 1.  
Satyr. 6.

Therefore Gentlemen of race, ought not to despise such as by their vertue may boldly say, & carry themselves for Nobles, but ought to respect the, & acknowledge in the, the cause from whence their Nobility of blood tooke their originall & commencement. They also which are Noble (not onely of race, but also of vertue) ought verily to be respected and double honoured: for as the Poet *Euripides* saith:

*As the good accounted is of Noble blood & bee:  
So double is his honour, whom vertuous we do see.*

*Euripides*  
Ibid.

Here will I end these present discourses, exhorting and praying the French Nobility, and all other persons which love the publike good of France, to marke and earnestly consider the points which above we have handled against *Machiavell*: For so may they know how wicked, impious & detestable the doctrine of that most filthy Atheist is, who hath left out no kind of wickednes to build a tyrannie accomplished of all abominable vices. They which know this, I beleve will courageously employ themselves to drive away and banish from France, *Machiavell* and all his writings, and all such as maintaine and follow his doctrine, and practise it in France, to the ruine and desolation of the kingdome, and of the poore people. I could much more have amplified this discourse, if I would have examined all the doctrine of *Machiavell*: For he handleth many other very detestable and strange things, as the meanes to make conspirations, and how they must be executed; as well with sword as with poyson, and many other like matters: But I abhorre to speake of so villanous and wicked things, which are but too much known amongst men, and have contented my selfe to handle the principall points of his doctrine, which merit to bee discovered and brought to light.

I pray God our Father and Creator, in the name of our Lord Iesus Christ our onely Saviour and Mediator, that hee will preserve his Church, and his elected, from the contagious and wicked doctrine of such godlesse and prophane men as are too common in the world: and that he will not suffer them which are of his flocke to be tossed and troubled by a sort of turbulent and ignorant spirits: But that he will grant us grace alwaies to persevere in his holy doctrine, & in the right way which he hath shewed us by his word: and well to discern and know abusive, lying and malicious spirits, to detect and shew them, and continually to follow his truth, which will teach us his feare and his commandements, and by his grace will bring us unto eternal life: So bee it.

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1641.





## THE INDEX OR TABLE OF Machiavels Maximes, confuted in those Dis- courses, divided into three parts.

The Maximes of the first part doe handle such Counsell as a  
Prince should take,



Princes good Counsell ought to proceed from his owne wisdom, other wise, he  
cannot be well counselled.

The Prince, to shew and not to be circumvented of Flatterers, ought to for-  
bid his friends and Counsellors, that they speake not to him nor counsell him any  
thing but only in those things whereof he freely begins to speake, or askeb them advice.

A Prince ought not to trust in Strangers.

The Maximes of the second part, handling the Religion which a  
Prince ought to observe, and be of,

A Prince above all things, ought to wish and desire, to be esteemed Devout, although hee  
be not so indeed.

A Prince ought to sustaine and confirme that which is false in Religion, if so hee is surer  
in the favour thereof.

The Paynim Religion holds and lifts up their hearts, & makes them hardy to enterprise  
great things: but the Christian Religion, perswading to Humilitie, humbleth and so much  
weakens their minds, and so makes them more ready to be injured and preyed upon.

The great Doctors of the Christian Religion, by a great ostentation and stiffness have  
sought to abolish the remembrance of all good heathen antiquities.

When men left the Paynim Religion they became altogether corrupted, so that they nei-  
ther beleevd in God nor the Devil.

The Romane Church is cause of all the calamities of Italy.  
Moses could never have caused his Lawes and ordinances to be observed, if force & arms  
had wanted.

Moses usurped Judea, as the Gothes usurped a part of the Empire.

The Religion of Numa was the chiefe cause of Romes felicitie.

A man is happy so long as Fortune agreeth to his nature and humour.

The

## A Table of the Maximes.

The Maximes of the third Part, entreating of such Policie  
as a Prince ought to have.

*That Warre is iust, which is necessary: and those Armes reasonable, when men can have no hope by any other way but by Armes.* Max. 1.

*To cause a Prince so withdraw his mind altogether from peace and agreement with his aduersarie, he must commit and use some notable & outrageous iniurie against him.* 2.

*A Prince in a conquered countrey must establish & place Colonies or Garrisons, but most especially in the strongest places, & so chase away the naturall & old inhabitants thereof.* 3.

*A Prince in a countrey newly conquered, must subvert & destroy all such as suffer great losse in that conquest, and altogether root out the blood and race of such as before governed there.* 4.

*To be revenged of a citie or countrey without striking any blow, they must be filled with wicked manners.* 5.

*It is folly to thinke, with Princes and great Lords, that new pleasures will cause them to forget old offences.* 6.

*A Prince ought to propound unto himselfe to imitate Caesar Borgia, the sonne of Pope Alexander the sixth.* 7.

*A Prince need not care to be accounted cruell, if so be that he can make himselfe to be obeyed thereby.* 8.

*It is better for a Prince to be feared than loved.* 9.

*A Prince ought not to trust in the amitie of men.* 10.

*A Prince which would have any man to die, must seeke out some apparent colour thereof, & then he shall not be blamed, if so be that he leave his inheritance & goods unto his children.* 11.

*A Prince ought to follow the nature of the Lyon and of the Foxe, yet not of the one without the other.* 12.

*Cruelty which tendeth and is done to a good end, is not to be reprehended.* 13.

*A Prince ought to exercise cruelty all at once: and to do pleasures by little & little.* 14.

*A vertuous Tyrant, so maintaine his tyrannie, ought to maintain partialities & factions amongst his subiects, and to sleie and take away such as love the Commonweale.* 15.

*A Prince may as well be hated for his vertue, as for his vices.* 16.

*A Prince ought alwaies to nourish some enemy against himselfe, to this end, that when he hath oppressed him, he may be accounted the more mighty and terrible.* 17.

*A Prince ought not to feare to be perjured, so deceive, and dissemble: for the deceiver alwaies finds some that are fit to be deceived.* 18.

*A Prince ought to know how to wind and turne mens mindes, that he may deceive and circumvent them.* 19.

*A Prince, which (as it were constrained) useth Clemencie and Lenitie, advanceth his owne destruction.* 20.

*A wise prince ought not to keepe his Faith, when the observation thereof is hurtfull unto him, and that the occasions for which he gave it, be taken away.* 21.

*Faith, Clemencie, and Liberality, are vertues very damageable to a prince: but it is good, that of them he only have some similitude and likenesse.* 22.

*A Prince ought to have a turning and winding wit, with art and practise made fit to be cruell & unfaithfull, that he may shew himselfe such an one when there is need.* 23.

*A Prince desirous to breake a peace promised and sworne with his neighbour, ought to move warre against his friend, with whom he hath peace.* 24.

A

## A Table of the Maximis.

A Prince ought to have his mind disposed to turn after every wind and variation of Fortune, that he may know to make use of a wind, which would be. Max. 25.

Illiberality is commendable in a Prince, and the reputation of an handicrafts man, is a dishonour without a will. 26.

A Prince which will make a strait profession of a good man, cannot long continue in the world among it such an heape of naughty and wicked people. 27.

Men cannot be altogether good nor altogether wicked, neither can they perfectly use cruelty and violence. 28.

He that hath alwaies carried the countenance of a good man, and would become wicked to obtain his desire, ought to colour his change with some apparent reason. 29.

A Prince in the time of peace, maintaining discords and partialities among it his Subjects, may the more easily use them at his pleasure. 30.

Civile seditions and dissensions are profitable, and not to be blamed. 31.

The meanes to keepe Subjects in peace and union, and to hold them from Rebellion, is to keepe them alwaies poore. 32.

A Prince which feareth his Subjects, ought to build fortresses in his country, to hold them in obedience. 33.

A Prince ought to commit to another those affaires which are subject to hatred & envy, and reserve to himselfe such as depend upon his grace and favour. 34.

To administer good Justice, a Prince ought to establish a great number of Judges. 35.

Gentlemen which hold Castles and Iurisdiccions, are very great enemies of Commonweales. 36.

The Nobles of France would overthrow the Estates of that kingdome, if their Parliament did not punish them, and hold them in feare. 37.

FINIS.





